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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the theoretical implications of private security for International 
Relations (IR) theory and global politics from the perspective of a security governance 
model. It draws upon multi-disciplinary theoretical research on private security to both 
map the way security governance has been de-linked from the state, as well as to map 
the public-private hybrids and security networks that constitute private security’s 
continued connection to the state.
On one level, this thesis engages in a direct theoretical critique of Realist theory and its 
Weberian inspired understanding of the state’s monopoly of security governance. Thus, 
the security governance framework used within this thesis is understood in terms of a 
theoretical response to the inability of Realist theory to conceptualize the political 
content of private security.
Against this backdrop of a critique of Realist theory—and its idea of the state’s 
monopoly relationship to authority, territory and coercion—this thesis re-articulates 
each of these concepts with reference to a security governance approach to the study of 
private security.
This thesis then provides a positive application of this security governance theoretical 
framework to a series of original case studies of hybrid public-private and private- 
private security networks.
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1 Introducing a Security Governance Framework to the 
Study of Private Security in International Relations
‘International Relations theorists have always concerned themselves with the possible formation of a 
supra-state, world-policing body. More attention should be paid to the potential devolution of coercive 
authority to the “private sector.”’1 -  Janice Thomson
Part I.
1.1 Locating the Problem: The Challenge o f Understanding Private Security in Global 
Politics and International Relations Theory via Weberian (Realist) Theoretical 
Language
This dissertation examines the theoretical implications of private security for 
International Relations (IR) theory and global politics from a security governance 
perspective. Specifically, it attempts to answer the dual question: ‘how can we theorise 
the political significance of the global expansion of private security, and how does it 
affect the state’s relationship to violence, in both theory and practice?’ At the level of 
our understanding of the state, countless claims have been made within IR literature that 
the ‘re-emergence of mercenaries’ embodied in the post-Cold War expansion of private 
security into functions traditionally understood to be carried out exclusively by the 
state’s military or police forces constitutes an ‘erosion of the state’s monopoly of 
legitimate violence.’
1 Janice Thomson, ‘State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and 
Empirical Research’ International Studies Quarterly 39 1995.
2 A discussion on terminology will follow later in the chapter. Suffice it to say here that while 
‘mercenary’ usefully highlights the commercial, private, international and armed (physically coercive) 
aspects of the subject matter, the word is burdened with normative, legal and other conceptual 
implications that this thesis rejects out of hand. The terms private security and private security company 
(PSC) will be employed interchangeably throughout the dissertation.
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Here, then, the expansion of private security has presented itself as a serious theoretical 
challenge to our discipline’s assumptions about the very nature of the state and its core 
Weberian attribute as a violence monopolist. While this is not a new claim within IR’s 
private security literature, this idea that the current growth of private security is 
somehow theoretically incompatible with the Weberian language we use to define and 
understand the state’s relationship to violence maintains a persistent and explicit hold on 
the discipline’s imagination. For instance, most recently, the private security analyst 
David Isenberg introduced his 2009 publication Shadow Force: Private Security 
Contractors in Iraq by suggesting that the prominent role of private security contractors 
in Iraq was radically juxtaposed to the idea that 4 [traditionally, the ultimate symbol of 
the sovereignty of a nation is its ability to monopolize the means of violence—in other 
words, raising, maintaining, and using military forces.’4
Importantly, the theoretical implications of private security for IR have not been limited 
to its relationship to the state. The contemporary growth of private security has also 
been perceived as offering a theoretical challenge to our Weberian influenced 
understanding of politics at the level of the global political system as well. For instance, 
in one early example in IR, Herb Howe stated 4Max Weber cited the monopoly of 
military coercion as a defining characteristic of the post-1648 state system’ in his 
discussion of the 'ambiguous order’ created in part by the growth of private security.5 
More recently, Deborah Avant has argued that the global expansion of private security 
has meant that 4the market for force has undermined states’ collective ability to
3 The term ‘Weberian’ is used to refer to theory, language, or ideas—particularly within Realist thought 
in IR and Sociology—influenced by the sociological work of Max Weber.
4 David Isenberg, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq (London: Praeger Security 
International) 2009 p.l.
5 Herbert Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States (Boulder: Lynne Reiner) 200 lp. 2.
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monopolize violence in the international system.’6 Here again, private security has been 
interpreted as presenting us with a larger theoretical puzzle: its growth seems to 
undermine the discipline’s Weberian conceptual proposition that violence today is—and 
since the creation of the modem Westphalian system could be unproblematically 
assumed to be—a system-level monopoly held by the community of states.
Beyond private security challenging some of the Realist language we use to discuss the 
state and the international system, on a deeper level, the expansion of private security 
also seems to challenge some of the fundamental binary concepts (i.e. 
legitimate/illegitimate, public/private, state/non-state, political/apolitical) underpinned 
by the state-centric IR term ‘sovereignty’ and its Weberian linguistic cousin,
n
‘monopoly’. Carlos Ortiz, one of the first students of the new role of private security 
within the field of IR, implicitly demonstrated this point of conceptual confusion when 
he wrote:
‘The spectacular growth of the PMC [i.e. private military company] industry over the last decade marks a 
profound change in the traditional state monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. The state’s possession 
of the means of coercion has been integrated in a general trend towards commercialisation; its legitimacy, 
considered by Max Weber one o f the defining criteria o f the state, thus is being partly shifted onto the 
market along with the actual management o f security.'*
Here, not only does the growth of private security challenge our Weberian Realist 
assumptions about ‘the defining criteria of the state,’ but it also challenges the way we
6 Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences o f  Privatizing Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 2005 p.264.
7 This dissertation argues that the Realist use of the term ‘sovereignty’ in IR and Realist sociology is 
essentially a synonym for the term monopoly and the state’s mutually constitutive monopoly of authority 
and monopoly of successful violence. This point will be elaborated later. For the sake of clarity and to 
avoid further muddying the waters, the term sovereignty is largely dispensed with in this dissertation in 
favor of the Weberian concept of monopoly, unless reference to ‘sovereignty’ by another author requires 
the term’s use.
8 Carlos Ortiz, ‘Regulating Private Military Companies: State and the Expanding Business of Commercial 
Security Provision’ in (eds. Kess van der Pijl, Libby Assassi, Duncan Wiggan) Global Regulation: 
Managing Crises after the Imperial Turn (Great Britain: Palgrave, 2004) emphasis added.
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conceptualise the location of ‘legitimacy’ over coercion itself. For Ortiz, legitimacy has 
moved away from the state towards the private sector where it has been ‘partly shifted 
onto the market.’ In making this observation, Ortiz is unsettling Realist and state-centric 
assumptions regarding the idea of the state’s monopolistic relationship to ‘legitimate’ 
coercion.
Fundamentally, then, this dissertation argues that the consistent contextualisation of 
private security in terms of a challenge to the Weberian and Realist idea of ‘monopoly’ 
demonstrated above cannot be read as a simple descriptive flourish used to introduce 
and underscore the significance of private security for the discipline of IR. Instead, it 
argues that these authors have accurately pinpointed a larger theoretical problem within 
IR that needs to be addressed directly. Specifically, this dissertation argues that the 
Weberian (Realist) conceptualisation of authority, coercion and territory—understood 
as unproblematically organized by the idea of a state monopoly—has handicapped IR’s 
understanding of private security. As a result, a richer understanding of private 
security—in both theoretical and empirical terms—requires breaking down the Realist 
and state-centric conceptual vocabulary of the ‘state monopoly’ into its various 
component parts and reconstituting them within a broader and more complex security 
governance framework.
1.2 From a Realist Conception o f Government to a Security Governance Model
Fundamentally this dissertation provides a study of private security from a security 
governance perspective. Drawing from theoretical research on private security in the 
field of criminology, this study adopts a security governance model to map the public- 
private hybrids and security networks that characterise private security’s relationship to 
the state—as well as it relationship to authority, coercion and territory—in global
14
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politics today.9 In doing so, this dissertation joins the broader global governance 
literature to argue that the nature of governance itself is shifting from the centralized 
hierarchies of the state towards a more dispersed and fragmented horizontal network of 
public and non-state actors and structures.10
Importantly, however, this dissertation rejects the idea that these processes of 
fragmentation associated with the growth of private security can be understood in terms 
of a direct or straightforward loss of power for the state. Rather than involving a simple 
‘loss’ or ‘gain’ of state control over security, the growth of private security constitutes a 
process that is changing the character of security governance while simultaneously 
having contradictory effects for state power. On the one hand, the growth of private 
security involves the shift of authority and control over security governance away from 
the state; on the other, these developments are taking place within the broader context of 
states using new neo-liberal techniques of ‘rule at a distance’ in order to control private 
security (and the clients that use them) in order to maintain their power over security
9 While IR has only begun to think theoretically about the role of private security in terms of its expansion 
into military functions during the last three years, the field of Criminology—with its focus on ‘private 
police’—has been studying this subject for the last 30 years. As a result, it provides the richest source of 
theoretical writing on the subject. Important works include Nigel South, Policing fo r Profit: The Private 
Security Sector (London: Sage) 1988; Les Johnston, The Rebirth o f  Private Policing (London: Routledge) 
1992; J.W.E. Sheptycki, ‘Transnational Policing and the Makings of a Postmodern State’ British Journal 
o f Criminology 35 (4) 1995; D. Bayley and C. Shearing, ‘The Future of Policing’ Law and Society Review 
30 (3) 1996; Ian Loader, ‘Thinking Normatively About Private Security’ Journal o f Law and Society 24 
(3) 1997;Trevor Jones and Tim Newbum, Private Security and Public Policing (Oxford: Clarendon) 
1998; ‘Special Issue: Private Security’, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 7 (2) 1999; 
J.W.E. Sheptycki (ed.) Issues in Transnational Policing (London: Routledge) 2000; Ian Loader, ‘Plural 
Policing and Democratic Governance’ Social & Legal Studies 9 (3) 2000; Les Johnston, Policing Britain: 
Risk, Security and Governance (Harlow: Longman) 2000; Ian Loader and Neil Walker, ‘Policing as a 
Public Good: Reconstituting the Connections between Policing and the State’ Theoretical Criminology 
5(1) 2001;Trevor Jones and Tim Newbum, ‘The Transformation of Policing? Understanding Current 
Trends in Policing Systems’ British Journal o f Criminology 42 2002. For a discussion of the concept 
‘nodal governance’ that this dissertation has adapted and drawn upon, see Les Johnston and Clifford 
Shearing, Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice (London: Routledge) 2003; Clifford 
Shearing and Jennifer Wood, ‘Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New ‘Denizens”  Journal o f Law 
and Society 30 (3) 2003; Clifford Shearing and Monique Marks, ‘Introduction: Diversity in Policing: 
Multi-Agency Frameworks and Strategies in South Africa’ Society in Transition 35 (2) 2004.
10 For two examples of this literature, see: Bob Jessop, ‘Capitalism and its Future: Remarks on 
Regulation, Government and Governance’ Review o f International Political Economy 4(3) 1997; Philip 
Cemy, ‘Plurilateralism: Structural Differentiation and Functional Conflict in the Post-Cold War World 
Order’ Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 22(1) 1993.
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governance. Overall, then, rather than viewing the growing role of private security in 
simple zero-sum terms of state decline (or even as an increase of state power), the 
dispersal of the authorisation and implementation—i.e. the governance—of security is 
understood as a complex re-articulation of security governance that empowers private 
security in global politics.
This proposition is based on two fundamental empirical observations that will be 
demonstrated in this dissertation. First, as private security companies expand globally, 
we can no longer assume that states unproblematically monopolise the ability to 
implement legitimate coercion in global politics. Second, today, as the location of legal 
authority over coercion evolves and is dispersed away from the centre of the state, we 
can no longer assume that the state unproblematically monopolises the ability to 
authorise legitimate coercion in global politics. On the one hand, these twin claims 
speak to the way this dissertation’s networked security governance model focuses on the 
dispersal and pluralisation—partly via privatization—of both authorisers and 
implementers of security governance. On the other hand, taken together, these twin 
statements also wreak havoc on traditional assumptions within state-centric IR theory— 
and Weberian inspired Realist theory in particular—about the state as a unitary actor 
that can be understood as holding a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In this 
sense, this dissertation’s use of a security governance model is self-consciously used as 
a broader critique of Weberian inspired Realist IR and Sociological analyses (or lack 
thereof) of private security.11
11 This dissertation makes no broader claims about the utility of Realism in general; it is only concerned 
with demonstrating the conceptual problems Realism has when discussing private security specifically.
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1.3 Framing a Security Governance Model against a Critical Literature Review o f  
Realism
Prior to developing and applying a security governance model to its empirical case 
work, this dissertation uses a critical literature review of private security studies in IR to 
demonstrate the practical and theoretical problems encountered when applying Realist 
concepts to analyses of private security. This critical literature review—extending from 
first-cut studies of private security within IR to Realist IR and Weberian Realist 
Sociology more generally—is developed for a number of purposes.
In Part III of this chapter, this literature review critically analyses texts of first-cut 
studies of private security in IR. Here, this review is used to corroborate the 
introduction’s claim that Realism’s theoretical language—and the term ‘monopoly’ 
specifically—is used as a conceptual touchstone throughout these early investigations 
into private security. Crucially, this critical literature review highlights some of the key 
conceptual problems within this literature’s interpretation of private security and 
contextualises these problems in terms of the influence of Realist thought. In chapter 
two, this critical literature review demonstrates how these conceptual problems 
originate in Realism by tracing them back to core Realist texts within IR and again to 
their origins in Weberian Realist Sociology.
Overall, then, this dissertation does not merely use a networked security governance 
model as a useful alternative to state-centric interpretations of private security in global 
politics. More critically, it also contextualizes this security governance approach against 
a broader exploration and critique of the limits of Realist interpretations of private 
security.
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1.4 Private Security and the Realist Idea o f Monopoly: Framing a Conceptual Problem
What is the relationship between politics and violence? How do we understand 
authority? Is there such a thing as ‘private authority’—or the authority of private 
security—and if so, what is its relationship to the traditional understanding of authority 
within IR? What do ‘public’ and ‘private’ mean, and how do we understand their 
relationship to each other? How does the public-private divide relate to our 
understanding of the state and private security, and more importantly, their relationship 
to each other? Moreover, if the political is constituted by the public (state) realm, does 
this ipso facto render private security apolitical? How can private security be apolitical 
if, as Weberian Realist theory suggests, politics itself is fundamentally about the way 
violence is organized?
Serious attempts to theorise private security within IR have been forced to explicitly 
recognize and grapple with at least some of these meta-theoretical problems within their 
research. For instance, Janice Thomson, in her highly influential early account of the 
elimination of legitimate extraterritorial violence (e.g. mercenaries and privateers) from 
the international system underscores some of these conceptual problems well. For 
Thomson, before such practices were banned in the nineteenth century,
‘today’s theoretical and practical distinctions between the economic and the political and between state
and nonstate actors—were meaningless’ [and it was] ‘impossible to draw distinctions between the
economic and the political, the domestic and international, or the nonstate and the state realms of
12authority when analyzing these practices. All lines were blurred.’
Deborah Avant’s acknowledgement that ‘ [i]t turns out that everyday terms like
“mercenary,” “public,” “private,” “privatization,” and “the state,” have a variety of
12 Janice Thomson Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1996 
p.41.
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meanings that do not always travel well across time or space’ and that ‘the distinctions
do not always add up’ also directly references the meta-theoretical issues tied to the
1 ^study of private security. More recently, Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams, in 
their discussion of what they refer to as ‘[t]he authority of global private security 
companies’ have argued that this type of private authority ‘cannot be contained within 
the traditional distinctions of inside-outside, global-local, or public-private, but requires 
the dissolution of the “state-territory-authority” marriage in favor of an analysis of new 
networks and interactions between state and non-state actors.’14 Each of these authors, 
then, has recognized—implicitly or explicitly—that the existence of private security in 
global politics upsets some of the long-held ontological assumptions within IR.
This dissertation argues that the core theoretical problem identified and referred to by 
the above authors is directly tied to the way Realist IR theory in general—and Weberian 
Realist sociology more precisely—neatly attempted to resolve all of these meta- 
theoretical issues within the idea of the modem state’s mutually constitutive ‘monopoly’ 
over authority, violence and territory. Theoretically encapsulated within the Realist idea 
of the modem state, successful political violence is monopolized; authority is 
monopolized; the political is differentiated from the apolitical and economic; the public 
sphere is differentiated from the private sphere; the state ‘inside’ is differentiated from 
the state ‘outside’; and the legal (legitimate) use of the state’s political violence is 
differentiated from a) the illegal (illegitimate) use of criminal violence and b) the legal 
use of apolitical violence. This idea of the state monopoly—typically referred to in 
shorthand as sovereignty15 within IR Realist thought—provided both an extremely
13 Deborah Avant, The Market for Force p.22-3.
14 Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams, ‘Securing the City: Private Security Companies and Non- 
State Authority in Global Governance’ International Relations 21(2) 2007 p.238.
15 Realists typically also discuss ‘external sovereignty’ in terms of its social character as a mutual 
acknowledgement of political rights from one state to another. However, this does not mean that Realists 
understand sovereignty as a ‘social construct’ or an evolving social institution in the same way that
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durable solution to the theoretical problems described above as well as an empirically 
convincing model of the actual organization of violence in global politics.16 
However, as the expansion of private security begins to empirically challenge Realism’s 
theoretical map of the way coercion is organized, it also brings to the foreground a 
weakness within the Realist conceptual language of state monopoly. Specifically, it 
reveals a theoretical paradox latent in any discussion of the political content of 
legitimate private force—i.e. private security—within a Realist framework. This 
paradox is succinctly illustrated by the prominent Weberian sociologist Randall Collins 
when he writes ‘a general theory of politics, then, is an explanation of how violence is
• 17organized, the structure of the state.’ This quote reveals how Realism sees politics as 
synonymous with ‘how violence is organized,’ while simultaneously assuming that this 
organization of violence can be adequately conceptualised as a state monopoly. While 
this dissertation accepts the first half of Randall Collin’s Realist dictum—i.e. that 
politics, or governance, is fundamentally tied to the way ‘violence is organized’—it 
joins the authors cited above by claiming that the current changes in the role of private 
security in global politics forces us to reconsider our assumption that the ‘organization 
of violence’— and the political itself—can be understood as a synonym for ‘the state’.
sovereignty is understood in constructivist IR literature. For Realists, the ‘political fact’ of the state’s 
monopoly o f violence is a conceptual prerequisite of sovereignty, and the terms are therefore essentially 
synonymous. For Realists the ‘social’ aspect of sovereignty emphasized by IR constructivist literature is a 
derivative attribute of the prior political fact of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. For a non- 
Realist account of sovereignty as a social construct that de-links sovereignty from the state’s control over 
violence, see: Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 1996.
16 Some analysts of private security would say I am too easily giving ground away to a state-centric 
interpretation of security governance here, and would point to the permanent and constantly evolving role 
of private security in governing the way security is organized. See Clifford Shearing and Monique Marks, 
Introduction: Diversity in Policing, p. 197.
17 Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science (New York: Academic Press) 
1974 p. 353.
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Part II.
1.5 Defining Security Governance and Deconstructing the State’s Authority-Coercion- 
Territory Monopoly
Understanding the political significance of private security in global politics today 
requires a theoretical framework capable of moving beyond the Realist assumption that 
‘the political’—i.e. the governance of security—is monopolized by the state. It also 
requires a theoretical vocabulary that does not assume, a priori, that the state is the 
exclusive, solitary and supreme unit of analysis when considering political authority, 
territory, and coercion in global politics. By de-centering the state from its analysis, this 
dissertation offers a re-interpretation each of these terms—authority, territory, and 
coercion—and then applies this re-interpretation in an analysis of private security’s role 
in security governance.
While the concept of security governance used in this dissertation is broadly compatible 
with theories of global governance that discuss the fragmentation of political authority 
and government functions to various public and private actors, it also has some 
important differences. First, this dissertation rejects a tendency within global 
governance literature to move away from an understanding of governance based on the 
organization of coercion towards a definition of governance based on juridical,
1 fteconomic-managerial, and other non-coercion-based attributes. Second, it rejects 
global governance models that—in their attempt to separate the political from the 
state—end up extending the concept of political authority to the criminal realm.19
18 For a similar critique of non-coercive definitions of ‘governance’ within global governance literature, 
see Martin Shaw ‘The State of Globalization: Towards a Theory of State Transformation’ Review o f  
International Political Economy 4(3) 1997 p.505.
19 For an example of a global governance approach that does this, see James Rosenau ‘Change, 
Complexity, and Governance in Globalizing Space’ in Jon Pierre (ed.) Debating Governance (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) 2000.
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Beyond these broad similarities and dissimilarities with the concept global governance, 
here the term security governance also has a more precise meaning. Throughout this 
dissertation, ‘security governance’ will be understood as comprised of three parts: first, 
meta-political authority located exclusively in public law and/or public institutions; 
second, the existence of an auspice, or agent legally entitled to hire a security 
implementer and to make rules that promote a particular definition of order; and third, 
an implementer that uses coercion or the threat of coercion to enforce this order within a 
particular territorial space. The following section will elaborate this understanding of 
security governance within a discussion of each of these concepts—and how they relate 
to private security—below.
1.5.1 Deconstructing the Realist State Monopoly o f  Authority
Realist theory conceptualises political authority in terms of a state monopoly. This 
monopoly over political authority is understood as a condition of the state’s supposedly 
unique ability to legislate the political order (i.e. to make laws) and ‘effectively sanction
1C\ • * •their upkeep.’ That is, the nature of the state’s political authority is such that it not 
only has the capacity to legislate its preferred political order within its territory, but it 
also has the ability to successfully maintain its order by the threat or use of force.
For Realism, this aspect of the state’s political authority also has a supreme and ultimate 
character. Understood in binary and zero-sum terms, Realists argue that this supreme 
characteristic of the state’s authority can be seen in its ability to draw and re-draw the 
public/private and legal/illegal divide over security governance within its territory as it 
sees fit. While private actors may be authorised by the state to engage in very limited—
20 Anthony Giddens The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two o f A Contemporary Critique o f  
Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Polity) 1985 p.282.
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‘household’21—private violence, the state maintains an authority monopoly over the 
ability to authorise these residual and minimalist rights of private violence. In this sense, 
Realism envisions the state’s supreme political authority over security governance not 
only in terms of the state’s presence in authorising security, but also in terms of where it 
chooses to be absent by allowing legitimate private violence to exist. This type of 
political authority has been described by a number of theorists as meta-political 
authority, and for Realists, it is a unique monopoly of the state.22 However, this 
dissertation and the security governance literature it draws upon reject this Realist 
understanding of the nature of political authority. In the place of a unified and supreme 
state monopoly of authority, this dissertation models the dispersion of political authority 
along two axes: auspices and non-state meta-political authority.
1.5.1.2 ‘Auspices ’ as Sites o f Political Authority
Fundamentally, Realism’s over-emphasis on the binary and zero-sum aspect of power 
has led it to over-emphasise the ‘ultimacy’ aspect of the state’s political authority. In 
turn, this has rendered it theoretically insensitive (and even blind) to the diversification 
of and growing political significance of the public and private actors legally entitled via 
public law to promote particular political orders through the hiring, managing, and 
directing of private security.
21 The term ‘household’ comes from Max Weber’s own discussion of the citizen’s residual rights of 
private violence. See Max Weber, Economy and Society vol. I Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds.) 
(Berkeley: University of California Press) p.56.
22 Janice Thomson uses the term ‘meta-political authority’ to describe the state’s claim to ultimate 
political authority, as well as the state’s purportedly unique regulatory ability to draw and re-draw the 
boundaries of what is legal and illegal. By extension, meta-political authority refers to the state’s 
purportedly unique ability to authorize other actors to engage in legitimate (i.e. legal) coercion. See Janice 
Thomson, ‘State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical 
Research’, International Studies Quarterly Vol.39, 1995, pp. 213-233.
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As a result of these developments, today, a map of the way security governance is 
authorised cannot be reduced to a discussion of the public source of meta-political 
authority that underpins its legality. Instead, at a practical level, the study of authority 
over security governance must also be sensitive to the new public and private 
‘auspices’23—such as corporations, NGOs, state sub-agencies and supra-state 
organizations—that legally hire and thereby authorise private security in global politics. 
In contradistinction to Realist thought, these auspices cannot be properly understood as 
relegated to the realm of apolitical and private ‘household’ violence by the legal 
restrictions placed on them by the state. On the contrary, these new authorisers of 
private security companies are engaged in the politically significant act of designing 
rules to promote order through the robust use of potentially lethal armed security; in 
other words, auspices are involved in the political process of designing the content of 
security governance programs. Far from being limited to promotion of a private 
household order, these auspices promote particular political orders within and across 
large tracts of public space, and do so on a global/local scale.
1.5.1.3 The Dispersion o f  Meta-Political Authority
This dissertation also extends its critique of a Realist reading of political authority by 
arguing that the state can no longer adequately be theorised as holding a monopoly of 
meta-political authority over security governance. While the state clearly maintains a 
privileged position of authority over security governance within its own territory, today, 
this position is no longer absolute. Instead, state meta-political authority must be
23 The term ‘auspice’ is defined in Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary as ‘patronage; 
support; sponsorship’ derived from an institution. Bay ley and Shearing were the first to introduce the 
concept of ‘auspice’—and its relationship to security ‘implementers’—within the study of private 
security. See David Bayley and Clifford Shearing ‘The New Structure o f  Policing: Description, 
Conceptualization and Research Agenda’ United States Department of Justice, National Institute of 
Justice. Washington D.C. 2001.
24
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
juxtaposed and understood in relation to the ‘expanding jurisdiction of institutions of 
international governance and the constraints of, as well as obligations derived from, 
international law.’24
As a result of this general observation, this dissertation argues that the meta-political 
power to authorize security governance belongs to a broader complex of public 
institutions—from international law to supra-national organizations—that includes (but 
is not limited to) the state. From this dissertation’s security governance perspective, law 
is not interpreted merely as a tool by which the state imposes its ‘supreme’ rule making 
authority onto private non-state actors by drawing and re-drawing the public-private 
divide as it sees fit. Instead, law is perceived as a tool used by private security to 
empower private security and help it legitimate its security governance programs. In 
contradistinction to Realist understandings of the state, law, and political authority, this 
dissertation’s security governance model emphasizes how the law can be used to open 
up new possibilities for private security to engage in security governance. Radically, as 
will be empirically demonstrated in this dissertation, public law can even be used as a 
source of meta-political authority by private security to legally engage in acts of 
security governance that contradict the political will of the states in whose territory they
9£ •operate. As a result, this study not only suggests that states no longer monopolize 
meta-political authority; it also suggests that states are also occasionally the objects of
• 97security governance regulation even within their own territory.
24 David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization (London: Polity) 2007 p. 126.
25 Indeed, this dissertation rejects the Realist proposition that states may draw and re-draw the public- 
private divide around security governance (and private security) as they see fit. While this state right may 
exist in theory, in practice, material, political and ideational constraints give private society the ability to 
push back against moves to restrict its role in security governance.
26 This claim will be empirically demonstrated in chapter five.
27 This theoretical observation was also made Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing in Governing Security, 
p.35
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1.5.1.4 Opening Pandora’s Box: Problems with Private Authority in Global 
Governance Theory
This thesis is sensitive to the fact that the deconstruction of Realism’s state monopoly 
over authority re-opens many of the meta-theoretical problems discussed in the last 
section of Part I. As a result, while this thesis agrees with the private authority theorists 
Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas Biersteker when they argue that ‘[t]he state is no longer 
the sole, or in some instances even the principal, source of authority, in either the
• • 98domestic arena or in the international system,’ it also parts ways with this literature’s 
understanding of authority. Specifically, this thesis argues that in their attempt to move 
beyond a state-centric study of politics, the global governance, private authority and 
nodal security governance literatures re-open these meta-theoretical issues without 
resolving them in a way adequate for a study of private security. The primary problem 
within this broader literature is its lack of consideration of meta-political authority.
First, by extending the concept of ‘the political’ beyond the state into the private non­
state realm by defining authority as a general measurement of the control over 
outcomes, global governance literature typically jettisons the concept of meta-political
9Qauthority, and with it the conceptual distinction between the illegal and legal. Though 
this approach is not without merit—and usefully highlights the power of non-state 
actors—the issue of legality is crucially important in the operation of private security, 
and any theoretical approach to authority that loses this distinction between legal and 
illegal faces a serious analytical handicap.30
28 Rodney Bruce Hall, Thomas Biersteker (eds.), The Emergence o f Private Authority in Global 
Governance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.5.
29 For a good introduction to the political-economy theoretical underpinnings of much of global 
governance theory and its extended understanding of the political and private authority, see Susan 
Strange, The Retreat o f  the State: the Diffusion o f Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 1996.
30 Studies of private authority have been impaired by this problem. For example, Rodney Bruce Hall and 
Thomas Biersteker have placed private security companies and the mafia in the same analytical sub­
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Importantly, the nodal security governance perspective used by Clifford Shearing and 
Les Johnston—an approach developed in the field of criminology and one that this
thesis draws heavily from—also jettisons the concept of meta-political authority from
• #  ^1 their analytical framework. As a result, their nodal security governance model
unhelpfully creates the conceptual space for criminal auspices of security governance; it
also creates an inability to differentiate between criminal violence and the legal security
governance of legitimate private security companies.
This problem of a lack of a meta-theoretical framework has also been absorbed by IR 
theorists that have adopted or incorporated nodal security governance theory into their 
own research model. For instance, while Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams have 
made an excellent contribution to the study of private security in IR from their private 
authority approach —and have usefully moved away from earlier discussions of the 
‘illicit private authority of mercenaries’ within the private authority literature—they 
also under-emphasize the significance of meta-political authority for the study of private 
security. Ironically, this problem exists as the result of three useful attributes of their 
study of the authority of private security.
First, their concept of authority—understood as the establishment of a presumptive right 
to speak and act34—usefully focuses on the socially constructed aspects of the authority
^ c
wielded by private security actors, such as the authority of the security ‘expert.’
category of private authority called ‘illicit private authority’ in a way that ignores the clear legal (and 
clear analytical) differences between these two types of actors. See Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas 
Biersteker (eds.) The Emergence o f Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 2002 p. 16-7.
31 This thesis adopts the language of ‘auspices’ and ‘implemented’ of security governance from the 
collaborative efforts of Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing in their work on nodal security governance. 
For a discussion of their rejection of the idea of what I refer to as meta-political authority, see Les 
Johnston and Clifford Shearing, Governing Security p.33-6.
32 See Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams, ‘Securing the City: Private Security Companies and Non- 
State Authority in Global Governance’ International Relations 21(2) 2007.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid p.240.
35 Ibid p.241.
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Second, by focusing on the legal nature of the security governance engaged in by 
private security, they avoid the mistake of conflating private criminal violence with the 
legal coercion of private security. Third, they also correctly emphasise that the authority 
wielded by private security need not be understood in terms of a zero-sum competition 
with the state. However, without explicitly focusing on meta-political authority—and 
by combining social constructivist and legal-formal attributes of authority into a 
singular definition of authority—their authority model is ill-prepared to document the 
possibility that private security and the state may engage in a political conflict over the 
nature of security governance defined in narrowly legal terms. While the social 
attributes of authority held by private security are important—and all the more so 
insofar as they are downplayed by Realist thought—they should be kept analytically 
separate from the technical and legal attributes of meta-political authority. The 
importance of maintaining a clear legal-formal approach to meta-political authority is 
elaborated below.
1.5.1.5 Closing Pandora’s Box: Moving Beyond State-Centrism While Maintaining 
Legal Formalism
As a result of the problems discussed above, this dissertation adopts a legal-formal 
approach to meta-political authority. In doing so, it also engages with and rejects some 
of the criticisms of legal-formal approaches to authority within the private authority 
literature. Specifically, Claire Cutler’s work on the emergence of private authority 
argues that ‘legal formalism identifies state/public authority as the only legitimate
36 Ibid. p. 141-2.
37 Legal-formal authority refers to the authority of public institutions—such as international law, the 
United Nations, and states—that are the ‘formally recognized’ holders of legal authority by the 
community of states. In this sense, the normative content of authority is de-emphasized in favor of its 
technical-legal and public attributes.
28
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
authority, rendering non-state/private authority a theoretical and empirical 
• • •  •impossibility.’ While this dissertation is sympathetic with Cutler’s project of de­
linking political authority from the state, there are a number of problems with her 
critique of legal formalism. First—again—it ignores that fact that legal formalism 
maintains a critical conceptual differentiation between formally legal private security 
companies and illegal criminal organizations. This problem of identifying private 
security as a sub-species of criminal ‘private violence’ is a prevalent problem within 
Realist analyses and should not be replicated within a security governance approach to 
private security. Second, Cutler’s formulation collapses state authority and public 
authority into a single category, unnecessarily equating the one with the other. As a 
result, her notion of public authority does not direct one’s attention—or indeed even 
allow the theoretical possibility for—private security turning to non-state sites of legal- 
formal public law as a source of meta-political authority for its security governance 
programs.
Overall, this dissertation adopts a position that moves away from a Realist 
understanding of the state’s monopoly over political authority, while simultaneously 
avoiding some important problems within the global governance/nodal security 
governance/private authority literature. The next section turns its attention to the Realist 
interpretation of the state monopoly over legitimate political coercion.
1.5.2 Deconstructing the Realist State Monopoly o f Legitimate Political Coercion
Within Realist thought, the state’s successful monopoly of violence is the necessary and 
logical corollary to the state’s monopoly of authority. Encapsulated within the territory
38 Claire Cutler, ‘Private Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation’, in The Emergence o f  Private Authority in 
Global Governance ' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2002 p.24.
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of the state, these twin monopolies of successful (i.e. superior) violence and supreme 
authority are mutually constitutive of one another, as well as constitutive of the state’s 
monopoly over the political. Crucially, as a result of this, Realism does not develop a 
conceptual space within which non-state actors can be understood to legitimately 
engage in acts of political violence. Instead, legitimate non-state actors can only seek to 
influence political violence by attempting to influence the state. This is what the Realist 
Sociologist Randall Collins means when he writes that ‘much politics does not involve 
actual violence but consists of manoeuvring around the organization that controls the 
violence.’39
This Realist reading of the state’s monopoly of legitimate political coercion has 
significant ramifications for how Realist theory understands private security. 
Specifically, Realism places private security within a zero-sum and binary relationship 
with the state where private security is reduced to either an example of illegitimate 
criminal coercion, or is perceived as a legitimate—yet apolitical—actor. In order to 
understand why and how this is so—and before elucidating this dissertation’s security 
governance solution to this dilemma—it is necessary to provide a brief discussion of 
Realism’s understanding of power. More precisely, it is necessary to illustrate how 
Realism understands the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence—and the Realist idea 
of political power that underpins it—in binary and zero-sum terms as a contest in ‘last 
resort control.’40
39 Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology p.353.
40 An understanding of the dual concepts ‘binary’ and ‘zero-sum’ as they pertain to a Realist IR 
understanding of political power essentially refers to the power of one actor over another actor. For 
example, in Morgenthau’s discussion of power, he writes ‘[w]hen we speak of power, we mean man’s 
control over the minds and actions of other men’ (Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.32 emphasis 
added). For Realism, the term ‘binary’ refers to the superior/inferior characteristic of power relationships. 
The term ‘zero-sum’ refers to the all or nothing aspect of this binary power relationship. For Realists, the 
terms sovereignty and monopoly are both underpinned theoretically by this notion of power. At an 
abstract level, the binary and zero-sum character of power is inescapable, ubiquitous, and timeless. For a 
more theoretically abstract and rigorous approach to Realist understandings of power defined as power 
over, see Gianfranco Poggi, Forms o f Power (Cambridge: Polity) 2001.
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1.5.2.1 Deconstructing the Realist State’s Monopoly o f Legitimate Violence as ‘Last 
Resort Control ’
For Realism, a crucial aspect of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence is 
understood in terms of an ‘all or nothing’ battle for political supremacy—in real or 
hypothetical terms—between the state and any other actor in its territory. Within this 
theoretical construct, the state either monopolises the political by virtue of its superior 
violence, or it is stripped of its political status by the existence of another actor 
possessing a capacity for violence superior to that of the state. This ‘all or nothing’ 
aspect of political power was what Carl Schmitt was referring to when he wrote ‘[i]f 
within the state there are organised parties capable of according their members more 
protection than the state, then the latter becomes at best an annex of such parties, and 
the individual knows whom he has to obey.’41 The ramifications of this idea for private 
security are clear: within this Realist power framework, unless private security reaches 
this Schmittian threshold and possesses the capacity for violence to a degree superior to 
that of the state, it cannot be said to be a political actor.
Anthony Giddens provides a perfect example of this Realist interpretation of the state’s 
binary all or nothing power relationship to private security when he writes ‘...nation­
states control the whole of the habitable area of the globe, and as corporations have to 
exist somewhere, they must in the last resort either take power in a state or become 
subject to one.’42 For Giddens, as with Realism generally, private security must either 
become a political actor by literally taking over the state’s political apparatus, or it must
41 Carl Schmitt, The Concept o f the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1996 p.52.
42 Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two o f a Contemporary Critique o f 
Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Polity) 1985 p.290.
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remain an economic and apolitical actor, submitting to state rule.43 Unless private 
security literally takes over the state, for Realism, the concept of private security 
engaging in the political act of governing security literally remains a theoretical 
impossibility. Instead, security governance is an activity that remains monopolized by 
the state and its dominant security forces.
Overall, the Realist emphasis on ‘last resort control’ embedded within its understanding 
of political power—an idea at the core of Realist understanding of coercion and the 
state’s monopoly of legitimate violence—is a powerful conceptual tool and one not 
easily displaced by a security governance approach to the study of private security. 
However, this dissertation argues that this rigid Weberian theoretical construct has 
created a conceptual wall that has not only blinded Realism to the significance of 
private security in the past, but that also increasingly obstructs our understanding of the 
way security is governed in global politics today. The next section describes how 
private security is viewed through a Realist lens that denies the possibility that private 
security can have political content.
1.5.2.2 The Realist State’s Monopoly o f Legitimate Violence, Private Security, and the 
Criminal-Apolitical Paradox
The logic of ‘last resort control’ explains how Realism conceptualises the state as
monopolizing the political. On a more subtle level—as will be explored in the critical
literature review—this concept also explains how and why studies of private security
influenced by Realist thought have interpreted private security as either a criminal
challenge to the state or a merely apolitical actor. Since Realism denies the theoretical
43 This proposition by Giddens also displays the classic circular logic of state reproduction. Notice that by 
taking over the state, private security simply ‘becomes’ the state, thereby timelessly reproducing this type 
of territorial political authority. This same argument is found in Kenneth Waltz’s discussion of the state 
take-over of other states at the level of the international system.
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possibility that private security can have the status of a political actor, Realist theory 
traps private security within a conceptual binary where it must be understood as either 
criminal, or legitimate and denuded a priori of any political power whatsoever. In the 
former instance, private security is viewed as a form of criminal ‘private violence’ and a 
challenge to the state in much the same way as a terrorist or organized crime 
organization. In the latter instance, private security is either viewed as engaging in 
coercion on a scale too small (i.e. a form of household violence) to be considered 
political, or as a literal extension of the coercive apparatus of the state, and therefore 
lacking political autonomy. The specifics of this theoretical dynamic will be explored in 
detail in Part III of this chapter; suffice it to say here that it has proven to be a 
significant conceptual hurdle for an adequate understanding of the political content o f  
the legitimate coercion o f  private security.
1.5.2.3 Security Governance, Political Violence, and Private Security as ‘Implementers’ 
o f Legitimate Political Coercion
Anthony Giddens was in the process of explicating the difference between the state’s 
monopoly of legitimate political coercion from other types of apolitical or criminal 
private violence when he wrote that he was ‘principally concerned with the means of 
violence associated with the activities of organized armed forces.’44 Overall, this 
dissertation agrees with Giddens’ observation that security governance fundamentally 
involves ‘the means of violence associated with the activities of organized armed 
forces.’ However, it also parts ways with Giddens by arguing that the criteria of 
‘organized armed forces’ that he outlines above not only refers to the state, but also 
clearly applies to the private security companies operating in global politics today.
44 Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence p. 121.
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Indeed, the logical corollary of this dissertation’s argument that the state no longer 
maintains a monopoly on legitimate political authority over security governance is its 
claim that the state no longer maintains a monopoly on its legitimate implementation— 
i.e. the threat and/or application of coercion—that is an inherent part of security 
governance.
First, in macro-terms, the very existence of the private security industry as a repository 
of legitimate coercive force is interpreted within this dissertation as empirical evidence 
of the impracticality of discussing the state in terms of a ‘monopoly’ on legitimate 
political coercion. Instead, IR theory needs to be sensitive to the politically significant 
content of the coercion engaged in (on a global scale) by the contemporary private 
security industry. Second, at the level of application of this dissertation’s security 
governance methodology, political coercion is re-interpreted here to include the use or 
threat of coercion by private security to implement the political programs of legitimate 
auspices.
Far from being understood as apolitical—by virtue of a supposedly limited, private, and 
household nature of the coercion involved—the size and public scope of the legitimate 
coercion implemented by private security on behalf of their various public and private 
auspices is of a decidedly political nature. Far from being relegated to the status of a 
criminal or apolitical actor, private security’s use of coercion must be understood as an 
act of legitimate security governance.
1.5.3 Deconstructing the Realist State’s Monopoly o f Territory
The last piece of the Realist state monopoly that this thesis engages with is Realism’s 
idea of territory. On a general level, the security governance model used in this thesis 
intentionally problematizes the way Realism views the organization of legitimate
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coercion in world politics as territorially organized through the dual principle of internal 
and external sovereignty.45 This critique is built around a number of different empirical 
observations. First, security governance is no longer territorially organized exclusively 
with reference to the geographical boundaries of the modem state; instead, it also occurs 
within local spaces (i.e. armed security convoys, road-blocks, secured compounds), 
trans-nationally across state territories, and even between state spaces in international 
waters. As a result, in the place of Realism’s emphasis on the state-centric 
inside/outside characteristics of territory, this dissertation emphasizes the different 
spatial levels of the local, regional, and transnational (as well as national) characteristics 
of security governance.46
Second, the way Realism conceptualises the territorial public/private divide as it 
pertains to security governance has also changed. Traditionally within Realist thought, 
security governance of public territory was seen as the function of the state’s internal 
security forces (i.e. police) and its external security forces (i.e. military). To the extent 
that private security engaged in the provision of coercive order maintenance, it was 
understood to be solely concerned with the apolitical order maintenance of privately 
held territory. Though this distinction was never absolute, it has become even less clear 
today. On the on hand, as private security expands, it is increasingly becoming involved 
in implementing coercive security governance programs within large tracts of public 
space. On the other hand, as private security increasingly finds itself embedded within
45 For Realism, the state’s territorially organized monopoly over legitimate violence is understood 
through the Janus-faced lens of internal and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is maintained by 
the state police forces and their relative superiority of violence within the state. External sovereignty is 
maintained by the state’s military forces and involves securing the state’s borders against external 
intrusions into the state’s territorial interior.
46 This idea is common with globalization and global governance literature in general. For an early 
application to the field of private security studies, see Les Johnston, The Rebirth o f  Private Policing 
p. 195. However, this dissertation’s discussion of territory in terms of security governance being 
undertaken by private security in international waters has not been explicitly addressed elsewhere.
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hybrid public-private security networks, the public-private spatial divide is itself losing 
its analytical relevance.
1.5.3.1 Realism, Compulsory Territorial Rule, and its Rejection o f  Local Political 
Orders
On an abstract level, Realist thought emphasises the state-level territorial characteristics 
of political rule—and security governance—with reference to the state-level coercive 
organizations (state police and military) that enforce it. The political nature of this 
territorial entity—i.e. the state—is predicated upon the compulsory and coercive nature 
of its territorial rule. That is, every actor within the state’s territory is placed—in real 
and hypothetical terms—within a compulsory, binary and zero-sum power relationship 
with the coercive security apparatus of the state that logically requires political 
submission to state rule.47 This compulsory aspect of the state’s rule is unique, and is 
predicated upon its unique monopoly over the authority to use physical coercion to 
enforce its territorial political order. For Realists, this aspect of compulsory territorial 
domination—backed up by the state’s monopoly of violence—distinguishes it from 
other, apolitical, territorial configurations.
As a result, the maintenance of order within smaller territorial localities—undertaken by 
agents other than the state’s security forces—is not considered by Realist theory to be 
properly political in nature. Realist theory justifies this position in two ways. First, for 
Realism, scale matters; political rule properly understood is a macro-level phenomenon 
that continuously affects societal territory as a whole and is not conceptualised as 
something that affects smaller territorial segments of society in sporadic or
47 To avoid this fate of political submission to the state, as explained above, it requires the other actor in 
question within the state’s territory to literally take over (and become) the state.
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discontinuous segments of time. Second, for Realism, violence matters; rule—in the last 
resort—is made compulsory by the use or threat of violence, and this unique political 
technique of rule is monopolised by a single territorial entity: the state.
These two Realist propositions of the importance of territorial scale and the uniquely 
compulsory nature of the state’s violent territorial rule are exemplified by David Easton 
in A Framework for Political Analysis.48 First, Easton argued that while the political by 
definition affects society as a whole, the smaller territorial configurations— ‘subsystems 
of subsystems’—internal to society are apolitical by virtue of the fact that they only 
affect smaller segments of society.49 Second, Easton argued that the authorities within 
these local territories—often with titles like ‘boards of directors’50—only extend their 
control over their own group members within a private space and furthermore do so 
without the threat of physical coercion to demand compulsory compliance. As a result 
of this dual logic, Realism has excluded private security’s coercive implementation of 
an auspice’s security program from its understanding of ‘governing’ security in 
territorial terms.
1.5.3.2 Security Governance, Compulsory Territorial Rule, and its Acknowledgement o f  
Local Political Orders
The above Realist interpretation of the state’s territorially organized monopoly over 
political order—and the logical underpinnings of this interpretation—are compelling. 
However, the security governance model used in this dissertation rejects this Realist 
state-centric understanding of territorial rule; moreover, it does so on largely Realist 
terms. First, this dissertation demonstrates how it is precisely the ‘boards of directors’ of
48 David Easton, A Framework fo r  Political Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1979 p. 50- 
5.
49 Ibid. Easton uses the term ‘para-political’ to refer to these smaller apolitical territorial orders.
50 Ibid, p.54.
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private security companies—as well as the boards of directors of the corporate auspices 
that hire them—that are involved in the organised deployment of armed coercive force 
within particular territorial locations. Second, the activity of private security is not 
limited to private, household territory; on the contrary, this dissertation demonstrates 
how armed private coercion is increasingly being deployed within public space.
Third, private security’s organized physical coercion is not merely limited towards 
promotion of order amongst its own members. On the contrary, this dissertation will 
demonstrate how private security affects all of the actors within the territorial space that 
is ‘shared’ with private security. Indeed, it will demonstrate how other actors may be 
compelled to ‘submit’ (e.g. to roadblocks, searches, or denial of movement) to the 
territorial political order coercively implemented by private security—and even 
compelled to do so under the pre-eminently political threat of death. Fourth, and finally, 
this dissertation will demonstrate how the security governance engaged in by private 
security cannot be accurately described as small-scale in territorial terms. On the one 
hand, this dissertation will provide case studies that document the state-wide 
implementation of coercive political programs by a single private security company 
involving the deployment of over 15,000 armed security personnel. On the other hand, it 
will demonstrate that the cumulative effects of hundreds or thousands of micro-sites of 
security governance operating simultaneously within a state’s territory—involving 
compulsory coercive order maintenance at the capillary level—must be understood as 
explicitly political in nature.
1.5.3.3 Security Governance and Territory: From Hierarchy to Network
Ultimately, this dissertation intentionally moves away from a state-centric model of 
territorial security governance—based on the vertical political hierarchies of the state
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and its centralized security forces—towards a model of geographically networked 
security governance. This networked understanding of territory is used to illustrate a 
number of aspects of security governance left hidden by state-centric territorial models. 
First, it is used to document or map the pluralisation of security actors (i.e. private 
security) and the fragmentation of territorial security governance that this entails. 
Second, the network concept is used as an analytical tool to map the way these multiple 
security actors (public, private and hybrid) interact with one another within a ‘shared’ 
territorial space. This includes, but is not limited to, the way the state attempts to 
monitor the activities of private security companies and the attempts made by private 
security to coordinate with public security forces. Finally, with reference to the 
transnational, a security governance model also emphasises the global-local 
characteristics of security governance, and the way in which auspices in one state may 
direct the activity of its private security implementer—and hence security governance— 
many thousands of miles away in another state. Ultimately, this networked security 
governance approach to territory is designed to highlight the ways private security 
engages in security governance left hidden or unarticulated by state-centric Realist 
territorial models.
1.5.4 Concluding Remarks on a Security Governance Reformulation o f Realism’s State 
Monopoly on Authority, Coercion and Territory
The security governance theoretical framework developed in this chapter is designed to 
demonstrate the specifically political content of the activity of private security in a way 
that Realist theory cannot properly articulate. This was accomplished by deconstructing 
the Realist state’s conceptual monopoly of authority, political coercion and territory, 
and reformulating them in such a way that the political significance of private security
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can be properly demonstrated. Underpinned by a public source of meta-political 
authority and embedded within a partnership with a legitimate auspice, private security 
companies constitute an increasingly important aspect of security governance within 
global politics today.
1.6 The Purpose o f  Histories o f Private Security Part I: Mercenaries and Change 
versus Realism and a Static Continuity o f the State’s Monopoly o f  Legitimate Violence
This dissertation does not provide a descriptive catalogue of the waxing and waning of 
‘mercenaries’ or ‘private police’ throughout history. This has been done at length 
elsewhere within IR’s study of private security and the field of criminology respectively 
and the process does not need to be replicated here.51 However, a number of substantive 
and broader conceptual points ought to be made about the purpose of different histories 
of private security as they pertain to IR and its understanding of the state’s monopoly of 
legitimate violence. Realism—from its classical to its neorealist variant—emphasises 
stasis and continuity in the state-centric organization of coercion in the international 
system. In Realist theory, historical analyses of politics remain firmly located on the 
state and its unique role as a security actor, and continuously emphasise the way 
political coercion is organized in terms of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. 
Alternatively, studies of private security typically emphasise change in the organization 
of coercion. Indeed, the primary purpose of many of the brief historical studies within 
the Criminology and IR private security literatures has been to highlight the ‘brute fact’ 
of the existence of private police and mercenaries throughout history ‘hidden’ by Realist 
state-centric narratives of security governance. Clifford Shearing and Les Johnston have 
made this aspect of their historical discussions of private security explicit in an effort to
51 See Peter Singer’s chapter on ‘Privatized Military History’ in Corporate Warriors: The Rise o f  the 
Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
40
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
correct Realism’s state-centric presumption of the state’s monopoly of violence. Though 
it has not typically been made with a great deal of theoretical precision, the claim that 
‘[i]n fact, the monopoly of the state over violence is the exception in world history, 
rather than the rule’ has been a core contribution of the historical studies of this 
Criminology and IR private security literature. This dissertation argues that histories of 
private security that focus on ‘change’ rather than ‘continuity’ usefully highlight the fact 
that the Realist theoretical models and Weberian language used to discuss the empirical 
organization of coercive force in global politics as a state ‘monopoly’ are now being put 
under duress by the current growth in private security.
1.6.1 The Purpose o f  Histories o f Private Security Part II: Security Governance and 
Contingency versus Realist Teleology and the State’s Monopoly o f  Legitimate Violence
However, there exist two other—theoretically intertwined—parallel debates embedded 
within the different histories of private security that relate to our understanding of both 
private security and nature of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. The first 
debate is tied to differing Realist and security governance interpretations of causation 
behind the historical ‘elimination’ of mercenaries from the international system.53 The 
second debate is tied to Realist interpretations of the state’s monopoly of legitimate 
violence as inevitable and necessary and alternative security governance interpretations 
that have emphasized the contingent role of ideas (or security governance mentalities54) 
behind the state’s monopoly of violence. Though the causal interpretation of the
52 Ibid p. 19.
53 These differing causal interpretations of the historical elimination of mercenaries have clear and 
immediate theoretical implications for differing causal interpretations o f the ‘mercenary’s return’ in the 
form of private security at the beginning of the twenty-first century as well.
54 Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing discuss the role of ‘mentalities of governance’ in broadly 
constructivist terms of culturally contingent mental frameworks that individuals use—often 
unconsciously—decide how to act when governing security. See Governing Security, p.29-30.
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elimination of mercenaries and the question of the necessity of the state’s monopoly of 
legitimate violence are logically separate issues, they will be briefly discussed together 
here.
First, within Realist historiography in general, the relative elimination of mercenaries— 
a long process that only culminated in the mid/late nineteenth century—is typically 
causally understood in evolutionary terms as a functional response to inherent problems 
with mercenaries (e.g. disloyalty, untrustworthiness) combined with the environmental 
competitive pressures of the inter-state system that forced states to either adopt more 
efficient nationalised fighting methods or perish.55 Thus, for Realists, the historical 
elimination of mercenaries is understood in teleological terms as a functional and 
objectively rational historical process.56 Weber highlights his perception of the 
problems with mercenary forces and why their elimination from the international 
system was part of a rational process when he writes:
The relationship of the army leaders, to whose persons and fates the armies and their chances for booty 
were tied, with the patrician houses of the city could never be without those tensions which down to [the 
Imperial general] Wallenstein [in the Thirty Years War] have always prevailed between the leaders of 
privately recruited armies and those who hire them. This persistent mistrust weakened the military
55 Paul Kowert and Jeffery Legro ‘Norms, Identity, and Their Limits’ in Peter Katzenstein (ed.) The 
Culure o f  National Security (New York: Colombia University Press) 1996 p.456.
56 Studies of private security in the field of Criminology have also leveled this criticism against traditional 
Whig histories of the elimination of private police as an inevitable and logical progressive process. See 
Les Johnston, Policing Britain p.5. Within IR, Deborah Avant has cleverly turned this proposition on its 
head, arguing against those who have interpreted the contemporary growth of private security as a 
‘natural, functional response’ to material changes in warfare. See Avant, The Market for Force, p.31. In 
general within IR, this line of argumentation is a common critique leveled against ‘Rationalist’ (i.e. 
Realist and Liberal) theories by constructivist scholars intent on examining the role of ideas in social 
science causality. This dissertation agrees with a constructivist account of the important role played by 
ideas in ‘constituting’ the identities of actors, and how these ideas can change the roles and 
responsibilities of private actors—and therefore the very nature of—security governance. The point of 
ideational causality will be elaborated with reference to a neo-Foucauldian reading of private security in 
chapter three.
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operations, so that the tactical superiority of the professional mercenary army could not be permanently 
maintained...’57
Here, Weber sees a timeless tension between ‘privately recruited armies and those who 
hire them’ as causally related to a largely inevitable historical process leading to the 
state ‘capturing’ and monopolizing the military function within the bureaucratic
f  o
apparatus of the modem state’s armed forces. Anthony Giddens also discusses the 
elimination of mercenaries in much the same rationalist terms by highlighting the 
problems with the ‘fluctuating tension between centralized control of the means of 
violence and decentralized military power’ inherent in a state reliance upon mercenary 
soldiers, and the objective pressures leading to their elimination.59 
In an example a Realist teleological and rationalist reading of the historical elimination 
of mercenaries that explicitly references the objective pressures of the international 
system, Samuel Huntington wrote that ‘[competition among the states caused each to 
create a corps of permanent experts devoted to the interests of military security’ [and 
that this] ‘[professionalism had to arise.’60 Since Huntington explicitly defines 
professionalism in terms of the elimination of mercenaries, this proposition is the 
logical equivalent of stating that mercenaries ‘had to be eliminated.’61 
Overall, these examples illustrate that Realist historiography does not merely downplay 
the existence of ‘private armies’; nor does it merely place its study of private security— 
such as it exists—within a broader historical narrative of the state’s monopolization of
57 Max Weber, Economy and Society vol. II p. 1364 emphasis added.
58 This point will be further elucidated in the second half of chapter two. Interestingly, he also 
foreshadows the some of the critiques leveled against private security by Singer, Avant and other analysts 
that apply transaction cost economist theory to their study of private security and emphasize a zero-sum 
relationship between private security and the state.
59 Giddens, Anthony, The Nation-State and Violence, (Cambridge: Polity Press) 1985, p.56-7.
60 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics o f  Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press) p. 32 emphasis added.
61 Huntington’s historical treatment of mercenaries is harsh. A mercenary officer is ‘essentially an 
entrepreneur’, unethical, lacking in responsibility or discipline, often poorly skilled, and by definition, 
unprofessional. See Ibid, p.21.
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violence and the elimination of mercenaries. Instead, more radically, Realist 
historiography typically interprets the elimination of mercenaries as part of an inevitable 
historical process. Moreover, for Realism, the same rationalist logic behind the 
elimination of mercenaries—i.e. the perceived inefficiencies intrinsic to using private 
security actors referred to above by Weber, as well as the system-level pressures of state 
competition—also acted as an invisible hand in creating the state’s monopoly of 
violence. Indeed, rationalist economic institutionalist literature inspired by a Realist 
reading of anarchy in the state of nature explicitly refers to the ‘invisible hand’ of 
reason when discussing the superiority of ‘stationary bandits’ to ‘roving bandits’ and the 
processes of rational-self interest behind an eventual—and inevitable—creation of a 
state with a monopoly of legitimate violence.
Ultimately, while this dissertation takes a catholic approach when explaining changes in 
security governance—and makes references to both ideational and material causal 
factors in its analysis—it is broadly sympathetic to criticisms levelled against Realist 
histories for their perception of the elimination of mercenaries as natural or necessary. 
Moreover, while this dissertation does not make any claims regarding the ‘necessity’ or 
lack thereof regarding the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence, it is in explicit 
agreement with John Agnew’s observation that ‘[a]n argument can be made that social 
science has been too geographical and not sufficiently historical, in the sense that 
geographical assumptions have trapped consideration of social and political economic- 
processes in geographical structures and containers that defy historical change.’ 
Overall, this dissertation’s security governance model self-consciously joins critics who 
argue that Realism and other rationalist theories of IR whose discussion of history
62 See Mancur Olson, ‘Dictatorship, Democracy and Development’, American Political Science Review 
87(3) 1993.
63 John Agnew, quoted in Neil Brenner’s ‘Beyond state-centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical 
Scale in Globalization Studies’ Theory and Society 28 1999 p.39.
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ignores change in the international system by relegating it to ‘a distant past or a distant 
future’64 are hindered by a serious conceptual handicap—especially in the study of 
private security.65
1.7 From Mercenaries to Private Military Companies? The Terminology o f Private 
Security
The title of David Isenberg’s 1997 monograph ‘Soldiers of Fortune Limited: A Profile 
of Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms’66 perfectly captures some of the 
early conceptual and linguistic hurdles associated with the rise of corporations 
marketing themselves as international providers of ‘professional military advisory 
services.’ On the one hand, these new security actors seemed to be differentiated from 
traditional private security companies by their specialization in security functions 
related to combat and other specifically military-related skill sets, as well as by their 
focus on international (foreign) military clients. On the other hand, the corporate 
structure of these companies—comprised of a permanent administrative bureaucracy as 
well as their legal registration as corporate business entities—also seemed to
64 The Realist sociologist Randall Collins provides an illustrative example of ‘relegating change to a 
distant past’ with his discussion of Realism’s differentiation between the pre-Westphalian political 
content o f private violence and the post-Westphalian modem bureaucratic state monopoly o f  the political. 
Collins writes ‘in non-bureaucratic societies, in fact, private violence and politics are virtually identical.’ 
As discussed in the above section on legitimate political coercion, today, for Realism, this is a conceptual 
impossibility. Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology p.352.
65 For an example of this argument, see: Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture o f  National Security: Norms 
and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press) 1996 p. 16;
66This was one of the very earliest pieces on the new ‘corporate mercenary firms’. See David Isenberg, 
Soldier o f  Fortune Limited: A Profile o f Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms (Washington 
DC: Center for Defense Information) 1997.
67 Three companies in particular stood out in the late 1990s that—along with the media attention attached 
to their roles or alleged roles in foreign government military campaigns—together constituted the ‘rise’ of 
a new type of corporate mercenary firm: the US company Military Professional Resources Incorporated; 
the British firm Sandline International; and the South African firm Executive Outcomes. The quote was 
taken from the archived website of the now defunct South African private security firm Executive 
Outcomes. http://web.archive.Org/web/19981212024722/http://www.eo.com Accessed June 10 2008.
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differentiate them from the more traditional concept of mercenaries as ad hoc and often 
criminal ‘soldiers of fortune’ or ‘dogs of war’ familiar to post-colonial African warfare. 
At the same time, a degree of self-recognition and self-promotion of the elite military 
unit or high-ranking military backgrounds of these firm’s constituent members (i.e. 
retired British SAS regiment or retired generals of the US military) helped to underscore 
the ‘military’ nature of these companies and the services they provided. By the late- 
1990s, due partly to the analytical issues described above, partly because of the negative 
normative (and technical legal implications) of the term mercenary, and partly because
co
it was adopted by these companies themselves, the language of corporate mercenary 
firms and military companies69 began to coalesce around the term ‘private military 
company’ and its acronym PMC.
However, the language surrounding private security remains unsettled to this day and 
the terminology used in its study—and even the meaning of the acronyms—continues to 
change and evolve along with the industry. For instance, James Taulbee has preferred 
the term Privatized Defense Service Providers70 while Peter Singer popularised the 
expression Private Military Firm (PMF) with his highly influential work Corporate 
Warriors: The Rise o f  the Privatized Military Industry. At the same time, ironically, 
today the letter ‘c’ in the acronyms PMC and PSC more often than not refers to 
contractors rather than companies due to the newer language of ‘security contractors’ 
used to describe the post-2003 multi-billion dollar security industry created in the wake 
of the Iraq war. For instance, Anna Leander and Rens van Munster recently used the
68 For instance, Sandline International—whose role in the ‘Arms to Africa Affair’ damaged the Blair 
government and helped focus public and media attention on this growing niche industry—described itself 
on its website as a Private Military Company. See Sandline International website: 
http://www.sandline.com/site/index.html. Accessed 17/08/08.
69 See David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, London. Adelphi Paper 316. 1998. In this early study, Shearer differentiated between ‘military 
companies’ and ‘security companies’ yet acknowledged the difficulty of distinguishing between the two 
categories.
70 James Larry Taulbee, ‘The Privatization of Security: Modem Conflict, Globalization and Weak States’ 
Civil Wars 5(2) 2002, p. 1.
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term ‘private security contractors’71 to describe the same companies Anna Leader had 
herself referenced as ‘private military companies’ only two years earlier.72 
Interestingly—and of specific importance for this dissertation—is the way the above 
terms used to describe private security are themselves linguistically tied to the binary 
categories (and coercive institutions) of the modem state. Implicitly, within this broader 
literature, a decision was made to conceptualize private security within the traditional 
binary of the ‘police’ and ‘military’—even while acknowledging that many of the firms 
discussed seemed to provide security functions that did not sit neatly within either a
n ' l
‘police’ or ‘military’ category. For instance, many early attempts to differentiate 
‘active’ from ‘passive’ PMCs74, or private military companies from private security 
companies made direct reference to the former’s role in providing services relating 
directly to military combat. Alternatively, the latter were defined as providing policing 
or ‘support’ functions, such as intelligence, logistics, or training. Most recently, Rita 
Abrahamsen and Michael Williams have continued to differentiate between PMCs and 
PSCs based on the ‘core activities’—of either a police or military nature—of each 
company concerned.75
However, as the industry itself has continued to mature and develop into a formal multi­
billion dollar service sector—and with ‘private military companies’ (like MPRI)
71 Anna Leander and Rens van Munster, ‘Private Security Contractors in the Debate about Darfur: 
Reflecting and Reinforcing Neo-Liberal Govemmentality’ International Relations 21(2) 2007.
72 Anna Leander, ‘The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military 
Companies’ Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 33(3) 2005.
73 Interestingly, this police/military conceptual binary was less of an issue for the ‘private policing’ 
literature of the Criminology field than it was for IR due to the fact that criminologists did not 
traditionally focus on the international, or war, or concern themselves with the study of mercenaries. 
Without IR’s Security Studies ‘mercenary narrative’, the field of criminology had no qualms interpreting 
companies like Sandline International as ‘international private security companies.’ This illustrates how 
the terminology and conceptual lens used to discuss private security could be—and was—significantly 
influenced by the conceptual boundaries (and biases) of each academic discipline. See M. Kempa, R. 
Carrier, J. Wood, C. Shearing, ‘The Evolving Concept of Private Policing’ European Journal on Criminal 
Policy and Research 7(2) 1999 p. 214.
74 Trewhitt, Philip. ‘The Business of Killing’. The Parliamentary Human Rights Group. London. 1999. 
p.3.
5 Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams, ‘Securing the City: Private Security Companies and Non- 
State Authority in Global Governance’, International Relations 21(2) 2007 p.239.
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supplying ‘policing’ functions and ‘private policing companies’ (like Wackenhut) 
providing robust para-military functions involving the use of armored vehicles and 
automatic rifles—maintaining a PMC/PSC distinction has become increasingly difficult
7 f \in analytical terms. Indeed, as the industry continues to consolidate with larger 
diversified defense firms such as L-3 Communications purchasing the PSC MPRI—and 
massive PSCs like G4S (formerly Group 4) specializing in mundane unarmed 
commercial sector guarding services purchasing more specialized PSCs like
77ArmorGroup—these distinctions have disappeared altogether.
1.7.1 A Security Governance Approach to the Language o f  Private Security: 
Deconstructing a Conceptual State Monopoly
This dissertation intentionally moves away from the language of ‘private police’ and 
‘private military’ and instead uses the terms private security and private security
70
company (PSC) interchangeably throughout the study. The significance of the use of 
the term ‘private security’—instead of private police or private military—relates to the 
broader theoretical claims made within this dissertation in three distinct ways. First, at
76 This US Department of Energy news release provides a discussion o f the supposedly mundane ‘rent-a- 
cop’ type of private security company as a provider of ‘para-military’ services for the US Government. 
See website: http://www.vso.doe.gov/News Releases/2007/NR-06-07.pdf. Accessed 02/19/09.
77 See David Robertson, ‘G4S buys security firm rival for 43 million pounds’ Times Online March 21 
2008. http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industrv sectors/support services/article3593666.ece 
Acccessed 05/13/08.
78 One further point needs to be made about the supposed ideological content of the term ‘private 
security.’ Peter Singer has argued that companies more appropriately described as Private Military Firms 
have essentially described themselves ‘using the more legitimate-sounding moniker of “private security 
firms’” in an effort to mask or otherwise obscure the military nature of their services. See Peter Singer, 
Corporate Warriors, p.73. While this may indeed be the case, it begs the question whether or not the 
author intended the term he invented—i.e. Private Military Firms—to be ‘less legitimate-sounding’ than 
the term private security firm and if so, why. Moreover, ironically, it must also be pointed out that the 
terms ‘private military company’ and ‘private military firm’ have themselves been referred to as part of a 
broader ideological program designed to mask the ‘mercenary’ nature of these firms as well as 
‘normalize’ or ‘legitimize’ the nature of their work. While this dissertation acknowledges—adapting the 
famous admonition by Robert Cox—that terminology is always for someone and for some purpose, it 
nevertheless self-consciously attempts to empty the term private security of any ideological or normative 
content.
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the level of the state, if Les Johnston is correct in arguing that the modem police forces 
symbolically constituted ‘at street level, the state’s monopoly of legitimate coercion,’79 
this dissertation argues that the language of ‘private police’ and ‘private military’ 
continues to unhelpfully socially constmct (at a conceptual level) security as something 
monopolised by these twin coercive institutions of the modem state. In one sense, then, 
the term private security intentionally helps us move away from the state-centric 
language of security governance within IR—a linguistic bias that ipso facto exists even 
within studies of ‘private military companies’ that attempt to move away from state- 
centred analyses of security.
Second, at the level of the international system, this dissertation’s security governance 
methodology is committed to re-imagining territory and its relationship to security 
governance at a global level in a way fundamentally at odds with the state-centric 
Realist IR interpretation of the international system. While the terminology of ‘private 
police’ and ‘private military’ continues to reproduce Realist IR’s inside/outside 
territorial binary, the term private security is free of such analytical territorial bias. As a 
result, ‘private security’ is better suited to a study that seeks to emphasize the globally 
networked, global/local and hybrid public-private characteristics of contemporary 
security governance.
Third, this dissertation argues that it is important not to reduce the operation of private 
security to a particular set of security functions that we normally associate with either 
the police or military, precisely because private security can and has done both—and 
more. Ironically, this empirical point is often acknowledged by the very analysts who 
still use the language of private police and military companies. However, at a more 
abstract level, this dissertation also argues that private security companies—and the
79 Les Johnston, Policing Britain: Risk, Security and Governance (Harlow: Longman Press) 2000 p. 12.
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government and corporate clients that hire them—are reflexively involved in socially 
constructing a new security vocabulary that is not adequately captured by the 
police/military binary. On the one hand, this new vocabulary is situated within broader 
late-modern ideational shifts centred on the ‘responsibility’ of the private sector to get 
involved in security provision and is directly connected to the discourse and counter­
terrorism strategies of ‘homeland security.’ Arguably, then, the term private security is 
not merely tied to new security models requiring new public-private security 
partnerships across public and private spaces; rather, private security— qua private
OA
security—is involved in creating new understandings of security itself.
Part III.
1.8 First-Cut Interpretations o f Private Security's Relationship to the Monopoly o f  
Violence in IR: Introduction
The critical literature review below fulfils three particular functions. First, it provides an 
introduction to the early academic literature on private security within the discipline of 
IR. Second, it outlines some of the general problems within this literature, thereby 
locating the security governance framework used in this dissertation against a broader 
backdrop of the early debates and conceptual issues tied to the study of private security 
within the discipline. Third, and most importantly, this literature review is used to 
empirically corroborate and demonstrate the way that Weberian Realist language—and 
the language of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence specifically—consistently 
created analytical problems for the first-cut studies of private security within IR. This 
latter point is crucial, since it validates the dissertation’s overall argument that the
80 This last point will be explored in chapter six.
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conceptual problems this literature encountered while trying to understand private 
security were directly linked to broader problems that Realism itself has in realizing a 
sophisticated vision of private security. Therefore, while this literature review will draw 
attention to a normative bias against private security within this first-cut PSC
Q 1
literature , on a more substantive level, it will focus on other analytical mistakes that 
can be traced to deeper problems within Realist theory itself These problems, in turn, 
will be traced within Realist thought directly in the following chapter.
Overall, it is safe to suggest that much of the early discussion of private security within 
IR was significantly influenced by the negative social connotations of the term 
mercenary, and the negative political connotations associated with the idea of ‘private’ 
non-state violence more broadly. As a result, many of the original studies of private 
security had a clear and critical normative objection to the growing role of private 
security in global politics. Occasionally, even the titles of these works intentionally 
evoked the social opprobrium they attached to the idea of for-profit corporations selling 
‘trigger pulling’ services to government, or worse, private sector clients. For example, 
early books entitled Mercenaries: The Scourge o f  the Third World, Mercenaries: an 
African Security Dilemma and the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group’s 
publication The Business o f Killing were three early studies whose titles did not hide 
their critical normative bias against private security.82
On a more substantive level, these first-cut studies of private security often did not 
differentiate private security as a legal commercial enterprise from illegal non-state
81 This notorious normative bias is amusingly referenced by the private security analyst David Isenberg 
when he writes: ‘It is a sad fact that much of the debate over private military and security contractors is, 
to borrow from Macbeth, a tale told by idiots, full of sound and fury; signifying nothing. The tale is made 
worse by the fact that much [sic] of those doing the telling have highly partisan axes to grind.’ See David 
Isenberg, Shadow Force, p. ix.
82 Guy Arnold, Mercenaries: The Scourge o f the Third World (Great Britain: Macmillan) 1999; Philip 
Trewitt, The Business o f Killing, The Parliamentary Human Rights Group, UK House of Commons, 1999; 
Abdel Fatau Musah (ed.) Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma (London: Pluto) 2000.
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actors that engaged in criminal violence. Instead, private security was seen as a sub­
species of the genus ‘private violence’ that could be unproblematically grouped with 
other private, non-state criminal entities such as organized crime syndicates and drug 
cartels. Often, this analytical mistake was facilitated by a position that viewed private 
security not simply—or neutrally—as a profit-motivated actor, but instead as an 
unsavory actor with a ‘profit-oriented interest versus the public interest.’83 According to 
these studies, the profit motive of a legal private security company was interpreted as 
somehow intrinsically hostile to the public interest, and was discussed as if it were the 
functional equivalent of a violent private criminal enterprise.
Once private security companies became a subcategory of criminal and violent non­
state actors—conceptually related to mercenaries, terrorists, warlords, and even 
organized crime—the claim that private security challenged the state’s monopoly of 
violence was often not far behind. For instance, Steven Brayton argued:
‘[f]or nearly three centuries the accepted international norm was that only nation-states fought 
wars. Today, however, organizing units unrelated to the nation-state, from terrorists, 
mercenaries, guerrillas and warlords to non-state militias and private military corporations, 
conduct war worldwide. Although the form of non-state force varies from one society to the 
next, the collective effect is the erosion o f the state’s monopoly on the use o f violence. ,84
This passage mirrors very closely the sentiments of Ulric Shannon, who claimed that the 
devolution of security functions to private security firms—which he describes as 
‘professional mercenaries’—reflects part of a ‘...collective effect manifest in an 
emerging global phenomenon: the erosion o f  the state’s monopoly over the use o f
83 Johanna Shapland ‘Selling Safety: Policing and Social Control over the Public-Private Divide’ in 
Policing and Security: Social Control and the Public/Private Divide (Paris: L’Harmattan, Inc.) 1999 p.20.
84 Brayton, Steven, ‘Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping’, Journal o f 
International Affairs 55(2) 2002 p. 303. Emphasis added.
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o c  '
violence. ’ Here, Shannon also interpreted private security as part of a larger problem 
of sub-state actors such as terrorists and warlords that posed a challenge to the state. In 
more abstract language, Enrique Ballesteros—in his official UN capacity as an 
investigator of mercenary activity—interpreted the growth of international private 
security companies as constituting a direct challenge to the very nature of the state and 
the international system itself. Referencing the growth of private security specifically, 
he wrote that
‘If states are prepared to give up an intrinsic element of their sovereignty, this is something 
which should be clearly stated and which the General Assembly should analyse in depth because 
it really would affect and change the nature, structure and functions o f the State, while at the 
same time changing the nature o f international relations. M
For Ballesteros, the expansion of private security not only posed a problem for the 
‘nature’ of the state and the international system; it was also seen in an intrinsically 
zero-sum relationship to state sovereignty. Lawrence Serewicz is another early 
contributor to the study of private security in IR who a) understood private security as a 
sub-category of a broader set of non-state military forces and who b) discussed private 
security’s relationship to the state in binary and zero sum terms. Interestingly, Serewicz 
set out to discuss ‘the impact that non-state military forces, such as private international
on
security companies, [would] have on state authority and legitimacy.’ However, he 
addressed this question exclusively within a typical first-cut PSC literature context of 
state/non-state actor competition, writing ‘[t]he question guiding this article is the
85 Shannon, Ulric, ‘Human Security and the Rise of Private Armies’, New Political Science 22(1) 2000 
p.103.
86 Enrique Ballesteros, United Nations Special Rapporteur ‘Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating 
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination’ HR/CN/764 14 
March 1997.
87 Lawrence W. Serewicz, ‘Globaliazation, Sovereignty and the Military Revolution: From Mercenaries 
to Private International Security Companies’, International Politics 39 March 2002.
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following: Does the diffusion of military knowledge, particularly via globalization, give
o o
the state or sub-state military actors an advantage?’
Consistently, private security was interpreted as a subcategory of private violence and 
combined with a host of other criminal and/or politically motivated non-state actors that 
used coercion to achieve their ends. As Serewicz’s above research question makes clear, 
private security was also interpreted in terms of a zero-sum competition with state 
control over violence. These examples represent a broad view of early literature that 
interpreted the growth of private security in terms of an erosion of the state’s monopoly 
of violence. However, larger studies interested in issues related to the changing nature 
of warfare and the increasing salience of non-state actors in the international system 
also interpreted private security in terms of an erosion of the state’s monopoly of 
violence. The rest of this section provides an examination of these issues in a bit more 
depth and highlights a few of the more prominent examples of IR’s interpretation of 
private security within this first-cut PSC literature.
1.8.1 Mary Kaldor: Private Security as a Feature o f  New Wars
OQ #
Mary Kaldor’s influential work New & Old Wars is an important exemplar of this 
dissertation’s critique of Realist thought for two reasons. First, the study relied upon 
Weberian language of the state (and its breakdown) to discuss the nature of post-Cold 
War conflict. For Kaldor, these ‘new wars...occur in the context of the erosion of the 
monopoly of legitimate organized violence’.90 Second, and crucially, this ‘erosion of the 
monopoly of legitimate organized violence’ is understood as specifically tied to the 
growth of private security and private violence more generally. For Kaldor,
88 Ibid p.76.
89 Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity) 1999.
90Ibid, p.4.
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‘[effectively, the ‘failure’ of the state is accompanied by a growing privatization of 
violence.’91 Here then, in the simplest terms, we see a classic trope of Realist analysis; 
namely, that the state and ‘private violence’ are engaged in a competition whereby the 
loss of power for one is accompanied in binary and zero-sum terms by a growth of 
power for the other.
Another problem for Kaldor rooted within Realist thought is the way the category of 
‘private violence’ is conceptualised. For Kaldor, ‘private violence’ is an umbrella term 
that does not differentiate between criminal and legally sanctioned non-state violence. 
Since Kaldor does not differentiate between the violence utilized by private security 
firms and the violence engaged in by organized crime, they both appear to be examples 
of the same broader process of the ‘privatization of violence’ that is eroding the state’s
09monopoly of legitimate violence. As a result of this conflation, she theorises private 
security as if it posed a challenge to legitimate public control over violence on a par 
with violent criminal syndicates.
Part of this problem is connected to the way Kaldor frames ‘new wars’ as fought by 
non-state actors for private, economic motivations, and how this language can 
(awkwardly) be applied to both private security and organized crime. For instance, 
Kaldor states that ‘new wars’ blur the distinctions between war, which she defines as 
‘violence between states or organized political groups for political motives’, and 
organized crime, defined as ‘violence undertaken by privately organized groups for 
private purposes, usually financial gain.’
This observation has been made by others, and has provided a useful contribution to the 
study of the political economy of contemporary warfare.94 However, by uncritically
91 Ibid, p.92.
92 Ibid, p.4-5.
93 Ibid, p.2.
94 See William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner) 1998.
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applying this understanding of private violence across the legal/legitimate- 
illegal/illegitimate spectrum of private, coercive, financially motivated activity, 
Kaldor’s analysis unhelpfully assumes that the profit motive itself is a problem. Indeed, 
Kaldor specifically references ‘so-called private security firms’ as a group in these new 
wars that—by their nature as private and profit-motivated actors—have a vested interest 
in continuing violence.95
At the same time, private security—again due to its private nature—is intrinsically 
classified as an agent of ‘particularist’ private interests, like urban gangs, that exist ipso 
facto in opposition to the state’s ‘universalist’ common public interest. Kaldor writes 
‘[i]f the particularists find allies in the private security agents, mercenaries, militia 
groups and urban gangs that also exist in wealthier parts of the world, so the 
universalists can find their counterparts among the NGOs and moderates in otherwise 
violent areas.’96
Importantly, on another level, Kaldor frames this new development of the ‘privatization 
of violence’ as a reversal of the processes of the ‘modernist’ historical state-building 
discourse located in the Realist historical writing of Hans Morgenthau and Weberian 
Realist Sociology more broadly. In a section that includes a discussion of private 
security firms, she describes new wars as ‘a disintegrative cycle...which is almost the
07exact opposite of the integrative cycle through which modem states were established.’ 
For Kaldor, as for Realist histories of private security in general, mercenaries were
QO
eliminated because ‘mercenary armies turned out to be unreliable.’ Pointedly, Kaldor 
even directly cites Max Weber’s differentiation of the rational-legal authority of the 
modem military officer from the ‘charismatic condottieri...who recruit and lead
95 May Kaldor (ed.), Global Insecurity (London: Pinter) 2000. p.5.
96 Kaldor, Global Insecurity p.23.
97 Kaldor New and Old Wars p.92.
98 Ibid, p. 16.
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mercenary armies as a capitalistic enterprise.’99 As a result of this, there is a high degree 
of teleological bias within her analysis of private security that ties their growth as a kind 
of literal manifestation of ‘backward-looking political projects’100 and a pre-modem, 
undemocratic, mercenary past. For Kaldor, general processes of security privatisation 
are interpreted in terms of a reversal of the processes through which the modem state 
was formed. Whereas the modem (and socially progressive) process of state-building 
was intimately tied to the regularization of armed forces and the elimination of private 
armies, today, new wars are characterized by the re-introduction of and the re- 
emergence of private organized violence.
Ultimately, for Kaldor, legitimate coercion by its very nature is, must, and ought to be 
located squarely within the public sector. Private security, by virtue of its use of 
coercion for financial gain and its status as a private actor driven by a ‘particularist’ 
agenda, is necessarily an illegitimate security actor. For Kaldor, the issue of the 
legitimacy of private security is not conceived of as a technical concern centred on how 
to guarantee the democratic control over legal private security firms, or how to 
effectively monitor and regulate their operations. Instead, she sees ‘[t]he key to any 
long-term solution is the restoration of legitimacy, the reconstitution of the control of 
organized violence by public authorities, whether local, national, or global.’101 For 
Kaldor, private security is—by its very nature—engaged in a zero-sum contest with the 
state over the control of organized violence, and there is no theoretical space for private 
security to play a legitimate role in security governance within this Realist-inspired 
framework. Ironically, Kaldor is ultimately interested in moving away from a strict
99 Max Weber, The Theory o f  Social and Economic Organization (London: Macmillan) 1947 p.326, cited 
in Kaldor, New and Old Wars p. 17.
100 Ibid, p.7.
101 Ibid, p. 10.
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state-centric ‘government’ model towards a model of ‘cosmopolitan governance.’ 102 
However, her Realist articulation of ‘the private’ as necessarily hostile to the state (and 
the public good) as well as reliance upon a Weberian understanding of legal-rational 
and legitimate security governance as fundamentally tied to a state monopoly on 
legitimate violence stymies an adequate understanding of private security.
1.8.2 Martin van Creveld: Private Security, Future War and State Decline
Martin Van Creveld’s work On Future War was another early influential text that 
discussed the expansion of private security in terms of the changing nature of warfare. 
In many ways an influential precursor to Kaldor’s own arguments, Van Creveld argued 
the twenty-first century would witness an end to the twentieth century’s major armed 
conflicts between states and instead be replaced with intra-state wars against smaller, 
more amorphous, non-state actors whose motivations combined politics with profit.103 It 
is in this context of state failure that Van Creveld makes a striking proclamation 
regarding the future relevance of private security:
‘The spread of sporadic small-scale war will cause regular armed forces themselves to change 
form, shrink in size, and wither away. As they do, much of the day-to-day burden of defending 
society against the threat of low-intensity conflict will be transferred to the booming security 
business; and indeed the time may come when the organizations that comprise that business will, 
like the condottieri of old, take over the state.’104
102 Ibid, p. 112.
103 Van Creveld, Martin. On Future War. (London: Brasseys) 1991.
104 ibid. p.207.
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Here, again, we see that private security—quite dramatically in this instance—is viewed 
through the Realist lens of binary and zero-sum power relations as a potentially hostile 
challenge to the state.
Van Creveld’s discussion of private security—both in empirical and theoretical terms— 
is developed in a bit more depth in his next book, The Rise and Decline o f the State.105 
As the title indicates—and paralleling Realist state-building narratives more generally— 
Van Creveld discussed the elimination of private force (i.e. mercenaries) as part of a 
longer historical process of the state’s consolidation of armed force and its 
monopolization of legitimate violence. Predictably, the growth of private security and 
the re-emergence of ‘mercenaries’—combined with the growth of other violent non­
state challengers to the state in the last decade of the twentieth century—is interpreted 
as a reversal of this state-building process and evidence of state decline. Extrapolating 
into the near future (as a futurist writer) Van Creveld argues that ‘[t]he provision of 
security—which since at least Thomas Hobbes has been recognized as the most 
important function of the corporation of the state—will again be shared out among other 
entities.’106
The practical political consequences of this situation are heavily informed by the nature 
of these ‘other entities.’ As with Kaldor, private security companies are simply a sub­
group of the broader category of violent non-state actors hostile to the state; here, 
differentiating legal from illegal, or legitimate private security activity from criminal 
behaviour, is not treated as analytically useful. Instead, Van Creveld sees the expansion 
of private security in terms of a dystopian future where private security firms—some
105 Van Creveld, Martin. The Rise and Decline o f  the State. Cambridge University, Cambridge. 1999.
106 Ibid. p. 406.
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criminal, others legal—will offer security services in an environment where the 
divisions between the two become increasingly meaningless.107
For Van Creveld, in this future environment of radical state collapse, the divisions 
between legitimate state violence and criminal violence simply no longer hold any 
analytical utility. He writes ‘ [wjhatever their goals, all will need money to survive. They 
will get it by contracting with states to do their dirty business for them, or by selling 
their services to other organizations, or by blackmailing the population.’108 Within this 
descriptive framework, security contracts with states (however unscrupulous) are the 
functional and analytical equivalent of criminal economic activity centered on 
‘blackmailing the population.’ Ultimately, he suggests, ‘[t]o put it a different way, 
terrorists, members of the security industry, and the state’s security establishment 
appear to be growing interchangeable in theory and, in at least some cases, in practice as 
well.’109
Setting aside this dissertation’s rejection of the dystopian vision that this narrative 
suggests is at the heart of the state’s ‘decline’, a number of points need to be 
underscored. First, Van Creveld follows a Realist understanding of power by discussing 
private security in binary terms as a zero-sum challenge to the state. Second, Van 
Creveld demonstrates a Realist theoretical bias by reducing all non-state actors that use 
force to either a) a potential violent political challenger to the state, or b) an irrelevant 
political epiphenomenon.
This conceptual binary leaves the Realist analyst with two choices regarding his or her 
understanding of private security; either it is essentially not worthy of consideration, or 
it can be shown to be an actual coercive threat to the state. Van Creveld, like Kaldor, 
chooses the latter path. It is this logical binary latent within Realism’s conceptualization
107 Ibid, p. 407.
108 Ibid, p.407.
109 Van Creveld (1999) p.406.
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of violence that is the primary reason why Van Creveld does not see an analytical 
problem in placing legal private security companies in the same category as terrorists. 
For Van Creveld, as with Realist thought in general, for private security to have political 
content, it must be presented as a (potential) violent challenge to the state. This 
consideration philosophically precedes the legal/illegal distinction, and helps to 
facilitate the combination of criminal and legitimate coercive enterprises into the same 
analytical category.
Third, Van Creveld demonstrates the recurring pattern of placing the growth of private 
security into a Realist state-building narrative. This narrative consistently displays a 
‘rationalist bias’ by viewing the elimination of mercenaries as an instrumentally rational 
decision on the part of states to increase their control over violence, rather than a 
product of more politically and ideationally contingent processes. Set against this 
broader Realist and rationalist reading of history, any interpretation of the growth of 
private security is heavily conditioned to be interpreted as a manifestation of state 
decline. The possibility that the growth of private security should be interpreted within a 
more neutral framework that does not a priori suppose such a decline of state power is 
not given consideration. For Van Creveld, the end of Hobbesian security governance is 
synonymous with a hostile threat to the state, and this threat to the state’s monopoly of 
legitimate violence exists equally from both legal and criminal actors that engage in 
violence.
1.8.3 Herbert Howe: Private Security and International Politics
The last example of a first-cut study of private security within IR used to illustrate the 
deeper conceptual problems Realism has when attempting to theorise private security 
comes in the writings of Herbert Howe. Howe was one of the earliest academics within
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IR to provide a detailed empirical description of the ‘new mercenaries’ with his writings 
on the South African private security company Executive Outcomes.110 These empirical 
studies usefully removed the study of private security from the broader category of 
‘private violence’ that unhelpfully included criminal and violent illegal political actors 
seen in earlier work.
While Howe focused much of his analysis of private security within the context of 
African politics, he also understood the expansion of private security as posing larger 
questions regarding the nature of the international state system. Again, in the broadest 
Realist terms, the questions related to private security typically involved its potential as 
a violent challenger to state ‘military might’ and the ‘global order’ itself. Howe wrote 
that ‘ [t]he international state system has controlled military might over the past 300 
years [and] [s]ome observers believe that a dramatic growth in private security could 
challenge this control and eventually threaten global order...’.111 Here, for Howe, the 
re-emergence of private actors selling military force on the international market seemed 
to directly contradict a defining characteristic of the modem state system itself. 
Elsewhere, however, Howe distinguished himself within the first-cut narratives of 
private security in IR by refusing to assume private security must be understood as a 
cause (or effect) of state decline. Using a more neutral tone, Howe wrote that ‘Max 
Weber noted that the modem state arose because it “successfully upheld a claim to the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” [and 
that] [t]he idea that private military groups might supplement or displace this core
110 Herbert Howe. ‘Private Security Forces and African Stability: the Case of Executive Outcomes’, The 
Journal o f  Modern African Studies 36(2) 1998.
1,1 Howe, ‘Global Order and Security Privatization’ p.l.
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function of the state....would until recently have been dismissed without serious
119consideration’.
Importantly, Howe avoided the common mistake within the first-cut private security 
literature by recognizing that private security did not ipso facto need to be understood as 
presenting a physical ‘challenge’ to the state, but could instead also ‘supplement’ state 
control over violence. Unfortunately, however, this did not mean that Howe avoided 
Realism’s restricted binary and zero-sum power model in his analysis of private security 
altogether. While he rejected the idea that legitimate private security should be 
conceptualised only in terms of a potential violent threat to the state, Howe maintained 
the integrity of Realism’s either/or reading of power (and the integrity of the conceptual 
language of the state’s monopoly over the political) by emptying private security of any 
political significance. This was accomplished by arguing that private security 
companies should be understood, in effect, not as ‘private’ actors at all but rather as a 
simple extension of the state itself. As with Van Creveld, we can see another 
demonstration of the Realist theoretical either/or power binary that reduces all non-state 
actors that use force to either a) a potential violent political challenger to the state, or b) 
an irrelevant political epiphenomenon. While Van Creveld settled on the latter, Howe 
gravitated towards the former. Following this line of Realist logic, Howe wrote:
" ’private security” is increasingly a misnomer. Western and African governments influence the functions 
of the companies both negatively (through restraining legislation) or positively (through government 
contracting) or introducing company representatives to foreign officials.’113
112 Howe, ‘Private Security Forces and African Stability: the Case of Executive Outcomes’, p.308; see 
also Howe, ‘Global Order and Security Privatization’ p .l, and Howe, Ambiguous Order (2001) p. 193
113 Ibid, p.219.
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The theoretical ramifications of these comments are crucial for understanding this 
dissertation’s critique of Realism’s interpretation of private security. While operating 
within a Realist theoretical framework, once Howe rejected the idea that private security 
posed a violent threat to the state, there was little if any Realist vocabulary (or 
conceptual ‘space’) left for him to theorise private security as an independent, legal, and 
politically significant security actor. This is because, for Realism, this conceptual space 
is literally monopolised by the state.
It is this conceptual vacuum within Realist thought that steers Howe towards the 
linguistically awkward expression—yet one consistent with an internal Realist logic— 
that denies private security its ‘private’ status. In making this statement, Howe reduces 
private security to a mere extension of the state, thereby denying it the political agency 
ascribed to an independent security actor. This move has the theoretical effect of 
emptying private security of its political content, relegating it to an apolitical status of 
economic actor. Overall, by emphasising the way governments influence the functions 
of private security—and by focusing on the negative restraints of legislation rather than 
the way law can be used to empower private security to act—Howe is applying a Realist 
binary logic that denies the existence of a theoretical space for private security 
companies to engage in the political act of security governance.
1.9 Second-Cut Interpretations o f Private Security in IR: Introduction
Before engaging in a critique of the way Realist theorists have conceptualised ‘private 
violence,’ it is necessary to briefly review the second-cut private security literature in 
IR. This literature provided the first book-length studies devoted exclusively to private
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security within the field.114 In general, the three works discussed below presented a sea- 
change in the approach to the study of private security in the discipline by distilling and 
separating private security from other forms of criminal and violent non-state actors 
(mercenaries in particular). Through this process, involving various taxonomies and 
other organizational frameworks, these works also helped to constitute private security 
as a discrete type of security actor—that was also part of a broader private security 
industry—that could be properly defined and studied within these terms. At the same 
time, by organizing the disparate literature on ‘mercenaries’ and ‘private military actors’ 
into broader research questions, these studies also provided some of the first 
systematically theoretical studies of private security in IR.
For these reasons, this dissertation does not intend to offer a substantial critique of the 
second-cut private security literature in the same critical fashion applied to the first-cut 
literature. Instead, the following discussion is used to situate this dissertation’s 
theoretical framework against the prominent examples of private security studies within 
IR. However, with the above caveat in mind, two particular issues within this literature 
will be highlighted. First, while the following studies differ on whether or not the 
growth of private security constituted a weakening or a strengthening of state control 
over security, all three studies focused on the issue of increase or decreased state control 
within these narrow binary terms. Second, while each of these studies made reference to 
broader changes in the nature of authority or networked private security governance, 
their theoretical models did not allow these ideas to be fully realized or developed.
114 Robert Mandel’s Corporate Warriors: Armies without States: the Privatization o f Security (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Press) 2002 was arguably the first book-length single-author volume dedicated to the 
study of private security companies within International Relations. Due to space constraints, this thesis 
does not offer a substantive discussion of this work. However, Mandel’s use of the Weberian term 
‘monopoly’ as well ‘governance’—combined with his limited theoretical elaboration of these concepts— 
renders this text open to much of the same critical commentary leveled at the three works discussed 
below. See pp. 30-31 for his use of the term ‘monopoly’ and pp. 40-42 for his use of the term 
‘governance.’
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1.9.1 Peter Singer and Corporate Warriors
Peter Singer provided the first doctoral dissertation-turned book-length work on the 
growing significance of private security in international politics, a development he 
referred to as ‘the rise of the privatized military industry’. This work has become a core 
text for the study of private security within IR, and provides the reader with a broad 
overview, or introduction, to the study of private security within the field of security 
studies.115 This work contextualizes the post-Cold War re-emergence of ‘corporate 
warriors’ within a long history of ‘private warriors’ going back to the ancient and 
mediaeval periods. It also created a taxonomy of private security—termed ‘Private 
Military Firms’—organized around three firms used as a tripartite of ideal types 
differentiated from one another by the types of defence services these firms provided.116 
Regarding Singer’s overall theoretical approach to private security, two general points 
need to be made. First, the core of Singer’s theoretical contribution is organized around 
the application of economic models to discuss the ‘military outsourcing and the loss of
117control’ he saw as an intrinsic aspect of state defence contracting with private
1 1 o
security. For Singer, the state’s use of private security to perform tasks traditionally
undertaken by the state’s own armed forces inevitably involved principle-agent 
dilemmas that would result in a zero-sum loss of control—measured for example in 
increased costs—for the state. This technical discussion of potential problems related to 
defence privatization was paralleled by his survey of problems associated with private
115 Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise o f the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press) 2003.
1,6 Ibid p. 73-136.
117 Ibid, p. 158.
118 For an alternative perspective on the principle-agent dilemmas pertaining to state outsourcing defense 
functions to the private sector, see: Patrick Cullen and Peter Weinberger, ‘Refraining the Defense 
Outsourcing Debate: Merging Government Oversight With Industry Partnership’ (Washington DC: Peace 
Operations Institute) 2007.
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security’s encroachment into civil-military relations more broadly. Here again, Singer 
emphasized a loss of state control—operationalized this time in the form of military 
coup risks in weak states or the loss of democratic control over foreign policy in strong 
states—in his analysis of private security.119 Overall, Singer’s economic principle-agent 
dilemma model provided an organizational framework upon which to hang many of the 
varied and multitudinous criticisms within the first cut literature on private security. 
However, its observations were somewhat diminished by the fact that this theoretical
1 onmodel was not applied to original case study research. By relying on public accounts 
that provided examples of the various problems that his theoretical model predicted, his 
analysis was strongly biased towards finding examples of the loss of state control vis-a- 
vis private security, rather than any potential benefits.
More importantly, however, by investigating private security’s relationship to the state 
in these binary terms that interpreted an increase in power for private security as a 
potential (and typically real) loss of power for the state, his theoretical model was left 
unable to address some of the more interesting claims made in his research. For 
example, Singer wrote ‘[m]ost fundamentally, PMFs challenge one of the basic 
premises of the study of international security: that states possess a monopoly over the 
use of force, and thus the study of security can be based on the premise that states
191constitute the sole unit of analysis.’ Singer went on to elaborate the significance of 
this observation, arguing that ‘[t]he powers are no longer exclusively sovereign states, 
but also include “interdependent players caught in a network of transnational
119 Singer, Corporate Warriors p. 191-215.
120 Part of this can be explained by the sheer difficulty of the task. Gaining interview access to private 
security companies is still a difficult task, but prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq it was difficult in the 
extreme. Many companies assumed any information they would share would be used to portray their firm 
as an unethical ‘mercenary’ company and many simply refused to be interviewed. Today, while it is still 
very difficult to get a private security company to discuss the specifics of a particular security contract, 
they are more accessible to researchers and the media in general.
121 Ibid, p.233.
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transactions” [and that] the privatized military industry represents alternative patterns of 
power and authority linked to a global market, rather than limited by the territorial 
state.’ 122
However, because Singer based his theoretical work on a micro-economic model that 
narrowly read the growth of private security in terms of a loss of state control over 
defence functions, he did not have a theoretical model capable of developing these 
significant observations. As a result, passing references to networks and the fact that the 
new and expanded role of private security constitutes a new form of de-territorialized 
power and authority beyond the state were left un-articulated and unexplored within this 
text.
1.9.2 Deborah Avant and the Market for Force
Deborah Avant’s book The Market for Force: the Consequences o f Privatizing Security
provides a theoretically sophisticated book-length work dedicated to the study of private
security within IR. In a reflection of the continuing sophistication of private security
research, her work combined multiple interview-led empirical case studies with a
coherent theoretical framework that focused on two simple questions: ‘Does the
privatization of security undermine state control of violence? Can the privatization of
1security enhance state control of violence?’
Dissecting the private security literature into two camps of ‘pessimists’ and ‘optimists’ 
that she interpreted as theoretically underpinned by economic institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism (respectively), Avant sought to distil and then empirically 
test their claims within an institutionalist synthesis that combined these two
122 Ibid pp. 169-70.
123 Deborah Avant, The Market fo r Force: the Consequences o f  Privatizing Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 2005 p.3.
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approaches.124 Disaggregating control into a tripartite framework of political, social, and 
functional control, Avant then looked to measure the effects that the privatization of 
security had on the ‘delivery of security services’ and ‘financing for security services’ 
for both state and non-state actors.
Overall, this complex theoretical framework provided a useful tool for thinking about 
the different types of possible effects that the growth of private security may have on 
the control over force. However, as her core questions above suggest, this study 
deliberately set out to analyse private security’s growing role in security governance in 
the zero-sum and binary terms familiar to Realist analysis. While her study includes a 
sociological institutionalist—i.e. constructivist—element, this too is used to measure 
whether private security either weakens or strengthens state control over violence.
While this binary formulation of private security either increasing or decreasing state 
control over violence went some way in correcting Singer’s earlier analytical bias 
towards finding a ‘loss’ of state control, Avant’s study also left a number of conceptual 
areas unexplored. For instance, Avant’s empirical case study research led her to 
indicate interesting changes in private security’s relationship to authority. However, her 
state-centric approach to authority—most notably exemplified by a comparative 
analysis of state regulation of private security exports—left broader legal/theoretical 
possibilities for private security’s contemporary relationship to authority unaddressed. 
While Avant stated that ‘[ajuthority over force is spread outside the state, to the oil 
sector and to local companies, some with ties to local militias’ her state-centric
124 Deborah Avant, The Market for Force, chapter two, pp. 42-80. Whereas economic institutionalism’s 
emphasis on the importance of state bureaucratic control over security tasks predicts loss of state control 
with privatization, sociological institutionalism’s emphasis on the importance of internalized actor’s 
norms predicts more room for neutral or even positive control effects associated with privatized security.
125 This differentiation between deliverers and financers is broadly compatible with a security governance 
approach’s differentiation between implementers and auspices of security used in this dissertation.
126 Avant, Market for Force p. 240. See also her discussion of historical differences in authority over 
security on p. 212, 244-7.
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model of authority left the actual meaning of this dispersal of ‘authority’ away from the 
state in this particular instance unexplained and under-theorised.
Finally, this dissertation also takes issue with the way in which Avant has 
conceptualised the public/private divide, and especially her definition of the term 
‘private.’ In her discussion of some of the meta-theoretical issues surrounding private 
security, she stated ‘I will use the term “private” to refer to non-governmental actors. 
Commercial entities and NGOs fall into this category—however, so do vigilantes,
1 97paramilitaries, and organized crime bosses.’ Here, Avant is self-consciously exposing 
her argument to the conceptual dilemma of placing legal private entities into the same 
category as illegal private actors. However, since she does not focus her case study 
research on illegal entities purchasing or supplying security, the practical effect of her 
understanding of ‘the private’ as both legal and illegal is left unexplored in her work.
1.9.3 Christopher Kinsey and Corporate Soldiers
As with Peter Singer’s work, Christopher Kinsey’s book on private security was the 
result of one of the first doctoral dissertations devoted explicitly to the subject of private 
security within the field of IR. In parallel with Singer, Kinsey’s doctoral thesis spent 
considerable time elaborating a typology of ‘private military organizations’ as well as 
situating the contemporary growth of private security within a centuries long narrative 
of the decline of private violence—i.e. mercenaries and privateers—associated with the 
rise of the modem state.
More substantively, two points need to be made regarding the theoretical content of 
Kinsey’s work as it pertains to this current study of private security. First, while Kinsey
127 Ibid, p.24.
128 Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise o f Private Military 
Companies (London: Routledge) 2006.
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does briefly introduce some of the terminology used in this dissertation’s security 
governance approach, his dissertation did not apply a security governance approach to 
private security. The concepts typical of a security governance approach—such as 
networks or the dispersal of authority—are neither theoretically developed nor applied 
in a systematic fashion. For instance, while Kinsey does discuss the possibility of
I  <}Q
‘multiple centres of authority,’ this terminology is reserved for a discussion of failed
states and refers to the existence of competing warlords in a particular territory rather
than a systematic discussion of the way private security relates to authority or the
fragmentation of political authority. Here, too, we see the concept of authority applied
to a broader category of non-state and criminal private violence. While it is perhaps
disingenuous to critique the idea of the political authority of warlords in a contemporary
African context, Kinsey’s use of ‘authority’ begs the analytical question of how the
legal authority of private security may be—or whether it should be—differentiated from
the illegal authority wielded by these criminally violent private actors.
Kinsey’s use of the concept of network is also limited largely to a broadly descriptive
account of ‘new wars’ and the way private security companies operate within this
1 ^ 0environment. For example, Kinsey draws on the observations of Mark Duffield and
other new wars scholars that emphasize a shift away from a state-centric (i.e.
• 1^1 ‘hierarchical, territorial and bureaucratic’) development models towards ‘a more
polyarchical, non-territorial and networked approach’ that increasingly relies on private
1 ^ 9  •security for support. However, Kinsey does not use the network concept to provide a
129 Christopher Kinsey, ‘The Rise of the Corporate Soldier: The Role of Private Military Companies in 
International Security’ Doctoral Thesis, University of Wales, Aberystwyth 2003. p. 212.
130 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books) 2001.
131 Development here is understood to mean state-building strategies of the broader international 
community aimed at the South—primarily African—developing countries.
132 Kinsey, Dissertation p.63.
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focused study of the way private security’s involvement in security governance is itself 
situated within these types of security networks.
He also introduces the notion of strategic complexes—described as complex and 
mutating networks of public, private, corporate and non-profit actors—to discuss the 
way security is being privatized to help achieve development-related policy goals. 
While this is an interesting point worth developing with case study analysis, Kinsey 
does not apply the notion of a strategic complex as conceptual tool to empirically (or 
systematically) map the networked interactions between private security and the host of 
other actors that comprise them. Instead, the notion of a strategic complex is used as a 
descriptive milieu of the post-Cold War developing-world environment within which 
private security operated.
This lack of a robust application of security governance concepts does not necessarily 
represent a weakness in the work, but rather—as with the other two authors discussed— 
a difference in theoretical emphasis. Kinsey draws from business management theory to 
discuss the way private security can be ‘more efficient than state militaries’ and spends 
considerable time discussing the relative advantages and disadvantages of various 
mechanisms of state regulation and control of private security addressed within British 
government policy circles. Importantly, these twin focuses on a) the relative efficiency 
of private security vis-a-vis state security, and b) the mechanisms by which the state can 
maintain control over private security again illustrate the re-occurring pattern of 
interpreting private security in terms of a net ‘gain’ or a net Toss’ of state control.
As with Herbert Howe, Kinsey differentiates himself from the other two authors 
discussed by concluding that private security may actually increase state control over
133 On an empirical level, he did not apply original case-studies to his analysis of the actual interactions 
between states, NGOs and multi-national firms and private security. For instance, the discussion of 
private security interacting with non-governmental organizations was limited to a three page discussion 
that stated ‘no close working relationship exists between PMCs and NGO’s’ and a discussion of possible 
future utility in these to actors working together. Kinsey, Dissertation p.209.
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security (rather than decrease it) by operating more efficiently than the state’s armed 
forces. However, in setting up his analysis of private security’s relationship to the state 
in this way, private security is still conceptualised in binary terms as either a challenge 
to state control over security or merely an apolitical tool used by states to increase their 
control over security. As a result, in this study the importance of private security as an 
independent political actor is not emphasised.
1.9.4 Second-Cut Interpretations o f Private Security in IR: Conclusion
The literature on private security within IR has grown considerably more sophisticated 
in the last few years. The original claims that private security undermines the state’s 
monopoly of legitimate violence—though still with us—have often been 
operationalized into research questions designed to measure the way private security 
either erodes or increases state control over violence and security. As a result, these 
second-cut studies of private security have proven to be extremely valuable. However, 
by designing their research questions in terms of the effects that private security has on 
the state’s control of violence—rather than focusing on how private security is itself 
engaged in security governance—these studies have also rather ironically retained a 
significant degree of state-centrism.
Because of this, these studies have not been able to focus their attention on other 
significant changes in the nature of private security’s relationship to security 
governance. Indeed, as illustrated above, these second-cut studies have occasionally 
revealed this fact within their own research—by briefly commenting on the dispersal of 
authority to non-state locations or the networked nature of security structures—while 
simultaneously operating without the conceptual vocabulary needed to elaborate these 
observations in theoretical terms. As a result, while these studies have made a
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significant contribution to the literature, they have not been able to discuss private 
security in terms of changes in the operation of authority—or changes in the 
relationship between territory and security governance—that require a conceptual 
deconstruction of the state’s monopoly on authority, territory, and coercion. By 
applying a security governance model to the study of private security that de-centers the 
state and deconstructs its conceptual monopoly on security governance, this thesis will 
fill this theoretical gap left by the second-cut private security literature.
1.0 Structure o f  the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter two completes the 
dissertation’s explicit critique of Realist interpretations of private security by providing 
a brief study of Realist IR and Realist Sociology. This short overview is important for 
two reasons. First, it is necessary to corroborate the claim that the conceptual problems 
related to the analysis of private security located in first-cut studies of private security 
can be traced back through Realist IR theory’s treatment of ‘private violence’. Second, 
the focus on Realist Sociology is used to further elucidate some of the Weberian 
concepts that underpin the state’s monopoly of authority, territory and coercion. In 
doing so, a greater degree of theoretical precision can be attained when discussing the 
idea of security governance’s ‘deconstruction’ of this Weberian triptych applied 
throughout the rest of the chapters.
Set against this critical backdrop, chapter three applies a security governance model to 
the study of private security in Iraq between 2003 and 2007. Overall, the chapter 
demonstrates what a security governance deconstruction of the state’s monopoly of 
authority, territory and coercion looks like when applied to Iraq. It provides empirical 
examples of the partnerships between auspices and private security implementers, and
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explains how they should be viewed as hybrid public-private (or private-private) 
security actors. It also illustrates how these hybrid actors were embedded into larger 
security networks that crisscrossed Iraq during 2003-2007. This model not only maps 
the way private security engaged in security governance throughout the territory of Iraq; 
it also provides a tool to illustrate how private security embedded itself into the state’s 
bureaucratic apparatus itself—at multiple sites or nodes—via hybrid security 
partnerships with the state.
Second, chapter three also provides an addition to a zero-sum and binary framework for 
understanding the power dynamics between private security and the state. It draws upon 
observations from the new sociology of governance and neo-Foucauldian literature and 
applies them to two detailed case studies of large-scale hybrid public-private security 
networks. Whereas the first case study of the Erinys Oil Protection Force discusses the 
state-private security power relationship through the neo-liberal lens of ‘rule at a 
distance’, the second case study of the PSC Aegis applies some neo-Foucauldian 
concepts to highlight aspects of private security’s relationship to the state that are 
hidden from binary and zero-sum power models.
Chapter four provides the second and final discussion of the operation of private 
security in Iraq. Complementing the previous chapter’s dual case studies of large 
(macro-level) networked private security operations, chapter four introduces the concept 
of the micro-level security network to explore the operation of private security at the 
capillary level. By demonstrating the way public auspices ‘activate’ resources external 
to the state—e.g. NGOs and PSCs—to implement public policy programs, this chapter 
also empirically elaborates the effects that the neo-liberal governmental practice of ‘rule 
at a distance’ has on security governance. Chapter four also provides a case study of 
security governance operating ‘beyond rule at a distance.’ This entails a discussion of an
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NGO hiring a PSC for armed protection without being embedded into a hybrid security 
network with a public auspice and an explanation of how this mode of security 
governance differs from ‘rule at a distance’.
Chapter five applies a security governance model to the study of maritime private 
security. Against the backdrop of the first detailed theoretical study of private security 
in the maritime environment, the fifth chapter demonstrates what the dispersal of meta­
political authority away from the state looks like in practice. It provides two case studies 
of maritime private security companies turning to international law as an alternative 
non-state source of meta-political authority to undergird the legitimacy of their security 
governance programs. The first examines a security governance program run by a 
hybrid public-private security network comprised of a quasi-state and a private security 
company off of the coast of Somalia. It explores the content of this security governance 
program, the power dynamics between the various nodes in the network, as well as the 
entrepreneurial use of international law by the PSC to support the legality of its work. 
The second case study provides an example of a hybrid private-private (i.e. PSC- 
commercial client) security network and its interactions with the littoral states of the 
Malacca Straits. More radically, this case study demonstrates how an entrepreneurial 
use of international law—and the meta-political authority that it provides—can 
empower private security to engage in a security governance program within a state’s 
own territory against the wishes of its government.
Chapter six provides a broader overview of the private security industry as a whole by 
shifting to a global level of analysis. It provides a discussion of the transformation and 
globalization of private security training by documenting the post-WWII growth and 
expansion of this industry from its origins in the United States and the United Kingdom 
to its contemporary global organization. Chapter six also maps the transformational
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changes in the nature of security training itself. First, it provides an empirical discussion 
of the pluralization of the consumers of security training to institutions above, below, 
outside, and within the state (yet outside of the state’s armed forces). Second, it briefly 
discusses how this de-linking of security training from the state involves a reflexive 
process between private security and the state that is altering the way we think and 
speak about security training. Chapter seven concludes the thesis and provides a thesis 
overview, a summary of its empirical and theoretical contributions, as well as a 
discussion of future research developments.
77
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
2 Private Security and the State in Realist IR and Realist 
Sociological Theory: A Brief Critical Review
‘If we try to avoid reifying some ideal, we find that what we mean by the state is the way in which 
violence is organized.’134-Randall Collins
‘This conflation o f policing with state police is now restricting our view of what is being done, and what 
can be done, to govern security under other auspices.’135 -  Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing
Part I.
2.1 Introduction
As illustrated in chapter one, while many of the first-cut studies of private security 
briefly touched upon the deeper problem of how to situate private security in relation to 
the IR discipline’s (loosely) Weberian understanding of the state’s monopolistic 
relationship to legitimate violence, this puzzle was left largely unresolved within this 
literature. However, this decision made by first-cut analyses of private security ‘to leave 
the Weberian question alone’ cannot be understood as a mistake or as a simple 
analytical oversight. Instead, the unresolved nature of this puzzle within the literature 
speaks to two larger and related issues within IR.
First, this lack of a resolution to the question: ‘How can we theorise private security as a 
political actor, and how does its growth challenge Realist IR theory’s understanding of 
the state?’ needs to be contextualized in terms of a traditional hesitancy within Realist 
IR theory to properly theorise the state—and its relationship to legitimate authority and
134 Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science (New York: Academic Press) 
1974 p.351.
135 Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing, Governing Security p. 10.
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violence—and instead simply posit this relationship as a self-evident fact.136 Arguably, 
this problem extends into all of traditional mainstream IR theory, where the state has 
been defined a priori as a sovereign entity with a monopoly of legitimate violence. 
Stephen Krasner illustrates this point succinctly when he writes ‘[f]or neorealism and 
neoliberalism, sovereign states are the basic ontological given: the actors in 
international politics are unitary, territorial, autonomous entities; they are sovereign
117 »states.’ In this larger sense, then, the first-cut private security literature’s insufficient 
discussion of private security’s theoretical relationship to the state was predicated upon 
a larger silence on these very questions within IR as a discipline.
Second, and more problematically, the task of opening up the Realist idea of the state to 
a sustained theoretical critique would inevitably involve re-addressing the series of 
complex meta-theoretical issues alluded to in chapter one. As a result, any systematic 
critique of Realism’s reading of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence in relation 
to its understanding of private security would have had to provide an alternative 
theoretical framework for understanding private security’s relationship to the authority, 
coercion and territory. While a security governance approach to private security can 
address these issues, the first-cut private security literature in IR did not. Tracing this 
problem back to Realist IR theory itself is the core task of the following section.
136 Elsewhere this lack of interest in the state as an institution within mainstream IR theory is critically 
referred to as an ‘asociological bias.’ See John M. Hobson, ‘What’s at stake in ‘bringing historical 
sociology back into International Relations’? Transcending ‘chronofetishism’ and ‘tempocentrism’ in 
international relations’, Historical Sociology o f International Relations (ed. Stephen Hobden) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2002 p.4.
137 Kraser, Stephen (ed.) Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities. New York: 
Columbia University, 2001. p.6.
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2.2 Private Security in Realist IR Theory
This chapter section offers a critique of the work of a number of prominent Realist IR 
theorists influenced by the conceptual language of Weberian sociology. This discussion 
is not intended as a critique of a Realist conception of international politics in general. 
Rather, its purpose is restricted to illustrating how Realist IR theory’s discussion of the 
state’s monopoly of legitimate violence—and its understanding of the category of 
private violence—has either hindered its understanding of private security or rendered 
private security completely invisible to Realist IR analysis.
This chapter section specifically links some of the conceptual problems illustrated in the 
first critical literature review—including the predisposition to theorise private violence 
as illegitimate and viewing all non-state violence in a zero-sum relationship to the 
state—to problems existing within core Realist IR texts. Finally, this chapter section 
sets up this dissertation’s brief discussion of Weberian Sociology itself before moving 
on to an empirical application of a security governance methodology to the study of 
private security in chapter three.
2.2.1 Kenneth Waltz and Neo-Realism
Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realist theory offers a useful starting point because of the 
importance of his work within Realist IR theory and also because it provides an 
example of the explicit usage of Weberian terminology in articulating the state’s 
relationship to violence. As a brief analysis of the quotations below will illustrate, 
Waltz’s usage of the terms private force, legitimacy and monopoly—and the implicit 
understanding of power that underpins them—create problems for a subtle analysis of 
private security’s relationship to the state. Since Waltz does not discuss private security 
explicitly; a fact in and of itself foreshadowing Realist theoretical problems in dealing
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with this subject matter. As a result, we are left to extrapolate Waltz’s understanding of 
private security’s relationship to the state from his discussion of private force’s 
relationship to the state. The quote below provides a useful introduction to the concept 
of authority (i.e. legitimacy) as it pertains to a Realist understanding of the use of 
coercion. Waltz writes:
‘A government, ruling by some standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself the right to use force—that is, to 
apply a variety o f sanctions to control the use of force by its subjects. If some use private force, others 
may appeal to the government.’ 139
For Waltz, ‘the right to use force’ (i.e. legitimate violence) is fundamentally something 
that states arrogate to themselves. The private use of force is not considered legitimate 
in the same way as the use of force by states, and states use a ‘variety of sanctions’ to 
control the private use of force. Indeed, in the preceding quotation, the private use of 
force seems implicitly criminal and therefore illegitimate in nature—a threat to the 
subjects of the state—who in turn may appeal to the government to counter this 
criminal, private use of force. The criminal or politically hostile conceptual relationship 
between private force and the state (and its subjects) is made more explicit when Waltz 
writes ‘[rjebels challenge a government’s claim to authority...[and] [nationally, private 
use of force used against a government threatens the political system.’140 Not only is 
private force considered illegitimate in this context, but the relationship between private 
force and the state is contextualized exclusively in zero-sum and violent terms.
138 In Realist thought, legitimacy and authority are essentially synonymous and have little normative 
content. Realism de-emphasizes the normative aspect of legitimacy and instead focuses on whether or not 
a state has its legitimacy recognized, and recognition is defined in terms of obedience. In this sense, 
legitimacy, like authority, is backed up by the state’s superior capacity for violence. This point will be 
made explicitly by Waltz himself in a quotation below.
139 Emphasis in original. Kenneth Waltz, ‘Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power’ in Neo-Realism and 
Its Critics (ed.) Robert Keohane, (New York: Columbia University Press) 1986 p.99-100.
140 Ibid p. 110.
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Crucially, it does not appear that Waltz theoretically differentiates between legitimate 
private violence (such as private security) and illegitimate private violence (such as 
rebel or criminal violence). On one level, then, one could argue that for Waltz, 
legitimate private violence is reduced to a conceptual oxymoron. If this is the case, any 
analysis of private security and its relationship to the state is obviously put under severe 
theoretical duress.
On another level, one could argue that Waltz does not view all private violence as 
illegitimate; rather, Waltz implicitly relegates acts of legitimate private violence—such 
as private security—to an apolitical or economic sphere. If this reading is accurate, two 
points can be made. First, since Waltz’s theory sees legitimacy as something ‘states 
arrogate to themselves’, his theory does not allow for the possibility—to be 
demonstrated in the empirical chapters—that private security may engage in acts of 
legitimate private violence independently of the state using alternative sources of public 
meta-political authority. Second, while Waltz may acknowledge the possibility of 
legitimate private force (i.e. private security), for Waltz it remains intrinsically non­
political and insignificant due to its inability to violently challenge the political order of 
the state. If this is the case, Waltz leaves little theoretical room for the possibility that 
private security may indeed operate as a politically significant actor.
Waltz’s discussion of the concept of monopoly and its relationship to private force is 
also instructive. He writes:
‘A government has no monopoly on the use of force, as is all too evident. An effective government, 
however, has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and legitimate here means that public agents are 
organized to prevent and to counter the private use of force. Citizens need not prepare to defend 
themselves. Public agencies do that.’141
141 Emphasis in original. Kenneth Waltz, ‘Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power’ in Neo-Realism and 
Its Critics (ed.) Robert Keohane, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) pp.99-100.
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This quintessentially Weberian formulation of the state as holding a ‘monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force’ is explicitly defined in terms of the prevention and countering of 
private force. Importantly, it appears that Waltz’s intent is to refer to the necessity of the 
‘effective’ state to be able to meet (and defeat) any violent (private) challenge to its rule. 
However, in this instance, the meaning of a ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of force’ as 
it pertains to private security and its relationship to the state is not made clear. Not only 
is private force again placed in a direct and violent zero-sum conflict with the state, but 
the very idea that the private sector may engage in its own politically significant 
provision of security—as a provider or as a consumer of security—is rejected. 
Moreover—as will be illustrated in chapter three—Waltz’s twin claims that ‘citizens 
need not prepare to defend themselves’ and that ‘public agencies do that’ seem 
increasingly antiquated as neo-liberal state policies of ‘responsibilization’ are not 
merely allowing but actually requiring citizens to provide their own armed security
142protection.
As a corollary to Waltz’s observations about private force’s zero-sum relationship to the 
state, the ‘private use of force’ in the inter-state system is also conceptualized in zero- 
sum terms as a potential hostile challenge. Ironically, however, in a telling disregard for 
the relevance of ‘private force’, neither rebels nor other ‘private actors’ (such as private 
security) are given the privilege of representing this challenge. Waltz writes:
‘Force used by a state—a public body—is, from the international perspective, the private use of force; but 
there is no government to overthrow and no governmental apparatus to capture. Short of a drive toward 
world hegemony, the private use of force does not threaten the system of international politics, only some 
of its members.’143
142 This refers to the policy of the Coalition Provisional Authority—and various other state organs— 
requiring commercial firms to provide their own security. Indeed, commercial firms were required to give 
a detailed ‘security plan’ in their contract bid even before they would be considered for the government 
reconstruction contract.
143 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power’ in Neo-Realism audits Critics (ed.) Robert 
Keohane, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) p.l 10.
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In a classic example of state-centrism, Waltz simply argues that (public) state violence 
viewed from the system-level may be understood allegorically as an example of ‘private 
force’, since there is no universal source of public authority that exists at a global level. 
Yet, according to Waltz, this ‘private force’ wielded by a (public) state against another 
state ought not be understood in terms of a challenge to the state-system itself. Indeed, 
according to Waltz’s systemic theory of international politics, the possibility of private 
force constituting a challenge to the international system—conceptually or literally—is 
essentially nil. While states can be victimized by ‘private’ aggression, the actual 
international system itself remains immune from such challenges since there is no 
‘governmental apparatus to capture’ at the global level. Indeed, for Waltz, this form of 
inter-state ‘private force’ must actually ‘make a drive for world hegemony’ in order to 
challenge the state system, and anything less—such as the absorption of one state by 
another—is simply a re-organization of power within the system rather than a challenge 
to it.
Two important points can be drawn regarding private security from Waltz’s 
commentary on the international system. On the one hand, it is instructive to note that at 
the level of the international system, private (read as non-state) force is considered to be 
so insignificant that the term ‘private’ is literally used to refer to inter-state violence. On 
the other, it is instructive to point out that within Waltz’s framework, private security 
would need to ‘threaten the system of international politics’ in a literal bid for world 
hegemony in order to either effect system change or even attain a degree of political 
significance at the level of the international system. Waltz’s framework not only 
obscures private security within an inarticulate category of private violence, but it also
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maintains a heavy theoretical bias for system stasis 
facts have proved to be a significant conceptual 
security in global politics.
2.2.2 Hedley Bull and the English School
Hedley Bull’s work Anarchical Society offers another example of a major theoretical 
influence within the discipline of IR whose Weberian language leaves it problematically 
situated for an analysis of the political content of private security, its relationship to the 
state, and its role in the international system. For Bull, as for Waltz and other Realists, 
‘[t]he starting point of international relations is the existence of states...'145 Bull draws 
upon Weberian terminology in his definition of the state when he writes:
‘[a] government is distinguished from other institutions within the modem state by its ability to call on 
physical force. On the one hand, it possesses actual force at its disposal that is overwhelming in relation 
to that which is commanded by any other group. On the other hand, it possesses a near monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force: apart from certain residual rights of self-defence that are accorded to the 
individual, only the government is able to employ force while being regarded by members of the society 
at large as within its rights of doing so’.146
In a fashion similar to Waltz, Bull discusses the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence 
in fundamentally zero-sum terms; he argues that the key attribute for an effective state is 
that it must have in its possession actual force that is ‘overwhelming in relation to’ the 
force wielded by any other actor within its territory. He describes this superior capacity 
for violence as ‘factual’ sovereignty and argues ‘an independent political community
144 John Ruggie, ‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity’ p. 148 and Richard K. Ashley ‘The 
Poverty of Neorealism’ p.290 in Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia Univeristy Press) 1986.
145 Bull, Hedley Anarchical Society, (Basingstoke: Macmillan) 1977, p.8.
146 Bull, Anarchical Society, p.55. It is interesting to note that Bull’s point of ‘residual rights of self- 
defence accorded to the individual’ directly follows Weber’s own treatment of this subject.
rather than change.144 Both of these 
hurdle for thinking about private
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which merely claims a right to sovereignty but cannot assert this right in practice, is not 
a state properly so-called’.U1 Clearly, this quotation suggests Bull’s articulation of the 
state’s monopoly of legitimate violence is not incompatible with the existence of private 
security. However, by framing the question of the state’s relationship to coercion in 
such stark either/or terms of whether or not a state can maintain ultimate coercive 
supremacy over other actors, private security is here again implicitly interpreted within 
a broader category of private force that is seen as either an existential threat to the state 
or dismissed as politically irrelevant; as a result, private security is left hidden from his 
analysis.
1 dQBull’s usage of the term legitimacy is also important. Unlike Waltz—whose approach 
to the relationship of private force and legitimacy is less clear—Bull takes a more 
explicitly Weberian approach to the issue of legitimacy. Specifically, he acknowledges 
that the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence is theoretically compatible with ‘certain 
residual rights’ held by the private citizen to engage in limited acts of legitimate 
‘private’ violence. This is an improvement upon Waltz insofar as the private use of 
force does not conceptually slip back and forth between (or simply remain an 
ambiguous combination of) legal and illegal violence. However, as with Weber himself, 
these residual rights are discussed in terms of the household right of individual self 
defense and are left intentionally incompatible with the idea of private security’s 
participation in the political practice of security governance at the societal level in 
general. Following a Realist and state-centric logic, for Bull, coercion at the societal 
level—i.e. politically significant coercion that extends outside of the household into 
broader society as a whole—is conceptualized as legitimate only when engaged in by 
the state. Logically following from this, the Realist pattern of interpreting organized
147 Bull, Anarchical Society, p.8 emphasis added.
148 This dissertation understands Bull’s use of the term legitimacy as a synonym for authority. The 
justification for this was explained in the previous section discussing the work of Kenneth Waltz.
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private force that takes place at the level of society as illegitimate and a challenge to the 
state is replicated in Bull’s writings.
Interestingly—and again in contradistinction to Waltz—Bull’s understanding of the 
state’s monopoly of legitimate violence is amenable to the idea that legitimate authority 
may be divided up between the state and other actors. However, rather than creating 
theoretical space for a discussion of the relationship between these multiple authorities 
and what this might mean for private security and its relationship to security 
governance, this possibility is precluded by an emphasis on state sovereignty and its 
‘[sjupremacy over all other authorities within that territory and population.’149 
Following Weber, for Bull any possibility of politically significant legitimate private 
authority over security governance being wielded by private security is rendered void by 
a binary reading of authority. For Bull, states either monopolize authority, or they are 
‘not a state properly so-called.’150
2.2.3 Hans Morgenthau and Classical Realism
The final example of the latent problems created by the Weberian inheritance within 
Realist IR thought when attempting to properly understand private security is taken 
from the defining classical Realist account of international politics—Hans 
Morgenthau’s IR textbook Politics Among Nations.151 While Morgenthau prefers to 
discuss the organization of violence within the state—and within the modem 
international system—in terms of the principle of sovereignty rather than monopoly, as 
previously emphasized, the two concepts when used within Realist IR theory and 
Realist Sociology are essentially synonymous. For Morgenthau:
149 Bull, Anarchical Society, p.8.
150 Ibid.
151 Hans Morgenthau Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw- 
Hill) 1948.
87
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
‘The modem conception of sovereignty was first formulated in the latter part of the sixteenth century with
reference to the new phenomenon of the territorial state. It referred in legal terms to the elemental
political fact of that age—the appearance of a centralized power that exercised its lawmaking and law-
enforcing authority within a certain territory. This power... .was superior to the other forces that made
themselves felt in that territory. In the span of a century, it became unchallengeable either from within the
152territory or from without. In other words, it had become supreme.’
Here, state sovereignty is understood in terms of the state’s ‘supreme’ and 
‘unchallengeable’ position to ‘the other forces that made themselves felt in [its] 
territory.’ For Morgenthau, sovereignty was first and foremost a political fact that 
expressed itself in the binary and zero-sum terms of the state’s superior control over the 
means of violence relative to those other actors present within its territory. Pointedly, 
Morgenthau did not refer to private force in his discussion of ‘the other forces’ that 
existed within a state’s territory. Instead, the ‘other forces’ he referred to were the 
emperor and pope on the one hand, and feudal barons on the other, an omission of 
private force that again broadly illustrates the way Realist thought has arguably
• 1 SIdisplaced private force—and hence private security—from analytical consideration. 
Given this dissertation’s critique of Realism’s ahistorical approach to the organization 
of violence in the international system, it is important to underscore that while 
Morgenthau has an historically located understanding of sovereignty, his understanding 
does not emphasize—or even allow for—continuing change in the nature of security 
governance. Nor is this framework theoretically sensitive to the possibility of private 
security’s potential role in security governance. Though Morgenthau does discuss an 
important historical transition from the mediaeval system to the modem system of 
sovereignty—and thus discusses the possibility of change in security governance—the 
‘end of history’ aspect of Realism’s state-centric understanding of the modem state’s
152 Morgenthau, Hans (1948) Politics Among Nations, New York: McGraw-Hill Inc, p.328.
153 Ibid.
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monopoly of legitimate violence provides the intellectual core of Morgenthau’s thought 
on security governance. For Morgenthau, the political /^significance of private force has 
remained an implicit constant from the sixteenth century onwards. This insignificance is 
understood in terms of the ‘political fact’ of the state’s superior control over violence 
that has continued into the contemporary period. Morgenthau writes that:
‘[t]oday, no less that when it was first developed in the sixteenth century, sovereignty points to a political 
fact. That fact is the existence of a person or a group of persons who, within the limits of a given territory, 
are more powerful than any competing person or group of persons and whose power, institutionalized as 
it must be in order to last, manifests itself as the supreme authority to enact and enforce legal rules within 
that territory.’154
With Morgenthau, as with much of Realist and other state-centric thought, to the extent 
that change in international politics is discussed, it is relegated to a distant pre- 
Westphalian past. At the same time, any discussion of the operation of private force as a 
significant political actor remained locked into a binary logic that required either a 
violent challenge to the state or its relegation to the status of an apolitical 
epiphenomenon. Indeed, for Morgenthau, as with Waltz after him, the relative 
insignificance of private force in the inter-state system was so profound that it did not 
merit any serious consideration whatsoever.
2.2.4 Contextualizing the Problems o f First-Cut Studies o f  Private Security in IR within 
the Broader Problems in Realist IR Theory
As illuminated above, many of the conceptual problems encountered by first-cut studies 
of private security in IR can be traced directly back to Realist IR theory. The writings 
of Waltz, Bull and Morgenthau all demonstrate—in different ways and to different
154 Morgenthau, p.335.
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degrees—a Weberian understanding of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence that 
has rendered their work theoretically ill-equipped to discuss the political significance of 
private security. On a general level, the static state-centric structure of Realist IR theory 
blinds it to the possibility of change in the organization of legitimate violence in the 
international system, thereby limiting its ability to understand the re-emergence of 
private security in terms of a shift in the way political coercion is organized. At the 
same time, Realist IR theory’s crude category of ‘private violence’ has proven incapable 
of offering a suitable analytical lens for understanding private security. On the one 
hand, by ‘dumping’155 private security into a larger category of potential challengers to 
state rule, Realism over-emphasizes a theoretical zero-sum power competition between 
private security and the state. On the other hand, Realism’s general understanding of the 
state’s monopoly of the political also forces private security into a conceptual binary 
whereby it is considered either a violent criminal actor or a legitimate yet politically 
insignificant actor. In the latter case, private security is either understood as an 
extension of the state without any real political autonomy, or essentially as an economic 
actor confined to the realm of private household violence.156 The following section 
traces these conceptual problems Realism faces when interpreting private security back
1 57to the writings of Max Weber and Weberian Realist Sociology more broadly.
155 This typically happens on an implicit level due to the fact that Realist theory does not discuss private 
security on its own terms, but merely as a sub-category of private violence.
156 For a critique of Realist theoretical arguments that deny the autonomy of non-state actors, see: Barnett, 
Michael, Finnemore, Martha. ’The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations’ in 
International Organization 1999 53(4) p.714.
157 This dissertation dispenses with the term neo-Weberian occasionally used to describe the writings of 
authors like Anthony Giddens or Michael Mann who have developed mild modifications to Weber’s 
definition of the state and its monopoly of violence. This decision is justified due to the fact that the 
writings of these ‘neo-Weberian’ authors are broadly exposed to the same general criticisms leveled 
against Weber and Realism in general.
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Part II.
2.3 Assessing the Impact o f Weberian Sociology on the Study o f  Private Security in IR
This dissertation agrees with Michael Smith’s proposition that ‘[m]ore than any other 
figure Weber established the discourse of the Realist approach to international 
relations.’ This dissertation also extends this observation by suggesting that more 
than any other figure, Max Weber has established the foundational conceptual terms 
within which the discourse on private security within International Relations has 
unfolded. Not only has the Weberian terminology of the state ‘monopoly on violence’ 
been a ubiquitous presence within the literature on private security; more 
fundamentally, the theoretical categories and concepts behind Weber’s definition of the 
state—regarding authority, territory, coercion, power and the political itself—have both 
dominated and created significant problems for the way IR has approached the study of 
private security.
By creating a definition of the state that ‘captures’ each of these concepts within the 
idea of a state monopoly, Weberian sociology has provided a theoretical template for 
Realist IR theory that is not only blind to private security, but is also theoretically 
unable to articulate private security’s role in security governance or its specifically 
political content. Moreover, Weber’s zero-sum understanding of power has directed 
most analyses of private security’s relationship to the state within IR in precisely these 
terms of a loss/gain power binary insensitive to the contradictory power effects of the 
hybrid public-private security networks that comprise the state’s relationship to private 
security. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to discussing the work of Max 
Weber—and Weberian sociologists—directly before moving onto the application of a
158 Michael Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University) 
1986 p.54.
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security governance framework to the empirical case studies presented in this 
dissertation.
2.4 A Critique o f  the Weberian State Monopoly o f  Security Governance on its Own 
Terms
This section provides a direct review and critique of Max Weber’s definition of the 
state. Rather than providing a redundant discussion of a Weberian interpretation of 
authority, coercion, and territory as outlined in Part II of chapter one, the following 
section will accomplish four specific tasks. First, it will provide a simple and brief point 
by point critique of Weber’s definition of the state as it pertains to the study of private 
security from the theoretical perspective of a security governance model. Second, in 
doing so, it will highlight a number of aspects of Weber’s definition of the state 
explicitly relevant to the study of private security that have not yet been illustrated. 
Third, it will offer a reappraisal of how Weber understands the ‘monopoly of violence’ 
in terms of ‘last resort control,’ with direct reference to how this crucial aspect of his 
definition has been avoided by other scholars of private security critical of Weber. 
Fourth, it will provide a brief reassessment of how the security governance model used 
in this thesis moves beyond a Weberian understanding of private security, and why this 
move is necessary, before moving onto the empirical section of the thesis in chapter 
three.
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2.4.1 Max Weber’s Definition o f Modern Security Governance: The State Monopoly
Max Weber’s definition of the state is complex and he takes a full three pages to 
elucidate it. His most succinct and popular definition—and the definition that has 
proven foundational within IR theory—posits that:
‘A compulsory organisation will be called a “state” insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds 
the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its social order.’159
Weber continues to elaborate the definition of the state with reference to characteristics 
of the modem state. He writes:
‘Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the 
state or prescribed by it... [t]he claim of the modem state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to 
it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous operation.’160
This definition of the state—elucidated in full here—does not merely describe the 
state’s characteristic features; rather, it does so in a way that builds (or rests) upon the 
series of meta-theoretical propositions within Weberian Realist thought discussed in 
chapter one. Importantly, each of these elements of Weber’s definition of the state are 
also used to differentiate the state—and its monopoly on the political business of rule— 
from other actors and their necessarily apolitical activity. In each of the following sub­
sections below, the various elements of Max Weber’s above definition of the state are 
highlighted and critiqued with reference to the problems they pose for the study of
159 Weber, Max, Economy and Society (eds.) Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Vol. I (Berkeley: 
University of California Press) 1968 p.54. Italics in original.
160 Ibid, p.56.
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private security. These various definitional elements are also briefly re-interpreted from 
a security governance perspective.
2.4.2 The Legitimacy o f the Security Governance o f  Private Security
Weber’s claim that ‘the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either 
permitted by the state or prescribed by it’ contains two points of direct relevance for this 
dissertation’s understanding of the legitimacy and legitimate authority wielded by 
private security. First, unlike some of the cruder discussions of private violence within 
Realist IR theory seen in the first half of this chapter, Weber’s rich definition of the 
state contains a legal-formal understanding of legitimacy that is capable of 
differentiating between legitimate private security and illegitimate criminal violence. 
However, the binary and zero-sum power relationship that underpins Weber’s 
understanding of the ‘permission’ that the state grants to legitimate private security also 
logically strips private security of its political content. While this dissertation 
acknowledges that Weber’s definition of the state creates a theoretical space for 
legitimate private security companies to exist, it posits that this acknowledgement is 
contingent upon denying private security its political content and denying the possibility 
of its role in political act of security governance in general.
Second, on an empirical level, this dissertation argues that Weber’s claim that ‘the use 
of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or 
prescribed by it’ is directly contradicted by the dispersal of meta-political authority to 
other public institutions such as international law. Within this dissertation, the use of 
force by private security is both legitimate and political; moreover, as will be illustrated 
briefly in chapter three and more conclusively in chapter five, private security need not 
necessarily rely upon the state for the meta-political authority to lend it this legitimacy.
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2.4.3 The ‘Compulsory Jurisdiction ’ o f the Security Governance o f  Private Security
For Weber, another essential aspect of the state is its ‘compulsory jurisdiction.’ As 
previously demonstrated in the section devoted to a Realist understanding of territory, 
Weber’s conceptualisation of compulsory jurisdiction is restricted to the state due to its 
unique use of physical coercion—via its police and military forces—to impose 
‘compulsory’ compliance with its state-wide political-territorial order. Because Weber 
understands legitimate private coercion as a) limited to private or ‘household’ space; b) 
limited in its degree or amount of coercion; and c) also limited in application to its own 
members, Weber’s concept of compulsory jurisdiction cannot extend to private security. 
However, in contradistinction to Weber, this dissertation argues that private security 
must be understood in terms of its role in implementing compulsory security 
governance. As the next chapter will clearly illustrate, not only does the operation of 
private security extend into large swaths of public space, but it also directly influences 
the behaviour and activity of everyone in its territorial sphere of operations. Moreover, 
private security’s access to the threat of lethal coercion also underscores the compulsory 
nature of its security governance.
2.4.4 The Politics o f Time: The ‘Continuous Operation ’ o f  the Security Governance o f  
Private Security
In Weber’s famous formulation above, ‘continuous operation’ is also an essential 
characteristic of the state. This political element of time—and the relationship between 
duration and rule—is used by Weber as an organizational category to differentiate the 
state’s political coercion from other acts of compulsory physical coercion he considers
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non-political. The Weberian sociologist Gianfranco Poggi has used the example of a 
street mugger to draw out the way time itself becomes a variable used by Weberians to 
differentiate the state’s uniquely political character. For Poggi, while a street mugger 
may violently dominate (and require compulsory submission) from his victim for a 
matter of seconds, the state constantly requires this compulsory submission from its 
citizens, and has institutionalized rules to demand this submission even when its 
coercive agents are not immediately and directly present. In a logically consistent (and 
only half-ironic) extension of this argument, the Realist sociologist Charles Tilly 
suggested that the political content of the state was not a result of it differentiating itself 
from crime per se; rather, it was its ability to institutionalize continuous crime by 
regularizing its muggings in the form of taxation.161
Two points need to be made about Weber’s concept of continuous operation as it 
pertains to private security. First, significant security governance is engaged in by 
private security for long periods of time within a particular territory. Major cities such 
as London have had a commercial private security presence in one form or another for
1 A1)well over a century. Today, this role is expanding as the security governance of major 
cities is being re-organized in such a way that private security’s role in providing 
security may accurately be described as continuous. This not only refers to the private 
security operating in the quasi-public squares on private property (e.g. shopping centres) 
or public-private spaces (e.g. subways and airports) but also increasingly to their 
continuous role in securing public space. First, private security may be contracted to 
secure a particular territory or to provide armed security functions throughout a 
particular territory for years at a time. This fact of continuous operation applies directly 
to many of the security contracts detailed in case study work—or simply alluded to—in
161 Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’ Peter Evans and Theda Skocpol 
(eds.) Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1985.
162 Les Johnston, Rebirth o f Private Policing p.6-9.
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this dissertation. Second, on a more abstract level, new models of networked 
organization currently allow security governance by private security to take place 
quickly in a particular space, move, and get reconstituted in another space in ways that 
are politically significant and even continuous while not being tied to a particular 
territory. Third, and finally, the security governance of private security may be said to 
be continuous to the extent that it is occurring simultaneously—by many different 
private security actors in many different places—at any given time. This, too, must be 
understood to have a political content.
2.4.5 The Professional ‘Administrative Staff’ o f Private Security
Another essential definitional aspect of the state’s violent ordering of political rule for 
Weber is the quality and capacity of the state’s ‘administrative staff.’ Interestingly, a 
close reading of Weber’s understanding of the role of the state’s administrative staff in 
successfully maintaining a monopoly of violence suggests that he is directly concerned 
with mercenaries. This is because, for Weber, the historical process by which the state 
gained the technical coercive capacity to monopolize violence was constituted by a 
move away from hiring mercenaries or engaging in commercial contracts with security 
agents external to the state towards the creation of a permanent, professional and 
bureaucratically organized state security apparatus. Weber writes:
‘...the modem army is essentially a bureaucratic organization administered by that peculiar type of 
military functionary, the “officer.”’ [Moreover,] ‘[t]he modem army officer is a type of appointed official
163 Fast moving, heavily armed private security convoys prevalent in Iraq is one prominent case in point. 
Private security anti-piracy armed ship escorts provides another example of this idea.
97
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
who...differ[s] radically from elected military leaders, from charismatic condottieri164, from the type of 
officers who recruit and lead mercenary armies as a capitalistic enterprise...’. 165
Thus, to the extent that mercenaries are mentioned within a Realist discourse, they are 
used as an exemplar of a pre-modem, unprofessional and inefficient technique of 
security governance. For instance, the preeminent Realist Samuel Huntington—in his 
classic work on civil-military relations The Soldier and the State—follows a Weberian 
logic and language by defining the military profession as a uniquely monopolized 
institution of the modem state constituted by the elimination of mercenaries and their 
replacement by the permanent institutionalization of the officer corps of the state’s 
armed forces.765
This Weberian focus on the elimination of mercenaries from the state’s administrative 
staff—and how this is an integral element of the state’s monopoly of violence—is a core 
feature of the Realist sociological discourse and has been repeated by many of the major 
contributors within this literature. For instance, Michael Mann writes:
‘Here I move on to... the state monopolization of organized military power—gone were feudal levies and 
private armies.’167 ‘Armed forces tightened from loose confederations of regiments “owned” by great 
nobles or mercenary entrepreneurs to modem, professional forces imposing highly centralized line and 
staff controls and discipline.’168
164 The term condottieri is an Italian word used to describe the mercenary leaders who engaged in 
business contracts with the rulers of Italian city-states between the 14th and 16th centuries to provide them 
with military services.
165 Weber, Economy and Society p.221-2.
166 This point was also made in the history section of chapter one. See Samuel Huntington, Soldier and 
the State: The Theory and Politics o f Civil Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 
1957 p. 14-15.
167 Michael Mann, The Sources o f Social Power vol. II The Rise o f  Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1993 p.73.
168 Ibid p. 17.
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Similarly, Christopher Dandeker writes:
‘[t]he state transformed military organization from a system comprising largely self equipped mercenary 
formations, employed by contracting captains, to one based on professional servants of the state, 
disciplined in a bureaucratic hierarchy and owing allegiance to the state alone.’169
Interestingly, Gianfranco Poggi links his discussion of the importance of the elimination 
of mercenaries from the state’s administrative staff to broader theoretical claims about 
the nature of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. He writes:
‘The controlling organization is a state in so far as it is (among other things) sovereign: that is, it claims, 
and if necessary is willing to prove, that it owes to no other power its control over the population in 
question; that it responds to no other organisation for the modalities and outcomes o f  that control. It 
exercises that control on its own account, activating its own resources, unconditionally, and does not 
derive it from or share it with any other entity. ’ 170
This brief review of how Weberian sociology understands the nature of the state’s 
administrative staff is directly relevant to this dissertation’s study of private security on 
a number of grounds. First, by demonstrating how Realist theory views the elimination 
of mercenaries from the political act of security governance as constitutive of the state’s 
monopoly of legitimate violence, this discussion helps to explain how and why Realism 
(un)theorises private security as a political actor. Second, it continues to contextualise 
the way the expansion of private security has been viewed in IR in zero-sum terms as a 
challenge to the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. Third, Poggi’s quote above 
provides a proper segue into a discussion of the relationship between the contemporary
169 Christopher Dandeker, Surveillance, Power and Modernity : Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to 
the Present Day (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) p.57.
170 Gianfranco Poggi, The State; Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press) p.21 emphasis added.
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expansion of private security, the Realist concept of the state’s administrative staff, and 
how the absence of mercenaries within this staff is deemed as a constitutive element of 
the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. Specifically, this dissertation argues that as 
states increasingly activate private security resources external to their own military (i.e. 
administrative staff) to implement their security programs, Poggi’s proposition that a 
state ‘owes to no other power its control over the population’ [and that] ‘it responds to 
no other organization for the modalities and outcomes of that control’ is becoming 
increasingly untenable. Fourth, as private security continues to develop, the notion that 
‘mercenaries’ do not have the skill sets required to act as professional security 
specialists—and that this security function is still monopolised by the state’s armed 
forces—is no longer tenable.
Today, the state-centric assumption that security professionalism is monopolised by the 
centralized security bureaucracies of the state’s police and military is giving way to the 
reality of a pluralisation of professional private security services. Rather than viewing 
professionalism as an a priori characteristic of the state’s security forces—and the 
absence of professionalism as an a priori attribute of private security—studies of 
professionalism must be grounded in empirical research of both state and private
171security forces. Finally, on an organizational level, late-modern and networked 
organizational models—and the neo-liberal ideologies and managerial techniques of 
rule at a distance that underpin them—are challenging the idea that the traditional
171 The degree of professionalism of both public and private security actors is a matter of empirical 
investigation. This importance of using empirical studies to move away from the state-centric theoretical 
assumptions regarding the privileged position of the state in matters related to security governance is a 
self-conscious contribution of the security governance literature. Also, Avant’s discussion of her category 
of ‘functional’ control of security usefully points out that economic institutionalist literature’s discussion 
of the superiority of state control over ‘sovereign’ functions like providing security assume an ideal 
model of the state (in terms of absence of corruption, etc) that is not always present in reality. See Avant, 
Market for Force, p.57. Clearly, this dissertation extends this critique to Realism’s assumptions about 
state professionalism in general.
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bureaucratic organization the state is the most rational and efficient form of 
administering security governance.172
Though this dissertation avoids placing too heavy an emphasis on the relative 
efficiencies and inefficiencies of private or public modalities of security governance, it 
intentionally draws attention to the way private security disrupts state-centric Realist 
understandings of ‘administrative staff as it pertains to the state’s monopoly of 
legitimate violence. Today, contra to Weber, the professional ‘administrative staff 
responsible for security governance in global politics exists both inside and outside of 
the state and its armed forces. Moreover, more often than not, the administrative staffs 
of these public and private security actors are involved in various degrees of hybrid and 
networked security arrangements that are increasingly blurring the distinction between 
them.
2.4.6 Private Security Beyond 'Last Resort Control’? A Qualified Defence o f  Weber
One qualification needs to be added to this dissertation’s critique of the Weberian 
concept of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. Specifically, it is important to 
acknowledge the significance of a Weberian understanding of ‘last resort control’ and 
the way this concept has been sidestepped in the literature on private security critical of 
a Weberian definition of the state. For Weber:
‘...the threat of force, and in the case of need its actual use, is the method which is specific to political
173organisations and is always the last resort when others have failed.’
172 David Osborne and Ted Gaebler Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is 
Transforming the Public Sector (New York:Plume) 1993; Manuel Castells The Rise o f  the Network 
Society vol. I p.151-67.
173 Max Weber, Economy and Society p.54. Emphasis added.
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Here, last resort control explicitly refers to the fundamental zero-sum power relationship 
between the state and other coercive actors within its territory. For Weber, the mere 
existence of other coercive actors within a state does not challenge its successful 
monopoly of legitimate violence. Poggi underscores this point when he writes:
‘First, the control a state exercises over a population typically involves coercion, with its characteristic 
ultimacy... In other words, whatever else and whoever else is involved in controlling a population, the 
state specializes in last-resort control... Second, the state claims the monopoly of such control.174
Importantly, while the Weberian Realist theoretical language used above is blind to the 
political content of private security and the security programs it implements, studies of 
private security that are critical of Weber’s use of the term ‘monopoly of legitimate 
violence’ are at risk of being blind to the Weberian concept of ‘last resort control.’ This 
problem stems from a reading of the Weberian monopoly over legitimate violence 
purely in terms of an historically located and empirical achievement rather than as a 
theoretical proposition related to the binary and zero-sum nature of power itself.
As a result, claims that ‘[wjhether the state exerts control, direct control, or 
monopolistic control over the use, means, or principal means of violence is an empirical 
question’175 and that ‘...the state’s monopoly Weber wrote about was exaggerated from 
the start and there has been a role for the private sector in security for some tim e...’ 
do not properly engage the Weberian definition of the state on its own terms. 
Specifically, these claims incorrectly read Weber’s understanding of the state’s 
monopoly of legitimate violence merely in terms of an empirical description of the way
174 Gianfranco Poggi, The State; Its Nature, Development and Prospects p.21.
175 Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates & Sovereigns p.9.
176 Deborah Avant, Market for Force, p.2.
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violence is organized, and crucially discount the binary zero-sum philosophical core of 
Weber’s meaning of monopoly as last resort control.
This over-emphasis on the empirical element of Weber’s understanding of the state’s 
monopoly of legitimate violence—and the under-emphasis on the hypothetical violent 
contest for political supremacy embedded within Weber’s idea of monopoly—is also 
found within nodal security governance criticisms of Weber. For Clifford Shearing and 
Monique Marks, a ‘state monopoly over the governance of security’ is interpreted as an 
ideal of the Hobbesian tradition ‘...expressed by Weber’s conception of the nation-state
1 7 7as requiring a monopoly of violence.’ For these authors:
‘[wjithin this political philosophy, aspiration led to claims that such a monopoly had been realized; that a
political fiction was the case. Over the past several decades this fiction has been increasingly difficult to 
178maintain...’
Again, Weber’s understanding of monopoly is reduced to a literal and empirical 
descriptive device and his concern with the zero-sum and binary nature of political 
power is ignored. Other writers within IR heavily influenced by the nodal security 
governance approach to private security can also be critiqued along these lines. From 
the Weberian perspective, claims that ‘...public authorities are only one (albeit an
1 7Qimportant and in many ways still privileged) provider’ of security are disingenuous. 
How important, and how privileged, is the state, and how does this importance and 
privilege manifest itself? Weber is clear on this point: the state’s privilege is total and 
stems from its superior ability to wield violence and choose the nature of the political 
order. For Weber, no empirical shift towards an increase in private security changes this
177 Clifford Shearing and Monique Marks, Introduction: Diversity in Policing p. 197.
178 Ibid.
179 Michael Williams and Rita Abrahamsen, Security the City p .242.
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brute political fact of the state’s ‘last resort control’ at the philosophical core of his 
understanding of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence.
2.5 The Necessity o f Moving Beyond a Weberian State Monopoly o f  Security 
Governance
However, this dissertation argues that the price of Weberian inspired Realist theoretical 
clarity that comes with a binary and zero-sum reading of private security’s relationship 
to the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence is high—too high—a price to pay. Most 
importantly, it does not provide us with the conceptual language to theorise the political 
content of private security or map its growing role in security governance. 
Fundamentally, this dissertation argues that our understanding of the way security is 
governed cannot be reduced to what the state does. While politics may still be 
fundamentally grounded in the way coercion is territorially organized, authorized, and 
implemented, the contemporary role of private security means we can no longer simply 
assume that these three aspects of the political are monopolized by the state. The next 
chapter begins the dual theoretical and empirical process of applying this dissertation’s 
security governance model to the study of private security and its role in security 
governance in Iraq.
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3 Iraq I: Private Security and Networked Security 
Governance in Iraq
‘A network, by definition, has nodes, not a center.’180— Manuel Castells
Part I.
3.1 Introduction
1 O 1
In light of the importance of Iraq to the study of private security in general, this 
chapter is the first of a dual set of complimentary chapters dedicated to an empirical and 
theoretical analysis of the security governance engaged in by private security within 
Iraq between 2003 and 2007. Taken collectively, these two chapters set out to illustrate 
how this practice of private security conflicts with traditional state-centric models of 
security organization that assume both the authorization and the implementation of 
security governance is monopolised by a unitary, centralized state security apparatus. 
The security governance framework used in this chapter emphasizes the de-coupling of 
public authorization of security from its implementation as well as the pluralisation of 
public and private actors (auspices) engaged in the authorisation of security via the 
employment and deployment of private security. Thus, this study of private security in 
Iraq is devoted to highlighting the shift in security governance away from the ideal of a 
state monopoly over security governance by empirically mapping the multiple public
180 Manuel Castells End o f Millennium: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture vol. Ill 
(London: Blackwell) 1998 p.332.
181 This comment should be understood on two levels. First, the US-led invasion of Iraq created a massive 
market for private security and an exponential increase—qualitatively and quantitatively—in the security 
governance engaged in by private security. Second, this fact brought the ‘idea’ of the relevance of private 
security to the attention of the social sciences, the media, and the general public to an unprecedented 
degree.
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and private auspices (authorisers/customers) and private implementers 
(deliverers/providers) of security involved with the governance of security in Iraq.182 
Rather than adopting a Realist state ‘logic of reproduction’183 that emphasizes the state’s 
continuous reproduction of its own structures—and therefore an ahistorical reading of 
the state’s monopolised relationship to security governance—this approach emphasizes 
the changing patterns and actors involved in governing security. In doing so, it also 
intentionally emphasizes that the organization of security governance is a historically 
contingent and open question; in other words, it must be investigated empirically and 
cannot be an in-built assumption or definitional aspect of the analytical categories (i.e.
i  j m
the state and its security monopoly) used to discuss security governance. Thus, by 
viewing security governance as a process, or a practice, and separating it from the 
institutions of the state, it becomes possible to bring attention to the changing structures,
|  o r
techniques and actors (i.e. nodes ) involved in security governance as well as the
I Q£
horizontal networks that connect them to each other.
The concept of a ‘security network’ is used here in two distinct ways. First, defined as 
‘a set of institutional, organizational, communal or individual agents or nodes that are
182 Wood also discusses the terms ‘security governance’ as well as ‘auspices’ and ‘implementers’ as part 
of a larger project to move away from a ‘state centered, Hobbesian view of governance’ that highlights 
the plurality of institutions authorizing and delivering security. See: Jennifer Wood ‘Cultural Change in 
the Governance of Security’ Policing & Society 14(1) March 2004 p.32.
183 A core aspect of this ‘logic of reproduction’ is the Realist proposition that violent actors must submit 
to the state or take over the state; within this Realist account, this process logically requires this new actor 
to ‘become’ the state, thereby perpetuating state reproduction.
184 Clifford Shearing, Jennifer Wood, ‘Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New Denizens’, Journal 
o f Law and Society 30(3) 2003 p.404.
185 The concept of a ‘node’ is common in sociological literature that is interested in mapping patterns of 
power that move beyond conventional state-centric theoretical models towards networked theoretical 
models. For an example of this, see Manuel Castells The Power o f  Identity: The Information Age: 
Economy, Society, and Culture Volume II (London: Blackwell) 2004 p.304. Here, nodes are understood as 
‘locations of knowledge, capacity and resources that can be deployed to both authorize and provide 
governance.’ Definition taken from: Clifford Shearing, ‘Thoughts on Sovereignty’ Policing and Society 
12(1) 2004 p.6.
186 David Held, Andrew McGrew, Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance 
London, Polity Press, 2004; James Rosenau, ‘Toward an Ontology of Global Governance’ in Approaches 
to Global Governance Theory (eds.) Martin Hewson, Timothy Sinclair, New York, State University of 
New York Press, 1999.
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interconnected in order to authorise and/or provide security,’187 security networks 
provide a tool to describe and analyse the way multiple security actors interact with one 
another within and across Iraq. Second, the term ‘security network’ is used to refer to 
the hybrid security actors created when an auspice (either public or private) hires a 
private security company to implement a security governance program. These hybrids 
are simultaneously networks—insofar that they are comprised of two or more actors— 
and yet are also security actors in their own right and can be discussed in terms of an 
individual unit involved in security governance. These actor/networks are referred to as 
‘hybrid public-private security networks’ when a public auspice is connected to a 
private security company, and ‘hybrid private-private security networks’ when a
1 QScommercial auspice is connected to a private security company. Importantly, the 
hybrid security network created by this auspice-PSC linkage is identified as a new 
process o f  security governance that disrupts traditional identities and patterns of public 
and private roles and security responsibilities. As a new security actor, hybrid public- 
private security networks also blur the institutional division between the public and 
private.
The security network concept has two further theoretical purposes for the study of 
private security. First, security networks are used to help articulate the way this 
dissertation’s security governance framework interprets private security’s interaction 
with the state, authority and territory. Second, the security network concept is used to 
help articulate the question of power implicit within the idea that security governance is 
shifting from a state monopoly into a multi-lateralized network of public and private 
auspices and private security companies. Without completely eschewing observations
187 Benoit Dupont, ‘Security in the Age of Networks’ Policing & Society’ 14(4) March 2004 p.78.
188 This terminology is occasionally truncated to hybrid security network, or hybrid security actor, when it 
has previously been made clear that either a hybrid public-private or private-private security network is 
being referred to.
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regarding the transfer of power from the state to private security companies in the realm 
of security governance, this chapter nevertheless moves away from a strictly binary and 
zero-sum reading of power that interprets private security’s growing role in security 
governance in Iraq as ipso facto a loss of power for the state. Instead, this chapter 
emphasizes how hybrid public-private security networks complicate the very notion of 
power transfer from the state to the non-state—and from the public to the private—and
■I Q Q
instead posits ‘not so much a “retreat” of the state, as its reformulation.’
The rest of this chapter is divided into seven sections. The first three sections briefly
discuss how this dissertation’s security governance framework approaches the state,
territory, and authority with specific reference to how each concept is disaggregated
and transformed by security networks in Iraq specifically. The fourth section addresses
the power relations between the ‘state’ and private security. First, it discusses the utility
as well as some of the problems of measuring the relative power of the state and private
security in Iraq when both of these actors are implicated in hybrid public-private
security networks. Second, it emphasizes the possibility of moving beyond zero-sum
power analyses by adopting a neo-Foucauldian reading of power. This approach
highlights important effects on the production of security governance left invisible by a
strictly zero-sum power analysis of state/private security power relations.
The fifth section adds empirical detail to the first three sections by mapping the various
networked relationships between public and private auspices and their PSC
implementing partners. Finally, the chapter concludes with two detailed case studies of
hybrid public-private security networks selected for their significant size and functional
scope in the security governance of Iraq. The first in-depth case study focuses on the
massive 16,000 strong private guard force created by the PSC Erinys to protect Iraq’s
189 Nicholas Dorn and Michael Levi ‘European Private Security, Corporate Investigation and Military 
Services: Collective Security, Market Regulation and Structuring the Public Sphere’ Policing& Society 
17(3)2007 p.214.
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oil infrastructure. The second in-depth case study looks at the PSC Aegis’ role in 
creating and running an Iraq-wide networked surveillance mechanism under the 
auspices of the US military designed to monitor private security companies operating in 
Iraq. Both case studies provide a detailed map of these hybrid public-private security 
actor/networks, as well as their networked relationships to other security actors 
operating in Iraq. However, each case study applies a different theoretical approach to 
power in order to highlight different aspects of private security’s relationship to the state 
and security governance more generally. First, the Erinys case study applies a more 
conventional reading of power as a capacity, and analyses the power effects of a state 
strategy of ‘rule at a distance’190 where a state auspice ‘steers’ or manages a security 
governance program while a private security company ‘rows’ or implements it. In 
contrast, the Aegis case study draws on a neo-Foucauldian relational understanding of 
power to describe the way in which state strategies of rule at a distance are predicated 
upon new mentalities, rationalities and techniques of security governance. Crucially for 
this dissertation’s dialogue with Realist thought, while power may be transferred 
between states and private security, this is not done in a simple zero-sum fashion. While 
state power may be undermined or consolidated by these processes, their effects are 
typically contradictory; more importantly, these transformations do not simply affect 
state power, but instead are constitutive of broader changes for security governance 
itself, both inside and outside of the state.
190 The notion of ‘rule at a distance’ is a common conception within security governance literature. The 
nautical metaphor is taken from David Osborne and Ted Gaebler Reinventing Government: How the 
Entreprenerial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (New York: Plume) 1993. For its application to 
the study of private security, see Les Johnston, Policing Britain p. 158-63.
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3.2 Iraq, Private Security and the State ’ as a Unified Bureaucratic Security Institution
By definition, studies of private security that take a security governance approach 
document the dispersal of security roles and responsibilities away from the state towards 
non-state actors.191 Unique within the literature on private security in IR, this study of 
private security in Iraq expands this emphasis on the dispersal and fragmentation of 
security governance to the institution of the state itself.192 It discards the notion that the 
totality of private security services performed for the myriad agencies within the state is 
best analysed in terms of a unified state actor. Instead of understanding these 
governmental departments and sub-agencies as organized into a hierarchical, 
centralized, and singular state, this security governance framework emphasizes the 
horizontal, decentralized, and multi-nodal structure of security governance located at the 
level of the state’s various sub-agencies. This approach allows for a clearer 
understanding of how private security has penetrated and infused itself at multiple levels 
and at various sites within the state. In doing so, this security governance approach also 
illustrates how various agencies and sub-departments—by authorising and managing 
their individual security requirements and hiring PSCs to implement them—have 
become important quasi-independent auspices of security governance within Iraq. 
Instead of a unitary-actor model that presupposes a unified state management of private 
security, this security governance framework sheds light on the more fragmented and 
networked interactions between different governmental auspices and their private 
security partners operating in Iraq. Furthermore, this opening up of the state into
191 Elke Krahmann, ‘Conceptualizing Security Governance’ Cooperation and Conflict: Journal o f the 
Nordic International Studies Association 2003.
192 While the other studies of private security in IR have referenced private security’s interactions with 
sub-state agencies (such as the US Army), it has not been done to emphasize a theoretical shift away from 
the state as a unitary actor towards a security governance approach that sees the state as a container of 
multiple public auspices for hybrid public-private security networks. For instance, see Deborah Avant’s 
treatment of the US military’s outsourcing of Reserve Officer Training Corps training to the PSC MPRI 
in Market fo r Force p. 116-20.
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multiple and decentralized auspices also lends itself to a more subtle analysis of hybrid 
public-private security networks created when state sub-agencies build partnerships 
with private security companies. It also emphasises the contingent, fluid and 
increasingly blurred boundaries between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ when state 
agencies combine with private security companies to implement their policy programs.
3.3 Iraq, Private Security and the ‘State ’ as a Unified Territory
Coterminous with the ‘flattening’ of the bureaucratic institution of the state into a series 
of semi-autonomous agencies, instead of viewing the territory of Iraq as a single and 
contiguous unit governed from a single site, this approach identifies the territory of Iraq 
as divided into a series of loosely independent and localised patchworks of security 
governance. Iraq is seen as a territory or space within which a multiple and diverse set 
of public and private auspices interact with, and rely upon, private security companies 
to implement their political programs. The term ‘political programs’ is used here 
advisedly to both engage with and critique the understanding of territory in Realist 
sociological discourse. On the one hand, it accepts the Realist notion that politics is 
about rule, and that a system of rule is comprised of legitimate coercive domination
103over a given territorial extension. On the other hand, this study rejects on empirical 
grounds the Realist sociological differentiation between private security governance and 
‘state’ (public) security governance in terms of a timeless, immutable and intrinsic 
relationship to territorially organized legitimate violence where private security is 
always limited spatially (i.e. it is always local), limited in duration (i.e. it is always
193 This point was discussed in the first chapter. As a reminder, Max Weber writes ‘A “ruling 
organization” will be called political insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within 
a given territorial area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative 
staff.’ Max Weber, Economy and Society vol. I. 1978 p.54-6 [emphasis his]; See also Anthony Giddens, 
A Contemporary Critique o f Historical Materialism vol.l (Berkley: University of California Press) 1981, 
p.45.
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temporary), and limited in function (i.e. what security role it can perform ) while public 
security’s relationship to each of the categories is understood in terms of a timeless 
monopoly.194 Within Iraq, as this chapter will demonstrate, the degree of private 
security’s coercive control over Iraqi territory and its populace precludes the easy 
categorization of the public and the private along these lines. Contrary to Realist 
sociological discourse, rather than private and public security actors having a set of 
clear and static security governance responsibilities territorially differentiated 
respectively along the lines of public and private space, much of the territory within Iraq 
has been subject to networked, simultaneous, and overlapping security governance by 
private and public security actors, with private security involved in the securing of 
public space and vice-versa. In these instances, the state cannot be assumed to be at the 
territorial ‘centre’ in this security governance network; rather, its role must be 
investigated in its contingent relationship to the other security actors across the 
territory.195 Moreover, and in line with the broader processes of globalisation, these 
security networks have not been contained within the territory of Iraq. Instead, 
territory’s relationship to security governance has been reconfigured through 
global/local processes and transnational private security actors whose decisions made in 
one comer of the world have an immediate and politically significant effect on the 
organisation of violence in another far-flung locale.196
194 This is a recap of the discussion of territory in chapters one and two. For an excellent example of a 
discussion of the differentiating features of state versus private violence as it pertains to rule (i.e. security 
governance in my terminology) along the lines of space/territory, duration and function from the 
perspective of Weberian realist sociology, see: Giaffanco Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development and 
Prospects, (Palo Alto: Standford University Press) 1990; also see Giaffanco Poggi, The Development o f  
the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press) 1978.
195 Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing, Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice 
(London: Routledge) 2003.
196 In just one of many examples, the multinational UK-based PSC ArmorGroup created a redundant 24- 
hour management centre in South Africa to monitor the movements of all of its security vehicles 
operating in Iraq. Email correspondence, Patrick Toyne-Sewell, ArmorGroup. 2008; See also Les 
Johnston, The Rebirth o f Private Policing (London: Routledge) p. 195; Peter Gill ‘Not Just Joining the
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IQ 73.4 Iraq, Private Security and the Fragmentation o f ‘State ’ Authority
This study of private security in Iraq acknowledges a difference between the state’s 
authoritative claims regarding security governance—understood in terms of the state’s 
legislative powers and the scope of its legal jurisdiction—and other auspices of private
• 10R • •security. However, in line with global governance theorists, this study also postulates 
that by refusing to theorise a diffusion of authority away from the state, state-centric 
interpretations of authority have become increasingly incapable of mapping the 
changing nature and ‘site’ of authority as well as the role of private actors in security 
governance. With ‘a lack of appropriate theoretical concepts’ for this dispersal of 
authority199 and an a priori and ontological commitment to understanding authority as 
monopolised by the state,200 state-centric models have blinded analysts to the changes in 
the actual practice of the multi-lateralised authorisation of security governance. 
Moreover, as this study of private security governance in Iraq demonstrates, the state’s 
meta-political authority can be more conditional and fragmented than traditionally 
assumed within state-centric discourses. Coterminous with this study’s deconstruction 
of the bureaucratic institution of the state into a series of semi-autonomous units, 
political authority in Iraq operated in such a way that a host of ‘multiple US government
Dots But Crossing the Borders and Bridging the Voids: Constructing Security Networks after 11 
September 2001’ Policing & Society 16(1) 2006 p.30.
197 In this chapter the ‘state’ refers interchangeably to the Coalition Provisional Authority, its parent entity 
the United States federal government, and the government of Iraq. It is beyond the purview of this thesis 
to offer a study of the change in ‘stateness’ embodied in the legal transfer of sovereignty that took place 
between the CPA, the United States, and the Iraqi government in 2004. Suffice it to say that this transfer 
simply added another layer to the already complex fragmentation of ‘state’ and public authority over 
security governance within Iraq between 2003 and 2007.
198 Jerome Ferret, ‘The State, Policing and “Old Continental Europe”: Managing the Local/National 
Tension’, Policing & Society 14(1) 2004.
199 Elke Krahmann, ‘Conceptualizing Security Governance’, Cooperation and Conflict, p.l 1.
200 Clare Cutler, Virginia Haufler, Tony Porter (eds.) Private Authority and International Affairs, 
(Albany: State University of New York Press) 1999 p. 16-22.
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agencies possessed] overlapping jurisdictions’ and responsibilities to act as auspices for
201private security companies.
Simultaneously, this dispersal of legitimate authority over security governance was not 
simply limited to the various agencies that comprised the US government. Instead, as 
PSCs entered Iraq in the early months of the Coalition occupation with contracts from 
various international and foreign Coalition government agencies, they did so under the 
auspices of these other states and International Organizations. Prior to any system of 
licensing or registration of PSCs by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and 
without any directives to administer a centralized authorization process for PSCs 
operating in Iraq, CPA officials simply recognized the status of Coalition partner 
foreign governments and International Organizations to act as auspices for private 
security firms. In the words of one CPA official responsible for managing CPA PSC
oversight at the time, the fact that these private security companies worked for allied
• 202 foreign governments and International Organizations ‘was their authority. ” In other
words, authority over security governance in Iraq was dispersed to other public
governmental auspices above (i.e. IOs) and outside (i.e. to allied Coalition
governments) of the CPA.
Crucially, this quote suggests that in practice the meta-political authority over security 
governance within Iraq wielded by these actors was not always derivative of authority 
granted to them by the CPA; rather, this authority existed independently from the CPA 
and was located within other public institutions operating within Iraq. This observation 
that private security may find sources of meta-political authority to legitimately 
implement a security governance program within a state’s territory without directly
201 See the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ‘Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 
Contracting and Procurement’. www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/Lessons Learned Julv21.pdf Access 
09/07/08.
202 Lawrence Peter, former CPA official. Telephone interview. Baghdad, May 18 2008.
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appealing to this state’s government provides an important avenue of critique of overly 
rigid and static interpretations of the state-authority-territory relationship.203 Moreover, 
this situation of overlapping jurisdictions also continued and was made even more 
complex during the transition from CPA administration to Iraqi sovereignty. Even after 
the official handover of sovereignty, ‘the actual extent of the interim government’s 
sovereignty—or its lawful control over its own territory to the general exclusion of 
other states— [was] unclear, as [were] the continuing coalition responsibilities.’204 
Finally, the state’s authority has itself been a source of the dispersal of security 
governance to multiple public and private auspices. The role of private security in Iraq 
perfectly illustrates the observation that the authority of the state has often been ‘utilized 
to promote and enable the emergence of auspices of governance that operate outside of 
state structures and state direction.’ In Iraq, this was accomplished via various CPA 
Orders, public notices and Memorandums that officially empowered multiple public and 
private sector actors to hire PSCs.206 Indeed, these CPA legal dictates even dispersed 
official responsibility for the enforcement of CPA regulations governing PSCs to these 
other actors.207 In short, between 2003 and 2007, PSCs in Iraq operated in a complex 
and shifting environment that contained multiple nodes of authority whose jurisdictions 
were often less than clearly delineated. From the perspective of a security governance 
framework, rather than treating the state as a unified authority, security governance 
within Iraq was authorised by the various public nodes or agencies from multiple states
203 The analytical ramifications of this observation will be developed in greater detail in chapter five.
204 Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress; ‘Iraq: Transition to 
Sovereignty’ p.5. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/39337.pdf July 21, 2004. Emphasis in 
original.
205 Clifford Shearing, ‘Thoughts on Sovereignty’ pg. 9.
206 See CPA ‘Public Notice Regarding the Status of Coalition, Foreign Liason and Contractor Personnel’ 
June 26 2003; See also CPA Orders 3, 5, and 17.
207 Rather than providing a unified or centralized punitive enforcement mechanism, CPA regulations 
stipulated unlawful acts committed by private security personnel were to ‘remain subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the State contributing them to the Coalition.’ See CPA document: ‘Public Notice 
Regarding the Status of Coalition, Foreign Liaison and Contractor Personnel’ June 26 2003.
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that relied upon their own meta-political authority to manage and promote the self­
organization of security networks as well as to devolve responsibility for security 
governance to a host of autonomous public and private actors. While the CPA still 
provided a meta-political legal backdrop against which this dispersal of authority over 
security governance was initiated, the overall ‘authority architecture’ within Iraq was 
both fragmented and constantly shifting.
3.5 Beyond a Realist Zero-Sum Reading o f Power for the State and Private Security in 
Iraq
A number of studies of the effects of security privatization in Iraq have interpreted the 
growth of private security’s role in security governance as ipso facto a loss of state 
power and control over armed force.209 Indeed, by emphasizing a shift in security 
governance from a single unified actor (the state) towards a multitude of non-state 
actors, this chapter’s security governance approach partially participates in a discussion 
of the loss of state power due to processes of security privatization. However, rather 
than relying upon such a binary and zero-sum approach, this study uses two alternative 
models for discussing the power relationship between private security and the state.
91 n •The first applies a ‘new sociology of governance’ reading of power that discusses the 
complex and contradictory ways that power gets transferred from one node to another
208 This observation comes from scores of interviews and more casual conversations with private security 
company personnel—and a smaller number of CPA and other government officials—that worked in Iraq 
during this period.
209 In one rather exceptional example of this, a recent study of private security in Iraq states ‘ [according 
to our typology, state wrecking is triggered by security outsourcing.’ See Jorg Friedrichs and Cornelius 
Frisendorf ‘State Wrecking: The Consequences of Private Force in Iraq’, Paper presented to the 
International Studies Association, San Francisco March 26-9 2008 p.5; See also Christopher Spearin, 
‘American Hegemony Incorporated: The Importance and Implications of Military Contractors in Iraq’ 
Contemporary Security Policy 24(3) 2003 p.36.
210 Ian Loader uses this term to describe the more traditional sociological approaches to mapping power 
transfers in networks more generally, and to differentiate these approaches from neo-Foucauldian 
govemmentality approaches to the study of policing. See Ian Loader ‘Plural Policing and Democratic 
Governance’ Social & Legal Studies 9(3) p.330.
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when these actors are organized into hybrid security networks. For example, while this 
approach does discuss some of the ways power is transferred between private security 
and the public auspices responsible for directing its implementation of security 
governance, it also emphasises the contradictory power effects of this process rather 
than any simple ‘loss’ or ‘gain’ or power by any of these nodes within the hybrid 
security network. This new sociology of governance approach brings attention to the 
concept—and contradictory power effects—of ‘rule at a distance,’ exemplified by 
hybrid public-private security networks where the public auspice retains the 
responsibility for ‘steering’ policy while private security has the responsibility of
9 1 1 *  •‘rowing’ or implementing this policy. This new sociology of governance approach is 
also used as a lens for analysing what Clifford Shearing has called ‘beyond rule at a 
distance’; namely, the use of private security by private auspices where the state is 
removed from the direct authorization or implementation of security governance 
altogether.212 Ultimately, this reading of power focuses on the way new, networked, and 
hybrid techniques of security governance are causing the public-private distinction to 
lose relevance both conceptually and empirically, rather than focusing solely on whether 
or not (and how) the state or private security ‘gains’ or ‘loses’ power.
9 1This chapter has also incorporated a neo-Foucauldian reading of power that moves 
beyond power measured as the capacity of one actor against another (such as the ‘state’ 
versus private security) towards a focus on the relational character of power dynamics.
211 While this zero sum model can be usefully applied to hybrid public-private security networks, it must 
be stressed that their ‘hybrid’ nature also complicates the task o f attempting to measure the contradictory 
effects of this transfer of power.
212 Clifford Shearing, ‘Thoughts on Sovereignty’ p.9.
213 The term neo-Foucauldian refers to the work by authors such as Nikolas Rose and Pat O’Malley and to 
a lesser extent Clifford Shearing who have explicitly or implicitly drawn on Foucault’s govemmentality 
literature in their analysis of neo-liberal rationalities of security governance. See Nikolas Rose and Peter 
Miller, ‘Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government’ British Journal o f Sociology 
43(2) 1992; Nikolas Rose, ‘Government and Control’ British Journal o f  Criminology 40 2000; Pat 
O’Malley, ‘Risk, power and crime prevention’, Economy and Society, 21(3) 1992; Pat O’Malley, 
‘Policing, Politics and Postmodemity’ Social and Legal Studies 6(3) 1997.
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This focus on power understood as a governmental process illustrates certain aspects of 
security privatization left otherwise unexplored by other power analyses. Through a 
neo-Foucauldian lens, rule at a distance within Iraq (and the security privatization in 
Iraq this entails) is understood as a technique of security governance undergirded by a 
particular mentality of how security governance ought to be arranged. Thus, rule at a 
distance is interpreted as a historically contingent—and specifically neo-liberal— 
rationality of security governance predicated upon new forms of knowledge, actor 
identities and action-orientations that make certain changes in security governance 
possible in the first place. Through this method of power analysis, an attempt to 
measure the power of one actor over another is replaced with two alternative 
measurements of power: the first focuses on actor identities and the second on particular 
techniques of security governance.
Overall, within this neo-Foucauldian approach, power is not conceptualised as a 
capacity held by actors; instead, power is understood as operating relationally between 
actors. For instance, power is understood to be located within the discursive 
construction and re-construction of actor identities; this process, in turn, re-defines new 
security roles for different actors, and re-defines what types of approaches to security 
are seen as appropriate in the first place. Using a neo-Foucauldian interpretation of neo­
liberal policies of state outsourcing, this chapter argues that a neo-liberal governmental 
rationality operated within Iraq that ultimately re-defined the identity of civil society as 
both an object and a subject of security governance.214
In other words, instead of viewing civil society simply as an ‘object’ to be secured (via
the centralized security apparatuses of the state), a new neo-liberal rationality allowed
civil society—comprised of the various non-state actors engaged in the Iraq
214 To see how these concepts are applied to a similar interaction between the state and another set of non­
state actors, see: Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Governance to Govemmentality: Analyzing 
NGOs, States, and Power’ in International Studies Quarterly 50(3) 2006.
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reconstruction effort—to be reconceptualised as a set of autonomous subjects both 
responsible for  and capable o f  securing themselves. Within Iraq, this ideational process 
re-directed security governance towards the private sector and was responsible for 
reconfiguring how security should be governed, by which actors, and to what ends.215 
The fact that this process of ‘responsibilization’ had serious practical ramifications for 
the way security was governed in Iraq during this period is provocatively illustrated in 
the following excerpt taken from a CPA website listing questions from reconstruction 
vendors regarding their requirements to provide their own security force:
Contractor Question: ‘What are the rules of engagement for our security forces? Will we be able to 
engage citizens in the event of perceived threat or hostile activities? Can we shoot to kill if warranted to 
do so?’
CPA Answer: “The following questions and answers are offered solely as a means of conveying general 
information to prospective offerors. The answers should not be construed or relied upon as legal advice. 
Prospective contractors must consult with their own legal counsel in order to receive authoritative advice 
concerning their rights and liabilities under applicable law.”216
This exchange demonstrates the degree to which governmental auspices within the CPA 
operated within a neo-liberal rationality that had re-defined the identities (and re­
constructed the practices) of non-state actors in such a way that normalized a radically 
new security governance role for private security companies and the private sector as a 
whole. Not only had the private sector been re-defined as capable of providing its own 
security—but as seen in the quotation above—it had also been extended the
215 Anna Leander and Rens van Munster discuss a similar process in ‘Private Security Contractors in the 
Debate about Darfur: Reflecting and Reinforcing Neo-Liberal Govemmentality’ International Relations 
21(2) 2007 p.203.
216 Emphasis added. This clearly also speaks to the issue o f fragmented authority over security 
governance in Iraq. See CPA website, http://www.rebuilding-iraq-sso.net. 10/09/2004.
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responsibility of turning to its own legal efforts to understand its newly acquired role as 
an authority of security governance.
This neo-liberal rationality that creates the impetus for ‘responsibilising’ civil society 
(i.e. civilian reconstruction workers) with providing its own security was also evident in 
the State Department (DoS) to refusal to give these workers advice on which private 
security companies to hire on the explicit grounds that it did not want to take 
responsibility for, or incur, any legal liability for their selection of security provider.217 
In line with a neo-liberal rationality that views the private sector as more ‘efficient’ than 
the public sector, the DoS also stipulated that it was unlikely it would be able to provide 
these civilian contractors with more efficient criteria for selecting private security than 
they could come up with on their own.
The extent to which the practice of ‘responsibilising’ individuals for providing their 
own security was tied to neo-liberal rationality’s belief in individual initiative and the 
superior efficiency of the market is described by Pat O’Malley when he writes:
‘Better understood as prudentialism, it is a construct of governance which removes the key conception of 
regulating individuals by collectivist risk management, and throws back upon the individual the 
responsibility for managing risk. This may be advocated by its supporters as “efficient”, for individuals 
will be driven to greater exertion and enterprise by the need to insure against adverse circumstances—and 
the more enterprising they are, the better the safety net they can construct’.218
Here, then, a neo-Foucauldian power analysis replaces a Realist emphasis on the 
relative power of security actors—or the relative efficiency of a particular security 
practice—with an alternative project of locating and identifying the neo-liberal
217 ‘Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers’ US 
Government Accountability Office GAO-06-865T June 13 2006 p. 14. 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06865t.pdfAccessed 05/08/08.
218 Pat O’Malley, ‘Risk, Power and Crime Prevention’ Economy and Society 21(3) 1992 p. 161.
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discourses by which actors and practices are constituted as ‘efficient’ providers of 
security in the first place.
Second, a neo-Foucauldian study of neo-liberal rationality identifies various techniques 
of rule at a distance—not in terms of a simple and instrumental technique of state 
‘steering’ and private sector ‘rowing’—but rather in terms of a specific and historically 
situated technique or practice of indirect governance. These neo-liberal techniques of 
governance involve a shift away from direct and coercive governance technologies 
towards ‘technologies of agency’ that works through rather than on civil society.219 
Specifically, this form of neo-liberal power operates by getting individuals to ‘freely’ 
align their behaviour with the political ends imposed on them via a series of indirect 
constraints and positive inducements that shape their choices and limit their actions. In 
other words, while it was demonstrated above how neo-liberalism re-defined the 
identities of the civilian reconstruction contractors as responsible and capable of 
providing their own security, neo-liberal rationality simultaneously compelled these 
actors to conduct this responsibility within an appropriately constrained model of action. 
In Iraq, neo-liberal rationality’s emphasis on the ‘conduct of conduct’ involved various
990 •forms of enforced self-regulation to compel and otherwise persuade non-state actors 
to freely adopt preventative private security measures. The conferring of entitlements, 
the co-opting of private interests and the technique of re-defining the continued 
provision of government security services to non-state actors as contingent upon their 
‘appropriate’ implementation of private security initiatives were all present in Iraq as a 
specifically neo-liberal rationality o f indirect security governance. Furthermore, these 
specific techniques of neo-liberal security governance implicated these non-state actors
219 Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Governance to Govemmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States 
and Power’ International Studies Quarterly 2006 50(3).
220 For another use of this concept, see: Adrian Chemey, Juani O’Reilly, Peter Grabosky, ‘Networks and 
Meta-regulation: Strategies Aimed at Governing Illicit Synthetic Drugs’ Policing & Society 16(4) 2006.
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in government auspice-led security goals. As a result of this paradoxical process of 
empowering non-state actors to participate in security governance while simultaneously 
exposing them to indirect techniques of control, the cumulative effects of this 
transformation are not viewed as an a priori loss of state power, but rather as a complex 
process with contradictory results for state power at different times and localities.
In the last section below—in the two primary case studies discussing major security 
contracts held by the PSCs Erinys and Aegis—both a ‘new sociology of governance’ 
reading of power as well as a neo-Foucauldian conceptualization of power will be used 
to investigate the power relationships inherent within these hybrid public-private 
security networks. Prior to this, however, the next section will provide an empirical 
investigation of the actual dispersal of security governance within Iraq.
Part II.
3.6 Fragmented Security Governance in Iraq: Multiple Auspices and Private Security
Without question, Iraq has evolved into the flagship case for the analysis of the
expanding and evolving role of private security companies in global politics. This is
first and foremost due to the sheer unprecedented quantity and quality of private
security operations that have taken place inside the country. In terms of numbers, in a
salient nod to the fragmented nature of security governance in Iraq, there is no
centralized and unified governmental database (even for PSCs working on US
government contracts) that maintains statistics on the number of private security
00 1personnel or the number of PSCs working in Iraq. Nevertheless, the numbers that do
221 Accurate quantitative data on the size of the PSC sector in Iraq is still piecemeal at best. The size of 
the private security industry as a percentage cost of the total Iraqi reconstruction effort has been estimated 
at between 16 and 22 percent. See Dept of State, Report to Congress, Section 2207, Report on Iraqi Relief 
and Reconstruction, January 2006. By 2004, the estimated cost of private security provision to the
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exist have been revealing. According to Lawrence Peter, the head of the Private 
Security Company Association of Iraq, by March of 2006 there were 181 PSCs 
operating in Iraq with approximately 48,000 employees, a number greater than any 
military coalition force with the exception of the US military.222 Though explicitly 
prohibited via CPA regulations from playing a direct role in offensive combat 
operations, in qualitative terms the content of these security services have been dictated 
by the level of violence within which they operated. Clients and contracts alike have 
stipulated the use of fleets of armoured cars and automatic rifles carried by a 
combination of western, third country national, and Iraqi security personnel for services 
including bodyguard and personal security details, armoured taxi services, armoured 
convoy security, and the ‘static’ guarding of buildings and other property. Many 
security contracts in Iraq have contained a ‘security umbrella’ or ‘life support’ aspect 
that required a private security company to provide a combination of these security 
functions to the client for the duration of the contract.
The media’s characterisation of private security in Iraq as a singular private security 
force ostensibly regulated by a centralized administrative body, however, masks the 
extent to which private security in Iraq has operated as a set of discrete, operationally 
unconnected yet loosely networked security actors under a wide variety of public and 
private auspices. Rather than viewing private security in Iraq from the perspective of a 
unified industry’s relationship to the ‘state,’ the following section provides an 
exploration of the myriad types of auspice-implementer relationships that existed 
between customers of private security in Iraq and the private security companies that
reconstruction effort alone was placed at seven billion dollars. See ‘security fears, costs are roadblock to 
rebuilding’ Stars and Stripes August 14 2005.
222 See the Government Accountability Office GAO report ‘Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to 
Improve the Use of Private Security Providers: www.gao.gov/new.items/d06865t.pdf. It should be noted 
that this number of armed private security guards, while larger than every non-US military Coalition force 
that operated in Iraq, did not constitute a single and coherent security force along the lines of British 
military’s Coalition contingent.
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provided this service. The following discussion also adds a level of descriptive detail to 
the claim that private security contributes to the fragmentation of the state, territory and 
authority as it relates to security governance in Iraq.
3.6.1 Public Auspices ‘Within the State ’ and Private Security
One of the central features of the role of private security companies in contemporary 
security governance highlighted by events in Iraq has been the dispersal of 
responsibility for the provision of security away from traditional centralized state 
security institutions (military and police) to multiple governmental agencies within the 
state. This dispersal has been extremely broad and has included many agencies not 
typically associated with either fieldwork in overseas warzones or the governance of 
armed security forces. In one such example, the US Justice Department was forced to 
rely upon the services of a private security company to protect a team of investigators 
conducting work at an Iraqi mass gravesite.223 At the other end of the spectrum, state 
agencies typically associated with the professional application of armed force—such as 
the military and intelligence agencies—have also contracted with private security and 
various military departments and agencies have been significant customers of private 
security. In the intelligence field, both the Central Intelligence Agency and the National 
Security Agency have hired the PSCs Blackwater Worldwide and MVM for security 
services in Iraq.224
As will be elucidated in greater detail with case studies in the following chapter, within 
the United States federal government this responsibility has even been devolved down 
to the sub-agency level, where various sub-agencies have been required to
223 Siobhan Gorman and August Cole, ‘Iraq Case Sheds Light on Secret Contractors’ Wall Street Journal 
July 17 2008 p. 1.
224 Ibid.
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independently source and manage private security for their agency’s security needs in
99SIraq. For example, though ostensibly part of the same federal department and 
operating in the same Iraqi space, the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security 
(DSS) and its Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement have both relied upon and 
managed separate private security companies to provide security for their Iraq projects. 
Moreover, they did so under separate contacts completely independent from one another 
and absent of any coordination between the two sub-agencies.
While formal meta-political authority over these various State Department sub-agencies 
and their interactions with their private security contractors remained centralised via the 
State Department’s Regional Security Officer in the Baghdad Embassy, the practical 
control over these PSCs—from the contract bidding process to the operational design of 
the security service to the daily management and oversight of the PSC—remained 
almost exclusively in the hands of each sub-agency auspice. Indeed, this devolution of 
authority over security governance is so complete that in many instances the 
government department as a whole does not even have a centralized database of what 
private security contractors it has contracted under its various sub-departmental 
auspices. Instead, this information—and the control—remains compartmentalized at the 
sub-agency level where the security contract was let. This is a key reason for the 
fragmentary information available on the number of security contractors in Iraq, and 
helps to empirically document the fragmented nature of security governance within the
997state bureaucratic apparatus itself.
225 ‘Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Security Providers’ July 2005 p.3 
http ://www. gao. go v/new. items/d0573 7.pdf
226 Telephone interview, Dennis Hadrick. State Department Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement 
September 20 2007.
227 This is common amongst government agencies from numerous countries. The UK’s Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, for example, has devolved its diplomatic security budget down to the Embassy 
level and has no centralized mechanism for monitoring or collating how many or which Embassies hire 
private security firms to supplement their security. Written correspondence between the author and the 
FCO, May 12, 2000.
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While communication and coordination between sub-agencies of the same federal 
government agency (and between a sub-agency and its ‘head’ office) was often limited 
in Iraq, communication and coordination relating to their respective private security 
operations between federal departments was often antagonistic. For example, a 
competitive relationship between the Pentagon and the Department of State hindered 
collaboration on a Department of Defense (DoD) led initiative to create a unified 
authority over PSCs under contract to the United States government designed to be 
managed by the Pentagon. Viewing this DoD proposal in terms of an inter-bureaucratic 
struggle and an effort by the DoD to gain control over State Department assets, the State 
Department flatly rejected the proposal and maintained it needed to keep operational 
control over its private security assets in Iraq. This stance by the State Department 
directly contributed to a status quo in Iraq that left each federal government agency 
exclusively responsible for the management and oversight of the private security 
operators it had contracted. This also explicitly highlights the multiple lines of authority 
within the US government over private security in Iraq and the increasingly flattened 
and compartmentalized structure of security governance within the state itself.
This particular dispute also sheds light on the practical difficulties involved in 
attempting to quantity the amount of power or control Tost’ or ‘gained’ when state 
agencies outsource security functions to the private sector. Whereas the Pentagon 
viewed the dispersal of control over security providers via the multiplication of sites of 
authority over private security to other agencies not traditionally associated with 
security governance in terms of a diminution of state security governance, the State 
Department viewed it simply as a redistribution of security governance to a series of
228 Eric Schmitt, ‘Pentagon Wants One Authority Over Contractors In Iraq’ International Herald Tribune 
17 October 2007. Other federal agencies also relied on PSCs for private security in Iraq. USAID, for 
example, maintained an independent security contract to protect its personnel and property with the PSC 
Kroll.
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alternative sites within the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. Indeed, the State 
Department argued that far from diminishing state control, its contracted private 
security agents provided the means for an extension of its (and thus state) power to 
implement its political programs.
3.6.2 Foreign Diplomatic Liaison Auspices and Private Security
Foreign states and their agencies were also given considerable authority to act as 
independent auspices of private security in Iraq. Though these foreign government 
auspices would be legally obligated to operate within the broad outlines of various CPA 
regulations governing private security contractors, the practical oversight of these 
private security contractors was the responsibility of the foreign missions themselves. 
Furthermore, Diplomatic and Consular missions were given the authority to bypass any 
evolving governmental PSC licensing or registration process by issuing a letter of 
certification to the CPA/Iraqi Ministry of the Interior requesting that its contracted PSC 
be allowed to conduct its security duties without waiting for an operating license via the
99Qoften slow, corrupt and laborious Ministry of the Interior PSC authorization process.
By 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority had authorized at least 35 different foreign 
diplomatic missions to enter into and execute contracts for security services with private
9^ 0security firms. These contracts would either be put in place by a government agency 
prior to entrance in Iraq, or on a more ad hoc basis by locating a PSC operating in the 
country after a foreign diplomatic agency had already entered into Iraq. This latter 
process of hiring a PSC after a diplomatic mission had already entered into Iraq often 
occurred when it found (occasionally to its surprise) that its offices and the overall life
229 See CPA Memorandum Number 17 Section 10, 26 June 2004.
230 See CPA Memorandum 5, August 22 2003.
127
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
support of its personnel, even if they had been seconded to the CPA, would not have 
adequate security provided to them by the Coalition. In a typical example, the United 
Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office hired the PSCs Control Risks and 
ArmorGroup to provide its personnel and its government offices with security during its 
operations in Iraq. At the same time, the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DfID) spent over 38 million pounds sterling between 2003 
and 2007 hiring Control Risks, ArmorGroup and Kroll for security services provided for 
its Iraq operations.233
These types of arrangements contributed to the creation of small patchworks of spaces 
or territories throughout Iraq whose security was provided and independently managed 
by these types of hybrid public-private networks. Often, a single contract could result in 
the public-private security governance of multiple micro-sites. For example, in one 
contract between the Japanese government and the PSC ArmorGroup, the security firm 
was required to safely deliver and then secure a network of 20 separate sites for mobile 
electricity substations at locations across Iraq.234
In each instance these foreign public auspices would be responsible for the oversight of 
their private security company and the subsequent content of their contracted security 
service. Moreover, each of these micro-security networks comprised of a public auspice 
and a private security firm would often be essentially invisible to the centralised 
governmental authorities within Iraq, or—as will be discussed in the Aegis case study 
below—visible only to the extent that these actors chose to participate in various formal 
and informal security networks. Often, information about the lack of pro-active
231 Interview, Andy Bearpark, Director of Operations and Infrastructure for the CPA. March 2005, 
London.
232 ‘Q&A: Private Security In Iraq; Concerns continue to be expressed about the role of private security 
funs operating in Iraq.’ BBC News, 27 May 2004. http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/uk news/3747421 .stm
233 UK Parliament ‘Written Answers to Questions’, 13 November 2007. See: http://www.parliament.the- 
stationerv-office.co.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm071113/text/71113 wOOO 1 .htm
234 See http://www.armorgroup.com/globalreach/asiapacific/asiacasestudies/iapan/.
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participation by a PSC in various military-run monitoring schemes only occurred after a 
deadly incident had been reported in the media. For example, a deadly insurgent attack 
on a civilian convoy guarded by the PSC Crescent Security under contract to the Italian 
government only became visible to governmental authorities after news of the fatal 
attack spread.235
3.6.3 International Organisation Auspices and Private Security
Even prior to the 2003 bombing of the United Nations (UN) headquarters in Iraq, 
International Organizations such as the UN and what the CPA referred to as ‘United 
Nations specialized and related agencies’ were authorized to possess weapons and act as 
independent auspices of private security firms within Iraq. The list of international 
agencies given this authority was impressive and just a sample of them included: the 
Food and Agricultural Organization; the International Civil Aviation Organization; the 
International Labour Organization; the International Monetary Fund; the World Food 
Program; UNESCO; the World Meteorological Organization and the World Health 
Organization. As similarly witnessed with the various state agencies that required 
private security services, absent an internal security capacity (or with this capacity taxed 
beyond its limits in Iraq) UN agencies often turned to PSCs for security services. As an 
example from a detailed case study in the following chapter demonstrates, the UNDP 
was forced to turn to a private security firm to act as an ‘implementing partner’ to help 
it carry out its mission objectives in Iraq.
235 According to Jack Holly, Crescent Security did not register the convoy movements of its Italian 
employers convoys with the Logistics Movement Coordination Center, an organization designed to give 
the US military an overview of civilian-run convoys throughout Iraq. Telephone interview with Jack 
Holly, Director of the Logisitics Monitoring Coordination Center, Baghdad, Iraq, 2008.
236 See CPA Memorandum Number 5 Annex A, dated August 22 2003.
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Perhaps a bit ironically, even supranational military organizations such as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) entered into independent security contracts with 
PSCs in order to help secure its operations in Iraq. In an effort to avoid a delay in the 
construction and operation of a Nato-run military training academy at Al-Rustimayah 
outside of Baghdad, Nato Ambassadors decided to temporarily rely of the services of a 
PSC to help them open the facility on time.237
In each of these instances, the governance of security was moved upwards away from a 
centralized state authority to a supra-state auspice ‘above the state’ that relied upon 
private security to implement a protective shield around these auspices’ activities in 
Iraq. This not only demonstrates a new pattern of authority over security and a nexus 
between private security firms and supra-state auspices. Importantly, because these 
auspices are supra-territorial in nature, these hybrid public-private (i.e. IO-PSC) security 
networks also demonstrate a global/local reconfiguration of the way security is 
organized with respect to territory.
3.6.4 Private (Commercial) Auspices and Private Security
This same technique of ‘authorising auspices’ to govern private security firms extended 
to the private sector in Iraq as well. Within the corporate sector, the amount of security 
governance undertaken by private security companies under the auspices of 
multinational companies engaged in the Iraqi reconstruction effort is staggering. By 
2007 literally thousands of individual Iraqi Reconstruction projects were underway 
across the country. With the cost of this effort upwards of $55 billion dollars, and with 
some estimates putting the cost of providing private security for these projects as high
237 ‘Private Firm to Protect Nato in Iraq’, Agence France-Presse, 4 May 2005.
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as 50% of the total value of the contract, the amount of money shifted to PSCs in this 
period was immense.
The large multinational corporations such as Bechtel, Parsons, Fluor, Perini, and KBR 
that acted as prime contractors for various governmental agencies like USAID and 
the US State Department—whom were in turn responsible for allocating these 
reconstruction funds—each required a massive private security presence for their 
operations. This typically included a security umbrella service that provided secure 
facilities for the prime contractor’s personnel and equipment, bodyguard and mobile 
personal security details for movement throughout Iraq, as well as convoy and static 
security teams deployed during visits to worksites. Depending on the nature of the 
security contact, this security service might be extended to all of a prime contractor’s 
reconstruction sub-contractors; alternatively, these sub-contractors may have in turn 
been required to select and employ another layer of sub-contracted private security for 
their own operations. This process of contractually devolved responsibility to provide 
one’s own security during the reconstruction effort down through various layers of sub­
contracting involving potentially dozens of reconstruction agents relying on a half- 
dozen private security companies—to carry out a single large reconstruction contract— 
became a common occurrence in Iraq.
It also constituted a system whereby literally thousands of project worksites throughout 
Iraq—as well as the equipment storage camps and living quarters required for the 
project—became micro-sites of security governance managed by a partnership between
238 Robert Pelton, Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror (New York: Random House) p. 106. 
In one source of funding alone, $18.4 billion in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund money was allocated 
by the US Congress to be spent on these infrastructure reconstruction work projects. See: 
http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/05-028 Asset Transfer GRD-PCO FINAL Report.pdf
239 ‘Prime contractors’ were commercial firms—typically construction firms such as Behtel—that were 
awarded massive contracts worth upwards of hundreds of millions of dollars. These prime contractors 
would then begin a long process of subcontracting various sections of the work stipulated within these 
mega-contracts to other firms.
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a corporate auspice and its private security provider. Though the duration of security 
governance at each site varied—and could consist of a long-term or permanent security 
presence at a project base camp, or a temporary armed security cordon of PSC 
personnel around a reconstruction team at a project site during the work day—the 
activities of these corporate-PSC partnerships became significant sources of the 
dispersed security governance of Iraq. As the miniature case-study below will reveal, 
occasionally these micro-sites of security governance would be comprised of a very 
significant security presence indeed.
3.6.4.1 Securing the Electrical Sector: The Perini Corporation and Hart Security
In March of 2004 the Project Management Office—a governmental auspice of the 
CPA—awarded the construction firm Perini a contract worth an estimated $500,000,000 
to provide “electrical power distribution and transmission” in southern Iraq.240 Acting 
primarily in a managerial capacity, Perini in turn subcontracted the electrical 
engineering work-requirement for the construction of power utility lines throughout the 
south of the country to a variety of engineering firms. To oversee the security of this 
project, Perini hired the PSC Hart Security as its preferred security provider for both its 
engineering subcontractors as well as for Perini’s own in-country management 
personnel.
Considering the fact that this contact received extremely limited media scrutiny, the 
actual size of Hart’s security operation for the Perini project was staggering. In total, 
Hart Security employed 3000 security personnel during the course of this single project
240 ‘Windfalls of War’, The Center of Public Integrity. 
http://www.publicintegritv.org/WOW/bio.aspx?act=pro&ddlC=45.
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for Perini.241 Following a standard practice for private security companies in Iraq, the 
majority of this security force was comprised of Iraqis, while the security management 
component and the managers of individual mission security teams were comprised of 
western expatriate security personnel. Overall, the security work requirement for Hart’s 
subcontract was complex and required securing the power line infrastructure under 
construction as well as the equipment and personnel used to build it. For the power 
lines, this meant placing guards—typically local Iraqis hired expressly for the 
purpose—along power line routes to protect the concrete power line towers every 200 
meters along the grid routes.242 Securing the workers and the construction equipment 
involved setting up and securing camps located as near to the actual worksites as 
possible in an effort to minimize the travel time necessary for the relatively vulnerable 
convoys of men and materiel.243 These camps were either temporary secured sites 
located in the desert, or alternatively involved gaining permission to use space within a 
Coalition military base. In an example of ad hoc and networked cooperation between a 
PSC and local area Coalition military commanders, Hart Security was given permission 
to headquarter their Perini project operations out of the Coalition military base Camp 
Echo and were allowed to set up basic facilities within ‘its outermost perimeter walls’ to 
build housing for their Iraqi guard personnel.244
The actual electrical reconstruction teams deployed to a given worksite on a given day 
were themselves comprised of around 20 men and required a static Hart security team of 
16 men at the worksite to guard them. Mobile Hart Security Teams were also 
responsible for guarding the convoys of Perini’s subcontracted construction workers as
241 Graham Kerr ‘Security in Iraq: The Private Security Perspective’ Journal o f International Peace 
Operations 3(6) 2008 p. 18.
242 Telephone interview Graham Kerr, Iraq Country Operations Officer, Hart Security. 3 June 2008, 
Cyprus.
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid. Iraqi PSC personnel often had problems gaining access to Coalition military bases due to security
concerns.
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they travelled between their Hart-operated secured campsites and the various and ever- 
changing project worksites. These convoys were in turn protected by using a dozen or 
more armed Hart security guards in three to four armoured security trucks. Moreover, 
Hart also provided a mobile security team for Perini’s management visits to these 
sites.245
During the course of this single security subcontract with Perini between 2004 and 
2005, Hart Security used thousands of armed private security personnel to operate a 
network of secured camps from which it dispatched dozens of armed mobile security 
teams to multiple worksites throughout southern Iraq. As a private security professional, 
the actual design and planning of this security service—and not merely its 
implementation—was left largely in the hands of Hart Security management.246 At the 
same time, as the client and auspice, Perini itself was given considerable authority and 
responsibility by the CPA not merely to manage Hart Security during the course of this 
contract but also in effect to govern its behaviour. In the words taken from a letter from 
the Office of the US Secretary of Defence to a member of the US Congress, 
‘disciplining contractor personnel is the contractor’s responsibility, not the CPA’s . ,2A1 
Though Hart Security participated in the ever-evolving CPA and Iraqi government PSC 
licensing and registration processes—and also interacted with various Iraqi police and 
military units as well as liaised with Coalition military personnel on an ad hoc basis— 
the day-to-day monitoring of the security activities of Hart, such as it existed, was 
conducted by Perini. The practical reality of the fragmented—and occasionally
246 This was not always the case. Some clients of PSCs had very specific ideas about what they wanted 
their contracted private security force to do. Typically this was an interactive process involving the PSC 
and the client. Graham Kerr, Chief Operating Officer Iraq, Hart Security. Telephone interview, 03 June 
2008, Cyprus.
247 Emphasis added. Quote taken from a DoD attachment included in a letter from Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld to Ike Skelton, Ranking Minority Member on the Armed Services Committee. May 4 
2004.
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privatized—nature of the responsibilities for oversight of private security was summed 
up succinctly by Graham Kerr, Hart Security’s Chief Operating Officer of Iraq when he 
stated “you are not ruled by the Embassy, you are ruled by your contract”™
This discussion of the different types of auspices and the way they interacted with 
private security in hybrid security networks provided a broad context for understanding 
the operation of private security and the fragmented nature of security governance 
within Iraq. It also used a series of empirical examples to illustrate the way a security 
governance model interprets private security’s relationship to the state, territory and 
authority. The next section is comprised of two case studies that give a rich and detailed 
account of hybrid public-private security networks and the forms of power highlighted 
by different interpretations of state strategies of rule at a distance.
Part III.
3.7 Case Study I: The Erinys Oil Protection Force: Introduction
By way of introduction, a brief description of the organizational state of the CPA—as 
well as the nascent Coalition post-insurgency military effort—is necessary in order to 
contextualise the role of the PSC Erinys in what eventually became known as the Oil 
Protection Force. Stated briefly, as the pre-insurgency phase of the Iraq war wound 
down and the formal armed forces of the Iraqi military collapsed, the Iraqi military 
divisions that had been assigned by Saddam Hussein to protect the strategically 
important oil infrastructure melted away. This process left thousands of kilometres of 
oil pipelines and various refineries vulnerable to criminal activity.249 By June of 2003, 
these long stretches of pipeline also began to be targeted by the growing insurgency that
248 Graham Kerr, Chief Operating Officer Iraq, Hart Security. Telephone interview, 03 June 2008, 
Cyprus.
249 ‘Iraq’s Pipeline War’ World Pipelines May 2005. Reprint PDF downloaded from 
http://www.erinvsintemational.com/downloads/Erinvs%20-%201ow.pdf
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used explosives to destroy the pipelines in an effort to disrupt the economy and thereby 
undermine the overall reconstruction effort.250 As a result of this criminal and insurgent 
activity the Coalition deployed military units to protect a small number of key oil 
installations as a stopgap measure until military and Coalition officials could find an 
alternative security solution. In an effort to unburden the military with this ‘non- 
military’ guard mission, and with battlefield commanders desperate to reallocate these 
troops to combat roles, the CPA (via the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior) created the 
Facilities Protection Service. This hastily recruited and lightly armed Iraqi guard force 
was deployed across Iraq to act as a first line of defence for Iraqi government buildings 
and public infrastructure and was broken down into various guard forces that included 
came to be known as ‘Oil Police, Electricity Police, and Port Police.’
With the protection of Iraq’s oil infrastructure given strategic priority by the CPA—and 
with the CPA unsure of the potential effectiveness of the all-Iraqi Facilities Protection 
Service—the CPA eventually decided to turn to a private security company to take over 
the task of guarding Iraq’s oil pipelines. In August of 2003, in what was the largest 
private security contract let in Iraq to date, the CPA awarded a $39.2 million contract to 
the private security company Erinys, effectively outsourcing the creation and 
management of the ‘Oil Police’ to the private sector.
Originally this contract required Erinys to hire, vet, train and equip a unified and 
nationwide 6,500 member security guard force to secure 140 fixed petrochemical 
facilities located throughout the country. By the end of the contract, however, both the 
size and the ambit of the operation had expanded considerably. At the end of the 
operation, Erinys had trained, equipped and deployed over 16,000 Iraqi guards deployed 
at over 280 sites across the entirety of Iraq. Led by a team of over 100 expatriate
250 Neela Bannerjee, ‘After the War: Iraqi pipeline blast is laid to sabotage’ New York Times 14 June 
2003; Dan Murphy, ‘Sabotage Still Clogs Iraqi Oil’ Christian Science Monitor 04 November 2003.
251 See ‘Facilities Protection Service’ at http://www.globalsecuritv.org/intell/world/iraq/fps.htm.
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security management personnel, during its lifetime this massive Erinys private guard 
force was the second largest security organisation operating in Iraq after the US 
military, and according to Erinys management arguably the single largest armed private 
security force in the world. The fact that this privately managed security force was 
also a hybrid public-private security actor would eventually be symbolically captured in 
the insignia that prominently displayed both ‘Task Force Shield’ and ‘Erinys Iraq’ on 
each guard uniform.
However, the project was not simply massive in terms of the size of its security force 
and the scope of its operations. It was also massive in terms of the degree of control 
over the content or actual practice of security governance that was placed in the hands 
of this PSC. As stipulated during the contract’s bidding process, ‘the lead contractor 
person would be responsible for all security matters and act as the lead security advisor 
to the Ministry of Oil.’254 Though this responsibilization of Erinys for ‘all security 
matters’ can be broadly contextualised in terms of a functional response to a security 
requirement—i.e. the necessity to free up Coalition ground units—it also involved the 
discursive construction of private security companies as expert security professionals 
with an authoritative knowledge of the technical provision of security. The fact that the 
public auspice had identified private security in these terms can be seen in the language 
of the government’s solicitation, which stated ‘...the technical proposal must identify 
based upon their knowledge how they plan to hire, vett (sic), train, equip and operate a 
guard force from the Iraq populace.’ In this sense, and in line with global governance
252 Interview with retired Major General John Holmes, Erinys Management. Erinys London Office, 
November 28 2005. According to General Holmes, Erinys’ 16,000 security personnel was arguably larger 
than the as yet nascent and reconstituted Iraqi Army and Police forces. It was also larger than the second 
largest Coalition forces provided by the British.
253 Task Force Shield was one US military auspices with oversight responsibilities during the OPF 
contract.
254 See: Solicitation for Security Services: Request For Proposal DABV01-03-B-001.
255 Emphasis added. Ibid.
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literature, this case study illustrates how the authority of this private security firm was 
bolstered not only by its contractual proximity to a public auspice, but also because it 
had been defined as a security professional with access to expert security knowledge.256 
The remainder of this case study involves a detailed empirical analysis of the nature of 
the Erinys Oil Protection Force as a hybrid public-private security network. It 
emphasizes the networked structure of the Erinys private security force, as well as its 
place within a larger, horizontal security network comprised of its informal and formal 
relationships with the other security actors operating in the same territory. It also 
discusses the techniques—such as the use of audits and embedded personnel—used by 
various public auspices to engage in a strategy of rule at a distance.
3.7.1 The Networked Structure o f  the Erinys Oil Protection Force
The Erinys Oil Protection Force (OPF) had a tripartite structure both geographically as 
well as organizationally. Geographically, unlike the vast majority of the private security 
contracts in Iraq, the OPF was organized into three regions that spanned the entirety of 
the country. Therefore, as a national security force, Erinys’ territorial scope defied 
simple Realist sociological characterisations of private security as necessarily localised 
in its territorial scope. Erinys’ northern, central and southern regions covered the Oil 
Protection Force’s nation-wide area of operations and extended from the offshore oil 
field platforms near the southern city of Basra—and which included an offshore oil 
platform security presence—to oil refineries in the northernmost regions of Iraq north of 
Mosul. While Erinys’ division of Iraq into three geographic regions was organized with 
key petrochemical installations and crucial stretches of pipeline in mind, each region 
was also designed to overlap as much as feasibly possible with the Coalition’s own
256 Clare Culter, ‘Private International Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation’ in Rodney Bruce Hall, 
Thomas J. Biersteker (eds.) The Emergence o f Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge) 2002 p.28.
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regional organization of its military forces to facilitate OPF-Coalition Force
•  9 ^ 7interoperability.
The Erinys OPF was also divided into three organizational levels. At the hub of this 
network was the Erinys OPF project management team located in the Erinys Iraq 
national headquarters outside of the Green Zone in the A1 Mansour neighbourhood of 
Baghdad. This fortified compound acted as a communications and management node 
for the Oil Protection Force and was responsible for the overall planning and 
coordination of the various program procurement and logistical requirements—such as 
sourcing and distributing uniforms, weapons, ammunition and vehicles—as well as 
designing the training of the mostly Iraqi guard force and the command/control 
communications system for the countrywide private security force. This Baghdad based 
Project Management Team was also responsible for managing the relationship with the 
various military, US and Iraqi government clients at the CPA headquarters in the Green 
Zone.258
The second tier of the hybrid public-private OPF security network was comprised of 
three regional headquarters. In line with a networked organizational structure, many of 
the key operational aspects of the day to day security operations were devolved away 
from the hub of the network to each of the three regional offices. These Erinys regional 
management teams were required to conduct ground reconnaissance of the key oil and 
gas nodes in the Iraqi petrochemical network in their region as well as find suitably 
secure locations for their office headquarters. Operational coordination of the OPF 
force, OPF basic force training as well as administrative support—such as equipment 
support, payroll, logistics and equipment maintenance—was the responsibility of the 
regional headquarters within each of the three regions. Each regional Erinys office also
257 ‘The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment’, p. 18
258 Interview with John Holmes, Director of Erinys International 28/11/05.
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acted as a middle management and coordinating agent between the local OPF guard 
forces at each oil and gas site selected for protection and the Erinys project management 
team located in Baghdad.
Below the regional level, at the third tier of the OPF organization, Erinys divided Iraq 
into fourteen sectors. Each sector headquarters had expatriate Erinys international 
management staff responsible for the managing the predominantly ethnically Iraqi Oil 
Protection Force. Within every sector, there were upwards of a dozen ‘fixed sites’ that 
needed to be guarded by the Erinys private security force typically comprised of 
warehouses, electrical power plants, crude oil storage tanks, petroleum refineries,
9 5Qpetroleum pumping stations, natural gas facilities, and water pumping plants. Each 
sector headquarters was responsible for continuity guard training and ensuring these 
sites had a static armed guard force at key points, as well as a mobile patrol force on the 
petrochemical facility’s grounds. Sector-level management was also responsible for 
operating a mobile security patrol element comprised of pipeline mobile patrol teams as 
well as a quick reaction force (QRF) that acted as a sector-level reinforcement 
capability if any single site in the network was under a sustained attack. Finally, at the 
very lowest level of the OPF network, each individual secured site had local Iraqi site 
management responsible for running day-to-day site security as well as assisting in the 
continuity training of each site’s Iraqi security team.
259 David Isenberg, ‘Iraq: Precarious Work Protecting Iraq’s Pipelines’ Asia Times Online September, 23 
2004 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle East/FI24AkO 1 .html.
260 The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment’, p. 10. 
Very often, the actual site security guards employed by Erinys were stationed at the facility previously 
under the auspices of a Saddam-era security organ and were enveloped into the broader Erinys OPF. This 
was due in part to the local tribal realities on the ground where local politics needed to be considered, in 
part to the necessity of getting ‘boots on the ground’ immediately, and following from this latter point, the 
inability to first train and then deploy a unified trained and vetted OPF force. In the beginning of the 
contract, much of the Erinys OPF made due with mobile Erinys training teams and an ad hoc and 
decentralized training mechanism for OPF guards already deployed as site guards. Interview, John 
Holmes 28/11/05.
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While in some respects the Erinys OPF network maintained a degree or hierarchical 
organization, in actual practice it operated in a flattened and decentralised fashion. 
Considerable operational control over the actual content of security governance was 
removed from the national Erinys network hub in Baghdad and dispersed to the 
capillary levels of the Erinys sector and each individual site. Indeed, under the Erinys- 
designed security model, and in line with the contract stipulation that the OPF be 
eventually handed over to the Iraqi government, the entirety of the OPF guard force was 
comprised of Iraqi guards managed at the site level by embedded Iraqi OPF 
management.261
Overall communication and coordination within the decentralised Erinys OPF 
management structure was facilitated via a twofold process. First, it relied upon a 
system comprised of site-visits and management security audits. This form of 
govemance-by-audit, associated with New Public Management practices associated 
with security privatisation more generally, was carried out by Erinys sector-level and 
regional-level management to verify ‘ground truth’ and make sure OPF security at each
969node in the Erinys security network was operating effectively. Second, each node that 
comprised the core expatriate management element of the Erinys OPF network (the 
national headquarters, the three regional headquarters, and the 14 sector headquarters) 
manned a 24-hour operations centre that was responsible for maintaining constant 
contact with other nodes in the network at both an m/ra-regional and an inter-regional 
level. At the m/ra-regional level, Erinys adopted a vhf radio system that linked each 
sector headquarters within a region to each other as well as to that region’s OPF
261 Where possible, Erinys worked with Iraqi officers with English language skills who had experience 
working with westerners—such as pilots from the former Iraqi Air Force and civilian petrochemical 
engineers previously employed at a guarded site—to act in an OPF management capacity. Interview, John 
Holmes 28/11/05.
262 Les Johnston ‘Private Policing in Context’ in European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 7(2) 
1999 p.180.
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regional headquarters. Second, an wter-regional communications system based on 
satellite telephones was used to connect each Regional headquarters to each other as 
well as the OPF national headquarters in Baghdad. Finally, direct data transfer 
communication between each node in the network was facilitated by a VS AT satellite 
network that had terminals located down to the level of sector headquarters. Under this 
decentralised system, the Erinys OPF networked management structure itself 
implemented the rule of ‘subsidiarity’ common to a shift from government to 
governance; in other words, the responsibility for carrying out security tasks was 
devolved to the lowest level of management deemed competent to take responsibility 
for i t 263
3.7.2 The Oil Protection Force as a Hybrid Public-Private Security Network
On one level, any combination of a public auspice with a private ‘implementing partner’ 
constitutes a hybrid public-private network. In the case of the OPF, this blurring of the 
public-private divide was made more complicated by the existence of multiple public 
auspices—military and civilian, US, British and Iraqi—that had an authoritative role 
regarding the Erinys private guard force. As a result of this, the actual 
institutionalization of the public authority over the OPF was in practice complex at best. 
The first auspice with an oversight role in the OPF—the CPA office of the Senior Oil 
Advisor—awarded Erinys the OPF contract and therefore also maintained responsibility 
for contract oversight.264 The Iraqi Ministry of Oil (IMO) was the second public auspice 
and was also the ultimate OPF ‘client’ insofar that it was the Iraqi petrochemical 
infrastructure that was being secured by the Erinys guard force. In practice, prior to the
263 Les Johnston, Policing Britain: Risk, Security and Governance (United Kingdom: Longman Press) 
2000 p.27.
264 See http://www.cpa-iraq.org/budget/DFI introl.html. See also The Erinys Iraqi Oil Protection Force: 
Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment. P.4
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handover of sovereignty, the Ministry of Oil maintained a ‘shadow’ representative 
within the CPA and attempted to influence the operation of the OPF through this 
channel. The third auspice, the multinational military force, was responsible for 
overall issues pertaining to security within Iraq. Through this auspice, Erinys was 
expected to coordinate and integrate the OPF with these Coalition forces. In a further 
blurring and disaggregation of public authority over their private security partner, 
Erinys was first supervised by Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO), a unit of the US 
Army Corps of Engineers responsible for managing the refurbishing Iraqi oil 
infrastructure, and later the military’s Task Force Shield, which was simultaneously 
responsible to the Coalition forces as well as the CPA’s Contracting Officers for 
ensuring Erinys was in compliance with its contract.
Overall, this demonstrates that mapping the disaggregated nature of authority within a 
hybrid public-private security network can be a difficult task in practice. As will be 
analysed in greater detail below, the difficulties surrounding this disaggregation of 
authority to various public nodes also shows how in certain circumstances, the actual 
technologies of rule at a distance have not always effectively caught up to the actual 
practice of rule at a distance. In other words, the techniques put in place to effectively 
monitor the privatization of security governance have not always been as robust as the 
procedures put in place to implement the privatization of security governance in the first 
place. Thus, according to the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraqi 
Reconstruction (SIGIR), oversight of the OPF was ‘beset with confusing management 
and inconsistent oversight from its inception.’ While this observation by SIGIR 
foreshadows a discussion of potential problems associated with the government’s ability
265Ibid, p.4.
266 See the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ‘Review o f Task Force Shield 
Programs' April 28 2006 p. 1-2 for a look at this disaggregated authority structure in greater detail. 
http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/06-009.pdf
267 Ibid. p. 5.
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to ‘steer’ while the private sector ‘rows’, it also lends empirical credence to the claim 
that when analysing private security governance within Iraq, the ‘state’ is itself often 
best understood in terms of a set of discrete nodes rather than a unified whole. 
Crucially, in this case, multiple agencies from multiple states each acted as an auspice 
and node within the OPF hybrid public-private security network.
The actual techniques used to connect the various public and private nodes that 
comprised this security network existed at each of the levels of the Erinys OPF 
structure. This coordination between Coalition military forces and Erinys was relatively 
weak at the level of the Erinys headquarters office in Baghdad. This was due in part to 
the fact that instead of having the Erinys OPF national headquarters and/or their OPF 
project management team co-located in the Green Zone with the central Coalition 
military command and the CPA, Erinys had their offices located in the Red Zone (i.e. 
the unsecured part of the city). For the first year, the only direct interaction Erinys 
management had with CPA officials responsible for overseeing the OPF contract would 
be would be in the form of OPF senior management visits to CPA offices within the 
Green Zone.268 The OPF project management team also spent a considerable amount of 
time ‘walking the halls’ giving briefings in the Republican Palace—where the CPA and 
various other governmental auspices maintained their headquarters—in a proactive 
attempt to inform the various stakeholders responsible for Iraqi infrastructure security as
J / T Q
to the role of the Erinys Oil Protection Force.
One considerable point of auspice-implementer interaction at the national level came 
from occasional invitations to the Erinys national project management team to 
participate in CPA and Coalition Force working groups that were tasked with creating a
268 Interview, John Holmes 28/11/05.
269 These briefings were very basic, and included PowerPoint presentation slides with titles such as ‘OPF
- what we are’; ‘OPF - what we do’; ‘OPF -  what we do not do’. See: ‘The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection 
Force: Infrastructure Security In A Post-Conflict Environment’ p. 12.
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mechanism to coordinate Coalition and Iraqi forces as well as private security firms into 
a coherent Iraq-wide infrastructure security force.270 However, the lack of ‘ownership’ 
by any single public governmental auspice—whether the CPA, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, 
or the Coalition military forces—was a contributing factor in the lack of efficient 
coordination between Erinys and the ‘state’ at this level of Erinys OPF management. 
Though coordinated exchange of information with the Iraqi Oil Ministry and the CPA 
were essentially limited to these rare exchanges at the national level, the regional and 
sector levels of Erinys OPF management was much more integrated with the Coalition
971military forces. Mimicking the informal coordination typical of many private security 
company interactions with Coalition military forces—such as Hart’s use of a Coalition 
base during the Perini contract discussed above—and contrary to the decision taken by 
the Erinys national headquarters, Erinys management at each of its three regional 
headquarters decided to co-locate within various facilities operated by Coalition military 
forces.
Moreover, underscoring the multinational possibilities of security networks, this 
involved co-locating with the militaries of multiple states. For example, in the north, 
Erinys was embedded within a US military facility located at the Northern Oil Company 
complex in Kirkuk, while the OPF southern regional headquarters was embedded within
979a British logistics base outside of Basra. Erinys also embedded its sector level 
headquarters into coalition force bases when possible. For example, the Mosul sector 
headquarters was re-located to a coalition base after it was attacked by insurgents, and 
the Nasiriyah sector headquarters was located within the Italian military contingent’s
271 The lack of coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil anywhere other than Baghdad reflected the lack 
of infrastructural power the new government Ministry had over many of its ostensible employees located 
throughout Iraq. The civilian elements of the CPA responsible for oversight of the OPF also did not take 
active measures to interface with the OPF at the regional or sector level.
272 The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment’, p. 14.
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headquarters. This technique of co-locating PSC operational headquarters within 
military bases was a crucial aspect of facilitating public-private security networks in 
Iraq. So too was the proactive work by sector level Erinys management to go out and 
regularly meet with military unit commanders below the brigade level in their area of 
operations.
The fact that both regional and sector-level OPF headquarters were embedded in 
Coalition military facilities—including Italian, US and British forces—also concretely 
illustrates one aspect of the blurring of the public/private divide in security governance. 
It also demonstrates the way local area military commanders—independent of any 
contractual or other official connection to the OPF per se—recognized the utility of 
cooperating with this Erinys private security force that co-existed in each of their areas 
of operations.
Another crucial technique of rule at a distance used by public auspices within this 
hybrid public-private security network was the use of liaison officers responsible for the 
task of connecting and coordinating the Erinys OPF with Coalition forces. A small 
dedicated cadre of US and British Army liaison officers facilitated joint OPF-Coalition 
forces planning and operations and also acted as a link between Coalition formations 
and units and Erinys regional and sector headquarters. As the OPF developed and 
matured, so too did the oversight technique of embedding military personnel into the 
Erinys security force’s management structure. By January 2004, Coalition forces had 
dedicated Task Force Shield liaison officers embedded into the offices of each OPF 
regional headquarters tasked with coordinating between these Erinys regional
7 7 4commands and coalition division and brigade headquarters.
273 ‘The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment’, p. 12.
274 Ibid. P. 10.
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3.7.3 The Oil Protection Force as an Actor within a Larger Security Network
Buttressing this dissertation’s interpretation of the fragmented nature of security 
governance within Iraq and the overlapping and splintered security jurisdictions and 
functions of various public and private actors within its territory, Erinys management 
explicitly conceptualised the OPF as one node within a larger security network. This 
concept of Erinys’ place within a security network existed on a number of formal and 
informal levels and had specific operational security ramifications.
First, Erinys conceptualised the Oil Protection Force as working in an area of operations 
jointly occupied by Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces. As a lightly armed guard force, 
Erinys viewed the OPF acting as a ‘tripwire’ or first line of defence for a graduated and
77^integrated joint public-private response to attacks on Iraq’s oil infrastructure. Within 
this networked framework, the vast majority of Erinys’ 16,000 predominantly Iraqi OPF 
guard personnel would be tasked with static site guarding duties to act as an immediate 
deterrent to crime or weak armed attacks. Within the Erinys security management 
vision, the OPF force would require significant close operational support from Coalition 
military and Iraqi security forces in the face of sustained or heavily armed attacks 
against OPF secured sites.
At the same time, Erinys trained 2,100 of their guards in advanced mobile patrolling 
skills for securing the pipelines that included vehicle maintenance, global positioning 
system navigation, as well as anti-ambush skills and counter-improvised explosive 
device (IED) techniques.276 These guard forces would then be made available for 
limited joint operations with Coalition and Iraqi forces. In one example of the 
operational support the OPF provided to Coalition forces, these mobile teams were used
275 Interview, John Holmes, 28/11/05 .
276 ‘Iraq’s Pipeline War’, World Pipelines, May 2005.
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to patrol stretches of highway and search for improvised explosive devices at the 
request of the US military.277
Second, and more informally, Erinys planned and implemented an engagement with a 
wide variety of stakeholders and political actors that had an interest in the security 
governance of Iraq’s oil infrastructure. For example, the Saddam Hussein-era oil 
company management personnel that still existed at many of the fixed sites Erinys was 
required to protect—as well as their already-on-site security forces (however limited 
and ad hoc)—were negotiated with and incorporated into the overall OPF structure. 
Erinys also created informal personal networks with regional tribal sheiks and religious 
leaders to gain permission to recruit local Iraqis into the OPF—and in the case of the 
more dangerous regions of Bayji and Haditha—to secure guarantees that Erinys 
management would not be harmed as they travelled through territory tied to various 
tribal affiliations. Over time, the informal network developed between Erinys and these 
tribal sheiks—facilitated in part by Erinys Iraqi management—became so strong for a 
period that the PSC was able to create forward operating bases in territories considered 
‘no go areas’ by Coalition Forces.278
Third, Erinys had planned to build these informal contacts with local actors into a 
‘comprehensive liaison and security information network’ called ‘information shield.’
9 7 Q Within this system, Erinys would act as an intermediary between Coalition forces 
and the myriad local Iraqi actors Erinys liaised with to allow Erinys to develop threat 
intelligence for the oil infrastructure as well as facilitate effective security counter­
measures by Erinys or Coalition forces. Though not fully implemented, this PSC- 
operated intelligence network effectively meant that Erinys had created an informal
277 Jackie Spinner ‘Iraqi Oil Gets its Own Police Force’ Washington Post January 17 2004.
278 The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment’ p.32-3.
279 Ibid, p.9.
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intelligence network that linked Coalition military forces and Iraqi security forces with 
these other actors operating in the territory occupied by the OPF.
3.7.4 The Erinys Oil Protection Force, Rule at a Distance, and New Sociology o f  
Governance Power Analysis
“We were making it up as we went along and don’t let anyone tell you otherwise.”280 
- John Holmes, Erinys
The contract let to the PSC Erinys to protect Iraq’s oil infrastructure is a classic example 
of state rule at a distance understood in terms of the ‘state’ maintaining a responsibility 
to ‘steer’ a security function while the private sector is utilized to ‘row’ or implement it. 
In the case of the Oil Protection Force, however, the fact that multiple governmental 
agents were involved in the role of ‘steering’ the OPF created a number of considerable 
practical problems.
The lack of a clear management structure for the U.S. agencies responsible for 
overseeing the protection of the Iraqi oil infrastructure degraded the ability of the Oil 
Protection Force to do its job. In effect, the multiplication of agencies or auspices— 
including the CPA, the US assisted Iraqi Ministry of Oil, and the various US military 
organizations involved—complicated and blurred the chain of command. The practical 
consequences of this meant that different governmental auspices had different—and 
occasionally contradictory—security priorities for the OPF. For example, while the core 
mission of the OPF centred on the protection of the pipelines and refineries, Erinys
280 Interview, John Holmes.
281 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ‘Review o f Task Force Shield 
Programs’ April 28 2006, p.i.
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management was informed by Task Force Shield that they would have to take over the 
guard duties of Baghdad’s government owned petrol stations in order to free up the US 
troops being used to guard these stations, effectively gutting the manpower from their
9 JOCentral Region mobile pipeline patrols. With multiple demands coming from 
multiple auspices, responding to one security priority necessarily involved a negative 
inverse affect on other security priorities. With many of these security tasks being added 
on in an ad hoc fashion outside of the contract’s original work description via a process 
that typically involved ‘getting signatures at the end,’ defining ‘success’ became 
more problematic as different auspices made contradictory requests to their private 
security implementing partner.
This lack of a clear chain of command also affected the auspice-implementer 
relationship more directly when the Task Force Shield Commander—who was 
simultaneously tasked as: a) the liaison between the broader Coalition military forces 
and the OPF and b) tasked with assisting the CPA in its oversight of the OPF contract— 
perceived that he had direct authority to command the OPF as he saw fit. Erinys 
management, as the employers of the OPF, rejected this assumption of command 
authority on the part of the task force commander. This resulted in a direct contestation 
of power between a state auspice and the private security provider contracted to 
implement a public security policy that would not be resolved throughout the course of 
the contract.284
A further point of contestation between the Erinys management team and its multiple 
public auspices centred upon two distinctly different conceptualizations of the nature of 
the OPF as a security organ. Instead of envisioning the OPF as an infrastructure guard 
force, elements within the CPA as well as the Coalition military forces understood the
282 Interview, John Holmes 28/11/05.
283 Ibid. This expression was used by the Erinys Director during the interview.
284 The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment’ p.30.
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capacity and role of the OPF terms of a para-military force. From the perspective of 
Erinys, this problem was enhanced by two factors. First, there was a lack of military 
experience on the part of the CPA officials designated oversight responsibilities for the 
contract that limited their understanding of the capacities of the OPF. This problem was 
compounded by their refusal to leave the secured Green Zone to visit the OPF operation 
in the field during the entire first year of the contract. Second, there was a systemic 
lack of communication throughout the various elements of the Coalition armed forces 
and the civilian CPA leadership regarding the Oil Protection Force’s remit and limit of 
exploitation that extended all the way down the chain of command to local military 
commanders in the field.
As a result of this, as the insurgency began to increase in intensity, local Coalition 
military commanders began to make requests to Erinys OPF management that they 
reposition their Oil Protection Force to act as an auxiliary para-military maneuver 
force. By making specific requests that Erinys redeploy its private guard force to 
actively engage in combat operations and assist Coalition forces in actively seeking out 
and engaging insurgency forces, Erinys management was put in a position to choose 
between either engaging in illegal offensive combat operations or rejecting requests 
made upon it by Coalition forces. Ultimately, Erinys declined this request, and spent 
a considerable amount of its time explaining the role of the OPF to various security 
actors using overhead slides that read ‘OPF: what we do not do -  “conducting offensive, 
pre-emptive or manoeuvre operations.”’289
285 Interview, John Holmes 28/11/05.
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid.
288 Indeed CPA Memorandum Number 17 stated ‘the primary role o f PSC (sic) is deterrence. No PSC or 
PSC employee may conduct any law enforcement operations.’ See CPA Memorandum 17 ‘Registration 
Requirements for Private Security Companies’ Section 9 entitled ‘Limitations and Responsibilities of 
Private Security Companies’ p.7 www.cpa-iraq.org Accessed 10/09/04.
289 ‘The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment’ p. 12.
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3.7.5 Case Study I  Conclusion
The Erinys Oil Protection Force remains the largest single privately run security force 
created in Iraq. It was also the largest hybrid public-private security network that 
operated in the country between 2003 and 2004. Not only did Erinys adopt a networked 
organizational structure for itself, but it also envisioned and set out to implement a 
networked relationship with the Coalition and Iraqi forces that operated within the same 
territory. Erinys also explicitly used the concept of a security network while collating 
intelligence gathered from tribal and other sources for its ‘information shield’ concept. 
In practice—and in line with a security governance framework—networked 
coordination, rather than hierarchical structures of control, pervaded Erinys’ 
relationship to its multiple public auspices.
Though the various public auspices that comprised one half of this hybrid security 
network used various techniques of rule at a distance—such as co-locating Erinys 
regional headquarters with state military headquarters and embedding military liaison 
officers into the OPF—the actual implementation of rule at a distance strategies can be 
seen as outpacing the effective practice of these techniques as a system of state auspice- 
directed governance. Regardless of the relative power lost or gained by public and 
private actors in the context of this contract, however, the nature of security 
governance—and its relationship to territory, authority and the state—was significantly 
changed by the hybrid public-private security network of the Erinys Oil Protection 
Force.
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3.8 Case Study II: A Private Security Company and Project Matrix: Introduction
Perhaps the most salient example of the hybrid public-private security network 
operating at the macro-level is embodied in the Iraq-Wide Reconstruction Security 
Support Services (RSSS) contracts]290 (also referred to as Project Matrix) awarded by 
the Pentagon to the private security company Aegis Defense Services Ltd291 (Aegis) that 
ran between May 25 of 2004 through 2008. Measured in terms of the monetary size of 
the contract, its geographical range, the number of security personnel involved, and the 
sheer scope and breadth of the security functions it was authorized to undertake, the
• tV»Aegis RSSS contract was truly massive. The first contract, awarded on May 25 of 
2004, was valued at $292 million dollars over a three year period.292 In May 2007, the 
RSSS was extended and Aegis won the subsequent re-award valued at $475 million, 
bringing its total revenue near $1 billion dollars for this single contract. During the 
course of the RSSS, Aegis would be required to hire over 1200 private security 
personnel, operate a fleet of over 100 armoured vehicles, and travel over three million 
miles while operating tens of thousands of private security details throughout the 
entirety of Iraq. Aegis would also play a unique role in providing a networked 
oversight mechanism for US military to gain a more comprehensive awareness of the 
myriad private security companies operating in Iraq.
Through an analysis of the various elements of this contract—with a special focus on 
the oversight element described above—we can see how the US military engaged with a 
private security company to carry out important physical security tasks as well as
290 At the time of writing, the Aegis RSSS contract was still running after being re-awarded in 2007 under 
the auspices of the Gulf Regional Division of the US Army Corps of Engineers.
291 During the course of the contract, Aegis would change its name to Aegis Specialist Risk Management. 
Throughout the chapter it is referred to as simply Aegis.
292 Audit Report Number 05-005 ‘Compliance with Contract No. W911S0-04-C-0003 Awarded to Aegis 
Defense Services Limited’, Special Inspector General to the Iraq Reconstruction, April 20 2005. pg. 1.
293 Much of the information for this case study such as the numbers above come from a compilation of 
sources, including the Performance of Work Statement for the RSSS contract, interview material, news 
reports and the SIGIR Aegis Audit.
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manage a PSC monitoring network that would act as the sole formal, operational point 
of contract between a public auspice and the hundreds of PSCs operating in Iraq. 
Specifically, this case study focuses on two goals. First, it provides a detailed empirical 
study of the security functions of a crucial hybrid public-private security network in 
Iraq. In a fashion similar to the previous Erinys case study, the hybrid aspect of the 
network is identified by detailing the techniques of rule at a distance used to integrate 
the Aegis operation with the auspices responsible for steering the contract. Second, and 
in contradistinction to the previous case study, it also applies a neo-Foucauldian 
analysis of neo-liberal rationality to analyse the techniques of indirect governance of 
security networks in Iraq.
3.8.1 Contract Background
Besides a requirement to provide a static guard force for CPA buildings, the RSSS 
contact essentially involved three parts. The first involved the need to provide a secure 
method for the CPA to visit and monitor the progress of various reconstruction projects 
in the field. The origin and contextual backdrop for this function—as with the second 
and third functions discussed below—was the growth of the insurgency and the 
resultant security requirement for the reconstruction effort. Tasked with responsibilities 
to oversee the US funded prime contractors of the private-sector-led Iraq reconstruction 
effort, the CPA’s Project Management Office (PMO) originally relied upon a combined 
team of US military, US government civilian, and private contractor personnel to 
monitor the various reconstruction projects operated by prime contractors across Iraq. 
As the insurgency started to pick up pace, these public/private PMO teams needed a
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security detail to provide armed guards during these reconstruction site visits.294 Absent 
any military doctrine, funding, or mission statement designed to provide security for the 
various CPA and other governmental agencies involved in reconstruction—and with an 
inadequate amount of soldiers to secure the reconstruction effort—the military did not 
provide this security. Thus unable to rely upon US military resources, the CPA/PMO 
turned to the private sector and awarded Aegis a contract to provide these monitoring
90Steams with an armed security presence. Over time, the CPA/PMO decided to replace 
its ad hoc reconstruction monitoring teams by exclusively relying on Aegis for this 
function. As a result, one key function of Aegis in the RSSS contract involved 
completely taking over this reconstruction monitoring fieldwork in the form of Aegis 
Reconstruction Liaison Teams (RLTs) created specifically for the task.
The insurgency also created the requirement for the second function of the RSSS 
contract; namely, the creation of Aegis security escort teams, or (SETs), designed to 
function as an armed security escort or personal security detail for CPA officials as they 
travelled around Iraq. The third and most important aspect of the RSSS contract 
involved Aegis creating and managing a networked Reconstruction Operations Center 
designed to monitor the PSCs providing security for the reconstruction effort. 
Originally, as the private sector actors that comprised the reconstruction effort ramped 
up their use of private security for static guarding of construction sites, in-transit 
personal security details and the guarding of reconstruction supply convoys, the US 
military maintained its posture that the Iraq reconstruction was essentially a civilian 
responsibility, parallel to yet separate from the military’s warfighting mission. As a
294 Jack Holly, Director of the Logistics Monitoring Coordination Center, Baghdad, Iraq. Telephone 
Interview, Baghdad. 07/05/08. Jack Holly is a retired US Marine Colonel has been described as ‘The 
Concierge of the Battlefield’ and was responsible for organizing the Iraq Reconstruction logistics mission 
and the management and distribution of upwards of $15 billion in materiel.
See: http://www.grd.usace.armv.mil/news/stories/Battlefield.pdfAccessed 17/11/08.
295 Ibid.
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result, the US military did not take an active role in monitoring, integrating or 
interfacing with the now burgeoning private security presence surrounding the 
reconstruction effort. Moreover, with the private sector effectively responsibilized for 
its own security, the military did not see the escalating deaths of reconstruction 
contractors between 2003 and early 2004 as its concern.296 This changed in a dramatic 
fashion on March 31, 2004, when four contractors from the PSC Blackwater USA were 
killed and their bodies burned and hung from a bridge in Falujah. The ensuing military 
operation in that city as a result of this violent event as well as the massive public media 
spotlight—and subsequent Congressional interest—that it gave to the role of PSCs in 
Iraq created the catalyst for the Department of Defense to take steps to oversee the
297private security companies operating in Iraq.
Thus, in many respects the origins of Aegis’ work under the RSSS needs to be 
understood as a combination of the rationalization of the ongoing static and mobile 
security requirements for the PMO/PCO officials monitoring the reconstruction effort 
as well as an effort to create a mechanism by which the DoD could monitor the private 
security companies operating in Iraq. In effect, the RSSS contract awarded to Aegis 
rolled multiple security functions into one single contract and created a unique PSC- 
operated private security monitoring system. As the most important aspect of the RSSS 
contract, the study emphasizes (and first turns to) an analysis of the Reconstruction 
Operations Center.
296 Between April 2003 and April 2004, 42 contractors were killed in 31 separate attacks against 
reconstruction workers. David Strachan-Morris, ‘ The Future o f  Civil-Military Intelligence Co-operation 
Based on Lessons Learned in Iraq’ International Studies Association Conference Paper 2007 pg.2.
297 This event marked, for the first time in the United States, a large public discourse on the role of private 
security companies in war zones. A letter from Ike Skelton, the Ranking Democrat on the US House of 
Representatives Armed Services Committee to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld dated April 2 2004 asking for 
a clarification of the role of PSCs in Iraq was the first serious attempt by Congress to understand this 
privatization of security in Iraq.
298 The PMO was transformed into the PCO after June 28 2004 with the dissolution of the CPA and the 
establishment of Iraqi interim government.
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3.8.2 The Reconstruction Operations Center (ROC): Hub o f a Broader Security 
Network
The PSC oversight/monitoring element of Aegis’s RSSS contract with the DoD 
involved the creation and overall management of the Regional Operations Center, or 
ROC. Primarily, the ROC was created by the US military to function as an unclassified, 
P SC-operated electronic surveillance system designed to provide battlefield 
commanders with a comprehensive picture of the location and movements of private 
security companies operating in their Iraqi ‘battlespace’. As a subsidiary function, the 
ROC would also formalize the informal and inter-personal intelligence networks created 
between PSC personnel and the military by disseminating a declassified security brief to 
the private security companies that participated in the program. As the ROC developed 
over time, participation was widened to include other actors in the broader civilian-led 
reconstruction effort, including envoys from reconstruction donor nations, NGOs and 
international organizations. As a result, the ROC became a ‘focal point for all agencies, 
both military and civilian, involved in the reconstruction program.299 
In this capacity, Aegis was not only a facilitator of government surveillance over the 
PSCs in Iraq, but also acted as a hub within a broader security network that exchanged 
security services and information between the myriad private security companies and 
the US military. On one level, this security network involved the series of public and 
private institutions and organizations mentioned above; NGOs, various international 
organizations, agencies from various governments—including fledgling Iraqi 
government agencies—as well as the individual private security companies and their 
corporate auspices were all tied to this network. On another level, described in greater
299 See: Performance of work statement (PWS) to provide reconstruction security support services (RSSS) 
for the Gulf Region Division, pg.49.
https://www.fbo.gov/files/c8c/c8cefl41d8f73c24669396fa7e80blb7.pdf?i=:d09fbaea075b66f38bc2a24d0
337ccd2
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detail below, the reach of this security network extended beyond and into each 
participating institution to each and every vehicle and convoy electronically monitored 
by the ROC. Therefore, while this broader security network had the potential for 
hundreds of institutional participants, it was also comprised of potentially thousands of 
individual network nodes.300
3.8.3 The ROC as a Hybrid Public-Private Security Network
The ROC was not merely the hub of a larger hybrid public-private security network. 
Aptly named Project Matrix, like the Erinys model, the ROC was itself a hybrid public- 
private security network comprised of a series of operations centers located throughout 
Iraq. Measured geographically, this Aegis-administered hybrid network covered the
breadth of the entire country. The core hub, the National Regional Operations Center
™  1
(NROC) was located in Bagdad’s International Zone (IZ) while five Regional 
Reconstruction Centers (RROCs) and six smaller, Satellite Reconstruction Operations 
Centres (SROCs) were set up across the country.
The fact that each of these regional (RROC) and satellite (SROC) ROC substations 
were embedded in Coalition military bases run by multiple state militaries underscored 
both the pluralised as well as the hybrid, public-private nature of the Aegis-run
• 0^9organization. So too did the actual operation of the ROC, which incorporated a 
number of US and other Coalition military and government civilian personnel into 
Aegis’s daily ROC operations. Though the ROC intelligence system was essentially
300 This should not imply that this ROC surveillance system was ‘total’ or comprehensive. Many smaller 
PSCs—and some large ones—refused to participate in the ROC system or were unaware of it altogether.
301 The IZ is also commonly referred to as the ‘Green Zone’.
302 RSSS Performance of work statement pg.7
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'XfYXrun, managed and operated by Aegis, Coalition military and other civilian 
government personnel were embedded within this Aegis-led organization in a number 
of ways. For example, Iraqi government personnel were present in an official point-of- 
contact liaison capacity to ensure that it received intelligence products from the ROC. 
At the same time, United States and non-US Coalition military units from Eastern 
Europe and Britain were integrated into the ROC’s various monitoring and intelligence 
functions.304 In turn, as the primary client, the US military also maintained a 
responsibility for overseeing the operation of the ROC. In a further example of how 
governmental tasks can be multinational and fragmented, oversight of this Aegis 
contract was a task combined by two different governments.
Despite the fact that the ROC was embedded into the military bases of multiple 
countries and both interacted with and was overseen by various governmental agencies, 
the ROC’s daily operation was nevertheless largely run by the personnel hired by the 
PSC Aegis. The Aegis Director and Assistant Director of Operations were responsible 
for the overall management of the ROC and all its regional and satellite subdivisions. 
They were also tasked with proactively making sure information was disseminated to 
the various relevant military and civilian organizations in Iraq, as well as maintaining 
contact with senior management personnel of other private security firms operating in 
the country.307
303 Aegis personnel requirements for the ROC included, among other posts, senior and junior intelligence 
and counter-intelligence analysts. For an overview of Aegis personnel requirements for the entire RSSS 
contract, including the ROC personnel, see: ‘Request for Proposal W91GXZ-07-R-0004 Reconstruction 
Security Support Services (RSSS)’.
304 David Strachan-Morris. Pg.3.
305 The Army delegated the administration of the contract to the Defense Contract Management Agency. 
Because Aegis is British firm financial auditing was an UK MoD responsibility, but an MOU let the 
DCMA pass on audit instructions to the MoD. http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdfiaudits/SIGIR Audit- 
Compliance Contract Aegis.pdf p.l
306 Ibid.
307 RSSS Performance of Work Statement, pgl 1.
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Thus, a rich degree of simultaneous integration into a public security institution (the US 
military) and networked integration with other public governmental institutions was 
combined with a significant degree of operational independence on the part of Aegis. 
This point was summed up by a US Colonel responsible for overseeing the Aegis 
contract who stated that while Aegis was integrated into the US Corps of Engineers 
‘intelligence and operations chain of command’, the Corps of Engineers had only a
O AO
small role in actual management of the ROC.
3.8.4 Project Matrix, Rule at a Distance, and neo-Foucauldian Power Analysis
From an organizational and technological perspective, the ROC’s tracking and 
monitoring of the private security firms in Iraq was facilitated by a two-fold process. 
First, the ROC used a commercial satellite tracking system to relay electronic signals 
from transponders mounted onto the vehicles of participating PSCs back to the NROC 
(via a RROC). This would allow Aegis personnel to record and monitor (on large 
walled plasma-screen maps) the real-time location of ROC-registered private security 
vehicles anywhere in Iraq.309 Second, Aegis provided PSCs with an electronic ‘mission 
notification form’ (via a password secured DoD owned, Aegis administered ROC 
website) that allowed PSCs to give the military prior written notification of their 
personal security detail (PSD) and convoy movements throughout Iraq. This latter 
process allowed greater coordination between the PSCs and the local military unit
308 Steve Fainaru and Alec Klein, ‘In Iraq, a Private Realm of Intelligence Gathering: Firm Extends US 
government Reach’ Washington Post, July 1 2007.
309 This system was not truly ‘comprehensive’ insofar that only security companies that chose to 
participate in the system and use the vehicle transponders. Since participation was not mandatory, a 
significant number of companies either intentionally opted out o f the system (Blackwater, Dyncorp) or 
were simply not well organized enough to participate. However, the quantity of oversight is still 
impressive. During one period in 2006, for example, this system allowed Aegis to record and monitor the 
movements of over 1800 PSC vehicles from 80 different private security companies nationwide.
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commanders responsible for the territory these PSC-protected reconstruction convoys 
would be driving through.
However, in a salient demonstration of the fragmented nature of the state and its 
authority over security governance in Iraq, even the bedrock US governmental security 
institution—the US military—that had created the ROC PSC surveillance system did 
not have the legal authority to require mandatory PSC participation.310 In a classic 
example of a specifically neo-liberal strategy o f  indirect governance, rather than relying 
upon direct forms of coercion to get private security firms to participate in this US 
military sponsored surveillance system, a series of techniques of enforced self­
regulation were deployed instead. PSCs and the various public and private auspices that 
hired them were compelled and otherwise persuaded to freely interpret participation in 
the ROC system in terms of a rational calculation of self-interest and responsible self- 
governance.
This neo-liberal modality of state control manifested itself within a variety of 
techniques. One such method of indirect coercion that the US military used was to make 
participation in the ROC a contractual requirement in any DoD contract involving 
private security. This meant that in order to profit from these lucrative DoD contracts, 
PSCs would be contractually required to register with the ROC, irrespective of the fact 
they were under no official or legal obligation to do so. However, this contractual tool 
had a series of drawbacks. First, it could not be applied to the contracts written by other 
US agencies. This problem was compounded by the Department of State’s intra- 
bureaucratic resistance to a DoD system that would by design also be able to monitor 
the PSCs used by the State Department. Resistance also came from the USAID and
310 Jack Holly, Director of the Logisitics Monitoring Coordination Center, Baghdad, Iraq. Telephone 
Interview, Baghdad. 07/05/08.
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DoS-funded prime contractors that interpreted the ROC’s monitoring system as an extra 
layer of operating overhead with little benefit being given to the corporate
111
participants. Many of these prime contractors already had long-term contracts in 
place that did not require participating in the ROC and they were disinclined to 
acquiesce to the Pentagon’s wishes.
As a result, the US military used a number of positive and negative incentives to compel 
recalcitrant PSCs and other reconstruction auspices/customers of PSCs to participate in 
the ROC oversight network.312 First, during a meeting with various prime contractor 
representatives, the US military acknowledged that while the reconstruction contractors 
were under no legal obligation to instruct the private security firms under their 
employment to participate in the ROC, neither was the US military obligated to provide 
any relief or assistance to these contractors if they came under insurgent attack. In this 
instance, the DoD simply took a previously taken-for-granted security service provided 
to contractors and redefined its continuation as contingent upon them ‘freely’ choosing 
to conduct themselves appropriately.
Second, the US military outlined a series of negative externalities associated with a lack 
of participation in the ROC and framed these issues in terms o f  a lack o f good corporate 
governance or adequate ‘duty o f care ’ for one’s employees. For example, the US 
military indicated during this meeting that a failure to join the ROC would increase the 
possibility of friendly fire incidents with Coalition forces. This was seen as particularly 
problematic with PSCs using ‘low-profile’ cars driven by ethnically Iraqi security
311 Ibid. Interestingly, Holly stated that the PSCs in the employ o f reconstruction contractors generally 
understood and agreed that the movements of their employers needed to be monitored by the Coalition 
forces, yet they were not in a position to force the issue with their employers.
312 Ibid. Ret. Col. Holly set up this meeting and negotiated what he referred to as a ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’ between the US military and the primary agents of the reconstruction contracting community 
to exchange a system of military support and security assistance in return for the contractor’s participation 
with the ROC. Holly’s notion of a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ perfectly captures the essence of a non- 
coercive technique of neo-liberal governance.
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guards. The military also indicated that PSC-guarded reconstruction convoys and 
other private security movements that did not give the military prior notification of their 
movements via the ROC would greatly increase the possibility of business delays due to 
ad hoc stops and searches from Coalition local area military commanders.
These neo-liberal techniques of indirect governance—i.e. techniques that seek to 
compel actors to ‘freely choose’ a particular course of action—utilized by the military 
also included a series of positive incentives. First, the military explained to various 
auspices that by allowing their PSC sub-contractors to be registered and electronically 
monitored, their PSCs would have access to the ROC’s Aegis-monitored emergency 
response system. The same electronic transponder system that monitored the location of 
a ROC-registered PSC also came equipped with a panic button that would alert the ROC 
of an insurgent attack against a registered PSC and its clients. Aegis would then be able 
to relay the real-time location of the PSC under attack and coordinate the dispatch of a 
local Coalition military quick reaction force (QRF) to deal with this threat. A second 
positive incentive was a ROC-coordinated military assisted medical evacuation 
(MEDEVAC) for any PSC or civilian reconstruction personnel wounded in these 
attacks. In a piece of advice that perhaps contradicts assumptions about the innately 
superior efficiency of the private over the public sector, the acting military 
representative Jack Holly also explained to reluctant contractors that their insurance 
premiums—and thus their operating costs—would be significantly reduced if they had 
access to a military QRF and MEDEVAC, thus co-opting their own interests on behalf 
of the military’s political objective.
313 David Carraway, ‘Blue and White: Engaging with Militaries’ Journal o f  International Peace 
Operations, September 2(2) 2006.
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In sum, for a significant percentage of the reconstruction effort, participation in the 
ROC was predicated upon a series of governmental techniques associated with a 
specific neo-liberal rationality of indirect security governance. Positive incentives were 
used to co-opt the interests of external actors, such as lowered insurance premiums. 
Negative externalities were re-framed in terms of problems of good corporate 
governance and an employer’s duty of care for its employees. Finally, in a classic 
extension of neo-liberal rationality more broadly, a security function typically assumed 
to be intrinsic to the raison d’etre of the state itself—i.e. the provision of a military 
quick reaction force to civilians being attacked by insurgents— was redefined as a 
service contingent upon an individual’s appropriate self-conduct and personal security 
measures.
These steps were very effective, and as a result many major reconstruction contractors 
began to require their sub-contracted PSCs to participate in the ROC.314 However, it 
should be mentioned that the ROC was far from comprehensive in its ability to provide 
the military with the total awareness of the private security companies operating in Iraq. 
For example, a number of prominent PSCs that operated on State Department security 
contracts declined to participate in the ROC. Other, smaller private security 
companies with small contracts and limited resources and knowledge also operated
•J1 £.
outside of the ROC system. Without the authority to require PSCs to register with the 
ROC—and without the wartime governmental capacity to enforce compliance even if it
314 Interview Simon Faulkner. Hart Security. Hart London Office 09/09/05.
315 Steve Fainaru and Alec Klein, ‘In Iraq, a Private Realm of Intelligence Gathering’ Washington Post 
July 1 2007 p. A01.
316 Interview Simon Faulkner. Hart Security. Hart London Office 09/09/05.
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were deemed mandatory—a significant number of PSCs operating on behalf of various
•51 *7
public and private auspices remained outside of this security network.
3.8.5 Beyond Surveillance: The ROC and Neo-Liberal Intelligence Collection at a 
Distance
The ROC’s previously alluded to subsidiary intelligence function operated on two 
different levels for two different customers. On the one hand, Aegis provided a 
‘sanitized’ intelligence bulletin to the PSCs participating in the ROC, and on the other 
hand it simultaneously provided a classified intelligence product to the US military. For 
the former group, Aegis was tasked with replacing the ad hoc, informal, and 
interpersonal connections used to share threat assessments between private security 
companies operating in Iraq (via emails, telephone calls, and meetings with friends and 
professional acquaintances) with a more institutionalized system for collecting 
intelligence.
Participation with the ROC now meant that standardized individual PSC security 
incident reports would be collected from the various PSC ‘nodes’ within the ROC 
network. These would then be analysed, collated and disseminated by Aegis back into 
the PSC community as an unclassified, unitary ‘relevant operating picture’ amongst 
security and reconstruction contractors. This information would be further enhanced
with sanitized US military intelligence reports, underscoring the philosophy of public-
*2 1 0
private partnership underpinning this endeavour. Designed to give PSCs a better 
understanding of the threat level in their area of operations, this intelligence product was 
provided by Aegis intelligence officers to its reconstruction customers via the Aegis
317 An example of one such NGO auspice that actively discouraged the PSC it had hired from 
participating in the ROC network is discussed in the next chapter.
318See the Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction Audit report.
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website. Daily and weekly intelligence briefs provided specific threat assessments on 
future building sites and planned vehicle routes, as well as detailed statistics on the type 
of weapons and tactics used in the attacks and a description of the forces responsible for 
the attack.320
As the Aegis intelligence system matured, however, its role began to shift. Instead of 
acting primarily as a centralized hub for disseminating intelligence learned from
reconstruction actors back into the reconstruction community, this information was
^  1
increasingly being classified and used exclusively for the military itself. Meanwhile, 
Aegis intelligence analysts were being tasked with ‘analysis of foreign intelligence 
services, terrorist organizations, and their surrogates targeting DoD personnel, 
resources and facilities.’322
This shift effectively meant two discrete things. First, it meant that the military had 
transformed Aegis’s primary role from surveillance partner to intelligence partner. 
Second, and more importantly, it meant that the identities of the various PSCs and 
other non-state reconstruction actors networked to the ROC system were also being 
reinterpreted by the US military. Rather than being viewed merely as passive objects 
o f security governance that needed to be electronically monitored and protected from 
the insurgency, the various non-state actor ROC participants were now being re­
defined as responsive and autonomous subjects o f security governance that could be 
utilized by the US military as an intelligence resource external to the state. This 
transition was partially facilitated by the fact that many of the actual practices of the
319 The rhetoric of public-private partnership is symbolically encapsulated in the website’s design. At the 
top center of the page, the term ‘Reconstruction Operations Center’ is flanked on both sides by the 
official seal of the US Army Corps of Engineers (the military branch in charge of ROC oversight) and the 
new Iraqi flag. Beneath this reads the following: ‘Powered by Aegis Specialist Risk Management’. See 
www.rocops.com/roc/Default.aspx7base accessed April 23 2008.
320 See: RSSS Performance of Work statement.
321 Steve Fainaru and Alec Klein, ‘In Iraq, a Private Realm of Intelligence Gathering’ Washington Post 
July 1 2007 p. A01.
322 See: RSSS Performance of Work statement p. 10.
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ROC embodied protective surveillance and intelligence functions simultaneously. For 
example, by using the vehicle panic button tied to the electronic ROC monitoring 
system while under attack, these non-state participants were not merely sending a 
distress call to the ROC, but they were also extending the US military’s ability to see 
the locations of, and patterns in, insurgent activity.
This had significant political consequences for the non-state nodes in the ROC 
network irrespective of whether or not they were aware of it. Specifically, these non­
state actors tied into the ROC as part of a new practice of responsible self-conduct 
now found themselves part of a networked extension of the US military’s intelligence- 
led counter-insurgency effort. In effect, the US military had reconceptualised the ROC 
to ‘activate’ non-state resources beyond its direct control—in this case, various public, 
private, and non-profit auspices and their subcontracted PSCs—into a broader public- 
private intelligence-led counter-insurgency network. Here, the ‘state’ had effectively 
extended itself and its security-intelligence apparatus into the private sector, blurring 
on yet another level both the public/private divide as well as the division between a 
state-led security effort (i.e. military intelligence gathering) and a non-state 
humanitarian effort (i.e. the broad, NGO-inclusive reconstruction effort). This 
important shift in the modality of security governance was predicated upon the non­
state actors participating in the ROC being re-defined by the military from potential 
victims of insurgent violence to potential sources of military intelligence.
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3.8.6 Beyond Security: RLTs, SETs and Neo-Liberal Intelligence Collection at a 
Distance
Reconstruction Liaison Teams (RLTs) were the key tool used by the US government to 
monitor the status and verify the ‘ground truth’ of the myriad reconstruction projects 
going on throughout Iraq. In this capacity, the Aegis RLTs effectively became a tool of 
remote management, coordination and oversight of the civilian led reconstruction effort. 
In practice this meant that the RLTs were responsible for reporting on the status of 
construction at the project site carried out by Iraqi sub-contractors to larger contractors 
implementing the reconstruction. This was accomplished by having an RLT physically 
drive out and visit each of the various, geographically isolated construction locations 
throughout Iraq.
The size and scope of these RLT missions is impressive. From January through 
November 1 of 2006 alone, 800 Reconstruction Liaison Team missions were conducted 
by Aegis throughout Iraq.324 Like their counterparts at the ROC, the Reconstruction 
Liaison Teams were embedded within Coalition military bases across the country and 
were divided into one dozen individual teams comprised of three vehicles each. Each 
RLT was comprised of one VIP vehicle holding the Aegis site inspectors and two 
heavily armed vehicle ‘gunships’ providing an escort.
Over time, however, instead of simply documenting and monitoring the status of 
reconstruction projects, the US military embedded a military intelligence and a counter­
insurgency function into Aegis’s RLT work. This included, among other things, creating 
a requirement for a description of the reconstruction project’s facility security, the 
location of ‘choke points’ along the sites access road as well as other security-related 
geographic features of the area and travel route. More pointedly, the RLTs were also
323 RSSS Performance of Work statement p. 14.
324 Ibid. p.5.
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required to catalogue the inhabitants of the area and the key personalities and their 
tribal/ethnic makeup, as well as document and record their political attitudes.325 All of 
this information was then turned into standardized reports and turned over to the US 
military via the ROC command.
Nor was this new military intelligence function limited to the passive collection of 
information. These reconstruction liaison teams were tasked with establishing 
‘relationships of trust with local tribal leaders, sheiks, or provincial governors’ and were 
also required to be proactively ‘conscious’ in identifying civil affairs projects and other 
hearts and minds efforts that would enhance the counter- insurgency effort. In an 
extension of this policy, Aegis used its own funds to finance one hundred small charity 
projects such as building soccer fields and running vaccination programs in a charity 
program Aegis named ‘Hearts and Minds’. This constituted a campaign specifically 
designed with principles of counter-insurgency in mind, and intelligence gleaned from
9^7these community connections could be passed to the US military. With the aid of 
Aegis’ local Iraqi employees embedded into these teams, the RLTs also proactively 
worked to resolve intra-Iraqi disputes—and thus to continue to help with the overall 
Coalition counter-insurgency effort—in Aegis’s areas of their operations.
On the one hand, this new intelligence and counter-insurgency role for the RLTs did not 
precisely constitute an instance of a neoliberal rationality of indirect governance, 
because the control mechanism was an instance of direct principle-agent contractual 
control. However, one not yet discussed technique of neo-liberal rationality used in 
security governance is the method of formally embedding security governance
325 Ibid. p. 14.
326 Ibid. p. 15.
327 Steve Fainaru and Alec Klein ‘In Iraq, a Private Realm of Intelligence-Gathering’ Washington Post 
01/07//07.
328 Rob Tillery, Executive Vice President of Aegis, LLC. Telephone interview, May 4 2008.
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responsibilities into tasks not traditionally or ‘functionally’ tied to security. Viewed 
through the lens of a neo-liberal rationality, rather than targeting an identity for re­
definition, in the case of the Aegis RLTs look at here, a task has been targeted and re­
defined to include embedded military intelligence and counter-insurgency functions. 
Morerover, this neoliberal shift towards embedding a subsidiary security function into 
everyday tasks typically not associated with security is both a cause and an effect of the 
fragmentation of security governance central to a networked security governance model 
used in this dissertation.
On a more mundane level, Aegis’ Security Escort Teams (SETs) were also tied into the 
ROC’s overall intelligence function. Meeting the US military auspice’s requirement to 
provide transportation and personal protection for government personnel ‘to, while 
visiting, and from’ project worksites, Aegis catalogued each insurgent attack on its large 
fleet of SETs into a large intelligence database. While these armed escort teams did 
not have an intelligence or counter-insurgency task embedded into their security 
function, Aegis nevertheless used each of the 38 security escort teams to act as ‘eyes 
and ears’ as an appendage of its extended intelligence data collection apparatus.
Like the ROC and the RLTs, the SETs were also an integral part of the Aegis RSSS 
hybrid public-private security network and were co-located at various Coalition military 
bases around Iraq. The NROC, for example, located in the international zone had 
seven SETs, while other security escort teams were embedded within various forward
i
operating bases (i.e. small military bases) located throughout Iraq. They also added to 
the overall size and breadth of operation of this macro-level private security network,
329 RSSS Performance of Work statement.
330 These teams numbered three to four units and were comprised of armoured and modified civilian 
vehicles.
331 Many, if not all, forward operating bases (FOBs) had Aegis security escort teams embedded within 
them. Each military administrative region (for example Gulf Region South) would have multiple FOBs 
(for example Hilah, Wassit, Diwaniyah, Kalsu, and Basrah) all had Aegis security escort teams on 
location. See Statement of Work pg 40.
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with Aegis security escort teams conducting more than 21,000 private security details 
for military and CPA personnel across the country.”
Finally, Aegis’ organization and management of the SETs also helps to highlight the 
ways in which private security firms engaged in the practice as well as the design of 
security governance in Iraq, and the extent to which this was expected as a matter of 
course from private security by their auspices and clients. Specifically, rather than being 
given a set of standard operating procedures for running the SETs and simply being left 
to implement them, Aegis was tasked by its client with proactively adapting the security 
escort team’s tactics, techniques and procedures to counter terrorist methods and were 
required to develop and submit these techniques in their RSSS bid. Thus, a close 
analysis of the Aegis RLTs and SETs reveal aspects of a hybrid public-private security 
network, the use of various techniques of a neo-liberal rationality strategy of indirect 
rule at a distance, and a degree of control of the content as well as the practice of Aegis’ 
private security governance in Iraq.
3.8.7 Case Study II Conclusion
This analysis of the Aegis RSSS contract provided a detailed account of one of the 
largest and most important hybrid public-private security networks in Iraq. Its massive 
size as well as its unique role as operator of the only centralized oversight mechanism 
for private security helps to problematize state-centric assumptions about the 
intrinsically limited functional capacity of private security. The discussion of its 
networked organizational structure and its place within a broader security network 
comprised of other actors in Iraq helped illustrate the utility of the concept of a network
332 Steve Fainaru and Alec Klein. In Iraq, a Private Realm of Intelligence Gathering: Firm Extends US 
government Reach’ Washington Post 01/07/07.
333 Performance of Work Statement pg. 11.
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as a descriptive analytical tool. Moreover, the discussion of the various methods of rule 
at a distance strategies used by various ‘state’ auspices to steer while Aegis rowed also 
helped to provide empirical detail to the hybrid aspects of this public-private security 
network. Finally, the neo-Foucauldian approach to the analysis of power used in this 
case study allowed for a detailed empirical study of a variety of techniques of a neo­
liberal rationality of indirect security governance as well as the redefinition of tasks and 
actor identities these techniques of security governance are predicated upon.
3.9 Chapter Conclusion
An analysis of the private security companies operating in Iraq reveals a broader pattern 
of disaggregated security governance that upsets the proposition that the production and 
authorization of security is monopolised by the sovereign state. Instead, auspices of 
security governance exist above, below, and outside of the state, and even the ‘state’ 
itself has been divided into different nodes or authorizers of security. As IOs, foreign 
governments, NGOs, corporations and the PSCs they rely upon operate trans-nationally 
and create networks of fragmented security governance with Iraq, they also disrupt 
traditional patterns and theoretical assumptions about the relationship between 
authority, territory and security.
Private security has also been embedded in a hybrid relationship to the state itself. 
Hybrid public-private security networks constitute a new modality of security 
governance that blurs distinctions between the public/private and state/non-state, and 
open up complex questions about the power relationships inherent in these state auspice 
interactions with private security.
A new sociology of governance reading of rule at a distance that interprets these hybrid 
actors in terms of state steering and private sector rowing offers a useful angle for
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addressing issues of the transfer of power inherent in the privatization of security. Yet 
these analyses must be sensitive to the often contradictory power effects of these hybrid 
relationships and the way in which they extend state power while simultaneously 
enabling private security to penetrate the state and empowering private security to 
implement security governance programs.
Alternatively, a neo-Foucauldian reading of rule at a distance brings a number of issues 
to light left hidden by alternative understandings of power. From this theoretical 
perspective, changes in the practice of security governance that entail the privatization 
of security are viewed in terms of a new neo liberal governmental rationality that 
redefines non-state actor identities and reassigns them new security responsibilities. The 
neo-Foucauldian approach’s analytical sensitivity to the indirect techniques of neo­
liberal governance allows various forms of self-regulation and governing through 
freedom to come into focus. Instead of attempting to measure the loss or increase of 
power—for either the state or private security—the neo-Foucauldian analysis 
demonstrates how both are implicated in a new technique of security governance that 
reassigns new roles for these actors that significantly reshape the way security is both 
authorised and implemented.
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4 Iraq II: Micro-Level Security Networks, Rule at a 
Distance and Beyond: NGOs, PSCs, and Governmental 
Donors
4.1 Introduction
This chapter uses a series of detailed empirical case studies to map the complex network 
of governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that used 
private security firms in Iraq between 2003 and 2007. On one level, this chapter’s focus 
on NGOs allows for a narrow emphasis on a particular type of auspice of private 
security. In doing so, it contributes to the literature on private security by highlighting 
the largely hidden and under-discussed phenomena of NGOs using private armed 
security to protect their personnel during humanitarian missions in hostile 
environments.334 On another level, following the previous chapter’s case study analysis 
of macro-level security networks operating in Iraq, this chapter shifts attention to 
micro-level security networks. Understood metaphorically as operating at a capillary 
level of security governance, the micro-level security networks analyzed in this chapter 
provide examples of the small-scale hybridization and diffusion of security governance 
that occurred throughout Iraq between 2003 and 2007.
The first two case studies discussed in this chapter focus on humanitarian mine action in 
Iraq and analyze the interactions between the demining NGOs, public auspices and 
private security firms that comprised these micro-level public-private security networks. 
Both case studies are held up as examples of state rule at a distance whereby a state 
agency acts as an auspice in a hybrid public-private security network to activate
334For one example, see Christopher Spearin, ‘Private, Armed and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, 
International Private Security Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism’ Security Dialogue 39(4) 2008.
335 For the purposes of this discussion, the term macro-level security network is used heuristically in 
opposition to the micro-level security networks analyzed in this chapter. Specifically, they refer to large- 
scale, state-wide, and centrally administered private security networks. The Aegis ROC network and the 
Erinys Oil Protection Force are referenced as examples of macro-level security networks.
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resources and knowledge external to it to help it implement its political and security 
programs. A strict zero-sum reading of power between the various public, private, and 
non-profit nodes within these two hybrid public-private micro-level networks is 
eschewed in favour of tracing the processes by which the location of public authority 
over security governance—as well as the modality of its delivery—was changed. 
Contrary to a Realist analysis that would view these networks—and the private security 
and NGO nodes that exist within them—in terms of a simple extension of the state, this 
analysis illustrates a more complex restructuring of the authority and power over 
security governance where private actors play an active role in shaping, directing and 
implementing security policy.
In contradistinction to the first two case studies, the discussion of the NGO Institute for 
War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) provides an example of a micro-level security 
network operating beyond state rule at a distance. Rather than being embedded into a 
network with a public auspice and used to implement a public governmental policy, this 
NGO relied upon the legal space granted to it to use a private security company to act in 
pursuit of its own civil society goals independently of any direct public oversight or 
control. Far from being apolitical, this case study of a hybrid private-private (i.e. NGO- 
PSC) network provides a detailed discussion of the way an NGO designed and managed 
an armed security governance program without the managerial participation of the state. 
The following two sections of this chapter provide a discussion of the conceptual utility 
of micro-level security networks as well as a brief historical and explanatory context of 
the use of private security by NGOs within Iraq prior to introducing the three case 
studies themselves.
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4.2 The Concept o f  Micro-Level Security Networks
The term micro-level security network is a descriptive tool used to map the concrete, 
changing modality of the provision of security in the form of hybrid networks at a 
peripheral and capillary level. The capillary characteristics that differentiate these 
micro-level security networks from their macro-level counterparts were essentially 
quantitative. For instance, the absolute number of people involved in these micro-level 
security networks was relatively small—i.e. occasionally comprised of perhaps less than 
two dozen individuals—in comparison to the thousands of individuals involved in Aegis 
and Erinys macro-level security networks. Thus, their actual imprint or security effect 
on their immediate surroundings was relatively minimal, sometimes covert when 
possible, and limited in both duration and frequency.
Here, the concept of micro-level security networks as capillary networks intentionally 
disrupts a Weberian Realist understanding of the political relationship between territory 
and coercion explicated in chapter one. First, the idea of a micro-level security network 
rejects the Weberian Realist position that defines politics, or rule, in terms of a 
compulsory territorial organization whose successful use of coercion is extensive in 
both size (i.e. territory) and time (i.e. permanent duration). This chapter illustrates that 
despite their limited size, scope and duration of operation, when taken together as a 
whole the myriad micro-level security networks that crisscrossed the country constituted 
a massive shift in the way security was managed and produced within Iraq. Second, 
micro-level security networks intentionally disrupt a Realist binary and zero-sum 
reading of power that relegates legal and small-scale organized coercion to a ‘private’ 
and ‘apolitical’ realm. Far from operating in private space, the micro-level security 
networks discussed below operated throughout the public territory of Iraq; far from 
being engaged in politically inconsequential coercion limited only to the members of its
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own private group, the private nodes in these micro-level networks directly managed 
lethal force and implemented security governance programs that affected not only 
themselves but everyone around them as well.
The peripheral character of a micro-level security network’s relationship to the state is 
also important While the ‘state’ is still conceptualized as a meta-authority that provides 
the broad legal space and system of law within which these micro-level networks 
operate, central ‘state’ agencies are neither active nodes nor key participants within 
these security networks. While a micro-level security network may have contained a 
public auspice (i.e. a sub-state or supra-state agency) as one of its constituent parts, they 
were nevertheless contractually and organizationally distanced from central and 
hierarchical government management, oversight and control. In practice this meant 
that—in contradistinction to macro-level security networks—micro-level security 
networks were either loosely connected or completely unconnected to the central 
governmental organs of the state. In practice this meant that on a day-to-day basis 
micro-level security networks often operated under the radar of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, the US Embassy, and other central government bodies.
Moreover, as the case studies indicate, these micro-level security networks also 
maintained a limited and somewhat haphazard (or even intentionally nonexistent) 
relationship to the broader web of security actors operating in Iraq. As a result, they
336 A detailed discussion of the legal framework governing private security in Iraq is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. On an empirical level, the laws, rules and orders regulating private security firms operating 
in Iraq evolved considerably over the 2003-2007 period. See: Jennifer K. Elsea, ‘Private Security 
Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status and Other Issues ’ Congressional Research Service Report 
for Congress, August 25 2008. http://www. fas. org/ssp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf. On a theoretical level, a 
security governance approach and the micro-level security networks discussed in this chapter are still 
committed to legal formalism’s meta-theoretical assumptions regarding public law and the de jure 
sovereignty of the state.
337 In one of the most provocative examples of this, neither the US government nor the government of 
Iraq had a comprehensive knowledge of the number of private security firms operating in the country 
between 2003 and 2006. Moreover, no centralized database of such private security firms existed.
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often operated independently from, and were often invisible to, other micro-level 
security networks in Iraq.
Finally, with the use of detailed case studies involving sub-agencies of the US State 
Department (and other governmental sub-agencies), micro-level security networks help 
to empirically elucidate the previous chapter’s claim that the ‘state’ may be usefully 
broken up into semi-autonomous auspices of security governance down to the sub­
agency level. First, they illustrate the way governmental sub-agencies have been 
delegated budgetary and managerial autonomy through the process of subsidiarity339 
over the security requirements for their governmental programs. This, in turn, provides 
an illustration of the pluralization and fragmentation of security governance that has 
occurred horizontally to multiple sites (or nodes) within the state. Second, micro-level 
security networks demonstrate how this process of fragmentation described above has 
resulted in responsibility over security governance being a) embedded into new 
governmental sites and agencies not traditionally understood as having security 
responsibilities; b) allocated as an ancillary task attached to broader governmental 
programs; and c) connected to a host of non-state actors that provide private security 
and implement the aforementioned ‘broader governmental programs.’
338 Dozens of interviews and other informal telephone and email correspondences between 2003 and 
2007 with government agencies, NGO officials and private security company personnel underscored the 
extent to which these organizations were unsure of the extent, location and operation of other micro-level 
security networks operating in Iraq.
339 Subsidiary is the principle that responsibility for carrying out a task ought to be delegated to the lowest 
level of government competent to it. See Les Johnston, Policing Britain: Risk, Security and Governance 
(United Kingdom: Longman) 2000. p.27.
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4.3 Historical Context o f  NGO use o f Private Security in Iraq
Though there are some limited examples of NGOs using PSCs for armed security in the 
past,340 the post-2003 Iraqi conflict has become—as it has in so many other areas of the 
transformation of private security—both a highly unique as well as a watershed moment 
for the NGO community. This needs to be contextualized with three overlapping trends 
affecting NGOs that reached a critical mass in Iraq. First, a growing trend of attacks on 
humanitarian relief personnel throughout the 1990s reached its apotheosis in Iraq with 
the deadly August 19 2003 attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad, an event that has 
been likened to the 9/11 attack in terms of its impact on the humanitarian community.341 
Second, this attack, coupled with a car bomb attack on the International Committee of 
the Red Cross’s Baghdad headquarters in the same year, instigated a controversial 
reconsideration within the NGO world regarding the utility and morality of using armed 
private security services to help protect humanitarian NGO personnel and facilitate the 
safe completion of their social programs. For the majority of NGOs that entered Iraq in 
early 2003, the cost of moving from the traditional NGO security strategy of acceptance 
(focusing on the acceptance of the NGO’s presence by the local population as well as 
belligerents) to a security strategy of protection or deterrence (an approach involving 
clandestine behaviour, hardened facilities and/or armed protection) was either
' lA 'y
ideologically unpalatable or financially untenable. However, a minority of NGOs 
operating in Iraq were able to combine the ability to secure the necessary financial 
resources for hiring private security with an organization-level normative willingness to
340 For an early discussion of the intersection between PSCs and NGOs see “The Politicization of 
Humanitarian Action and Staff Security” the use of private security companies by humanitarian agencies” 
International Alert International Workshop Summary Report April 2001.
341 ‘UNHCR and the Current Security Environment’ Alan Vernon Senior Partnership Coordinator, 
Emergency Security Service, UNHCR Refugee Survey Quarterly 23(4) p. 147.
342 Norman Stewart, Head of Security for NCCI NGO Coordinating Committee, Iraq. Email 
Correspondence. 09/27/07; See also: Alexandre Carle and Hakim Chkam, ‘Humanitarian Action in the 
New Security Environment: Policy and Operational implications in Iraq’, Overseas Development 
Institute, September 2006, pg. vi.
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use them. As a result, a number of NGOs relied upon armed private security to keep 
their programs running during and after the NGO exodus from Iraq between 2003 and 
2004. Third, by 2003, various public governmental actors at the state agency level and 
the supra-state agency level had, to varying degrees, successfully implemented 
‘responsibilization’ policies to activate private, corporate and non-profit NGO resources 
to help them implement their ‘broader’ policies and political programs alluded to in the 
previous section. In line with government directives that had devolved the budgetary 
and managerial responsibility to multiple sub-agencies for turning to resources outside 
the state to help them implement their policies—and crucially, to provide the security 
necessary for implementing their policies—NGOs often found themselves contractually 
obligated to enlist the support of private security firms.
4.4 Humanitarian Mine Action in Iraq I: The IMMAP Case: Introduction 
With a recent history of internal wars ranging from the 1980-1988 war with Iran, the 
first Gulf War in 1991 and the current conflict that began with the US-led Coalition 
invasion in March 2003, Iraq has been one of the most severely landmine, UXO, and 
AXO343 contaminated countries in the world.344 Millions of undocumented landmines 
and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) were scattered across Iraq, causing dozens 
of civilian casualties per month and constituting a serious humanitarian emergency. 
Because of this outstanding problem, the identification, safe clearance and destruction 
of Iraq’s mines and ERW became a key goal for the various public and private actors— 
state agencies and International Organization donors, NGOs, and corporate deminers— 
that comprise the international mine action community.
343 This acronym stands for Abandoned Explosive Ordinance.
344 Landmine Monitor, 2005.
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Immediately following the fall of the Saddam government, various demining NGOs and 
for-profit corporations that had been pre-positioned in Kuwait began to pour into Iraq to 
implement a network of state, UN, corporate and NGO demining efforts. One such 
NGO involved in this effort was Information Management and Mine Actions Programs 
(IMMAP), an American NGO based in Washington, DC.345 Specializing in information 
management systems and the provision of technical advisors in complex emergencies, 
IMMAP won a number of grants from various UN and US government agencies to aid 
in the early ‘emergency’ phase of the Iraq demining effort.346 During their original 
entrance into Iraq—and prior to the UN headquarters bombing in 2003—IMMAP had 
followed their typical operating procedures and conducted their de-mining work without 
the security services of a PSC. However, in early 2004 IMMAP had been awarded 
grants by various governmental agencies to conduct a massive, nation-wide landmine 
survey at precisely the time when the deteriorating security situation had caused the 
majority of NGOs and demining firms to either curtail their work or pull out of Iraq 
completely. It was during this program that the NGO IMMAP became a node within a 
hybrid public-private (micro-level) security network and coordinated its work with a 
PSC for the provision of armed security services.347
345 Between 2003 and 2006 IMMAP was changed from an operationally independent affiliate of the NGO 
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) to a separate and wholly independent NGO. To avoid 
confusion with VVAF, for the purposes of this study IMMAP will be referred to by its current status as an 
independent NGO.
346 IMMAP had multiple contracts with UNDP, United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the US State Department to carry out humanitarian mine action work 
in Iraq in 2003. This work included providing personnel for the US State Department’s Emergency Mine 
Action Team as well as the embedding in the UNDP office at the Coalition Forces (CF) Humanitarian 
Operations center to help disseminate public data on the location of Coalition munitions strikes for future 
UXO cleanup operations. Joe Donahue, Director, Information Management & Mine Action Programs. 
Telephone interview Washington DC. 02/05/08.
See also http://www.esri.com/news/arcnews/winter0405articles/iraqs-explosive.html 
and IMMAP’s website at http://www.immap.org.
347 Some of the NGOs that left during this period included DanChurchAid, Handicap International, 
HELP, and Mine Advisory Group. Many for-profit demining contractors, such as Mechem, also left Iraq 
during this period. See http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/iraq.
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4.4.1 Multiple Public Auspices ‘Within ’ and ‘Above ’ the State: the WRA and the UNDP
Unlike many of the other security networks discussed previously, the demining program 
in question—the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS)—did not have the provision of security 
as its raison d’etre. Instead, this micro-level security network’s core function was 
locating landmines and other ERW as a precursor to destroying these mines and 
munitions at a later date. As such, security governance per se was merely one important 
responsibility tangential to this larger policy task. Nor was this network comprised of 
the by now familiar binary model of public auspice/private security implementing 
partner. Instead, it was comprised of multiple public auspices that each in turn activated 
NGO and PSC resources external to them to implement their landmine eradication 
policy.
During the course of the program, two distinct governmental donors provided funding 
and acted as public auspices for the LIS project. The first auspice as well as the largest 
donor was located ‘within the state’ as a sub-agency of the US State Department named 
the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA). As part of its mission to 
remove explosive remnants of war worldwide, it awarded IMMAP a $4 million dollar 
grant that paid for the majority cost of the NGO’s implementation of the Landmine 
Impact Survey. The second public donor that acted as a governmental auspice for 
IMMAP during the LIS program was not a state actor at all, but rather a United Nations 
agency located ‘above the state.’ This public auspice—the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP)— awarded IMMAP a grant that paid for the associated personnel 
costs for IMMAP’s Senior Technical Advisor during the LIS project. As a result of the 
combination of the State Department’s sub-agency WRA and the UNDP providing 
funding and acting as dual auspices for this program, both the NGO IMMAP and the 
PSC it was networked to derived their meta-political authority from multiple sources—
182
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
and levels—of public governmental agencies. Moreover, operationally and contractually 
speaking, this authority did not emanate from the CPA or any other centralized state 
apparatus, but was located at the capillary level of the sub-agency of the State 
Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement as well as the offices of the 
UNDP.
4.4.2 Dual and Blurred Modalities o f Public Control over Security Governance
Importantly, while each governmental auspice provided funding for armed private 
security for IMMAP personnel during the course of the LIS program, the modality by 
which each donor provided this NGO with security differed significantly from each 
other. In the case of the State Department’s WRA grant to IMMAP, the NGO’s security 
was provided for via a pre-existing security and life-support ‘umbrella’ contract. This 
contract, set up with the private security firm Ronco Consulting Corporation, had been 
previously established by the DoS sub-agency WRA for the security of its own 
management personnel overseeing its demining work in Iraq. Under this arrangement, 
the WRA maintained a direct contractual relationship with the PSC Ronco—and thus 
direct managerial control over—the private security services provided by Ronco for 
IMMAP’s NGO personnel. Though Ronco would have significant input into the 
security process and therefore have influence over security governance, WRA did not 
allocate any security governance responsibilities to their NGO implementing partner.
348 Ronco, a firm with extensive demining experience of its own, had won a previous contract from the 
WRA to provide a host of life support and UXO-related services, up to and including the provision of 
static and mobile armed security services to its State Department client. Dennis Hadrick. Program 
Manager, State Department Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Telephone interview, 
Washington DC. 09/20/07.
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However, public control over security governance within this hybrid security network 
was complicated by the UNDP’s different approach to providing IMMAP with security. 
Due to restrictions placed on UN personnel after the attack on the UN Baghdad 
headquarters building, the UNDP had a much more limited physical managerial 
presence overseeing the LIS project than that of the WPA. Because of this limitation, 
the UNDP was forced to allocate more responsibility to IMMAP and rely more heavily 
on the NGO to act in its place, not merely as its implementing partner but also in a more 
general managerial capacity during the program.349 This fact became apparent in the 
UNDP’s approach to security governance within the LIS program.
Without the same type of contracted private security architecture enjoyed by the WRA 
in place prior to this international organization’s deployment to Iraq, the UNDP was not 
in a position to ‘extend’ a private security umbrella similar to that of the WRA to their 
NGO implementing partner. Instead, the UNDP shifted the responsibility for the 
provision of security to IMMAP by requiring the NGO to include a ‘security plan’ with 
their original bid for UNDP funding for the LIS contract. Though the UNDP maintained 
the authority to approve or dismiss IMMAP’s proposal, the actual content of the 
security plan—and hence security governance itself—was left to the NGO.
In practice, this meant that the UNDP did not provide any set protocols for IMMAP 
regarding the use of private security firms, rules for the use of weapons, or rules for the 
use of lethal force.351 Nor, once the UNDP awarded IMMAP the contract, did they offer 
any guidance on what kind of general security plan their NGO implementing partner 
should implement. Instead, the International Organization simply delegated the 
responsibility of making sure IMMAP’s personnel had adequate security—as well as 
the responsibility of defining precisely what constituted adequate security—to the NGO
349 Joe Donahue, Director, IMMAP Telephone interview Washington DC. 02/05/08.
350 Ibid.
351 Confidential telephone interview, IMMAP personnel. Washington DC.
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itself. The effect of this decision by the UNDP to refrain from giving specific security 
guidelines to their NGO partner meant that a considerable amount of control over the 
design and content of security governance was shifted from a supra-state public auspice 
to a non-governmental organization.
However, in practice, IMMAP did not use UNDP security funding to hire and then 
manage its own private security service. Instead, and with UNDP approval, IMMAP 
chose to incorporate their UNDP security funding into the private security management 
structure already put in place by the State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal 
and Abatement.352 Essentially, rather than build a redundant private security structure 
parallel to the Ronco PSC security structure already put in place by the WRA, IMMAP 
proposed to simply use the UNDP funds allocated for IMMAP’s security to ‘pay into’ 
this WRA private security structure. Thus, while IMMAP was organizationally in a 
position under their UNDP contract to act in an oversight or managerial capacity over 
the PSC Ronco in a similar fashion to the public auspice WRA, it simply chose not to 
take on this role. In the words of a senior IMMAP official, “these [independent 
oversight] structures were in place, but we never needed to use them. We never had a 
problem with Ronco’s service.”353 This decision made by IMMAP to use WRA’s PSC 
security umbrella effectively returned (or re-embedded) a considerable amount of 
control over security governance within this hybrid micro-level security network back 
to the public sector, albeit tying it to a public auspice different from the UNDP (i.e. the 
WPA) connected to a different political institution (the United States) altogether.
352
353
Ibid.
Joe Donahue, Director, IMMAP Telephone interview Washington DC. 02/05/08.
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4.4.3 The Practice o f  Securing IMMAP Personnel During the LIS: Ronco’s Low Profile 
In practice, due to their contractual role as well as status as professional security 
experts, the actual day to day management of security matters was largely left to the 
discretion of the PSC Ronco.354 Because of the nature of the Landmine Impact Survey 
project, the security work undertaken by Ronco for IMMAP personnel was relatively 
limited in comparison to the other case studies examined in this chapter. Designed to 
complete a survey of the location of landmines and unexploded ordinance throughout 
the country, the LIS relied heavily on interviewing people from local Iraqi communities 
familiar with the ERW threats in their immediate surroundings. As a result of this 
interview methodology, the vast majority of the LIS survey work was conducted using 
ninety Iraqi personnel hired by IMMAP and divided into very small two or three person 
teams that travelled discretely throughout the Iraqi countryside to various ERW 
contamination sites. Because of the success of this practice, Ronco and IMMAP 
decided—and their Iraqi personnel insisted—that the combination of stealth and local 
goodwill necessary for their work would be best achieved with an absence of Ronco 
personal security detail (PSD) teams.
However, the western expatriate staff of this micro-level security network did rely upon 
Ronco for personal security detail services throughout their work in central and southern 
Iraq. In line with both IMMAP’s and WRA’s preferred low-profile approach, Ronco 
avoided large armored SUVs and instead used smaller—though occasionally armored— 
civilian vehicles when escorting IMMAP personnel. In and around Baghdad, this
354 Under the terms of their contract with the WPA, Ronco was required to use its expertise as a security 
professional to make many of the decisions regarding the actual content of their security service. Dennis 
Hadrick, State Department Office of WRA 09/20/07.
355 Telephone interview, Joe Donahue, IMMAP, Washington DC.
356 This low-profile security approach favored by the network of WRA, IMMAP, and Ronco personnel 
can be differentiated from the more aggressive and ‘high-profile’ approach favored by the public-private 
network comprised of the US State Department sub-agency for Diplomatic Security and its three PSCs
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included armed escort services to and from Baghdad International Airport as well as 
between their offices in the Green Zone and the offices of the nascent Iraqi National 
Mine Action Authority and other relevant government offices located in the 
increasingly insecure ‘Red Zone’ of Baghdad. In Southern Iraq, Ronco provided PSD 
teams for IMMAP movement between the Basra airport and port and their offices in the 
city of Basra, and later, in Azzubyar. These Ronco PSD escorts typically consisted of
*3 c o
three or four car convoys—with one lead scout car followed by the ‘principle’s’ car 
surrounded by a lead and tail car—with approximately a dozen Ronco security
'J C Q
personnel armed with automatic rifles and RPK heavy machine guns. Combined with 
their quick reaction teams and static security forces stationed at various WRA 
compounds Ronco’s security team was small relative to its macro-level counterparts yet 
still constituted a considerable private security force in Iraq.
4.4.4 Case Study Conclusion
The scope and the scale of work conducted by IMMAP—and by extension the work of 
its private security team—during the actual implementation of the LIS between June 
2004 and November 2006 are impressive. During the course of the landmine impact 
survey, IMMAP surveyed 13 out of Iraq’s 18 provinces, visiting over 12,000 
communities and documenting over 2000 communities affected by landmines and other
(Blackwater, Dyncorp and Triple Canopy). The significant difference between the two ‘profiles’ of 
private security provision, as well as lack of any operational or organizational coordination between the 
two sub-agencies, further underscores the value-added of an approach to the study of private security in 
Iraq that emphasizes the multiple sites or ‘nodes’ of security governance located within the state itself.
357Joe Donahue, Director, IMMAP Telephone interview Washington DC. 02/05/08; Dan Bowen, Director 
of Operations Iraq, Ronco Security. 09/27/07.
358 The principle refers to the subject or object being guarded or otherwise receiving security.
359 Dan Bowen, Director of Operations Iraq, Ronco Security. 09/27/07.
360 A closer analysis of Ronco’s security force under contract to the WRA follows in the next case study.
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UXO from 3,673 suspected hazard areas. Overall, the program was operated by a 
micro-level security network that included one supra-state auspice, one sub-agency 
auspice, one NGO implementing partner and one private security company. Though 
each of these actors were independent agents, the overlapping nature of their contractual 
and operational responsibilities as well as their shared demining objective and 
operational inter-reliance suggests a more complex hybrid and networked actor. While 
the overall effect of this security network was significant, the limited scale of its 
security ‘footprint’ and the fact that it operated at a capillary level with a US sub-agency 
auspice and limited centralized oversight makes it an example of a micro-level security 
network.
Importantly, since a state agency was embedded with an important budgetary and 
managerial function within this networked actor, the ‘state’ still played a significant role 
in ‘steering’ the actions of the non-profit and corporate ‘rowing’ implementing partners. 
However, with only a limited connection to the CPA and the fluctuating nature of 
sovereign authority in Baghdad, the WRA and the UNDP acted less as a unified and 
bureaucratically streamlined agent of a unified state or public authority, and more as 
loosely coordinated quasi-independent authorizers and managers of private security.
The decision by these two public auspices to incorporate the knowledge and 
technological resources of an NGO also had noteworthy effects on this non-profit 
organization. Specifically, the decision by the UNDP to responsibilise IMMAP with 
creating its own security procedures had a series of significant implications for the 
identity of the NGO as well as its relationship to security governance. First, without an 
internal set of standard operating procedures or guidelines regarding the use of weapons 
or armed security services, IMMAP’s director was compelled to address these new
361 IMMAP website accessed on February 25 2008 at:
http://www.immap.org/ioomla/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=:57&Itemid=69
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security governance responsibilities and create an internal policy document articulating 
the NGO’s stance on weapons and private security. Second, IMMAP had to adjust to 
a new policy of their governmental donors using international private security firms and 
the concurrent expectation that their NGO partners would be willing and able to work 
with armed private security personnel. Finally, in the case of their ongoing work with 
the UNDP, they had to adjust to the fact that as the 10’s ‘implementing partner’ the 
door had been opened to the fact that they would now be contractually required to 
engage in the political process of selecting and even managing armed private security 
firms during the course of their demining work.
For IMMAP, this use of armed security represented a significant shift away from 
established ‘acceptance model’ norms of the NGO development community. It also 
changed the character of IMMAP by transforming it from a purely demining and 
information management NGO into an organization with partial managerial 
responsibility for the PSC Ronco. As a result, the NGO IMMAP was also transformed 
into an organization at least partially responsible for security governance and the 
organization of armed coercion in Iraqi territory.
Ultimately, the NGO allocated much of this responsibility for security governance 
oversight to the US State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement. 
However, by this very action, or practice, of a non-state entity giving or relinquishing a 
security governance role to a state actor, we see a paradoxical reversal of the state- 
centric assumption that security governance devolution always flows in the opposite 
direction. The very fact that a non-state actor was placed in such a position vis-a-vis a 
state agency accentuates the de-linking of security governance from the state that is 
central to a study of security governance.
362 Joe Donahue, Director, IMMAP Telephone interview Washington DC. 02/05/08.
363 Ibid.
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4.5 Humanitarian Mine Action in Iraq II: The IMCO Case: Introduction
The Iraqi NGO IMCO364 offers a second example of an NGO embedded into a micro­
level public-private security network with the WRA and the PSC Ronco. In an effort 
independent of the UNDP that ran both prior and concurrently with the LIS program 
previously discussed, in September of 2003 the WRA financed the establishment of the 
Iraq Mine and UXO Clearance Organization (IMCO), the first Iraqi NGO specializing 
in de-mining.
As with the previous case, the private security provided by the PSC Ronco was 
instrumental in the implementation of this de-mining program. However, Ronco played 
a significantly larger role in this WRA-IMCO-Ronco micro-level security network than 
it did while providing security for IMMAP. This is due to the fact that the WRA had 
contracted Ronco to essentially ‘stand up’ the Iraqi NGO IMCO from scratch. In 
practice, this meant that Ronco had been hired to equip and train approximately one 
hundred Iraqi IMCO personnel in the use of metal detectors, mine detecting dogs and 
manual and explosive demolition expertise throughout the course of the contract. At 
the same time, the Ronco Consulting Corporation was also tasked with providing 
security for the IMCO personnel it was training under the same umbrella security 
contract that the WRA used to provide security to the western advisers to IMMAP.
This security requirement for IMCO was considerably greater than that of IMMAP for a 
number of reasons. While IMMAP was able to rely on low-profile two or three person 
Iraqi LIS teams to clandestinely survey landmine sites, IMCO’s work required it to
364 IMCO is an acronym that stands for the Iraq Mine and UXO Clearance Organization.
365 Dennis Hadrick, State Department Office of WRA 09/20/07. Ronco’s training was made easier by 
their recruitment of former Iraqi military personnel familiar with demining techniques. The firm also 
trained IMCO managers and administrators. See also “Progress in Clearing Iraq's Landmine Legacy” 
Coalition Provisional Authority media note, December 12 2003 www.cpa- 
iraq.org/pressreleases/20031213a mines.htm See also: www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/52830.htm.
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move a large amount of equipment, mine detecting dogs and personnel to landmine and 
ERW contamination sites across the country. This meant that the NGO could not rely 
upon stealth for security in the same way that the smaller LIS teams were able to. The 
problem of the NGO’s visibility was also exacerbated by the fact that IMCO personnel 
had to stay on site for considerably longer periods of time than their IMMAP 
counterparts in order to carry out the slow and painstaking work of disposing of mines 
and other ERW. This expanded exposure to potential security threats, combined with 
actual death threats made against Iraqi IMCO personnel, heightened the level of security 
the PSC Ronco would provide for IMCO.366
Moreover, unlike the Iraqi contingent on the LIS program, the all-Iraqi IMCO personnel 
were essentially embedded from the outset within the WRA life-support infrastructure 
in Iraq. This meant that IMCO offices, vehicles, equipment and training facilities were 
all located within two purpose-built WRA compounds managed by Ronco in Baghdad
' l f .n
and in southern Iraq. As a result, the IMCO’s Iraqi NGO personnel enjoyed a 
comprehensive and robust life support/security package that was significantly greater 
that that undertaken for IMMAP during the LIS program.
4.5.1 The Practice o f Securing IMCO and WRA Personnel I: Micro-Level Compound 
Security
A brief discussion of the two WRA compounds—the first located inside Baghdad’s 
Green Zone and the second located (at different times) in the southern cities of Basra 
and Azzubayar—illustrates some of the typical characteristics of micro-level hybrid 
public-private security networks. It will also shed light on some of the explicit roles and
366 Dennis Hadrick, State Department Office of WRA 09/20/07.
367 IMMAP also had access to office space in the two WRA compounds. However, their much smaller 
presence and overall footprint constituted a much smaller security requirement for Ronco.
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responsibilities the PSC Ronco was tasked with under its umbrella life support and 
security contract for the State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement. Overall, the WRA umbrella contract required the PSC Ronco to provide 
two fully secure and functionally independent bases of operations for the WRA 
and its implementing partners. The first and primary compound, located within the 
Green Zone of Baghdad, consisted of an enclosed space with a half dozen buildings. 
These included IMCO administration offices, classrooms, and UXO disposal equipment 
storage facilities as well as a maintenance facility for a one hundred IMCO vehicle car 
pool. Ronco also created a firing range and organized shooting and PSD escape drills 
for its WRA clients and also set up mock-battlefield UXO training lanes and dog 
training courses for its IMCO demining trainees within this enclosed compound.
Despite being located within the relatively secure Green Zone, Ronco was contractually 
obligated to make security arrangements independent of the centralized security 
apparatus of the CPA Green Zone security forces. As a result, Ronco chose to surround 
the WRA compound itself with large concrete blast walls (or Bremer walls), rocket 
screens and guard towers. The compound also had its own Ronco-managed static and 
roving private security force. It was guarded by a total force of ninety Ronco-employed 
indigenous Iraqi security guards armed with AK-47s that were then divided up into 
units that operated on eight hour shifts and were managed by two Ronco western
' J / ’Q
security personnel and a Jordanian ex-commando. The compound also had its own 
gate, or vehicle entry control point, that was manned by armed guards responsible for 
stopping vehicles and conducting explosives checks. Ronco also stationed armed guards
368 Dennis Hadrick, State Department Office of WRA 09/20/07.
369 This composite of Iraqi, third-country-national (TCN) and western security personnel was typical of 
PSCs operating in Iraq at the time.
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within the series of towers along the walls at all times, and at night the perimeter of the
770compound was patrolled with roving armed guards and guard dogs.
771At the second WRA facility located in the southern Iraqi port city of Basra, the 
Ronco-managed compound was secured using methods essentially identical to the 
Baghdad compound. However, the Ronco security team embedded within the Basra 
WRA compound also included a mobile private security Quick Reaction Force (QRF) 
as an extra layer of security. Located outside of the relative security of the Green Zone 
and unable to count on quick support from Coalition Forces in this more isolated region 
of Iraq, the Ronco QRF was designed to be deployed against any assault against the
  777WRA compound perimeter. It was comprised of two heavily armored and armed 
civilian vehicles commonly referred to as ‘gunships’ within the Iraqi private security 
sector and were designed for firepower unlike their more lightly armed variants used in 
escort missions. Each of these gunships were manned by eight Ronco guards armed 
with their personal weapons (including smoke and fragmentation grenades used to
• 777 •‘break contact’ with their attackers) as well as RPK heavy machine guns. Besides 
being designed to counter-attack any assault against the WPA Basra compound, these 
QRF teams were also tasked with coming to the assistance, if necessary, of any Ronco 
PSD team that had been assaulted while in transit in the region.374
370 Telephone interview, Dan Bowen, Ronco 29/02/08.
371 This compound would later be relocated to Azzubyar.
372 Dan Bowen, Director of Operations Iraq, Ronco Security. 09/27/07.
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4.5.2 The Practice o f  Securing IMCO and WRA Personnel II: Micro-Level Mobile 
Security
As typical of many private security contracts in Iraq, beyond the ‘armed taxi service’ 
and QRF functions described above, Ronco’s work for IMCO also contained a mobile 
security element that included an armed convoy and a field security component. This 
armed convoy task involved Ronco providing security for IMCO personnel and 
equipment as it travelled from one of the Ronco-administered WRA compounds to the 
actual demining worksites that dotted the countryside. Depending on Ronco’s 
perception of the level of threat, the PSC would escort the IMCO demining team 
convoy using low-profile armored civilian vehicles or a combination of these with more 
heavily armored and armed high-profile vehicles. Upon arrival and once the IMCO 
personnel were deployed at the UXO contamination site, Ronco would use a mobile 
security team of up to two dozen security personnel to create a secure perimeter around
' I H C
the NGO deminers as they conducted their work. This maintenance of a secure 
perimeter included not only dispersing armed security personnel around the actual 
workers themselves, but also setting up ad hoc checkpoints along the roads that ran near 
the IMCO mine/ERW cleanup sites. Ronco did make active attempts to inform local 
area military commanders of the presence of these de-mining sessions both to avoid 
friendly fire incidents and to facilitate the possibility of military assistance in case of an 
attack by insurgents. However, these tactical level actions were left to the discretion of 
Ronco and involved personal and informal rather than formal interactions with 
Coalition forces.
This decision to set up road blocks in particular illustrates a number of important points. 
On the one hand, it illustrates the degree of latitude this PSC was given while
375 Telephone interview, Dan Bowen, Ronco 29/02/08.
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implementing their security governance programs by its public auspice/client. On the 
other, it demonstrates a security governance technique that did not merely create a 
defensive security posture but rather implemented a future or risk-oriented proactive 
security method common to private security in general that had important political 
consequences. By setting up security checkpoint roadblocks Ronco forced civilians 
within this region to move through this territorially delineated zone of private security 
governance administered by Ronco for the duration of IMCO’s fieldwork. Rather than 
simply creating a ‘passive’ personal security detail around the IMCO demining team, 
this mobile private security detail dramatically changed the security governance within 
a public territorial space. Contrary to a generalised Realist understanding of legitimate 
private coercion, this security governance was not restricted to ‘members of its own 
group’ nor did it take place within a private space. Instead, these road-blocks were set 
up on public roads and these Ronco security perimeters affected everyone that was 
either inside it or forced to move through it.
One further point can be gleaned from these temporary yet significant ‘zones of security 
governance’ specific to the operation of micro-level public-private security networks. 
The ability of the PSC Ronco to have the decision-making authority to set up 
checkpoints affecting general civilian traffic highlights both the permissive and 
disjointed environment these micro-level hybrid security networks operated in; 
examples of similar un-coordinated security governance decisions were replicated by 
other micro-level security networks across Iraq on any given day between 2003 and 
2007. This fact resulted in Iraqi territory being divided up into a patchwork of zones of 
security governance—of various sizes, durations, and degrees of intensity—that were 
controlled by a myriad of private security companies. At the same time, this example 
illustrates the practical consequences of dispersing security governance responsibilities
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to various sub-agency nodes within a state and how this directly resulted in a more 
fragmented (and privatized) mode of security governance. The next section will address 
the way Ronco managed this micro-level security network’s interactions with other 
security actors.
4.5.3 IMCO’s Networked Interactions with Other Security Actors
This micro-level security network had a conditional relationship to the fragmented 
patchwork of parallel and overlapping security structures and actors that operated in 
Iraq during this period. As a hybrid public-private security actor in its own right, it was 
also tied into broader security networks—both informal and formal—with a number of 
different types of actors. As the security implementing node within its micro-level 
security network, it fell within Ronco’s area of responsibility to interact with the various 
civilian authorities, PSCs, as well as military and police units from multiple states that
'1H(L
co-habited in the same Iraqi territory.
The level of interaction as well as the number and types of security actors Ronco liaised 
with varied geographically. For example, in southern Iraq, Ronco liaised with the 
British Coalition forces stationed in the region, whereas in and around Baghdad, the 
PSC created contacts with the US Coalition forces stationed in that area. Part of this 
coordination with US and UK Coalition forces was facilitated by Ronco’s participation 
in the formal security network provided by the PSC Aegis via the Regional Operations
077
Center (discussed in the previous chapter). However, in an observation that helps 
substantiate the claim that micro-level security networks operated somewhat ‘off the 
radar’ of central governmental bodies, in practice Ronco found the level of coordination
376 Telephone interview, Dan Bowen, Ronco 29/02/08.
377 For example, Ronco outfitted its vehicles with the transponders connected via satellite to the ROC 
surveillance system discussed in the previous chapter.
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the formal ROC network provided rather limited. As a result, it developed and tapped 
into other informal and local security networks that existed independently of centralized 
military administration. Other active attempts made by Ronco to coordinate its 
security governance role with more centralized governmental bodies also encountered 
problems. For instance, the ability of the PSC to gain Coalition identification cards for 
its employees that were ostensibly considered mandatory was routinely hindered by
' I 'T Q
various bureaucratic obstacles. As the security barriers (both physical and 
bureaucratic) the PSC encountered when attempting to gain access to CPA and US 
Embassy central staff increased, Ronco’s security management decreased their attempts 
to interact with these central authorities.380
In its place, Ronco proactively created more informal and interpersonal networks with 
Coalition forces in their immediate area of operations. For example, Ronco initiated 
‘meet and greets’ with local Coalition forces to announce their presence to local military 
commanders in an effort to create a positive and collaborative relationship as well as to 
avoid friendly fire incidents.381 Simultaneously, Ronco encountered various Iraqi police 
and military units operating in their areas of operation and made a conscious effort— 
wherever possible—to use their Iraqi employees to create a rudimentary working 
relationship with these Iraqi security forces. These informal and often personal and ad 
hoc methods of integration with the multiple security actors operating in Ronco’s area 
of operations help to illustrate both the fragmented and networked nature of security 
governance in Iraq overall, as well as the concrete methods by which Ronco—as the
378 Dan Bowen, Director of Operations Iraq, Ronco Security. 09/27/07.
379 This was an extremely common problem for PSCs.
380 Telephone interview, Dan Bowen, Ronco 29/02/08.
381 For example, Ronco’s Iraq Country Manager made it a point to personally introduce their security 
teams to every new military unit manning a checkpoint in an effort to familiarize them with Ronco’s 
vehicles in an effort to avoid friendly fire incidents. This policy was also instituted with the belief that 
local commanders personally familiar with a PSC’s operations in an area were also more likely to provide 
informal assistance in the form of information or even material or QRF support. Dan Bowen, Director of 
Operations Iraq, Ronco Security. 09/27/07.
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sole private security provider within a micro-level public/private hybrid security actor— 
situated itself amongst these various security actors.
4.5.4 The Global-Local Security Governance o f a Micro-Level Security Network 
This next section illustrates the mode of WRA oversight of Ronco’s umbrella security 
service and adds another level of empirical detail to the claim that the WRA acted as a 
semi-autonomous auspice of private security governance in Iraq. During the beginning 
of the IMCO demining program the WRA had a full-time member of its staff stationed 
in its compound in Baghdad’s Green Zone. However, over time WRA removed its 
permanent presence from this facility and its method of oversight evolved into a system 
of ‘remote management.’ In this method, permanent WRA ‘on-the-ground’ program 
oversight was replaced by occasional field visits by personnel from the WRA 
Washington DC office.382 A certain degree of centralized and on-site ‘state’ oversight 
was maintained via a State Department Embassy liaison officer stationed within the 
Green Zone. However, in practice, this essentially amounted to basic program auditing 
rather than a management process that had qualitative input into the actual demining- 
security program itself. Indeed, in a classic illustration of the ‘capillary’ nature of 
micro-level security governance, at no point during the duration of this contract did 
CPA or US Embassy staff give any orders or managerial requests regarding Ronco’s 
security and life support work for WRA and IMCO.383 Despite the fact that the higher 
governmental echelons at the US Embassy in Baghdad were located just down the street 
from the WRA Green Zone compound, the bulk of the actual program oversight was 
now being handled remotely by the WRA personnel in Washington, DC.
382 Full-time on-site WRA personnel at the Baghdad compound ended at the end of 2004. Dan Bowen, 
Director of Operations Iraq, Ronco Security. 09/27/07.
383 Ibid.
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As a result, the majority of the interaction between the auspice WRA and its PSC 
implementing partner Ronco became long distance and reliant upon telephone and 
internet communication. These two nodes in this micro-level hybrid security network 
jointly determined that Ronco would email the WRA’s Washington DC offices situation 
reports on a regular weekly as well as monthly basis. Unscheduled telephone calls were 
a daily occurrence and situation reports (sitreps)—involving, for instance, PSD teams 
receiving small arms fire—were emailed by Ronco staff to WRA’s Washington DC 
offices immediately after such an incident occurred. At the same time, face to face 
meetings between Ronco and WRA were also conducted in the US, and were facilitated 
by the fact that Ronco’s Washington DC offices were only a ten minute walk from those 
of WRA. This proximity allowed WRA personnel to personally discuss issues with 
Ronco management in DC who would then relay their client’s directions back to their 
employees in Baghdad and elsewhere.
This section’s analysis of the oversight mechanisms put in place by the WRA to 
monitor Ronco’s security work within this micro-level security network illustrates two 
important aspects of a security governance perspective. First, it offers a detailed study 
of how a governmental sub-agency becomes a site of security governance. It shows how 
such an office became transformed into a public auspice of security governance and 
how it also became a single node—fused with a private security firm and an NGO—into 
a micro-level hybrid security network. Second, it dramatically illustrates the global/local 
nature of the interactions between the WRA auspice and the PSC implementer that 
comprised the security governance embedded within this demining program. This was 
accomplished by documenting the ‘remote control’ oversight mechanisms that were
384 WRA also instituted a six month award assessment fee board to determine the quality of the service 
provided. Dan Bowen represented Ronco during these meetings. Dennis Hadrick, State Department 
Office of WRA 09/20/07.
385 Ibid.
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largely tied to internet and telephone connections between Washington DC and 
Baghdad Iraq, existing at a distance of over 6000 miles.
However, it is also important to stress that the actual content of the security service was 
left largely in the hands of Ronco itself. In the words of one WRA official,
“[w]e really relied on their SME [subject matter expertise] when it came to security. We were using
performance based contracting. We’d tell them the results we wanted...for example, we would tell them
386to take adequate measures to protect our people, or property against sabotage.. .not how to do it."
Ronco’s assessment of this relationship directly supports this description. In the words 
of Ronco’s Iraq Country Manager, “We said how we think it should be done, and they 
said do it.” Though the decision regarding the overall low profile approach to security 
during the LIS contract was shared by IMMAP and WRA personnel, the actual 
authority to decide when more robust security measures were required—including the 
establishment of a gunship QRF for their IMCO operations—was left to the discretion 
of Ronco. Indeed, the very fact that the WRA hired Ronco precisely because of its 
professional security ‘subject matter expertise’ as a private security firm became a 
rationale for ceding this decision-making authority over security decisions to the 
PSC 388 Throughout the course of the contract, this ability to affect security governance 
held by the PSC manifested itself in every security decision made in the management of 
the WRA compounds, the PSD teams, and other forms of mobile security provided to 
WRA State Department, IMMAP, and IMCO personnel.
387 Dan Bowen, Director of Operations Iraq, Ronco Security. 09/27/07.
388 See professional expertise as a source of ‘private authority’ in The Emergence of Private Authority in 
Global Governance. Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J Biersteker [eds.] Cambridge University Press 
2002 .
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4.5.5 Case Study Conclusion
Overall, this case study—as well as its predecessor—has demonstrated how the neo­
liberal responsibilization strategies that have transformed the way public actors activate 
non-state actors to implement their political programs can also change the modality of 
security governance. With a focus on micro-level security networks, they also illustrated 
the way sub-agency auspices—such as the WRA—have themselves become important 
quasi-independent authorizers of security governance. Importantly, this focus on the 
capillary level of security governance also illuminated the way these micro-level hybrid 
security networks maintained a considerable amount of independence—and 
organizational and managerial distance—from centralized governmental bodies like the 
US Embassy. However, while these networks empowered private actors with security 
responsibilities in new ways, they also retained a degree of direct public governmental 
guidance by maintaining a physically embedded state sub-agency presence within this 
hybrid security actor. As a result, a public auspice maintained a considerable ability to 
‘steer’ security governance within this network even as a private security company 
‘rowed’ to implement it. This next case study moves away from the hybrid public- 
private network model and instead examines an NGO that operated in Iraq with an 
armed private security firm without being embedded into a network with a public 
auspice.
4.6 Civil Society Building in Iraq: The IWPR Case: Introduction
The Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) case departs from previous analyses 
of government techniques of ‘rule at a distance’ and instead provides us with an
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example of security governance beyond rule at a distance. Instead of acting as an 
implementing partner for a public auspice while embedded within a hybrid public- 
private security network—such as IMCO and IMMAP in the cases above—this study 
exemplifies an instance where an NGO used private security to help it implement its 
own policy goals while outside of state structures and state direction.
While a governmental auspice did play a role in funding the work IWPR conducted in 
Iraq, this public actor did not act as an auspice within the security network itself. This 
case study, then, provides an example of an NGO acting as an auspice for a PSC within 
a hybrid private-private security network at the micro-level. It also documents the 
techniques used by the United Kingdom Department for International Development 
(DfID) to exert influence over IWPR security decisions and discusses what this means 
for security governance in general.
4.6.1 NGO as Auspice: Security Governance Beyond Hybrid Public-Private Security 
Networks
While the IWPR website describes itself as ‘an international network of three 
organizations,’ it is essentially an international NGO registered as a non-profit or 
charity governed by a board of directors in three countries (the UK, the US and South 
Africa).390 Organized with the mission to ‘build peace and democracy through free and 
fair media,’ IWPR has sent its personnel into conflict zones around the world to provide 
professionalization training and capacity building support for local independent news 
reporting.391 With this goal in mind, the IWPR London office created a Middle East 
(Iraq) program and sent a team to Iraq in June of 2003 to identify, train, and commission
389 Clifford Shearing ‘Thoughts on Sovereignty’ Policing & Society 14(1) 2004 p.9.
390 See IWPR website:
http://iwpr.net/index.php7apc state=henotop trustees euro.html&s=o&o=top trustees int.html.
391 Ibid.
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qualified politically independent Iraqi journalists and editors. Relying on multiple 
sources of funding to carry out this project—e.g. its own funds, private donations and 
government agency grants—between June of 2003 and October of 2005 IWPR 
established offices in Baghdad and throughout Iraq to enhance Iraqi civil society by 
training and mentoring local journalists.
IWPR’s relationship to security governance differed considerably from that of IMMAP 
and IMCO. Whereas the contracts IMCO and IMMAP had with the WRA gave them 
access to Ronco’s security umbrella contract, IWPR set up its operation independently 
from any such public actor and was therefore responsible for independently providing 
its own Iraq project with security. In its effort to accomplish this security task, IWPR 
relied on contacts on the ground it had developed prior to the actual launch of their Iraqi 
program to acquire a small local bodyguard force. Between June 2003 and October of 
2004, in a move that significantly differentiated them from the previous two NGOs 
analyzed, IWPR directly hired local armed security guards who also acted as drivers for 
the NGO’s expatriate staff.393
IWPR first contacted a PSC in August of 2003 after the bombing of the UN 
headquarters building. Though IWPR originally refrained from using a Western PSC for 
armed security work—preferring their own in-house Iraqi security team—the severity of 
the UN attack compelled them to turn to a PSC for security advice. Specifically, IWPR 
contacted AKE, a British PSC specializing in the provision of security for NGOs, to 
conduct a number of security reviews for the NGO’s recently rented office space in 
Baghdad’s ‘Red Zone.’394 These security reviews conducted by AKE consisted of
392 A mmar Al-Shahbander, Iraq Program Director, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. London. 
10/13/2005. The other office locations included Sulimani and Irbil. IWPR also had coordinators in 
southern Iraq.
393 Ibid.
394 Ibid. The “Red Zone” is the name given to the large section of Baghdad that is outside of the secured 
CPA “Green Zone.”
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several site visits to the IWPR Baghdad offices, during which time they advised IWPR 
personnel on how to best secure and fortify their office space. During these visits 
AKE also advised the IWPR Iraqi security guards on simple enhancements to their 
security procedures.
During this sixteen month period, IWPR acted with complete independence from any 
government or public agent guidance with respect to their security decisions. The 
decision by IWPR to set up its own armed local armed guard force was done without 
any consultation with a government agency, and IWPR’s primary governmental 
donor—the British Department for International Development (DfID)— did not have 
any input into its NGO grantee’s self-provision of armed security for their work in Iraq. 
Moreover, only after the NGO had independently decided that the attack on the UN 
meant that a serious deterioration in the security environment required additional 
consultation with a professional private security company did they then decide to 
contact AKE.
However, this changed dramatically in October of 2004 when the videotaped beheading 
of a British aid worker prompted a public outcry in the UK and a quick government 
reassessment of the security precautions of British citizens working for the British
'3Q/'
government in the private and non-profit sectors.
4.6.2 Contested Security Governance: A Governmental Donor and IWPR Collide
In the days immediately following the beheading of Ken Bigley, the IWPR Baghdad 
office was informed by DfID of a new ‘unofficial policy’ that all of its grantee NGOs
395 Ammar Al-Shahbander, Iraq Program Director, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. London. 
10/13/2005.
396 ‘British Hostage Ken Bigley Dead’, Independent October 8 2004.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/british-hostage-ken-biglev-dead-543061.html.
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would be required to have their offices located in the secure Green Zone.397 The IWPR 
Iraq office immediately refused to comply with this DfID request on the grounds that 
their entire operational philosophy was tied to their co-habitation with the Iraqi public. 
More specifically, the NGO wished to remain geographically unassociated with the 
CPA Green Zone and symbolically unassociated with the military occupation of Iraq by 
staying headquartered in the Red Zone. Absent the political or even contractual 
authority to demand IWPR comply with its wishes, DfID responded to IWPR 
intransigence with a compromise position tied to an ultimatum. In effect, DfID 
demanded that IWPR hire a Western PSC or face the withdrawal of DfID funding for
OQO
their program, a move that would effectively force IWPR to leave Iraq. Under this 
pressure, IWPR complied with this demand and was immediately granted an emergency 
budget cost extension by DfID to cover the additional cost of hiring a PSC.399 
Although DfID did not act as an auspice for IWPR, and despite the fact that it was not 
able to contractually or legally deny IWPR the ability to manage its security within Iraq 
as the NGO saw fit, this government department nevertheless was able to use the threat 
of a withdrawal of crucial future funding to coerce IWPR into making a concession. 
While IWPR maintained its location in Baghdad’s Red Zone against DfID wishes, DfID 
was able to impose the use of a Western PSC onto its grantee.
Ironically, while this decision by DfID effectively decreased IWPR’s autonomy over its 
general approach to security, in practice it translated into an increase in this NGO’s
397 A mmar Al-Shahbander, Iraq Program Director, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. London. 
10/13/2005.
398 Confidential telephone interview with IWPR employee. 10/15/05. The degree of coercion employed 
by DfID involved in this process was not advertised and government language describing this process 
differed from the NGO account considerably. According to a UK Parliament website, “DFID has offered 
NGOs which we are supporting additional finance for increased security [in Iraq] if needed.”
See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/244/244we02.htm 
Accessed March 12 2005.
399 This was not an isolated case. By early 2004, DfID had diverted over 278 million pounds from its 
reconstruction budget to help pay for increased private security. See Robert Fisk and Severin Carrell, 
“Occupiers Spend Millions on Private Army of Security Men” Independent March 24 2008.
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control over security governance. Indeed, DflD’s oversight of the security funding it 
provided for IWPR was the least intensive of the governmental donors studied. In a 
process similar to that of the UNDP relationship to IMMAP, no advice was given to the 
NGO on what security firm to hire, what methods of security the PSC should provide, 
or how the contract should be managed.400 DfID disengagement even extended beyond 
that of the UNDP to the extent that it did not require IWPR to request permission (or 
otherwise notify) DfID regarding its plans to use private security or the security 
governance techniques it would employ. The IWPR Iraq Program Director made this 
point by bluntly stating that ‘DfID didn’t interfere with [our] management of this 
private security company.’401
4.6.3 The Practice o f  Securing IWPR Personnel: An NGO Manages Private Security
Upon receiving the DfID security emergency funding, IWPR immediately approached 
three UK PSCs that they were familiar with. IWPR contacted Chiron, Centurion and 
AKE—all of which had already been set up and operational within Iraq—and selected 
Chiron for the security contract. The nature of this contracted security service differed 
significantly from the previous case studies. Specifically, the IWPR Iraq field office did 
not want to yield the type of operational control over the organization’s movements or 
security methods to the PSC in the same way WPA had done under Ronco’s security 
umbrella contract. Describing the process of allowing a PSC to make tactical security 
decisions in the field as a process of ‘giving up a lot of rights and taking on a lot of 
obligations [to the PSC]’ the IWPR Iraq Program Director chose to hire Chiron in an
400 DfID did attach a single and generic stipulation to this funding; namely, that IWPR hire a British PSC.
401 A mmar Al-Shahbander, Iraq Program Director, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. London. 
10/13/2005.
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advisory capacity that left a great deal of discretion over security governance to 
IWPR.402
In practice, this meant that IWPR—in contradistinction to the experience of both 
IMMAP and IMCO—maintained considerable control over the overall content, 
management, planning and implementation of the security service that Chiron provided. 
This hands-on approach manifested itself in a number of different ways. First, the IWPR 
Iraq field office selected two Chiron security personnel from a list of curriculum vitae 
provided by the PSC, specifically requesting individuals with a background in foreign 
military training and security management to help train their local Iraqi security team.403 
Second, IWPR refused to follow the State Department Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement technique of simply explaining to the PSC what security outcomes they 
wanted while leaving the selection of the means to achieve these ends to the PSC itself. 
Instead, IWPR created a detailed twenty-eight page document outlining the duties and 
security policies the PSC was expected to adhere to.404 Importantly, in a decision that 
illustrates the extent to which IWPR was removed from the CPA or other governmental 
oversight of their security governance, the NGO did not stick to, or even read, the 
CPA’s published regulations regarding the PSC rules for the use of force when creating 
their NGO security document. Instead, they relied upon the in-house experience of its 
team to draft these rules.405
During the course of the contract, IWPR tasked Chiron with the following duties: 
training the IWPR Iraqi guard force; managing the logistics for IWPR movements 
around Baghdad; fortifying the IWPR Baghdad compound (including reinforced doors,
402 A mmar Al-Shahbander, Iraq Program Director, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. London. 
10/13/2005.
403 Ibid. The Chiron personnel IWPR selected had experience in the SAS and MI5.
404 Ibid.
405 Confidential telephone interview with IWPR employee. 10/15/05. It needs to be pointed out that 
IWPR’s rules for the use of force were very strict and were compatible with the broad guidelines created 
by the CPA.
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fencing, and the planning of escape routes); providing IWPR with a weekly security 
assessment and intelligence report; and providing close protection for IWPR 
personnel.406 The NGO Iraq office also created its own five-tiered threat level 
schemata—complete with a variety of security indicators—to work out, in advance, 
what security procedures the PSC would implement under various security conditions. 
This was created for the express purpose of maintaining NGO command and control 
over its own movements within Iraq 407 Since IWPR had a very small British expatriate 
staff and worked with a small number of Iraqi journalists, these movements relied 
heavily on stealth and maintaining a low security profile rather than a heavy and visible 
PSC presence. Though the two Chiron security personnel did in many respects 
‘manage’ IWPR’s security by constantly adding input into the decision-making process, 
the existence of an independent in-house NGO armed security team combined with the 
contractual arrangements outlined above gave the NGO considerable managerial 
discretion in their own security provision. Moreover, without any public auspice 
embedded into this decision-making process, the NGO was also effectively participating 
in a form of security governance from a position ‘beyond the state’. This latter point 
will be elaborated below.
The emphasis the IWPR’s Iraq office placed on maintaining managerial control over 
security policy extended beyond its relationship to the PSC Chiron. It also occurred 
both internally within IWPR as an organization and, more importantly, externally in its 
dealings with various governmental authorities in Iraq. First, though IWPR officially 
maintained a ‘no weapons’ policy—claiming like many NGOs that they did not use 
weapons—in reality the local IWPR program officers had a considerable degree of
406 Ibid.
407 Ibid. It was common practice in Iraq for PSCs to have the contractual right to ultimately decide if a 
scheduled movement by its client was too dangerous to carry out for security reasons. IWPR’s threat 
matrix, worked out with Chiron in advance, was designed to keep this decision-making authority with the 
NGO rather than ceding it to the PSC.
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autonomy from the home office. In practice, this autonomy meant that the security 
policies set up on the ground in Iraq were enacted without informing the IWPR London 
office with the details.408 The methods used for getting around this official IWPR ban 
on the use of weapons included obscuring budget allocations used for purchasing 
weapons by giving money to the security personnel to make these purchases instead of 
having IWPR purchase them directly 409 At the same time, their Iraqi security guards 
also brought with them their own weapons—including hand grenades—that were 
ostensibly used to protect IWPR personnel but which were considered the ‘personal 
private property’ of their guards.410 This official ‘no weapons’ policy also had the 
unintended consequence of creating a lacuna of weapons-use guidelines internal to the 
NGO. As a result, the IWPR Iraq office created its own weapons ‘rules of engagement’ 
for both its in-house employees as well as the Chiron security contractors under their 
employment.
The second decision taken by the IWPR Iraq office to maintain its autonomy had direct 
ramifications for governmental oversight of its security governance. Instead of 
participating in formal networks (such as the ROC) or actively making attempts to keep 
in regular contact with the CPA or other governmental agencies, IWPR expressly 
requested that Chiron refrain from engaging in either formal or informal networks with 
the government agencies or Coalition military forces operating in Iraq.411 On the one 
hand, this stance was adopted by IWPR to ‘deny the PSC more leverage in command 
and control issues’ pertaining to the NGO’s movement and actions in Iraq.412 On the 
other hand, this position was simply an extension of its philosophy that led it to avoid
408 Confidential telephone interview with IWPR employee. 10/15/05.
409 Ibid.
4,0 Ibid.
411 Ammar Al-Shahbander, Iraq Program Director, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. London.
10/13/2005.
412 Ibid.
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being headquartered in the Green Zone in the first place; along with many NGOs 
operating in Iraq, IWPR wanted to keep as much of a symbolic and operational 
independence from the CPA and the Coalition occupation of Iraq as possible. This 
decision to intentionally avoid any coordination with the CPA or Coalition forces— 
combined with the absence of an embedded governmental auspice and the creation of its 
own rules for the use of force—meant that this micro-level hybrid security network had 
effectively engaged in security governance beyond the state.
4.6.4 Case Study Conclusion
By independently entering Iraq and hiring an armed security team, IWPR had removed 
the state from any direct role in either the authorization or the implementation of its 
security governance. Overall, though DfID did provide crucial funding for the IWPR 
Iraq program, the NGO implemented its own policy rather than that of a government 
agency. The fact that IWPR was not engaged in the type of hybrid public/private 
network that maintained an embedded governmental managerial element (as witnessed 
in the previous two cases) underscores this point. As a result, IWPR operated in terms 
that cannot be encapsulated by the concept of ‘rule at a distance’ where a state agency 
steered a policy while a private actor rowed.
While DfID was able to use its role as a crucial donor to coerce IWPR into hiring a 
PSC, this decision merely affected the level of security enjoyed by the NGO. It did not 
empower DfID to participate—as an auspice within a hybrid security network—in the 
actual content of this security governance. Indeed, it paradoxically increased the degree 
to which its NGO donor engaged in security governance beyond public oversight or 
control. Finally, the unilateral decision made by IWPR not to allow the PSC Chiron to 
coordinate its security activities with the CPA or other governmental agencies—
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combined with the sole discretion IWPR had over the content and management of its 
multi-tiered private security force—further illustrates that this NGO engaged in security 
governance beyond the state. While the CPA did provide the meta-political authoritative 
framework within which IWPR—as a legitimate NGO—was legally authorised to use 
armed private security, the fact that IWPR wilfully ignored the CPA orders and 
memorandums regarding the use of force and instead relied on their own norms413 of 
security governance further compliments the idea of IWPR as operating beyond state 
rule at a distance.
4.7 Chapter Conclusion
By focusing on three case studies involving the use of private security by non­
governmental organizations, this chapter contributed to an under-researched area of 
private security studies. Its introduction of the micro-level security network also 
provided a conceptual device that connected this NGO-PSC relationship to important 
processes of governmental restructuring. Specifically, micro-level security networks 
provided empirical depth to this dissertation’s claim that security governance 
responsibilities have been dispersed away from the state’s centre, both horizontally 
across various state agencies as well as vertically to state sub-agencies and supra-state 
agencies.
Micro-level security networks highlight the way these newly created auspices of
security governance did not have an indigenous capacity to provide or implement
security, thereby necessitating partnerships with private security. At the same time,
these micro-level security networks demonstrated how security requirements could be
413 On this point IWPR—as a Western NGO—was clearly influenced by and broadly operated within 
Western norms regarding how coercion ought to be governed. The point I am making is that they 
explicitly relied upon their own judgment—as opposed to CPA regulations—when creating their 
guidelines for the use of force.
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embedded as an ancillary function into ostensibly non-security-related governmental 
tasks such as de-mining. By re-distributing responsibility for security to the lowest 
levels of government, this logic of subsidiarity had not only forced these governmental 
nodes to ‘activate’ resources external to the state, but had also allowed private security 
to ‘penetrate’ the state within new (and counterintuitive and unexpected) agencies or 
nodes. The simultaneous state ‘activation’ of private security and private security’s 
‘penetration’ of the state involved a complex networked restructuring of security 
governance not easily encapsulated within a binary and zero-sum power analysis of the 
state and private security.
As a result, these three cases studies provide a two-pronged analysis of private security 
in Iraq—and its relationship to the state—without simply identifying the growth of 
private security as ipso facto a loss of power for the state. In the first two cases, a 
horizontal or nodal view of the state was combined with the concept of hybrid 
public/private networks to discuss power in terms of state ‘rule at a distance’. Yet this 
did not result in a simple increase in state power. Instead, the activation of non-state 
resources to assist in the implementation of governmental programs paradoxically 
increased the control these state auspices had over security governance even as it 
simultaneously decreased state control by adding new actors into the security process. 
Crucially, however, this chapter also moved beyond such binary analyses of a Toss’ of 
state power to map the new modality of public/private security governance as well as 
the multiplication of the ‘sites’ (or auspices) of public security governance. The studies 
of the US State Department Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement’s use of the 
demining NGO’s IMMAP and IMCO and the private security company Ronco illustrate 
these public/private security networks in action, and give a concrete detailed account of 
this government ‘rule at a distance.’
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The last case study involving the NGO Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) 
provided an example of security governance that operated beyond the model of state 
rule at a distance. Rather than being tied into a hybrid network while acting as an 
implementing partner for a governmental auspice, the NGO IWPR effectively acted as a 
private auspice, managing and directing both its in-house private security force as well 
as its contracted PSC. While its non-profit work and the security provided by the PSC 
Chiron were heavily subsidized by DfiD—thus helping underpin the NGO’s legitimacy 
as a private auspice of security governance—the government agency was in no way 
embedded into the security management process of this PSC. It is true that IWPR 
operated within the legal parameters of the meta-political authority of the CPA, since 
the Coalition Provisional Authority formally allowed NGOs to act as security auspices. 
However, this does not diminish the fact that this non-state actor was directing security 
governance independently of—and with an intentional distance from—any state 
guidance or direction. Thus, while IWPR did not pose any direct challenge to the 
authority of the state, it was still involved in independent, politically significant and 
legitimate security governance within Iraq. In this instance, IWPR and its PSC 
implementing partner were not ‘rowing’ as the state ‘steered’ a particular government 
program, but instead were enacting their own political security governance program 
‘beyond the state’ and its direction or control.414
414 Clifford Shearing, ‘Thoughts on Sovereignty’, Policing and Society' 14(1) 2004 pg. 9.
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5 Maritime PSCs and the Entrepreneurial Use of 
International Law: The Dispersal of Meta-Political 
Authority over Security Governance
5.1 Introduction
Piracy,415 once generally perceived to have been eliminated as a security threat to states 
and international commerce alike, has again gained recognition as a significant problem 
for the international community. Tankers and other sea-going transports carrying 
expensive cargo while travelling through international shipping lanes in the Malacca 
Straits and the Gulf of Aden have become the targets of increasing numbers of pirate 
attacks, and the assaults themselves have also become more violent.
At the same time, the inability of weak or failed states such as Somalia to effectively 
patrol their territorial waters has caused an increase in piracy and other forms of 
criminal predation—including violent and heavily armed illegal fishing operations— 
trawling up and down their un-govemed coastlines. These weak and failed states have 
played host to piracy as both a traditional crime of opportunity and also as a form of 
organized crime, with criminal pirate syndicates planning the theft of valuable ship 
cargoes and increasingly kidnapping crews and holding them for ransom.
415 This chapter follows the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) by defining piracy as ‘an act of 
boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and 
with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.’ See “Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships”, Annual Report, International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime 
Bureau, January 31 2006.
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Moreover, since 9/11, this vulnerability of international shipping to piracy has been 
increasingly viewed as a potential terrorist threat by the United States and other states. 
Fears that terrorist organizations may synergize political violence with the methods of 
piracy in an effort to either damage the global economy or to mount a large scale 
'spectacular' terrorist attack against a major port have become a serious concern.
Against this backdrop of the re-emergence of piracy as a security threat, this chapter 
applies a security governance analysis of two instances of maritime private security 
operations between 1999 and 2005. It provides a significant contribution to the 
literature on private security by providing an empirically rich examination of the 
largely unexplored yet increasingly significant field of maritime private security 
services.416 The first case study analyses the efforts of a private security company to 
eradicate illegal and violent piratical fishing operations on behalf of the government of 
the quasi-state Puntland State of Somalia. In a fashion similar to the Erinys Oil 
Protection case, the Puntland case study examines the power dynamics within the 
hybrid public-private security network created between the PSC Hart and their 
government client as well as the effect that this contract had on security governance in 
the Gulf of Aden as a whole. The second case study examines private security 
providing armed anti-piracy vessel escorts for commercial ships through the Malacca 
Straits. This case moves away from a study of a hybrid public-private security actor 
and instead shifts attention to a private-private (i.e. PSC-commercial client) actor. In 
this instance, the interactions between this hybrid private-private security actor and the 
local littoral state authorities are discussed in terms of a broader and informal security 
network.
416 The significance of the maritime private security sector experienced another spurt of growth as a 
result of an sharp hike in Somali piracy. See: Patrick Cullen, ‘Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
with Public and Private Security’ (Washington DC: Journal o f International Peace Operations) 
October 26 2008.
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On another level, this chapter continues to elaborate the theoretical and practical 
ramifications that the de-coupling of exclusive meta-political authority over security 
governance from the state has for the study of private security. Specifically, this 
chapter empirically demonstrates the way private security has used international law 
as an alternative source of meta-political authority for their security governance 
programs. By moving away from state-authorized security governance via an 
entrepreneurial use of international law, the security programs engaged in by these 
maritime PSCs constitute a radical challenge to the Realist proposition that the state 
maintains a monopoly over the meta-political authority to legitimate security 
governance. Moreover, as these global private security actors link their security 
programs to the meta-political authority of international law, this process also 
displaces the state and reconstitutes the relationship between authority, coercion, and 
territory—and hence the nature of security governance itself.
5.2 From a Multi-lateralization o f Auspices to a Multi-lateralization o f Meta-Political 
Authority
Previously, in the work on Iraq, the concept of an auspice was used heuristically to 
highlight the way in which multiple actors—both public and private, within the state 
and external to it—have acted as agents that ‘authorise’ private security to implement 
various security governance programs. Here, authorization essentially referred to the 
actual practice of auspices hiring, directing, designing the program content of, and 
otherwise managing the actions of armed private security companies. This auspice- 
centred notion of authority was necessary because the alternative state-centric 
proposition that state’s monopolized authority over security had masked important
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changes taking place (i.e. multi-lateralization and privatization) in security governance. 
It also argued that state-centric models that assumed states continued to hold a 
monopoly on authority over security governance were ill-suited for an analysis of 
hybrid public-private security networks.
However, while the dual chapters on Iraq intentionally decentred and deconstructed the 
state’s authority over security governance, it did not offer a substantive empirical 
demonstration of the dispersion of meta-political authority away from the state. Indeed, 
on the contrary, these chapters acknowledged that the state retained a somewhat 
privileged relationship to authority—embodied in its legislative powers and scope of 
legal jurisdiction—that differentiated it from private auspices of security governance. 
For instance, chapter three demonstrated this point by indicating that the authority of 
private (e.g. corporate) auspices to hire PSCs and engage in security governance within 
Iraq was typically an explicit legal right conferred or granted to these private actors by 
the state.
However, chapter three also pointed out that the state’s meta-political authority over 
security governance was not absolute or total. Instead, other public agents (e.g. Allied 
Coalition governments, international organizations) were also recognized as holding 
meta-political authority over security governance within Iraq. In other words, these 
other public actors could hire private security to legally engage in security governance 
in Iraq—and were capable of granting private auspices the right to do the same—by 
virtue of their own authority independently of the authority of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority. This simple empirical observation thereby undermined a strict Realist and
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state-centric understanding of the state’s monopoly over security governance within its
417own territory.
This chapter returns to this issue of the dispersal of meta-political authority over 
security governance to provide a substantial illustration of its practical importance for 
private security and security governance more generally. Specifically, as discussed in 
the introduction, this chapter will illustrate the way private security has turned to 
international law as a tool to legally authorize its security governance programs 
independently of—and sometimes in confrontation with—states themselves.
5.3 Case Study I: Puntland State o f Somalia and Private Security: Introduction
This case study analyses a security contract that created a hybrid public-private fisheries 
protection and anti-piracy patrol that operated in the semi-autonomous state of Puntland 
between September 1999 and February 2001. By providing a detailed empirical survey 
of the operational aspects of this maritime hybrid public-private security actor, this case 
study continues to illustrate the networked public-private nature of security governance 
operating in the world today. The concept of a security network is also used to briefly 
examine the PSC’s creation of a private regional intelligence network and their 
incorporation of non-state actors into a broader anti-piracy security network— 
something the PSC itself described as ‘a network of capability that denies [pirate]
417 It is important to reiterate that this dissertation is not making a technical legal argument regarding the 
right to legitimate security governance held by international organizations. Nor is it making any claim 
regarding the status of legal personality granted to international organizations under international law as 
pertaining to security governance. Instead, it argues that the independent authority held by international 
organizations over security governance is based on the actual practices of these actors in Iraq and the 
perception o f  legitimacy to authorise security governance granted to international organizations by CPA 
officials themselves. However, for a broader discussion on the legal personality of international 
organizations as it pertains to security governance, see: Nigel White and Sorcha MacLeod, ‘EU 
Operations and Private Military Contractors: Issues of Corporate and Institutional Responsibility’ in The 
European Journal o f  International Law 19(5) 2008 p.970. These authors argue—in a fashion that 
supports my own argument—that international organizations hold ‘objective’ legal personality that is not 
derivative o f  states '. Ibid, p. 971.
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4 1 8operations.’ This case study also includes a description of the techniques of control, 
or rule at a distance, deployed by the quasi-state over its PSC implementing partner, as 
well as a discussion of the contradictory effects of the transfer of power between the 
state and the PSC. However, the crucial point that this case study seeks to elucidate is 
tied to the legal strategy used to claim legitimate authority over security governance 
made by the PSC during the course of this security contract. Specifically, this case study 
will illustrate how a private security company used international law to displace the 
state as only source of meta-political authority over security governance.
5.3.1 Contract Background: Puntland, Piratical Fishing and a Business Opportunity
The political origins of Puntland State of Somalia—and its subsequent involvement in 
arguably the world’s first and only quasi-state Exclusive Economic Zone fisheries 
protection operation—is tied to the collapse of Somalia’s Syad Barre regime in 1991. 
After seven years of statelessness and civil war—and with several failed initiatives to 
create a unified state of Somalia—various stakeholders in northeast Somalia initiated a 
dialogue regarding self-rule and the reestablishment of regional law and order. In March 
of 1998 a number of political organisations comprising leaders from various regional 
militias as well as civic leaders (traditional clan elders) from throughout the northeast 
began a series of open political discussions that culminated in the Garowe Conference 
on May 5th 1998.419 After three months of deliberations, the autonomous ‘Puntland 
State of Somalia’420 was proclaimed under the presidency of former Somali Salvation
418 George Simms quoted in Brian Scudder’s ‘Beating the Pirates’, Gulf Business February 2000 p.51.
419 Maria H. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: from statelessness to 
statelessness? International Books, Utrecht: 2001 p.272-3.
420 Unlike its neighbour Somaliland, Puntland State of Somalia did not declare independence from 
Somalia, but instead declared itself an autonomous state o f Somalia. It will be referred to as ‘Puntland’ 
during this case study.
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Democratic Front42 Chairman, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. President Ahmed appointed a 
government cabinet three months later, and a parliament was inaugurated in September
A'y'y »of that same year. This new consolidation of power in the institution of the self- 
declared state of Puntland, along with the peace process that created it, was 
accompanied by the popular disbandment of a series of smaller regional militias that 
had operated in the region during the Somali civil war. A side-effect of this process also 
meant that thousands of individual armed militia members were released into the 
community. As a result, criminal activity increased throughout the region.
In particular, the sea lanes off of the coast of Puntland were a popular target for these 
former militia members. In the words of one analyst,4 [t]hese former fighters, armed but 
with no jobs and few skills, ran amok.. .practicing piracy in sea lanes in the Gulf of 
Aden and the Indian Ocean, making them unsafe for legitimate seafaring traffic, 
protecting the illegal fishing operations of private companies, and joining protection 
rackets...’.423 This was exacerbated by the fact that many of these militiamen had 
practiced piracy in order to finance their militia’s previous military campaigns and had 
simply taken what they knew and applied it in a freelance fashion. As a result, piracy 
became rampant off of the hom of Africa during this period.424 Two particular and inter­
related types of piracy afflicted the waters off of Puntland’s coastline. First, a traditional 
form of piracy occurred whereby passing ships would be boarded and hijacked, with 
both the ships as well as the crew taken to shore and held for a ransom. Second, a 
piratical form of illegal and violent fishing had developed off of the coast. In this 
instance, warlords operating large fishing trawlers armed with heavy weapons and 
crewed by armed men ran violent extortion rackets against both the international fishing
421 The SSDF was one of the armed factions fighting against the Barre government and was the dominant 
political and military structure in the northeastern region of Somalia in 1998.
422 Rebuilding Somalia: Issues and Possibilities for Puntland, HAAN, London, 2001, p.21.
423 Ibid p. 13.
424 Brian Scudder ‘Pirates Last Stand’ African Business, March 2000, p.17-19.
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fleet operating off of Puntland’s coast as well as the artisanal fishermen from villages 
along the coast.
Although the new Puntland state installed a police force that began to restore a 
semblance of internal stability and had established a rudimentary degree of control 
along parts of the coastline, they did not have the funding, equipment or the training to 
effectively patrol their territorial waters for illegal fishing operations or to address these 
piracy problems properly.425 Moreover, without an effective judicial or penal system in 
place, and without an established tax revenue base required to finance the establishment 
of these basic governmental institutions, the newly established government of Puntland 
was severely handicapped in their ability to address these issues.426 
Since it was clear that in the immediate to short term Puntland was incapable of creating 
these rudimentary governance institutions on its own, a broad consensus was reached 
that the government ‘...would have to strive for a mix of private and public services, 
implying a kind of “compact” between state, private service providers and the public, in 
which the roles and responsibilities of each would need to be clearly defined.’427 This 
consensus that good governance within Puntland would involve a high level of public- 
private partnerships was not limited to the government of Puntland and the private 
sector. International aid agencies, NGOs and the humanitarian community operating in 
the region had also come to the realization that the minimal infrastructure—such as 
communications, transportation, water purification, and electricity—that had been 
created in Puntland between 1991 and 1998 had been provided by private sector
425 This funding problem was exacerbated by the UN and the international community’s unwillingness to 
provide military equipment to any Somali political actor. Calls from Puntland and Somaliland for 
international help in building effective coastguards were rejected during this period. See Brian Scudder 
‘Beating the Pirates’ Gulf Business February 2000 p.51.
426 Rebuilding Somalia p. 43.
427 Ibid p. 46.
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entrepreneurialism. Moreover, these basic services had not been provided by locals 
alone but rather by international networks of local-global business partnerships.
It was under these circumstances that in mid-1999 President Abdullahi Ahmed agreed to 
support the efforts of an international business delegation comprised of western regional 
expatriates and local Somali partners in a search for public-private business 
opportunities within Puntland. With the continued support of the government, this 
business group formed the Puntland International Development Company (PIDC) and 
immediately set out to attract international investment for the exploitation of Puntland’s 
natural resources.429 After exploring several potential business opportunities, the PIDC 
decided that the active enforcement of Somalia’s right to demand a fishing license fee 
within their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off of Puntland’s coastline provided the 
best opportunity to generate revenue. First, the licensing of a large and unlicensed 
international fishing fleet operating illegally off of Puntland’s coast presented a readily 
available source of potential income. Second, the development of a fisheries 
management program was perceived to be the easiest and least risky business 
opportunity available to the PIDC since the concept required only a limited amount of 
onshore investment in an area still considered dangerous and politically unstable.430 
After a consultation with President Yusuf regarding this business proposal, the PIDC 
was commissioned by the government of Puntland to both design and operate a fisheries
429The support from the government of Puntland was predicated on the notion that the business activity of 
the PIDC would generate a substantial source of tax revenue for the state. See Robert Parr, ‘An 
Evaluation of Security Management in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Puntland, State of Somalia’ MA 
Thesis, University of Leicester. March, 2003 p.4. Robert Parr is a retired member of the British SAS that 
was hired by Hart Security to assist with the operational management of this security governance program 
in Puntland. During a telephone interview on 12/13/05 he suggested that I refer to his MA Thesis as a 
source for my research on this case study. Though this case study makes extensive use of this MA Thesis 
for the first person historical narrative it provides—as well as for access to quotes taken from internal 
Hart documents—the analysis and argument provided here are original.
430 Robert Parr, ‘An Evaluation of Security Management in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Puntland, 
State of Somalia’ p.5.
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management program on behalf of the self-declared state.431 With this political 
agreement in place, the PIDC set out to outsource the actual day to day operation of this 
Puntland EEZ fisheries protection contract to a private security firm capable of running 
a coastal monitoring, control and surveillance system for Puntland’s fisheries. To this 
end, PIDC approached Hart Group International in the summer of 1999 to offer the 
PSC a partnership in this Puntland project 433 On September 29th, 1999, a contract was 
signed between Puntland’s President, Hart Security and the PIDC that authorised this 
investment group to manage Puntland’s fisheries resources for a period of five years and 
that authorised Hart to run this program 434
5.3.2 Ambiguous Authority: A Self-Declared State, Private Security and International 
Law
At the outset, Hart had identified the potential legal risks associated with the 
enforcement of an Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) on behalf of Puntland when this 
‘state’ did not have legal recognition from the international community. In the words of 
an internal company document, ‘political risk [and] the legality of a State [sic] within a 
country implementing its own EEZ...’ was viewed as a serious legal liability by Hart’s 
management.435 As a result, Hart hired the international maritime law firm Hill 
Dickinson to explore the legal feasibility of conducting PIDC’s proposed fisheries
431 George Simms, Hart Security. Telephone Interview. London. 12/09/05.
432 This is the same parent company mentioned in the Perini Corporation micro-case study in this 
dissertation’s first chapter on Iraq. During this Puntland contract Hart Group International created a 
subsidiary named Hart Nimrod (Bermuda) Limited. In the rest of the paper the PSC will be referred to as 
Hart or Hart Security.
433 Robert Parr, Hart Security. Telephone interview. New Zealand. 12/13/05.
434 The Indian Ocean Newsletter ‘A coastguard service in Puntland’ March 4 2000.
435 Hart Security, ‘Puntland’ State o f Somalia’, internal company document cited in: Robert Parr, ‘An 
Evaluation of Security Management in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Puntland, State of Somalia’, p.5.
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management program on behalf of Puntland.436 The product of these consultations 
created not merely a novel and privatized approach to EEZ patrolling, but more 
importantly, it also created a novel approach to a private security company’s claim to 
legitimate authority over security governance in general.
Specifically—and in line with a security governance framework that emphasizes the de­
coupling of both the authority and the implementation of security governance from the 
state—this occurred when the PSC Hart and its law firm advisers created a legal 
argument for operating a privatized maritime security patrol within a section of 
Somalia’s EEZ on behalf of the self-declared state Puntland based on international 
law /37
Though Hart was acting under the auspices of the PIDC—which in turn acted under the 
ostensible authority of the Puntland State of Somalia—the fact that Puntland’s legal 
status was itself in question meant that an internationally recognized alternative source 
of meta-political authority was deemed necessary. First, this involved Hart, in close 
consultation with their legal advisers, using the recently ratified United Nation’s 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—the document that articulates the rights 
of states to exploit a 200 mile offshore Exclusive Economic Zone—as the core legal 
basis for their claim to legitimate authority in managing a fisheries protection program 
on behalf of Puntland. Other international legal documents pertinent to this security
436 Brian Scudder ‘Beating the Bandits’ in Gulf Business Feb 2000 p.51; George Simms, Hart Security. 
Telephone Interview. London. 12/09/05.
437 Establishing the validity (or lack thereof) of the legal basis for Hart’s Puntland security operation is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. What this case study emphasizes as crucial is the actual practice of 
a PSC using international law as a basis for a claim of legitimate authority over security governance.
438 Hart’s approach to basing the legality of their operation on UNCLOS involved three distinct parts. 
First, the UNCLOS Preamble was used as a basis for the legitimacy of the people of Puntland to claim 
rights to an EEZ irrespective of whether or not Puntland was a legally recognized government. Second, 
UNCLOS was used as the core legal document for establishing the rights and obligations of Puntland in 
the management of this EEZ. Third, it was considered crucial that Hart not be perceived as engaging in a 
law enforcement activity themselves. Instead, Hart would be acting in a consultancy capacity to assist the 
Puntland government in the operation of their fisheries protection program. Robert Parr, Hart Security. 
Telephone interview. New Zealand. 12/13/05.
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program were also used to bolster its claim to a legitimate role in security governance 
based on international law, including the San Remo Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.439
Second, Hart also turned to other international institutions outside of the state to bolster 
its claim to a legitimate and legal security governance role during this program. Given 
the contractual mandate to design the actual content of the fisheries management 
program—in itself a considerable amount of power or control over security 
governance—Hart designed the Puntland Fisheries Management Program to comply 
with a set of monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS)440 guidelines created by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations 441 Hart relied on these 
FAO guidelines to assist them in creating a number of Puntland’s standard tactical 
operating MCS procedures, including the use of a fisheries patrol vessel, procedures for 
vessel inspections, arrests, as well as the processing of evidence and the detainment of 
fishing vessels.442
In a third instance of Hart’s attempt to augment their legitimate authority to conduct this 
security operation by turning to sources of internationally recognized legal authority 
outside of Puntland, Hart requested that the Puntland government legally mandate Hart 
to settle any international legal disputes that arose with foreign parties in the course of
439 See Robert Parr, ‘An Evaluation of Security Management in the Exclusive Economic Zone of 
Puntland, State of Somalia’, p.47.
440 ‘Monitoring, Control and Surveillance’ or MCS is the technical term used to describe the operational 
procedures involved the fisheries management of an Exclusive Economic Zone.
441 Robert Parr, Hart Security. Telephone interview. New Zealand. 12/13/05. For the actual FAO 
documents used by Hart to design their MCS procedures, see: Peter Flewwelling, ‘An Introduction to 
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance of Capture Fisheries’, Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, Food 
and Agriculture Organization, Technical Paper T338,1994.
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/V4250E/V4250E01 .htm;
Also see ‘FAO guidelines for Responsible Fisheries -  Fishing Operations’
www.fao.org/documents/show cdr.asp?url file=/DOCREP/OQ3/W3591EOO.htm Accessed December 14 
2005.
442 Robert Parr MA Thesis p.6.
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this contract within the jurisdiction of the British court system.443 Though Puntland had 
an independent legislature and judiciary, due to the weakness of these institutions, the 
Puntland government agreed to the institutionalization of British court jurisdiction in the 
event of a legal dispute between a foreign fishing vessel detained for illegal fishing by a 
Hart fisheries patrol vessel.
In a fourth and final step taken by the PSC to buttress their authority to legitimately 
engage in this security governance program, under the advice of its law firm Hart 
worked in tandem with the Puntland government to increase the visibility and the intent 
of the Puntland Fisheries Management Program. To this end, the PSC sent notifications 
to various governments, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), as well as 
members of the international fishing community and the fishing media explaining the 
upcoming implementation of this hybrid public-private EEZ fisheries protection 
program.444 These notifications included a declaration published by President Ahmed in 
September of 1999 which claimed jurisdiction over the fishery resources within the 
section of Somalia’s 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone that was adjacent to the 
territory of Puntland.445 This document stated that a moratorium on all fishing within 
this Puntland EEZ would be declared for a period of one month starting from January 
1 st 2000 and that the government of Puntland would maintain a sole right to financial 
remuneration from the issuance of fishing licenses to legally fish in Puntland’s EEZ 
after February 1st 2000. Finally, it also stated that this decree would ‘be vigorously
443 This decision was made to give members of the international fishing community whose vessels were 
boarded and impounded by the Puntland Marine Force access to an internationally recognized legal 
system within which to launch any legal appeal against a subsequent arrest for illegal fishing. Cases of 
illegal fishing by Puntlanders were to be decided by the local justice system. Robert Parr MA Thesis p.67; 
Also George Simms, Hart Security. Telephone Interview. London. 12/09/05.
444 Brian Scudder, ‘Beating the Bandits.’ See also Robert Parr, ‘An Evaluation of Security Management in 
the Exclusive Economic Zone of Puntland, State of Somalia’, p.5.
445 President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Open Letter from the Office of the President, Puntland State of 
Somalia. 29 September 1999. Taken from Appendix Two, Robert Parr MA Thesis.
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enforced by fisheries protection vessels to be engaged on behalf of the Puntland State of 
Somalia.’446
The consequence of these legal manoeuvres for our understanding of the way security is 
organized—and authorized—in the international system is significant. By primarily 
grounding their claim to engage in this security governance program on international 
law rather than state law, Hart de-centred the state as the key authoritative basis upon 
which a private security company could legitimately engage in the practice of security 
governance. More specifically, Hart de-linked the authoritative basis for the provision 
of security from the monopolistic legislative authority of the state and replaced it with 
authority linked to a set of multiple legal sources based fundamentally on international 
law. In a quote that perfectly underscores this alternative claim to legal authority taken 
by Hart of the Puntland security governance program, Robert Parr argued:
‘The power to direct the Fisheries Management Programme was drawn from a number o f interlinked 
elements that had to be woven into a legally sustainable matrix o f laws, codes, procedures and 
operational capabilities. This should be seen as a process of education, training and finally operational 
deployment to establish and maintain legal order throughout the EEZ.’447
In an excellent example of the complex reconfiguration of authority that a security 
governance seeks to illustrate, rather than articulating a position that grounded their 
legal right to undertake this security program via a single and monopolistic source of 
state authority, Hart relied on a ‘matrix’ or network of multiple legal resources, many of 
which existed outside of the ‘state’ of Puntland.
Perhaps more provocatively, Hart initiated a model for a private security company to 
make a legal claim to implement a security governance program under the umbrella of
446 Ibid.
447 Robert Parr MA Thesis p.45. Emphasis added.
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international law as an alternative to the potentially questionable claims of meta­
political authority made by its self-declared state auspice Puntland. In the words of the 
founder and CEO of Hart, the establishment of this unconventional legal basis for their 
Puntland security program:
‘...was so important. We had everything vetted by an internationally recognized marine law firm in the 
UK prior to publishing the Fisheries Regulations and the President’s declaration of a moratorium on 
fishing. It was...an essential precursor to operational deployment of the Patrol Vessel and the Marine 
Force. We didn’t want to end up in court only to find we couldn’t sustain our position.’448
5.3.3 Patrolling Puntland’s EEZ: Hybrid Public-Private Security Governance
With the legal argument for this contract in place, Hart began the actual groundwork for 
this maritime security operation. In November 1999, Hart sent a six man security team 
to the north of Puntland in Bosaso to set up basic life support such as food, 
accommodation and electricity for the duration of this contract. Next, with government 
assistance, Hart procured a large hotel complex on the Bosaso beachfront and secured it 
as a headquarters to house and train a Puntland security force that would be used during 
the course of this contract.449 Working under the pressure of a February 1 2000 
deadline—the date President Ahmed declared the Puntland EEZ moratorium on fishing 
without a Puntland license would be enforced—Hart began a six week selection and 
training program to transform a group of local ex-Somali marines into the new Puntland 
government’s Puntland Marine Force. The PSC trained this seventy-five person 
contingent in basic swimming and boating skills as well as the hook and ladder ship
448 Lord Westbury, CEO of Hart. Quote taken from Robert Parr MA Thesis p.50.
449 Brian Scudder ‘Pirate’s Last Stand’ African Business March 2000 Issue 252 p. 19.
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boarding techniques to be used during ship inspections.450 Using weapons procured by 
the government of Puntland at the request of the PSC, Hart also provided AK-47, RPK 
and RPD light automatic weapons training for the Puntland Marine Force451 as well as 
instruction in international law pertaining to the use of force while enforcing the 
fisheries protection program 452
By February, with the training of the marine force finished, Hart had acquired a 200 
foot stem trawler in Europe to be used as the main fisheries patrol vessel and had sailed 
it through the Suez Canal to Hart’s operational headquarters in Bosaso, Puntland. This 
1800 ton vessel, fitted with surveillance radar and satellite communications, would act 
as a floating command, communication, control station as well as barracks for the 
duration of the contract.453 This trawler housed sixty members of the Puntland Marine 
Force that worked on two rotating shifts of thirty marines as well as a British ship crew 
and three to six Hart security personnel acting in the capacity of fisheries protection 
officers.454
At the tactical level, this Hart trawler was also used as a ‘mothership’ to house and 
deploy smaller and faster interceptor vessels during its Exclusive Economic Zone 
patrols. To this end, Hart had purchased four twenty-four foot rigid inflatable boats 
(RIBs) that were stationed onboard the trawler and which would be lowered to the sea 
via a deck crane and deployed to intercept and board vessels operating illegally within 
the EEZ. During Hart’s EEZ patrol between February 2000 and February 2001 this
450 George Simms, Hart Security. Telephone Interview. London. 12/09/05. See also ‘A Coast Guard 
Service in Puntland’, The Indian Ocean Newsletter, March 4 2000.
451 Ibid. See also Brian Scudder ‘Pirate’s Last Stand’ African Business March 2000 Issue 252 p. 18.
452 Explaining the legal aspects pertaining to the use of force proved a daunting task. In the words of 
Robert Parr ‘[w]hen we discussed the rules of engagement and international law, at first [the Puntland 
Marine Force] would be saying “haha we will kill everyone”, and we really needed to explain first 
principles regarding rules of engagement, restraint with the use of force, etc. We explained that force was 
only to be used in self defense.’ Robert Parr, Hart Security. Telephone interview. New Zealand. 12/13/05.
453 Robert Parr MA Thesis p.7-8.
454 Telephone interviews, Robert Parr and George Simms.
229
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
large fisheries patrol vessel cruised along the Northern Puntland coastline from Bosaso 
around the horn of Africa to the Southern fishing village of Eyl. In the event of the 
sighting of any vessels suspected of fishing illegally within Puntland’s declared 
jurisdiction, three RIBs would be deployed from the mothership—each carrying six 
members of the Puntland Marine Force armed with automatic weapons and a Hart 
Fisheries Protection Officer—to intercept and board the vessel.455 
The fact that the private security firm was put in charge of the training of the Puntland 
Marine Force as well as the actual selection and design of the security tactics and 
boarding procedures meant that Hart was given considerable control over the content of 
this security governance program. One such tactic involved the Hart fisheries patrol 
vessel monitoring the speed and behavior of a fishing boat via radar to discern whether 
or not these ships had dropped their lines and nets into the water prior to attempting to 
board them. Once it was suspected that its nets were in the water, Hart would cruise 
towards the fishing boat and deploy their fast RIB intercept boats to engage and board 
these vessels.456 Though left to the discretion of the PSC, Hart’s evidence collection 
procedures in the event of a forced boarding of a fishing vessel were based on fisheries 
protection documents from the FAO. These included, among other things, the Puntland 
Marine Force using photographs and videotape to document the location of the ship 
within the Puntland EEZ, as well as photographically documenting the crew, fishing 
equipment and fish catch.457 In a considerable extension of the political power invested 
in Hart, the private security company also designed the content of Puntland’s actual law
455 Ibid.
456 Typically, the Hart fisheries patrol vessel would try to get within 3 nautical miles of a vessel suspected 
of already having its nets in the water—determined by their speed—before deploying their RIBs to 
engage in a high speed interception. This put the ship master in a dilemma; either ‘cut the lines and run 
for international waters’, losing nets worth a quarter of a million dollars in the process and potentially 
hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of fish, or continue fishing and hope for the best. Telephone 
interview, George Simm.
457 This included photographing the ship’s bridge global positioning system (GPS) to document the 
location of the vessel.
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enforcement procedures put in place to deal with individuals engaged in illegal fishing 
or other criminal activity within Puntland’s territorial waters and EEZ. Extraordinarily, 
and again at Hart’s discretion, these legal procedures—including the level and types of 
fines to be imposed—were based on FAO guidelines and written into legal codes in the 
Puntland Fisheries Management Program.
The actual method used by Hart of imposing fines offers an interesting illustration of the 
global/local nature of this hybrid public-private security operation. After boarding a 
vessel caught illegally fishing in Puntland’s EEZ—and after completing the evidence 
collection process—the hybrid public-private boarding team would issue an on-the-spot 
fine to the ship master. In the event of the boarding of an international fishing vessel, 
the ship master would then be instructed to contact his home office—often half way 
around the world—by satellite telephone to explain that their ship had been detained as 
well as the nature of the charges and fine.459 During this arrest, a form would then be 
given to the ship master to fax to the home office to facilitate the electronic transfer of 
funds from the fishing company to a bank account designated by Hart, PIDC and the 
Puntland Government.460
During these multi-weeklong offshore patrols, communications between the 
government and Hart’s mothership were indirectly facilitated by satellite telephone 
exchanges between the ship and the Hart country manager based at their headquarters in 
Bosaso. This Hart country manager would then liaise with a representative to the
458 Robert Parr, Hart Security. Telephone interview. New Zealand. 12/13/05. See also Robert Parr MA 
Thesis p.71. The FAO guidelines used by Hart included ‘FAO guidelines for Responsible Fisheries -  
Fishing Operations’ www.fao.org/documents/show cdr.asp?url file=/DOCREP/OQ3/W3591EOO.htm 
Accessed December 14 2005.
459 Many of these transactions were nearly instantaneous. In one instance, a call between a ship master 
and the vessel’s home office took place at 3am local time, Seoul, Korea, with the electronic payment of 
the fine taking as little as three hours. George Simms, Hart Security. Telephone Interview. London. 
12/09/05.
460 Hart maintained the fines levied for illegal fishing and other infractions were stipulated by 
international law and in one instance reached $200,000. Robert Parr, Hart Security. Telephone interview. 
New Zealand. 12/13/05.
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President of Puntland who acted as an established point of contact during the course of 
this contract and gave Hart a degree of access to the President that was ‘only a phone 
call away.’461
However, even though Hart security personnel were operating in a the capacity of 
fisheries protection officers for the Puntland government, there was a strong level of 
disagreement between the PSC and the office of the President over the level of 
operational control that the government had a right to exert over Hart’s execution of its 
contract. According to Hart, the degree of corruption within various offices of the 
government—such as the Harbourmaster—combined with governmental requests that 
Hart engage in security actions outside of its contracted mandate meant that Hart tried to 
shield the ‘business end’ of their work from the government.462 In the words of a Hart 
official:
‘We had our mandate... we did not include [the government] in the minutia. If they had a question, we’d 
answer it... [w]e would not tell any government officials anything regarding what was happening at sea 
until we were on shore. There was a great deal of corruption, and everyone, like the Harbourmaster, may 
have been a legal official, but was also a petty criminal in his own right, and would look for ways to 
extort money from our operations.’463
Whereas the government of Puntland wanted to be able to issue tactical commands to 
Hart personnel and the Puntland Marine Force, the PSC interpreted its contract to run 
the fisheries protection program as ceding it the ultimate discretionary control over the 
management of this security program.464 This tension between the PSC and their
461 George Simms, Hart Security. Telephone Interview. London. 12/09/05.
462 Ibid.
463 Ibid.
464 For example, Hart refused direct government requests to interdict a vessel carrying arms due to Hart’s 
understanding that it would have been illegal for them to carry out this order. George Simms, Hart 
Security. Telephone Interview. London. 12/09/05.
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government client severely limited the actual operational control that the Puntland 
government was able to exert over the day to day content of the security governance 
program of the public-private Puntland EEZ patrol, even as Hart extended the 
government’s ability to patrol their territorial waters and EEZ.
This issue of the contested degree of control Hart maintained over the actual operation 
of the Puntland fisheries protection program was also present in the degree of slippage 
between the de jure and de facto managerial role played by Hart in this operation, as 
well as in the authority relationship that existed in this public-private hybrid between 
the Hart fisheries protection officers and the Puntland Marine Force. Originally, Hart 
had stated to local media that ‘a boarding party will have to be assembled that can board 
a ship—but Somalis will do that, not British.’465 This public stance was adopted due to 
the sensitive legal issues surrounding this contract, and the necessity of a perception that 
the local community was taking the lead in any actual law enforcement work. For these 
reasons, Hart’s British fisheries protection officers did not officially carry weapons and 
were not officially engaged in any law enforcement capacity on behalf of the 
government of Puntland. In the words of one Hart employee:
‘ [i]t was quite important that the locals are the ones policing. We [i.e. Hart expatriate personnel] were not 
armed, and we were not operating in a law enforcement capacity. It would be best to say that I was 
accompanying the boarding party, acting as an interpreter and offering commercial advice.’466
However, another Hart employee described the relationship between the Hart expatriate 
staff and the Puntland Marine Force in a distinctly different manner:
465 Brian Scudder, ‘Beating the Bandits’ Gulf Business February 2000 p.51.
466 Confidential interview, Hart employee.
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‘They [i.e. the Puntland Marine Force] did not have the inherent talent to lead. If a commander [in the 
Marine Force] was from a different tribe, you would not be able to get them to listen. You needed an ex­
pat commander to act as the glue to hold them together.’467
As a result, while it was important under the stipulations of international law that the 
local Somalis be seen as the ones enforcing their rights to an EEZ during this hybrid 
public-private security governance program, in actual practice Hart’s British security 
staff played a dominant leadership role in the execution of the actual vessel 
boardings.468
Ultimately, irrespective of the legal technicalities involved—and in a classic example of 
a hybrid public-private security actor—this hybrid security network comprised of Hart 
Security and the Puntland Marine Force created a complex hybrid institution that belied 
simple attempts to separate the one from the other. Not only was Hart acting in a 
contractual capacity as fisheries protection officers for the government of Puntland, but 
the Puntland Marine Force itself was officially employed by the PSC Hart Security 469 
At the same time, Hart paradoxically increased the Puntland government’s ability to 
exert and extend control over security governance within its waters, while denying or 
limiting the government’s ability to manage the content or nature of this security 
governance at the tactical level.
5.3.4 Private Security Confronts Piracy: Breaking a Maritime Warlord
Though the primary function of this public-private Exclusive Economic Zone patrol was 
the protection of Puntland’s fisheries, it quickly became apparent once the operation
467 Confidential interview, Hart employee.
468 This Hart leadership role included everything from driving the RIBs to issuing commands to the 
Marine Force and leading the negotiations with the captain’s of detained foreign fishing vessels.
469 George Simms, Hart Security. Telephone Interview. London. 12/09/05.
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began that an anti-piracy element would become an integral aspect of this work. This 
was necessitated by the fact that Hart encountered forms of piracy within Puntland’s 
coastal waters that were linked to and parasitic upon the fishing fleets operating in this 
region, thus essentially forcing the PSC to engage with the problem of piracy.
The most virulent form of piracy that Hart encountered during its patrols of the Puntland 
EEZ consisted of a form of violent and piratical international organized crime involving 
the former state manager of a fleet of five fishing trawlers previously owned by the 
Somali government.470 Having taken unilateral personal control of this Somali 
government-owned fishing fleet during the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991, 
this former state employee had since run a violent illegal fishing and extortion operation 
up and down the Somali coast during the 1990s.471 Based in the port of Aden, Yemen 
and described as a pirate by local Puntlanders, he had mounted his fishing trawlers with 
heavy weapons and as many as fifty to sixty men armed with automatic rifles to use 
violence and the threat of violence to steal from his competitors.472 
This included two different practices. First, this heavily armed fleet of trawlers would 
approach and then extort a ‘license fee’ at gunpoint from foreign fishing vessels 
operating in Somali waters.473 Second, this piratical fishing fleet also targeted local 
artisanal fishermen. Locals were forced to sell their catch of lobster and other fish at 
prices below market value thereby allowing this criminal syndicate to increase their fish
470 The international character of this piratical fleet existed on several levels. First, these ships were 
stationed in Aden, Yemen, while conducting their illegal business activity throughout the Puntland EEZ. 
Second, they sold their illegal goods in European fish markets. Third, the crew itself was international, 
with an Italian ships master and gunmen from various countries. Interviews, Robert Parr and George 
Simms; interview with Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the International Maritime Bureau. London. 
11/12/05. Captain Mukundan was familiar with this EEZ operation run by Hart Security as well as its 
violent encounter with this piratical fishing operation.
471 Brian Scudder, ’Beating the Bandits’ Gulf Business February 2000, p.52.
472 Brian Scudder, ‘Pirate’s Last Stand’, African Business, March 2000, p. 18.
473 The similarity between Hart’s EEZ patrol and these extortion rackets were not lost on the senior 
executives of Hart. They made explicit references to this illegal behaviour and their reliance upon 
international law to differentiate their Puntland fisheries management program from these extortion 
rackets. Robert Parr MA Thesis, p. 11.
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sales in more lucrative foreign markets.474 In an act of extreme violence that 
underscores the degree of lawlessness in this remote region, when these local fishermen 
offered armed resistance, this piratical fleet would move close to shore and fire upon 
their isolated fishing villages such as Hafun and Eyl with anti-aircraft weapons mounted 
onto the decks of their ships.’475 This, in turn, increased the radicalization of these small 
fishing communities and the amount of their own retaliatory piracy attacks on 
international fishing vessels.476
Though the government of Puntland had been in indirect ‘diplomatic’ contact with these 
pirates since January of 1999 in an effort to get them to recognize and comply with the 
government’s upcoming EEZ fisheries regulations deadline of February 1st, these
Annattempts at licensing were ignored. As a result of these failed negotiations, the hybrid 
public-private security force’s first encounter with this piratical fishing fleet occurred
xL
within the first month of the deployment of the fisheries patrol vessel. On the 14 of 
February, after spotting a fishing vessel on the ship’s radar within 3 nautical miles of the 
patrol vessel, Hart fisheries protection officers deployed three RIBs to interdict and 
board the fishing trawler. However, as the RIBs closed in on this trawler the boarding 
party came under intense automatic small arms fire from the dozens of guards on the 
illegal fishing vessel that resulted in one member of the Puntland Marine Force being
474 Ibid p. 11; See also Brian Scudder, ‘Pirate King Turns Law Enforcer’ African Business, July/August
2000 p.28.
475 Hart personnel described this activity as ‘Zoo Fishing’, named after the Soviet built ZSU/23-4 four- 
barrelled anti-aircraft gun used by this piratical fleet during these extortionate punitive raids. Robert Parr, 
MA Thesis p . l l .
476 Recent spikes in piracy off of the Puntland coast have created contemporary news stories that have 
touched on this process of radicalization discussed here. For instance, the New York Times writes ‘[t]he 
piracy industry started about 10 to 15 years ago, Somali officials said, as a response to illegal fishing. 
Somalia’s central government imploded in 1991, casting the country into chaos. With no patrols along the 
shoreline, Somalia’s tuna-rich waters were soon plundered by commercial fishing fleets from around the 
world. Somali fishermen armed themselves and turned into vigilantes by confronting illegal fishing boats 
and demanding that they pay a tax.’ Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Somali Pirates Tell A ll’, New York Times, 
September 30 2008. See www.nytimes.com/20Q8/10/01/world/africa/0 lpirates.html?
477 This exchange, via intermediaries and a local newspaper, included a threat to kill every Hart employee 
in Bosaso. See Brian Scudder, ‘Pirate King Turns Law Enforcer’ African Business, July/August 2000
p.28.
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wounded. Forced to disengage pursuit, the RIBs returned to the fisheries patrol vessel 
which returned to the port of Bosaso to provide medical attention to the injured marine
A H Q
as well as to allow Hart’s team to reassess this new security situation.
Due to the intense level of the threat of violence—including the casualty suffered by 
one of their Puntland Marine Force employees—Hart initiated a series of decisions to 
deal with this piratical threat in a fashion that deviated considerably from the original 
business model of the fisheries protection program and led simultaneously to a more 
militarized and intensified diplomatic approach to their security task. First, in a 
determined effort not to be outgunned in future encounters with this criminal fleet, Hart 
acquired a howitzer field gun for the fisheries patrol vessel with a range and calibre 
superior to the heavy weapons known to be operated by this piratical fleet of ships.479 
Second, Hart proceeded to set up a regional intelligence network to gain business- 
sensitive information on this illegal fishing syndicate.480 Hart argued that with this 
intelligence network in place, they were better positioned to determine ‘...how to deal 
with the pirates either by diplomacy, international law, or the use of the country’s 
military resources.’481
In actual practice, Hart relied upon a measure of all three—diplomacy, international 
law, and the threat of ‘military’ force from the hybrid public-private security actor—in 
their engagement with this pirate organization. As the presence of the fisheries 
protection vessel began to increase the level of pressure on this criminal syndicate by 
disrupting the illegal international fishing fleets it preyed upon, Hart was able to use
478 Robert Parr MA Thesis p.9; Telephone interview, George Simm.
479 Confidential interviews with Hart personnel.
480 Robert Parr, MA Thesis p.70. This PSC run intelligence network gathered intelligence in Britain, 
Yemen, Puntland and Somalia.
481 Internal company document, ‘Hart Nimrod (Bermuda) Limited, Anti-Piracy Insurance/Response, 
Bermuda. Hart Group Limited, 2002’. Quoted in Robert Parr MA Thesis p.70. Note the Puntland’s 
military resources in this instance are referring to Hart Security and the Puntland Marine Force they 
employed.
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information gained from its intelligence network to set up a meeting with the head of
a o j  *
this pirate group in Aden, Yemen. During this first diplomatic meeting, Hart’s 
delivered a threefold message. First, the PSC used the explicit threat of violence by 
explaining both their professional special operations forces military background as well 
as the increased ‘tactical legitimacy’ provided by their field gun. Specifically, they 
argued that any future encounters that this pirate organization had with the Hart 
fisheries patrol vessel would put the pirates in a militarily disadvantageous position.484 
Second, they communicated the threat of criminal charges to be brought against the 
head of this criminal organization through the British courts system. Relying on 
information gained from their intelligence network, the PSC also threatened other legal 
charges that would specifically target this pirate’s financial interests located within the 
United Kingdom.
Third, Hart offered a positive incentive for compliance by explaining their legal 
mandate and conveyed the possibility of immunity for this individual from charges 
related to his criminal activity by the government of Puntland under the condition that 
this operation arrange to license its fishing operations and end its criminal extortion 
racket.485 During subsequent meetings between this crime syndicate, senior Hart 
executives and a contingent from the Puntland government held in London, an 
agreement was reached on the terms dictated by Hart and the Puntland government and
AQ4L
this instance of organized piracy was eliminated. Indeed, in another unconventional 
decision designed to increase the surveillance capability of EEZ patrol, this formerly 
criminal fleet of fishing trawlers were incorporated in Hart’s security operation and used 
as observation platforms by the Puntland Marine Force for the remainder of this hybrid
482 Interview Robert Parr.
483 Ibid.
484 Interview, George Simms.
485 Interviews with Robert Parr and George Simms.
486 Ibid.
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A Q n
public-private security contract. While the techniques used by Hart were 
unconventional and fell outside of the normal boundaries of a fisheries protection 
program, by using a series of threats and incentives this fleet of violent piratical fishing 
vessels were licensed and brought under the authority of the government of Puntland’s 
PSC-operated fisheries management program.
5.3.5 Case Study I  Conclusion
This case study of the fisheries protection program operated by the PSC Hart for the 
self-declared Puntland State of Somalia provides a number of important insights into the 
operation of private security and security governance in general. Consistent with a 
broadly similar practices analysed in Iraq, the government of Puntland contractually 
authorised a private corporation—the PIDC—to implement a security program. This 
contract, in turn, granted the PIDC the power to act as an auspice to hire a private 
security company to help facilitate and implement this policy/security program. The 
case study also demonstrated how a private security company changed the way security 
governance was practiced in the region. Specifically, Hart did not merely implement a 
security governance program, but importantly also designed its content. Not only did 
Hart’s design of the actual tactics and procedures enshrined in the Puntland Fisheries 
Management Program, but the PSC was also responsible for the more informal and ad 
hoc decisions made regarding the use of heavy weapons and the combined use of 
military, legal and diplomatic threats to deal with a pirate syndicate.
Furthermore, the case study outlined the institutionally complex security hybrid created 
whereby ostensibly private security personnel were acting as government fisheries
487 Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the International Maritime Bureau. Interview. London. 11/12/05. 
Brian Scudder, ‘Pirate King Turns Law Enforcer’, African Business July/August 2000 p. 28.
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protection officers while the ostensibly public Puntland Marine Force was itself 
contractually employed by a private security firm. Though one key purpose of a study 
of hybrid security actors is to challenge easy conclusions regarding a zero-sum power 
analyses, this case study nevertheless drew conclusions regarding Puntland’s degree of 
control over the PSC Hart. While Hart ultimately enhanced Puntland’s strategic control 
over its territorial waters, actual government control at the operational and tactical 
levels of the fisheries program was extremely limited. In a fashion similar to Erinys’ 
rejection of its public partner’s interpretation of the OPF security contract, Hart rejected 
the Government of Puntland’s claim that it was in a position to command this Hart- 
managed hybrid security force, and Hart actively distanced the operational aspect of this 
contract from what it perceived as illegitimate government interference.
Finally, and most importantly, given the ambiguous international legal status of the 
public agent involved in this hybrid public-private security network, the PSC Hart 
created a novel legal argument to buttress the legitimacy of this security program. This 
process involved finding an alternative source of meta-political authority based heavily 
on international law rather than relying on authority of the state. Authority over security 
governance was therefore de-linked from the state on two separate levels. First, 
paralleling events in Iraq, the government of Puntland pulled the strings that unravelled 
its own monopoly over security governance by granting the PIDC the authority to act as 
an auspice over an armed fisheries management program.
Second, moving beyond what was witnessed in Iraq, the PSC Hart turned to a matrix of 
legal sources external to the government in whose territory it operated to make a legal 
claim to legitimate authority over security governance. This ‘matrix’ of legal resources 
was based primarily on international law but it also used norms of fisheries protection 
created by the Food and Agriculture Organization as well as the extra-territorial
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jurisdiction of the British court system. Ultimately, this case study also demonstrated 
the way a private security company operated globally by using resources—both legal 
and material—to alter the nature of security governance on behalf of a quasi-state client.
5.4 Case Study II: Private Security Governance in the Malacca Straits: Introduction
The second case study in this chapter analyses the provision of armed anti-piracy ship 
escorts provided by private security firms for commercial clients transiting the 
Malacca Straits during 2005. It shifts from an analysis of a hybrid public-private 
security network towards a study of a private security company and its commercial 
client. In line with this chapter’s previous case study, this analysis of private security 
operating in the Malacca Straits moves beyond merely focusing on the multi­
lateralization and privatization of auspices and implementers of security governance 
illustrated in the work on private security governance Iraq. Instead, this case study 
continues this chapter’s documentation of the way private security has challenged the 
idea that state’s have a monopoly of meta-political authority over security governance 
by illustrating how maritime private security companies used international law to 
legitimate their security programs.
Importantly, however, this study also moves beyond the previous case study’s analysis 
of how private security merely used international law and other legal tools to lend 
additional legitimacy to a security governance program that already operated with the 
political approval of a state client. Instead, this case study illustrates a more radical 
situation where private security relied upon international law to legally engage in 
security governance within a state’s territory against the will of that state’s 
government.
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In the previous Puntland case study, the decision made by Hart to bolster its legal 
position via international law did not challenge or contradict the political will of its 
government client. Irrespective of Hart’s use of international law as the source of 
meta-political authority, this PSC had nevertheless acted on behalf of and with the 
explicit authority of the state in whose territory it operated. Moreover, Hart had acted 
as a security implementing partner embedded within a hybrid public-private security 
network. As a result, while Hart’s legal strategy did upset the idea that states have a 
monopoly on meta-political authority over security governance, their security program 
did not directly contradict the state-centric and Realist assumption that states enjoy a 
monopolistic right to organize security governance within their territory.
In contrast, this case study provides an example of a private-private hybrid actor 
implementing a security governance program underwritten by the meta-political 
authority of international law within the territorial waters of Indonesia and Malaysia 
while in direct opposition to the political will of these two states. Importantly, 
international law was not used to supplement the authority granted to a private security 
company by a state; instead, it was used as an alternative source of meta-political 
authority to override or neutralize the ability of these states to interfere in the 
privatised security governance programs.
In the process, these armed private security escorts conducted in Malaysian and 
Indonesian territorial waters provide an empirical example that upsets the Realist and 
state-centric notion of the state’s ultimate authority over—and necessary political 
acquiescence in—private security operating within its territory. It also empirically 
demonstrates an extreme example of a key claim made by security governance 
theorists; namely, that the state—as a regulated object of international law—need not
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be perceived as the exclusive locus of meta-political authority over security
488governance.
5.4.1 Background: Piracy, Terrorism, and the Politics o f  Security Governance in the 
Straits
Before examining the practice of armed private security vessel escorts in the Malacca 
Straits during 2005 it is necessary to situate this phenomenon within the broader 
political and security context of the Straits at the turn of the millennium. Generally 
speaking, the Straits of Malacca is a 500-mile long waterway running along a 
Northwest-Southeast axis situated between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. On 
average, over 50,000 ships—including oil and gas tankers, cargo and container vessels 
and barge-towed oil rigs—pass through it each year making it one of the most 
strategically vital maritime highways in the world. Because of the density of the traffic 
and the slow speeds with which it travels due to the narrowness of the Strait—it is 
only 1.5 nautical miles wide at one point—the merchant vessels in these waters have 
been a perennial target for pirates.
By 2005 a number of issues had combined to make the idea of armed private security 
anti-piracy escorts more attractive to companies that had to navigate assets through the 
Malacca Straits. First and foremost, incidents of piracy in the Straits had dramatically 
increased. Between 1994 and 2004 respectively, there was an increase from 22 to 94 
annual incidents of piracy within Indonesian waters alone.489 Piracy had also become 
more organized and violent within the Malacca Straits, with pirates using automatic 
rifles and radio equipment during their attacks. Furthermore, pirates had started
488 Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing, Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice 
Routledge, London, 2003, p.35.
489 ICC International Maritime Bureau ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships’ Annual Report 2005, 
p.5.
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kidnapping the crews of the hijacked vessels and holding them for ransoms 
occasionally exceeding a million dollars.490
Despite assurances from the Malaysian government that ‘the littoral states [were] 
capable of patrolling the Straits without external intervention’, a broad consensus had 
been reached that these countries were not providing sufficient security in this 
channel.491 Part of this problem was due to the limitations of littoral state resources. In 
2005 the Indonesian navy had only twenty functioning patrol boats to protect its 
archipelago of 17,000 islands across a distance of over 3,200 miles.492 Politicized 
jurisdictional issues between local governments also hindered inter-state anti-piracy 
cooperation in the Straits. For instance, naval vessels lacked of right to engage in ‘the 
right of hot pursuit’ to give chase against pirates by following them across 
jurisdictional boundaries into the territorial waters of neighbouring littoral states also 
contributed to the levels of insecurity from piracy.493
Piracy, however, was not the only security issue that involved the Straits in the post- 
9/1 1 climate of 2005. Maritime terrorism and the possibility of A1 Qaeda targeting the 
international shipping and oil sector—called ‘the umbilical cord and lifeline of the 
crusader community’ by Osama bin Laden—had become a serious worry for states 
and industry alike.494 Exhibiting this concern, in November of 2003 Singapore’s 
Defense Minister, Real Admiral Teo Chee Hean warned that terrorists could turn
490 Graham Gerard Ong, ‘Ships can be Dangerous Too: Coupling Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in 
Southeast Asia’s Maritime Security Framework’ ISEAS Working Paper: International Politics & Security 
Issues Series No. 1, 2004, p.3.
491 Quote taken from Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Razak in ‘Recent Attacks Prompt International 
Pressure to Secure Malacca Straits’ JINSA Online, July 15 2005.
492 Ibid.
493 Gal Luft and Anne Korin, ‘Terrorism Goes to Sea’ Foreign Affairs, volume 83 no.6 
November/December 2004, p.69.
494 Rupert Herbert Bums, ‘Terrorism in the Early 21st Century: Maritime Domain’ IDSS Maritime 
Security Conference May 20-22 p.8.
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supertankers or tankers filled with liquid petroleum or liquid natural gas into floating 
bombs targeting the Straits that could cripple global trade.495
Since September 11, 2001, the United States in particular had viewed political 
extremists in Indonesia, Malaysia and other regional states as potential terrorist threats 
to commercial trade. As a result, the scenario where terrorists might hijack a large 
supertanker and detonate it in port or sink it in the Straits to disrupt trade and damage 
the economy—as well as disrupt U.S. naval mobility—became a security concern of 
strategic significance.496 Due to this combined threat from piracy and terrorism, a 
number of initiatives were discussed by various states and the commercial shipping 
industry to increase the public provision of security governance in the Straits. For 
instance, in 2004 a United States Admiral proposed a Regional Maritime Security 
Initiative to combat piracy and maritime terrorism in the region complete with a 
presence of US marines and special operations forces personnel patrolling in fast 
watercraft.497 The Japanese also proposed that their Coast Guard could mount patrols 
through the Straits, while the commercial sector called for a joint public patrol of the 
Straits in the form of a multi-national military force operating under the authority of 
the United Nations.498
Invariably, however, in each instance these plans that centered on the use of foreign 
naval vessels patrolling the Malacca Straits were turned down by Malaysia and 
Indonesia over the issue of state sovereignty. Because the narrowness of the passage 
meant that these naval vessels would inevitably be forced into the territorial waters of 
these two littoral states, these plans for foreign naval patrols of Malaysian and
495 ‘Piracy and Maritime Terror in Southeast Asia’, IISSStrategic Comments vol. 10 no.6 July 2004.
496 Adam J. Young and Mark J. Valencia, ‘Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: 
Rectitude and Utility’ Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.25 no.2 August 2003, p.276-7.
497 ‘Piracy and Maritime Terror in Southeast Asia’, IISS Strategic Comments vol. 10 no.6 July 2004.
498 Keith Bradsher, ‘Warnings From A1 Qaeda Stir Fear that Terrorists May Attack Oil Tankers’ New 
York Times, December 12, 2002.
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Indonesian territorial waters in the Straits were interpreted as challenges to their 
sovereign political authority and therefore rejected.499 For Indonesia and Malaysia, the 
question of sovereignty was not only symbolic—with clear implications for 
sensitivities regarding national prestige—but was also grounded in a concern with 
legal precedent for the patrolling of their national waters by foreign warships. Indeed, 
Malaysia and Indonesia had been in a decades-long dispute with the United States, the 
USSR/Russia and other major user-states over the legal status of transit rights through 
the Straits of Malacca and had vehemently opposed ‘the internationalization of the 
straits.’500 Moreover, these littoral countries were also concerned that any 
acquiescence in a multi-national Straits patrol-scheme would be tantamount to a public 
acknowledgement that they were not fulfilling their security obligations as sovereign 
states.
The results of this situation for private security firms offering armed escorts in the 
Malacca Straits in 2005 were twofold. First, the increased threat from piracy and the 
perceived risk of terrorism—combined with the consensus of an insufficient public 
security presence in the Straits—meant that a market had been created for these 
private security services.501 As a result, regional private security firms such as Glenn 
Defense Marine Asia (GDMA) and Background Asia Risks Solutions (BARS) as well
499 ‘Piracy in South-East Asia: Obstacles to Security Cooperation’ IISS Strategic Comments Vol.6, Issue 
5, June 2000.
500 Raj Sativale, ‘Transit Passage in the Straits of Malacca’, Sativale, Mattews & Arun Advocates & 
Solicitors., Maritime Institute of Malaysia Bulletin, April 15 2003.
501 In the words of Stephen Weatherford, Glenn Defense Marine Asia Director of Operations,‘[t]his 
company started looking at maritime security as a possible business venture almost two years ago, not so 
much as a direct result of queries from potential commercial clients, but as result of our own analysis of 
the potential threats to shipping. Once we continued to explore the business, we began to get queries.’ 
Email correspondence 02/11/05.
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as global PSCs such as Hart Security and Olive Group began providing armed escorts 
in the Malacca Straits for various private clients.
Second, and more importantly for an analysis of private security’s relationship to 
authority over security governance, these PSCs were offering armed escort services to 
private clients in a broader political context where armed vessels transiting the Straits 
were perceived as a potential challenge to the political authority of Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Since the geographical nature of the Straits inevitably caused these PSC 
escorts to enter into the territorial waters of Malaysia or Indonesia during their voyage, 
this situation created the potential for a political conflict over the nature of lawful 
authority and implementation of security governance within the national waters of 
these states. In the words of one maritime analyst, ‘[t]he PSCs, by...offering their 
services in the Strait of Malacca [had] inserted themselves into a seminal political 
struggle regarding the nature of sovereignty and the right to enforce security in the 
Malacca Strait.’503
5.4.2 Antagonistic Authorities: State Sovereignty, International Law and PSC Escorts
This potential for conflict between private security conducting armed escorts in the 
Malacca Straits and the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia turned into a political 
scandal in April of 2005 when a series of newspaper articles published in The Straits 
Times brought public attention to these previously low-profile escort services.504 This 
media coverage highlighted and helped instigate a debate on armed private security
502 Stephen Fidler and Arlen Harris, ‘Pirates hold Malacca Strait shipping hostage to fortune’ The 
Financial Times, June 23, 2005, p.20; Interview correspondence, private security personnel, October 
2005 and August 2008.
503 Mark J. Valencia, ‘PSC Operations in the Malacca Strait: Legal and Political Issues and Options’. 
Paper presented at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia, December 4 2005.
504 Carolin Liss, ‘The Role of Private Security Companies in Securing the Malacca Strait’, Maritime 
Studies, November -  December 2007, p. 17.
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escorts in the Straits by contextualizing these private security operations in terms of a 
challenge to the authority and sovereignty of the governments of Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Articles appeared that stated, for example, that ‘[a]s the convention on state 
sovereignty dictates, the legitimate monopoly over the use of force in matters of 
security lies with the state and not with vessels seeking passage.’505 
These criticisms were picked up and amplified by the governments of Malaysia and 
Indonesia, with Malaysian government officials in particular using the public media to 
criticize and even threaten with arrest the private security firms conducting these 
armed vessel escorts through the Straits. For instance, in April of 2005 Malaysia’s 
Director of Internal Security, Othman Talib, stated that any ship that provided an 
armed private security escort to a commercial vessel in Malaysian territorial waters 
through the Malacca Straits would be detained.506 Othman Talib went on to argue that 
the crew of private security escort vessels could be categorized as ‘mercenaries’ or
T A T
‘terrorists’ and charged under the Malaysian Internal Security Act. Marty 
Natalegawa, a spokesperson for the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, publicly stated that 
‘Indonesia won’t allow any private party to provide their own armed security in the 
Malacca Strait [and that] responsibility for maintaining security should remain in the
(AO
hands of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.’
This public controversy culminated in a dispute over the nature of legitimate security 
governance within the Malacca Straits that directly pitted the Malaysian and 
Indonesian governments against the private security companies and their corporate 
clients that engaged in these armed escort activities. Specifically, it pitted state claims
505 Graham Gerard Ong, ‘A Case for Armed Guards on Ships’, The Straits Times, May 26 2005.
506 Agence France Presse, ‘Armed Escort Vessels Can Sail in Malaysian Waters: Defense Minister’, June 
5, 2005.
507 Ibid.
508 Marcus Hand, ‘Malaysia furore fails to deter Malacca escort security firm: security outfit at center of 
new anti-piracy controversy.’ Lloyd’s List International, 04/05/05.
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of holding the authority to legitimately arrest and detain PSCs engaging in armed ship 
escorts within their waters over and against the claims made by these PSCs that they 
had the legitimate legal authority to conduct these armed security escorts unmolested 
by the security forces of these littoral state governments. Even more pointedly, it 
created a conflict between these private security companies and Malaysia and 
Indonesia over the extent of the political authority these states had over the actions of 
private security within their waters and the content of security governance within their 
own territorial waters in general. Whereas Malaysian government officials stated 
private security companies ‘...have no power in this country and [these escorts are] a 
violation of our territorial sovereignty,’ Background Asia Risk Solutions (BARS), 
Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA) and other private security companies insisted 
that they had the legal authority to operate armed escorts in the Malacca Straits 
through the territorial waters of Malaysia and Indonesia irrespective of these public 
government protests.509
The claim made by these PSCs that they had legitimate authority to operate armed 
security escorts through the Malacca Straits in defiance of the political wishes of the 
governments of Malaysia and Indonesia—a claim that posed a clear challenge to state- 
centric assumptions regarding a state monopoly on authority over security 
governance—was critically based in international law. In order to make this legal 
argument effectively, both BARS and GMDA turned to law firms to help them make 
their case. GDMA approached a law firm in Singapore to have their armed escort 
procedures and their overall armed escort business plan reviewed by legal experts to 
make sure it complied with the ‘relevant legislation’ prior to undertaking their escort
509 Ibid.
249
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
activities.510 The CEO of BARS, in turn, publicly stated that ‘prior to commencing our 
operations we researched the legal and regulatory position for all jurisdictions.’511 
With the legal advice of their law firms, these PSCs based their claims of meta­
political authority to legitimately engage in security escorts within the Malacca Straits 
upon the third United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and its articles 
pertaining to transit passage to give them the right to pass through the Straits without 
being impeded or deterred in any way by the security forces of the littoral states 
bordering this waterway. Using language taken from UNCLOS, both BARS and 
GDMA argued that as long as they began their ship escorts in international waters 
outside of the jurisdiction of Indonesia or Malaysia and transited ‘continuously and 
expeditiously’ through territorial waters they had a legal right under international law 
to conduct armed security escorts through the Straits. Alex Duperouzel of BARS, for 
example, publicly stated that the legal critics of his private security firm’s armed ship 
escort services did not have a sufficient understanding of ‘.. .the international maritime
c i ' i
laws that clearly govern our operations.’
GDMA and BARS also maintained that UNCLOS gave them the legitimate authority 
to legally bypass two other types of control over security governance typically 
assumed to be the prerogative of states. First, both Background Asia Risk Solutions 
and Glenn Defense Marine Asia argued that under the provisions of UNCLOS they 
did not need to— (and in actual fact they did not)—register themselves as private 
security companies in any of the states whose territorial water they traversed.
510 Stephen Weatherford, GDMA, email correspondence, 28/08/2008.
511 Marcus Hand, ‘Malaysia Furore Fails to Deter Malacca Escort Security Firm: Security Outfit at Center 
of New Anti-Piracy Conroversy’, Lloyd’s List International, May 4 2005.
512 For a legal discussion of the ‘transit passage’ clause in UNCLOS III and how it pertains to the inability 
of littoral states to hinder the ‘continuous and expeditious transit’ of vessels, see Raj Sativale, ‘Transit 
Passage in the Straits of Malacca’, Sativale, Mattews & Arun Advocates & Solicitors, Maritime Institute 
of Malaysia Bulletin, April 15 2003.
513 Alex Duperouzel, ‘BARS Clarifies’ The Jakarta Post, July 30 2005, section 7.
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Irrespective of the fact that the Malaysian Director of Internal Security argued that any 
private security company that wished to operate in Malaysia would need a permit from 
his Ministry,514 the CEO of BARS rejected this legal claim and stated ‘[i]t is wrong to 
assume that licensing is required...we are not licensed anywhere.’515 Second, these 
PSCs relied upon the provisions of transit passage outlined in UNCLOS to avoid any 
requirement to license the weapons used during these armed ship escorts with the 
governments of any states, littoral or otherwise. BARS, for instance, explicitly argued 
that they did not, nor were they legally required, to have their weapons licensed with 
Indonesia or Malaysia for the purpose of armed anti-piracy escorts through the 
Straits.516 In effect, by assiduously avoiding security tasks that would fall outside of 
the legal parameters of the right of transit passage provided under UNCLOS, these 
PSCs claimed they had the legal authority to conduct their armed escort work without
c  i  7
any licenses whatsoever by any state. Indeed, under UNCLOS, GDMA and their 
legal advisors argued that Indonesia and Malaysia’s legal right to intervene—even in 
the event of a potential breach of transit passage by a GDMA or client vessel during a
C I O
ship escort—was extremely limited by this international treaty.
514 ‘Malaysia Warns on Private Marine Security Escorts’
http://www.marinelog.com/DOCS/NEWSMMV/2005mav02.htnil accessed August 10 2008.
515 Telephone interview, Alex Duperouzel, Managing Director of Background Asia Risk Solutions, 
20/10/05.
516 BARS also stated that practical problems with multiple jurisdictions kept them from trying to license 
weapons. One BARS manager stated this issue thusly: ‘If you are a terrestrial security firm you have one, 
maybe two jurisdictions to worry about. With us, we might transit through as many as five or six 
jurisdictions in a single mission. It [i.e. licensing] is not feasible for the type of work we do.’ Telephone 
interview, Alex Duperouzel, Managing Director of Background Asia Risk Solutions, 20/10/05.
517 According to Alex Duperouzel, other, non-escort services or tasks would have required a license. For 
example, Singapore requires that a PSC providing security for ships ‘bunkering’ (i.e. taking on fuel at or 
near port) needs to be registered with Singaporean authorities. This activity clearly falls outside the 
parameters of the right of transit passage, and BARS turned down requests to provide this service to 
retain its unlicensed status. Similarly, if a PSC actively chased a pirate vessel, rather than simply defend 
against pirate attacks, this too would violate the clause of ‘continuous and expeditious’ transit passage as 
outlined in UNCLOS III. Telephone interview, Alex Duperouzel, Managing Director of Background Asia 
Risk Solutions, 20/10/05.
518 Typically, it would require the littoral state to request permission to intervene from the government of 
the vessel’s flag state prior to any actions taken by the littoral state’s security forces. Email 
correspondence, Stephen Weatherford, November 25 2008.
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However, the fact that these PSCs were able to use international law to override 
Malaysian and Indonesian attempts to deny these PSCs the right of conducting armed 
vessel escorts through their territorial waters did not mean that these states did not 
have a de facto capability to physically intervene in these private security ship escorts. 
Indeed, GDMA acknowledged that in the eventuality of a private security team 
member shooting (and wounding or even killing) a pirate assailant the client and/or 
PSC escort vessel could be subject to boarding by state maritime security forces. In 
this case, irrespective of the legal provisions of UNCLOS, the private security team— 
and the ‘shooter’ in particular—could be subject to criminal investigation, arrest and 
detention.519
Importantly, however, this de facto power of arrest did not directly translate into an 
automatic ability of the state to treat a potential PSC shooting incident as an illegal 
and criminal action on the part of the private security company or its private client. 
Indeed, both GDMA and BARS actually used the Malaysian and Indonesian law codes 
to provide themselves legal protection against interference from the governments of 
these two states. Specifically, these PSCs relied upon the common law tradition of ‘the 
right of self defense’—as legally codified within each state jurisdiction they operated 
in—to provide them with the legitimate authority to use their weapons against pirates 
in self defense. By aligning their ‘rules of engagement’ or rules for the use of force 
within the parameters of each state’s laws pertaining to self defense, BARS and 
GDMA were able to make a legal case for the use of deadly force during a pirate
519 Telephone interview, Stephen Weatherford, GDMA 14/10/08.
520 The requirements for legal right to self defense were different in different national jurisdictions. 
According to BARS personnel, ‘ [i]n Singapore, for example, the right to use force in self defense does 
not exist unless you first call for help, so [BARS security teams] are sure to issue a mayday distress call 
before using force.’ Telephone interview, Alex Duperouzel, Background Asia Risk Solutions 20/10/05.
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attack in the event of Malaysian or Indonesian security forces boarding and arresting
m  i
PSC personnel or threatening criminal charges against the PSC or its client.
This interlocking matrix of international and national law used by these PSCs to 
protect themselves from prosecution by littoral state governments included the rights 
of private property owners to protect themselves and their property from criminal 
attacks. Arguing that ‘we are no different to an armed security service protecting a 
building on land in any country’ the GDMA director of operations Stephen 
Weatherford and his legal advisors adopted laws pertaining to private property into a 
legal justification for the potential use of lethal self defense . Technically, this 
involved the private-private hybrid being legally combined into a single entity, with 
the PSC security personnel being contractually designated as ‘supernumeraries’— 
essentially a legal extension of the client’s crew—for the duration of the security 
escort service.523 Other sources of maritime regulations—including SOLAS, ISPS, the 
laws of the client’s flag state, and regulations from the International Maritime 
Organization were also explicitly adhered to by GDMA and BARS to bolster the 
legitimacy and legality of their security escorts.
Ultimately, this political dispute regarding the nature of authority over security 
governance in the Malacca Straits was resolved in favor of the private security firms 
against the political will of the littoral states. Government officials such as the 
Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak were forced to publicly acknowledge 
that the littoral states were required under international law to allow armed PSC escort 
vessels to pass unmolested through their territorial waters. Moreover, this point was 
conceded by referring to the same transit passage clause found in UNCLOS that the 
PSCs themselves had used as legal justification for their operations. The Malaysian
521 Multiple telephone interviews with BARS and GDMA personnel.
522 Agence France Presse, ‘Armed Escorts in High Demand in Asia’s Pirate-Infested Waters’ May 8 2005.
523 Email correspondence, Steve Weatherford, 26/11/08.
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Deputy Prime Minister, for example, admitted ‘[w]e are obliged under the straits 
regime to allow them transit passage...passage that should be continuous and 
expeditious.’524
This admission that Malaysia was not only a regulator of security governance but was 
itself also regulated by international law provided an extreme example of the potential 
ramifications when both the authority over and the implementation o f  security 
governance is de-linked from the state. In this instance, rather than insisting that these 
PSC escorts remain consistent with Malaysian law while transiting through Malaysian 
waters, the Deputy Prime Minister was limited in his insistence that ‘...these [private 
security services] should remain consistent with international law. ’ Due to the 
transit passage clause of UNCLOS—and that fact that the littoral states were 
signatories to this treaty—private security companies were able to legally implement a 
security governance program within the territorial waters of Malaysia and Indonesia 
under authority based on international law over and against the political will of the 
governments of these two states. This not only changed the locus of decision-making 
over security governance, but it also changed the content of security governance 
within the Straits as well. This next section provides a detailed description of the 
nature of these private security escorts.
5.4.3 Private Security Anti-Piracy Security Escorts: Security Governance Beyond the 
State
With this legal argument in place, private security companies continued to offer escort 
services to private clients in the Malacca Straits. In one example, between May and
524 Agence France Presse ‘Armed Escort Vessels can Sail in Malaysian Waters: Defense Minister’ June 5 
2005.
525 Emphasis added. Ibid.
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August of 2005 GDMA provided a series of armed escort security services for the 
Malaysian bunker supplier526 firm Ban Hoe Leong (BHL).527 Despite the ongoing 
public dispute, BHL viewed hiring a PSC to protect its slow moving 100-meter long 
tankers from piracy as a necessary political risk and a reasonable business expense. 
This decision was aided by the fact that BHL’s fleet was particularly vulnerable to the 
increasing number of piracy incidents in the region. When fully loaded, though the 
raised bow and the aft above-deck pilot tower were a considerable height from the 
waterline, the large mid-ship section of one of Ban Hoe Leong’s tankers could be as 
low as six feet from the water. This meant that pirates attempting to gain access to a 
Ban Hoe Leong tanker could forgo the use of hooks and ropes and needed little more 
than a small traditional boat to cruise up to the tanker to gain access to the deck.528 
For these reasons BHL hired GDMA to design and implement an anti-piracy escort 
service for their tankers as they transited through the Straits.
During the course of this business arrangement the majority of the security governance 
engaged in by this private-auspice/private-implementer partnership between BHL and 
GDMA involved the use of unarmed GDMA security personnel placed directly 
onboard BHL tankers. Typically, these uniformed security teams would stand watch 
mid-ship to act as a visible anti-piracy deterrent and would carry out a GDMA security 
protocol in the event of a pirate incident. On a number of occasions, however, BHL 
specifically requested that GDMA include a contingent of armed security personnel as
Cl ]
part of their anti-piracy escort service.
526 ‘Bunkering’ refers to the process of refueling of a ship. A bunker supplier specializes in the technical 
process of bunkering.
527 ‘Bunker Supplier Turns to Maritime Security Escorts’, Bunkerworld, November 2005, p. 10.
528 For a discussion of how pirates would do this in the Malacca Straits, see John Burnett, Dangerous 
Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas Penguin, New York 2002.
529 ‘Bunker Supplier turns to Maritime Security Escorts’, Bunkerworld, November 2005, p. 10.
530 Telephone interview, Steve Weatherford, 12/05/08.
531 ‘Bunker Supplier turns to Maritime Security Escorts’ Bunkerworld, Novermber 2005, p.10.
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In order to operate within the legal stipulations of transit passage as outlined by 
UNCLOS, these armed escorts needed to begin outside of Malaysian or Indonesian 
national waters. As a result, GDMA would deploy their armed security teams to 
international waters—for instance just east of the Horsburgh Lighthouse at the Eastern 
entrance to the Malacca Straits—to board or convoy with the client BHL tanker and 
escort it through the Straits. Though this legal requirement was a logistical 
inconvenience, the ability and willingness of GDMA to extend their armed escort 
service for BHL tankers into international waters (beyond the limits of littoral state 
security agency patrols) was one of the reasons the BHL general manager, Hean Boon 
Yeow turned to GDMA in the first place.532
Under the original escort method devised for this client, GDMA used two converted 
ex-Japanese coast guard vessels—the Glenn Fearless and the Glenn Enforcer—from 
its corporate fleet to provide a PSC escort vessel for the BHL tankers.533 During this 
method of anti-piracy escort, GDMA used one of its escort ships—complete with a 
crew and a ten person security team armed with automatic rifles—to sail in close 
proximity to the BHL tanker during its voyage. This escort method provided BHL 
with a highly visible security deterrent against would-be pirate attacks and also 
allowed the private security team to physically place itself between the client vessel 
and a potentially hostile ship.534 The use of an escort ship also allowed Glenn Defense 
Marine Asia to proactively engage with and—within the bounds allowed under a 
‘continuous and expeditious’ transit passage—extend a security zone around the client 
vessel while warning off suspicious approaching ships. Paralleling the broader effects 
of the private security details analyzed in Iraq, although this security service was
533 Multiple interviews, Steve Weatherford. For photos of these two GDMA escort vessels see 
http://www.glennmarinegroup.com/sea assets.html accessed July 12 2008.
534 Telephone interview, Steve Weatherford 12/05/08.
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strictly limited to the self defense of the BHL tanker and crew, the creation of this 
security zone meant that GDMA escort vessels also had a significant effect on the 
nature of security governance within the territorial waters in the immediate vicinity of 
its client.
In practice, despite the advantages of physically placing a floating platform between a 
possible pirate attacker and the client’s tanker, the Fearless and the Enforcer had a 
limited range and were also cost prohibitive for smaller clients such as Ban Hoe 
Leong. As a result, the second and more frequently employed armed escort method 
GDMA provided to Ban Hoe Leong was the placement of GDMA security teams 
directly onboard the BHL tankers. These GDMA security teams came out of a rota of 
about sixty men used by Glenn Defense Marine Asia and were comprised primarily of 
Nepalese Gurkhas whom had previous military experience in the Nepalese, Indian, or 
UK armed forces. Each ten-person team consisted of nine Gurkhas led by one 
Western expatriate GDMA team leader that typically had a background in an elite unit 
in a Western military.537 Once onboard the BHL tanker, these GDMA teams were 
divided into three units and worked a security schedule that rotated on an eight hour 
shift basis. One unit of three uniformed and unarmed Glenn security personnel would 
stand watch on the deck of the client vessel at all times, while a second security unit 
remained off-deck and ready as an armed quick reaction force. The remaining three 
members of the security team would be sleeping below deck and would be woken in
535 The cost of fuel for the escort vessel was a major source of overhead. While major oil firms were 
allegedly willing to pay the higher costs—between $50,000 and 100,000 per escort—associated with 
using a PSC escort vessel, smaller regional firms like BHL were typically unable and unwilling to pay 
these higher prices. Multiple interviews, PSC personnel, 2005.
536 Lee Hong Liang, ‘Bravehearts Securing the Peace for Shipping’, Bunkerworld, November 2005, p.10. 
Each of these men were given additional training—including tactical maritime weapons training—as well 
as legal instruction in rules for the use of force.
537 For instance, the GDMA director of operations was a former Special Forces soldier in the US military.
538 Under security procedures designed by GDMA, these armed security personnel would remain out of 
sight to avoid any potential misunderstandings with random littoral state maritime patrols that might 
mistake these armed Glenn security personnel for pirates.
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the event of a crisis to act as the second responder—after the armed team response— 
during a security incident.539
Control over this security team and their actions were the product of cooperation 
between the private auspice BHL and the private security implementer GDMA. In 
practice, this essentially meant a division of control between the ship master540 and the 
GDMA security team leader. Officially, the ship master maintained overall command 
of the ship and the actions of its crew in his capacity as the officer of this merchant 
vessel. However, in actual practice the GDMA team leader was given considerable 
authority via the contract with BHL to advise the ship master in all matters relating to 
ship security. Importantly, the GDMA team leader also designed the content of the 
client vessel’s security procedures and maintained tactical command over the private 
security force onboard the BHL tanker.541
In the eventuality of an attack by pirates the GDMA team leader’s responsibilities 
extended to include overseeing the ship master’s distress calls to state authorities as 
well as directing the ship master through a series of escalating non-violent deterrence 
measures prior to any consideration of the use of firearms. First, open channel radio 
communication and the use of loudhailers were used to communicate with and warn 
off any suspicious approaching vessel. If this failed, the speed of the tanker would be 
increased and evasive steering maneuvers would be enacted to communicate an active 
intent to hinder any attempts at a pirate boarding. GDMA was also contractually 
authorized by the client to initiate a series of other non-violent countermeasures, 
including stationing men at the fire hoses mounted to the sides of the tanker. If a 
suspected pirate vessel continued to approach the tanker, these fire hoses would be 
manned by the private security team to repel any boarding attempt and to threaten any
539 Multiple telephone interviews, Stephen Weatherford GDMA Director of Operations 2008.
540 A ship master is the officer in command of a merchant ship and is typically also the captain of the ship.
541 Telephone interview, Stephen Weatherford GDMA Director of Operations 12/08/08.
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small approaching vessel with sinking under the weight of the pressurized water shot 
into their boat.542
The significance of conceptualizing (and emphasizing) the relationship between the 
PSC and its client auspice in terms of a hybrid private-private actor becomes 
especially salient when analyzing the nature of the control over the use firearms; the 
decision whether or not to use them was contractually divided and held jointly by 
BHL and GDMA. In the event of a pirate attack, the ship master would first need to 
authorize the GDMA team leader to use their firearms. Once this permission was 
granted, the private security team leader needed to give the order to the armed 
members of the security team to fire the M-16 rifles they carried on these missions.543 
Since GDMA was hired precisely in their capacity as a professional security advisor, 
this decision process involved the private security team leader advising the civilian 
ship master if and when the use of firearms was required. Importantly, however, the 
PSC also retained the contractual right to refuse to fire their weapons in the event of 
the ship master authorizing and then requesting that the GDMA security team to open 
fire on pirates attacking the vessel.544 Thus, while the auspice could not force the 
private security team to fire its weapons, the private security personnel could not do so 
without the permission of the auspice. As a result of this, a crucial element of security 
governance—namely the authority over the use of lethal force—was divided between 
the private auspice and their PSC implementing partner.
This section’s survey of the techniques put in place by GDMA to counter the event of 
a pirate security incident—though significant in its own right—also sheds light on the
544Specifically, the GDMA director of operations did not want to be ordered to discharge GDMA 
weapons by a civilian ship master that was under duress during a pirate attack who might give an order to 
fire before it was necessary to do so to protect the crew or vessel. Telephone interview, Stephen 
Weatherford 12/08/08.
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broader effects of this hybrid private-private security network on the nature of security 
governance within Malacca Straits in general. These private security escorts did not 
merely constitute a re-distribution in the location of decision-making over the nature 
of security governance within the Straits. Instead, the procedures put in place by 
GDMA to thwart piratical attacks upon Ban Hoe Leong’s vessels also injected a 
preventative approach—or mentality—to security provision that was fundamentally 
different from that of state security actors.545 GDMA’s focus on piracy prevention— 
rather than the state security force’s emphasis on piracy apprehension—brought with 
it a series of techniques and responsibilities divorced from the question of public 
security more broadly.
Moreover, GDMA’s emphasis on the security of its client—rather than public 
security—changed the referent object of the PSC’s security governance program, and 
therefore changed the very metrics used to measure the ‘success’ of the provision of 
security itself. This fact did not necessarily present a challenge to the public order (as 
defined by Indonesia and Malaysia) within the Straits. Indeed, as will be discussed 
below, these PSCs plausibly argued that their anti-piracy escorts actually increased 
public security. However, since the very definition o f security itself was radically 
different for GDMA and the state security forces, a real political tension nevertheless 
existed in a way that transcended a simple re-distribution of security-related decision­
making.546
545 For a short discussion on the mentality of private security, see Les Johnston, ‘Transnational Private 
Policing’, in (ed.) J.W.E. Sheptycki Issues In Transnational Policing, London, Routledge, 2000 p.39.
546 For instance, many maritime security experts and institutions—such as the International Maritime 
Bureau—have argued that the use of armed private security anti-piracy escorts creates an arms race that 
may increase the degree of violence used by pirates and therefore reduce overall public security. Others 
have disputed this claim and argue the opposite. Irrespective of the net gain or let loss in public security 
within the Straits as a result of these PSC operations—something very hard to measure—the fact that 
littoral states and PSCs have different referent objects for security means that they will view this question 
differently.
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5.4.4 Informal Security Networks: Connections, Concessions and Coordination
As previously demonstrated, although private security companies were not legally 
obliged to coordinate their escort missions through the Malacca Straits with the littoral 
state governments, the de facto powers of these states meant that PSCs had a 
pragmatic interest in doing so. As a result, both BARS and GDMA engaged in a series 
of informal meetings with Indonesian and Malaysian authorities—at various levels 
within the government and security forces—designed to build trust as well as to gain 
tacit approval for their escort operations.547
In the case of GDMA, this operated on two levels. First, the fact that the company had 
been based in East Asia for sixty years providing diversified marine husbanding, naval 
logistics, force protection and other support services for the region’s navies meant that 
GDMA was able to use its long term working relationships and political connections 
with local littoral state political authorities to facilitate informal agreements regarding 
its security work.548 GDMA referred explicitly to its informal political network on its 
website that advertised:
‘...after many years of close working relationships with the relevant local authorities in host countries
that GDMA operates, we have built for ourselves an impressive and strong network of contacts and
ground knowledge. Thereby allowing us to excel in arranging critical diplomatic meetings and
conferences where local protocols, security requirements and logistics combine to offer unique 
549challenges to our clients.’
547 In the words of a BARS official, ‘Until you sit down face to face with someone, [security officials] 
distrust you, and are bound to think the worst of you.’ Alex Duperouzel, Telephone interview, 20/10/05. 
Reportedly, these types of informal meetings also occasionally involved the ‘informal’ exchange of cash. 
See Carolin Liss, ‘The Role of Private Security Companies in Securing the Malacca Strait’, Maritime 
Studies, November -  December 2007, p. 17.
548 These connections existed up to the Cabinet level within certain governments. Telephone interview, 
Stephen Weatherford, GDMA 27/08/08.
549 See Glenn Defense Marine Asia website, http://www.glennmarinegroup.com/profile.html Accessed 
20/08/08.
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Second, these meetings also took place at the operational level between Glenn Defense 
security team management and officers within the Malaysian Marine Police and the 
Indonesian Navy. For example, management from Glenn Defense Marine Asia made it 
a point to directly contact and speak with the Indonesian and Malaysian security 
officers responsible for running the maritime patrols in the Straits. These meetings 
were designed to familiarize these officers—likely the first point of contact with 
Malaysian or Indonesian authorities in the event of a security incident at sea—with 
GDMA’s escorts as well as to answer any questions and allay any concerns they might 
have about GDMA’s work. PSCs also used these meetings to review littoral state law 
with the state security personnel responsible for enforcing it. In the words of the CEO 
of Background Asia Risks Solutions:
‘...the law in Asia is often unclear. So it is always a good idea to sit down with the person who enforces 
the law and ask them “how do you read this?” They are not going to give you a permission slip, but 
they’ll warn you off.’550
State security officials, for their part, used these informal meetings to induce the PSCs 
to make certain security-related concessions. For instance, BARS refrained from 
carrying fifty-calibre sniper rifles on board their escort ships—something they claimed 
they were within their legal rights to do—and also switched from using AK-47 
automatic rifles to M-16s after specific requests that they do so came from littoral state 
police forces during such informal meetings.551
550Telephone interview, Alex Duperouzel, 20/08/05. In the course of these meetings GDMA 
representatives also discussed their interpretation of international and Malaysian or Indonesian law as it 
pertained to the right of armed self defense and their armed escort services in general. Telephone 
correspondence, Stephen Weatherford GDMA 12/10/08.
551 Telephone interview, Alex Duperouzel, BARS 20/10/05.
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GDMA also made attempts to create positive inducements for cooperation and a 
degree of networked coordination between their company and local naval and 
maritime police forces. GDMA and other PSCs intentionally attempted to control and 
modify local security forces’ perception of PSC security escorts by contextualising 
their ship escorts in terms of a partnership with littoral state security forces. For 
instance, BARS and GDMA assiduously explained to law enforcement officials that 
they only engaged in self defense security measures and that they decidedly did not 
engage in any proactive efforts of piracy eradication, apprehension, or other activity 
that fell into the realm of law enforcement activity.
At the same time, these PSCs explained to law state security personnel that they had 
written up protocols of evidence preservation for ‘maintaining the crime scene’—such 
as taking a written statements as well as ‘isolating the shooter’ after a shooting 
incident—to assist law enforcement in the event of the necessity of state security 
personnel to conduct a shooting investigation. This image of assisting the state in 
creating a secure environment without infringing on the state’s role in law 
enforcement is precisely what the managing director of BARS sought to convey 
during meetings with state security personnel. For instance, while delivering a 
presentation entitled ‘The Role of Private Security in the Malacca Straits’ the BARS 
CEO argued that:
‘ [p]rivate maritime security is only useful as a supplement to existing sovereign security. It is not there 
to supplant the important and vital role of navies, coast guards and marine police.’554
552 Telephone interviews, BARS and GDMA personnel. October 2005.
553 Ibid.
554 Alex Duperouzel ‘The Role of Private Security in the Malacca Straits’ paper presented to LIMA 2005, 
Langkawi, Malaysia.
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GDMA also provided littoral states with another concrete example of how this 
partnership would work in practice as a networked relationship. Specifically they 
argued that GDMA was willing to use their armed ship escorts as a means of sharing 
intelligence, thereby extending the surveillance capacity of over-stretched littoral state 
security forces capable of patrolling only a fraction of their territorial waters.555 
GDMA also coordinated their armed presence on board and armed vessel escorts with 
littoral state authorities by informing them of their entrance in the Straits at a 
particular landmark and then giving them an estimate of their speed to allow state 
security forces to plot the general location of the armed security team and client during 
their escort voyage.556 Glenn Defense Marine Asia institutionalized this practice for a 
number of reasons. First, this notification acted as an informal acknowledgement of 
state authority over security governance within their territorial waters and helped 
assuage the concerns of public security forces by giving them a degree of surveillance 
over GDMA armed escort operations. Second, this information had the potential to 
give Malaysian or Indonesian security forces a head start in offering assistance in the 
case of a distress call made during one of these escorts. Third, and in a related fashion, 
it allowed state security agents to have foreknowledge of an armed private security 
contingent operating in the area in the event of a distress call, thereby reducing the 
chance of an accidental shooting by police or naval officials mistaking armed GDMA 
personnel onboard a client vessel as pirates.
Though GDMA and BARS did provide a minimal degree of coordination and 
cooperation with littoral states and their security forces, there were also clear 
limitations to these informal security networks. First, and foremost, there were no
555 Specifically, GDMA would report the time of sighting and location of suspicious vessels encountered
during their journeys. Telephone interview, Stephen Weatherford, 12/10/08.
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public security personnel embedded into any GDMA or BARS armed escort 
operations in the Malacca Straits. Indeed, Malaysian Marine Police personnel turned 
down repeated offers by GDMA to accept employment and/or a per diem financial 
compensation package to participate in GDMA ship escorts during operations that
C C O
would pass through Malaysian waters.
Indeed, even publicly discussing the existence of these informal arrangements between 
these PSCs and the local government officials and state security personnel was 
problematic. Both Malaysian and Indonesian authorities, for instance, publicly denied 
that these informal sessions even took place.’559 As a result, even though these 
meetings and other attempts at creating networks with littoral state security forces 
went some way in mitigating the political risks associated with running this maritime 
security governance program against the expressed wishes of local governments, they 
did not eliminate the tension between these PSCs and Malaysia and Indonesia.
5.4.5 Case Study Conclusion
This study of anti-piracy vessel escorts in the Straits of Malacca moved away from an 
analysis of hybrid public-private security actor towards a study of a private-private 
(i.e. PSC-corporate) security actor and its interactions with state security forces. In 
contradistinction to—and in a move beyond—discussions within the private security 
governance literature that argue private security companies derive their ‘...legitimacy 
precisely from their connections to the state’, 560 this case study demonstrates how 
private security may ground its legitimacy independently from the state. Indeed, 
though an entrepreneurial use of international law, this case study demonstrates how
558 Ibid.
559 Captain Noor Apandi Osnin, ‘Armed Escorts in the Strait of Malacca: A Challenge to Malaysia’s 
Governance’ Paper presented at the MIMA seminar on Private Maritime Security. March 17 2006 p. 16.
560 See Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams ‘Securing the City’ p.238.
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private security companies can use alternative sources of meta-political authority to 
operate security governance programs in opposition to the state. However, 
importantly, both BARS and GDMA also relied upon a matrix of other sources of law 
to legitimate their anti-piracy escorts. Specifically, they relied upon the authority 
derivative of their role as the agents of legal private property holders (i.e. their clients) 
as well as the right of self defense enshrined in the domestic laws of each nation 
whose territorial waters they passed through.
While GDMA and BARS were not tied to the state in the form of a hybrid public- 
private security network, they were connected to the littoral states via a loose and 
informal security network. While this informal security network was similar to those 
informal networks discussed in Iraq, there were also differences. For instance, the 
security activities of GDMA and BARS in the Malacca Straits were not the result of 
state initiated ‘responsibilization’ programs or other state strategies of rule at a 
distance. Specifically, Malaysia and Indonesia did not intend to embed new security 
functions into the commercial shipping industry or seek to ‘activate’ non-state 
resources in an attempt to extend the state’s ability to counter the threat of piracy 
within their territorial waters. However, both PSCs nevertheless interacted and 
coordinated with each other and with the governments and security forces of the 
littoral states—both to share information and exchange intelligence—in a fashion that 
constituted a broader informal security network.
As a result, the Malacca Straits became a ‘shared space’ where autonomous public and 
hybrid private-private security actors interacted with one another, implementing 
different security governance programs under different regimes of meta-political 
authority. As with the other case studies analyzed, the security governance engaged in 
by these private security companies was not limited to private property but instead
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operated within the public space of international, Indonesian and Malaysian waters. 
Uniquely, this case study also illustrated an example of a private security actor 
crossing multiple state jurisdictions within a single security operation, thus offering 
another critique of static assumptions regarding the correspondence of territory to the 
provision of security governance.
The pluralization of security governance within the Straits also came with a new mode 
of preventative, risk-oriented security initiated by these PSCs to protect their clients 
that changed the nature of security provision within this body of water. For these 
PSCs, the metrics of success were defined not in terms of reducing the threat of piracy 
within the Malacca Straits as a whole—which constituted an alternative public 
security success metric—but rather in terms of the safe passage of the client vessel. 
Beyond the fact that the locus of security governance decision-making was shifted to 
the private auspice and its private security partner—and irrespective of whether 
public security was enhanced or impaired—both the referent object and content of 
security governance was also changed. Finally, in an extreme example of the 
separation of authority over security governance itself from the state, this case study 
demonstrated how PSCs can engage in legal and legitimate competition with states 
over the content of security governance within a state’s own territory.
5.5 Chapter Conclusion
Through a pragmatic and entrepreneurial search for the legal authority to engage in 
various maritime security governance programs, Hart Security, BARS and GDMA 
demonstrated the new avenues available for private security to engage in security 
governance when meta-political authority is longer monopolised by the state. In so 
doing, they also demonstrated how authoritative regulatory activity as it pertains to
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security governance cannot simply be imagined—as a state-centric Realist model 
suggests—as always flowing in a hierarchical fashion from the state downwards 
towards non-state actors. By emphasising the importance of a legal-formal concept of 
meta-political authority within its discussion of private security’s relationship to 
security governance more broadly, this dissertation is uniquely situated not only to 
bring these new patterns of security governance to light, but also to highlight the way 
private security may engage in security governance programs that directly contradict 
the political will of the state—even within its own territorial space—while still 
maintaining its status as a legal and legitimate security actor.
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6 The Global Transformation of Private Security Training
‘While all professions are to some extent regulated by the state, the military profession is monopolized by 
the state.’5 1 -  Samuel Huntington
‘We’ve got more Generals per square foot here than the Pentagon.’
-Ret. Lt. Gen. Ed Soyster, Military Professional Resources Incorporated
6.1 Introduction
This final chapter shifts this dissertation’s empirical focus on case studies of hybrid 
security networks towards an analysis of the broader global market in private security 
training. In doing so, it provides a security governance analysis of the pluralisation of 
both the customers and the suppliers of this training, and also discusses the various 
types of transformations and hybridizations associated with this new global security 
training market. At the same time, it provides a discussion of some of the global private 
security companies that operate in this new market, and offers a broad historical and 
industry-wide context within which to situate the previous case-study-centric chapters 
of this dissertation.
While as recently as ten years ago any discussion of a global market for private security 
training would have been premature, today, an increasingly consolidated and 
professionalized sector of the private security industry is changing the way states train 
their security forces. The last decade has witnessed private security companies 
transform themselves from a small-scale and ad hoc domestic training asset or discreet 
tool of foreign military assistance into an important global supplier of military
561 Samuel Huntington The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics o f Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press) pp.14-15.
562 The notion of private security companies being used in an ad hoc fashion as ‘discreet tools’ of foreign 
policy was a common feature—and an historically accurate claim—made by early journalistic 
investigations of private security companies and studies within the security studies literature. For the
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training. This fact has been most dramatically and visibly underscored by the prominent 
transnational training role played by private security companies in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
where private firms have been awarded a spectrum of large-scale training contracts for 
the new Iraqi military, police, and paramilitary forces. Less spectacular yet equally 
transformative has been the privatisation of the training of Western armed forces 
themselves. Offering courses ranging from sniper marksmanship and advanced urban 
combat tactics to more technologically sophisticated flight simulations centers, the 
private security industry is now offering alternatives to government owned and operated 
military training facilities around the world.
In a number of previous studies, this new market in security training has been viewed as 
either a net loss or net gain for the state, often measured in terms of the cost- 
effectiveness of outsourced training or various contract compliance issues.564 While this 
approach has proven useful, its state-centric and zero-sum focus on the relative 
efficiencies or inefficiencies of public versus private security training obscures and 
leaves unaddressed other, broader implications related to the privatisation of security 
training. Specifically, it obscures the way that private security is both an agent and the 
effect of a de-linking of security training from the state’s armed forces that is
former, see: William D. Hartung, ‘Mercenaries, Inc: How a U.S. Company Props Up the House of Saud’ 
The Progressive, April, 1996. For the latter, see David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1998 p. 10.
563 For instance, Dyncorp was awarded a contract reportedly worth $1.7 billion to train over a quarter of a 
million Iraqi and Afghan police officers. See Renae Merle, ‘Coming Under Fire: DynCorp Defends Its 
Work in Training Foreign Police Forces,’ Washington Post, 19 Mar. 2007, D01. The Northrop Grumman 
subsidiary Vinnell was awarded a $48 million contract to train the first nine battalions of the new Iraqi 
Army. See ‘Northrop Grumman Awarded $48 million Contract to Train New Iraqi Army,’ PR Newswire 
Association, Inc., 2 July 2003. The South African firm Erinys was awarded a $39.5 million contract in 
August 2003 to train a 6,500 member paramilitary Iraqi Oil Protection Force. See ‘Iraqi Efforts to Secure 
Oil Facilities a Boon to Security Firms,’ The Oil Daily 53(163) 15 August 2003.
564 For instance, Deborah Avant measures ‘functional control’ of security largely in terms of the relative 
cost-effectiveness of private versus public provision of various security related services and uses private 
military training contracts as case studies. See Avant, The Market fo r Force", Peter Singer also measured 
private defense training in terms of cost effectiveness and other issues related to the loss of state control. 
See Corporate Warriors; See also Patrick Cullen and Peter Weinberger, Reframing the Defense 
Outsourcing Debate: Merging Government Oversight with Industry Partnership (Washington DC: Peace 
Operations Institute) 2007.
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transforming the institution of military training itself. In contrast, this chapter applies its 
security governance model to map and highlight a number of facets of this de-linking 
process, and to explain how it is changing our understanding of military training.
These changes are occurring on a number of different levels. First, with the expansion 
of private security into military training, the providers of military training are being 
pluralized. As military training becomes a market commodity and is re-conceptualized 
as a service similar to any other, governments are increasingly acting as ‘customers’ that 
no longer simply assume the state’s armed forces have a monopoly on military expertise 
and instead look to both the public and private sector to fulfil their training 
requirements.
Second, the consumers of military training are becoming pluralized in both the public 
and private sectors. In the public sector, as governmental agencies adapt to the pressures 
of globalisation and to post-9/11 security threats that blur the military/police divide, a 
host of public auspices located below, above, and horizontally within the state (yet 
outside of the armed forces) have been given new requirements for security training 
traditionally considered intrinsically ‘military’ or ‘police’ in nature. Absent traditional 
security requirements—and hence without any internal capacity to provide security 
training for their personnel—these governmental agencies have partnered with private 
security to provide security training for their personnel that had traditionally been 
reserved for members of the police and military.
A similar process has occurred within the private sector as well. As various non-state 
actors operating in politically unstable areas have increasingly become the targets of 
organized violence—and have simultaneously been given greater responsibility to 
provide their employees with suitable levels of security—they too have turned to private 
security for training assistance. Within the private sector, the pluralization of consumers
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of security training has extended to both commercial and non-profit organizations— 
such as humanitarian NGOs, media outlets, multi-national corporations—that have 
turned to private security to provide their employees with specialized security
*  • • 565training.
Third—and following from this last point—as the public and private sectors work with 
the private security industry to fulfill these new security requirements, states, non-state 
actors and private security are reflexively566 involved in creating a new concept of—and 
market in— ‘security training’ that is reinterpreting and transcending the traditional 
police/military functional divide. This reinterpretation has involved the private security 
industry transforming itself as a professional provider of hybrid security skill-sets along 
the whole functional police-military skill-set range in a way that differentiates private 
security from the ‘military’ training and ‘police’ training conducted by the state’s police 
and military institutions. Today, private security is positioning itself as a professional 
security actor providing a new type of security training to a variety of state, non-state, 
and public-private actors. Moreover, they are self-consciously moving beyond the 
confines of any individual state by providing these services on an increasingly global 
scale.
6.2 The Origins o f  Modern Private Military Training: A Post-WWII British Narrative
While it is accurate to characterize the contemporary market for private military training 
as increasingly global—in terms of the multinational characteristics of the firms 
providing this training as well as their international clientele—the modem origins of this
565 For example, media outlets often use private security to provide security training to their war 
correspondents, including counter-surveillance techniques and minefield identification. In an important 
example of the impact new risk mentalities can have on security governance, much of this training is 
becoming mandatory in order to get insurance policy coverage.
566 The term ‘reflexive’ is used here to describe the way these actors are mutually involved in the social 
construction of new actor identities for both private security and its state and non-state clients.
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training industry are decidedly Anglo-American in nature. One influential first-cut 
narrative of the origins of contemporary private military training refers to the small 
firms comprised of retired British and European soldiers that specialized in providing 
small unit tactical military training to post-colonial and pro-Western states during the
cf: n ' #
1960s and 1970s. British firms in particular have a long and rich history of this type 
of overseas military training. Often credited with creating the template for the modem 
‘private military company,’ David Stirling, founder of the British Special Air Service 
(SAS), created the Watchguard Organisation in 1967 to provide military training and 
other services to governments friendly to the United Kingdom in the Middle East and
f / J  o
Africa, ‘from Abu Dhabi to Zambia.’ During the 1980s dozens of small British firms 
sought to emulate this business model and met with varying degrees of success. Often 
working out of converted London livingrooms and equipped with little more than a 
short list of personal connections to potential government clients, a significant 
proportion of these British companies were built around one or two training contracts 
and disappeared shortly after their completion. Falconstar’s 1982 contract with the 
Ugandan government to train and organize the Ugandan Police Special Force, a 
paramilitary force used to operate against domestic insurgents, was typical of many of 
these contracts.569 At the other end of the spectrum successful firms such as Defence 
Systems Ltd (later to become ArmorGroup International) built reputations for 
professionalism and discretion that allowed them to turn overseas military training into 
a steady and lucrative business. While these firms would occasionally work as proxies 
for the British government, providing training to foreign governments that had
567 See Kevin O’Brien, ‘Private Military Companies and African Security 1990-1998,’ in Abel-Fatau 
Musah and J Kayode Fayemi (eds), Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma (London: Pluto Press) 
2000 .
568 Tony Geraghty, Who Dares Wins: The Story o f  the Special Air Service 1950-1980 (London: Arms and 
Armour Press) 1980.
569 Peter Tickler, The Modern Mercenary: Dog o f War or Soldier o f  Honour? (Wellingborough: Patrick 
Stephens Ltd) 1987.
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originally approached the Foreign Office for military assistance—these British firms did 
not provide training for British armed forces.
6.2.1 A Post-WWIIAmerican Narrative
By contrast, America’s post-World War II experience with private military training 
differs from this British model in two important respects. First, since the 1970s, the 
United States armed forces have used a wide array of small domestic private companies 
for training in a variety of tactical skills ranging from martial arts, skydiving and 
advanced driving skills to explosives handling and marksmanship. Unlike their British 
counterparts, in many instances these private companies did not originally conceive of a 
‘military training market’ per se and instead had intended to sell their services in the 
civilian sector. Gunsite provides us with an early example. Originally established in 
1976 by a retired US Lt. Colonel as one of the first professional shooting schools for 
civilian marksmanship in the United States, it immediately began receiving telephone
• •  ♦ • S70inquiries from various military and police units interested in firearms training. 
Companies such as Gunsite, whose armouries allowed them to offer courses 
familiarizing US soldiers with Soviet and other foreign weapons, became popular with 
elite military units deploying to regions where these weapons would be commonplace 
on the battlefield. Similarly, high-end professional driving schools that offered 
specialized driving courses to the public also began receiving requests to train State 
Department foreign officers and elite forces personnel. As these training relationships 
matured, a number of civilian driving schools began incorporating shooting ranges into
570 Telephone interview with Ed Head, Gunsite Director of Operations, 12/08/06.
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their driving course properties and offering shooting instruction at the behest of their
C71
government clients.
During the 1980s, small companies offering tactical fighting courses proliferated 
throughout the US, and as the personal reputations of individual instructors or the 
quality of a company’s training facilities spread through the elite forces community via 
word of mouth, a number of these firms transitioned their core business from the 
civilian to the military sector. CQD, a firm founded in 1981, exemplifies this kind of 
transition. Combining martial arts methods with practical experience gained from 
working with local and federal police agencies to create a training program in 
‘integrated armed/unarmed fighting techniques,’ CQD was eventually contacted by the 
Naval Special Warfare Center to train US Navy SEALs in shooting techniques, prisoner 
control, and dynamic room entry.572
This trend shifted somewhat during the 1990s, with small start-up firms headed by 
retired military personnel looking to market their services directly to the military as 
opposed to civilian marketplace. Tactical Explosive Entry School (TEES) and Direct 
Action Resource Center (DARC), founded in 1991 and 1996 respectively, were both set 
up to exploit this niche elite forces training market, with the former focusing on 
explosive door breaching and hostage rescue and the latter on urban combat training. 
While these US firms increasingly began looking like the British PSC insofar that they 
were comprised of a small number of retired military personnel, they remained 
distinguished from them by focusing their training business on their own state’s armed 
forces. As late as the mid-1990s, however, the size of the market for training US armed
571 Confidential interview with the CEO of US private military training facility. See also http://www.bsr- 
inc.com/SDT.HTM, accessed 25 October 2006.
572 Telephone interview with CQD founder Duane Dieter, 08/09/06. See also Bob Pilgrim, ‘To Fight Is To 
Risk Death: Training SEALS To Be Complete Warriors,’ SWAT Weapons, Tactics, and Training for the 
Real World April 2003 p.44-8.
573 Telephone interview with Alan Brosnan, founder of Tactical Explosive Entry School, 16/05/06; 
Telephone interview with Richard Mason, CEO of Direct Action Resource Center, 05/05/06.
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forces personnel in tactical firearms and small unit combat skills remained very limited 
in absolute terms. Through the 1990s, there were probably less than a dozen US tactical 
training firms that could claim to train 1,000-3,000 students per year.
The post-World War II American experience with foreign private military training 
provides a second major difference from the British model. In the same way that the US 
military’s use of private military training came from firms not designed to specifically 
meet these needs, so too does this model correspond to the origins of the American 
private sector’s training of foreign armed forces. During the Vietnam War the Pentagon 
funded universities to provide military and police training to South Vietnamese forces 
and also hired contractors to provide electronics training and develop a South 
Vietnamese officer corps training program.574
In 1975 Vinnell, a firm originally specialising in construction and logistics, was 
awarded a $77 million contact to manage and implement the complete training and
cnc 9 #
force modernisation of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Whereas British PSCs 
engaged in relatively small-scale military training contracts for foreign governments 
with an often tacit approval of the British government, the Vinnell contract illustrates 
how the US government was willing to use the private sector as a tool to provide foreign 
militaries with large-scale training packages. This contract—unique at the time—would 
later be viewed as precedent-setting and a precursor to future large-scale American train 
and equip contracts in the former-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
574 Avant, The Market for Force, p. 114.
575 William Hartung, ‘Mercenaries Inc.: How a US Company Props Up the House of Saud,’ The 
Progressive, April 1996.
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6.3 Industry Structure: Growth, Transformation, and Consolidation
Defining the size and structure of the private military training industry has proven to be 
conceptually problematic due to a number of different factors. First, there is a lack of 
consensus regarding what precisely constitutes military training. For decades modem 
militaries have used the private sector to train their armed forces personnel in skills such 
as foreign languages or computer programming deemed integral to the maintenance of 
the modem military, yet which have not traditionally been considered skills intrinsically 
military in nature. The US military’s use of the advanced civilian driving and martial 
arts schools described above, for example, complicates the question of what to include 
and exclude in any definition of private military training.
Second, an added layer of complexity is encountered when one contemplates the 
possibility of ‘military’ training being transplanted to various non-military institutions. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that (as discussed later in this chapter) certain ‘military’ 
skill-sets typically seen as functionally specific to the armed forces, such as sniper and 
close quarter combat training, are increasingly being taught to various government 
agencies outside of the military. Third, the most commonly cited difficulty with 
determining the size or structure of this industry is its vast scope and diversity. For 
example, both SAIC and Gunsite provide armed forces training to personnel from a 
number of militaries around the world. However, whereas SAIC is a multinational, 
Fortune 500 company specialising in technology-intensive training simulations and has 
44,000 employees with an annual revenue $7.8 billion, Gunsite, in comparison, operates 
a professional shooting facility based in Arizona employing a few dozen instructors who 
are sporadically contracted to teach small elite forces units in tactical shooting 
techniques.576
576 Interview Ed Head 12/08/06. See also www.saic.com/news/pdf/corporatefactsheet.pdf.
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In analytical terms the notion that these two firms represent different sectors in the same 
military training ‘industry’—or an evolving and expanding security industry more 
generally—is a relatively new concept for military professionals, defense bureaucrats, 
and academics alike. This fact, combined with the lack of readily available comparative 
government data on private training contracts, has rendered statistics on the ‘size’ of the 
industry problematic at best. For example, while Peter Singer of the Brookings 
Institution and Doug Brooks of the security firm trade group International Peace 
Operations Association (IPOA) are ostensibly discussing the same industry, Singer has 
estimated its annual global revenue at $100 billion, while Brooks places the figure at 
$20 billion.577
Nevertheless, there is a broad consensus that the private security industry is 
experiencing a rate of tremendous growth. Throughout the 1990s, the value of private 
security companies with publicly traded stocks grew at twice the rate of the Dow Jones 
average while corporate estimates have increased the value of the private security 
industry from $55.6 billion in 1990 to $202 billion by 2010.578 This growth has 
occurred in tandem with a growing consolidation between the defense armaments and 
military training sectors as major defense manufacturers such as Boeing have entered
C 'T Q
the training market to take advantage of its expanding revenues. The acquisitions of 
the PSCs MPRI and Vinnell by the defense contractors L-3 Communications and 
Northrop Grumman, respectively, exemplify this trend towards consolidation. As the 
private security industry has evolved and matured, so has its ability to project itself as a 
professional and legitimate member of the defense industry. The Washington, DC,
577 Peter Singer, “Peacekeepers Inc,” Policy Review June/July 2003. Interview with Doug Brooks, 
Director of International Peace Operations Association, 10/02/07.
578 Deborah Avant, ‘Privatizing Military Training,’ Foreign Policy in Focus 5(17) June 2000.
579 For example, Aviation Training International, Ltd, a joint venture between Boeing and Westland 
Helicopters, Ltd, was selected in 1998 to provide training for the British Army for their Apache attack 
helicopters for up to 30 years. It has four training centers with state-of-the-art flight simulators, and 
computer training. See www.atil.co.uk. Accessed 04/09/07.
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based IPOA and the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC), 
founded in 2001 and 2006, respectively, represent the new and formalized advocacy 
efforts being made by these private security firms.
Changes within defense bureaucracies and defense associations have also contributed to 
this transformation. In 1998 the Pentagon’s acquisition process was radically revamped 
by establishing online electronic ‘shopping malls’ that brought potential government 
‘customers’ together with private security firms selling, among other things, military 
training services. These government websites created a massive virtual market in 
training services that have exponentially increased the visibility of government training 
contracts, thereby allowing a myriad of small PSCs to bid on contracts previously
CO A
hidden by a complex and paper intensive DoD procurement process. This, in turn, has 
exposed government contracting agents to a much larger pool of private security 
companies, creating a feedback effect that has increased the government’s solicitation of 
private training contracts. While the United States has taken the lead in this revolution, 
it is far from a unique case. For example, the Israeli defense export organization, Sibat, 
has created an online Defense Sales Catalog that advertises the military training services 
of a series of Israeli PSCs. Similarly, organisations such as the United Kingdom’s 
Defense Manufacturers Association (DMA) traditionally geared towards promoting the 
country’s defence industry products have also turned to the internet to facilitate a 
growing demand in the international market for defence related services. Describing 
itself as a ‘one stop consultancy shop’ for all aspects of defence and security related 
needs, the DMA actively seeks to create online networks between British firms offering
580 Confidential interview with PSC CEO 09/05/06. See www.fedbizopps.com for a prominent example of 
one US Federal Government website soliciting military training services.
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training services to foreign militaries, and other overseas customers looking for military 
training.581
These structural changes, along with the billions of dollars in revenue generated from 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, are causally linked to three features of the current 
private security training industry. First, firms such as MPRI and Vinnell that specialize 
in large-scale train-and-equip programs for foreign militaries as well as technology and 
classroom based training are continuing to expand their scale of operations. Second, as a 
new generation of private security companies reinvest their earnings from providing 
armed security services in Afghanistan and Iraq into large-scale tactical combat training 
centers, they are transforming a once niche tactical training market focused on small 
elite forces units into a large scale business increasingly being used to train large 
numbers of regular enlisted soldiers in tactical combat techniques. Third, these PSCs are 
increasingly looking for opportunities to expand their companies into truly global 
providers of military and security training. These characteristics can be seen in the 
private security companies highlighted below.
6.4 Global Private Security Companies
Founded in 1987, MPRI has developed into one of the largest suppliers of doctrine 
based military training both within the United States and abroad. Over the past decade 
the company has seen rapid and steady growth. Between 1997 and 2005, MPRI grew 
from 400 employees and a business volume of $48 million, to over 3,000 employees 
worldwide and reported revenues exceeding two billion dollars. Headquartered near the 
Pentagon in Alexandria, Virginia, MPRI draws on an online database of over 15,000 
individuals, comprised primarily of retired military personnel, to undertake a wide array
581 See www.the-dma.org.uk/Products/main.asp.
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of training functions, including pre-deployment training, new equipment training, and
f
force on force training. Within the United States, MPRI has provided instructors to 
various military schools such as the US Army Force Management School, and the US 
Army Sergeants Major Academy, and has also designed the doctrine and curriculum 
used by the US Army to train and educate its soldiers.
In this capacity, MPRI has written numerous field manuals, authored future warfighting 
concepts, and has written strategic opposition forces doctrine for the US military. 
Internationally, MPRI has operated in more than forty countries worldwide and opened
C O 'l
subsidiary offices in Europe and the Middle East. In Africa alone, MPRI has 
supported the US State Department’s African Contingency Operations and Assistance 
Program (ACOTA), conducted armed forces re-professionalizing programs in Nigeria, 
operated a sophisticated maritime simulations center in Egypt, trained the armed forces 
of Equatorial Guinea, and worked in a wide range of training programs in support of the 
South African Department of Defence. Most recently, MPRI won a $15 million contract 
to provide instructors for a Baghdad Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence through 
the year 2010.584
While MPRI has been at the forefront of doctrine-based classroom and technology 
intensive training, Blackwater USA has positioned itself at the leader of the private 
security industry’s rapid expansion into tactical military training. Between 2002 and 
2005, its annual revenue increased an estimated 600 per cent, winning over $500
r o r
million in contracts since 2000. With 100 trainers on staff, the Blackwater Training 
Center—a massive 6,000 acre facility including 40 computerised shooting ranges,
582 This tactical battlefield training has included training exercises to sustain crew proficiency in tank, 
armoured personnel carriers, artillery, and mortar gunnery.
583 See www.mpri.com.
584 See www.defenselink.mil/contracts.
585 See www.fastcompany.com/magazine/103/open_ll-jackson.html; see also Bill Sizemore, and Joanne 
Kimberlin, ‘Blackwater: On the Front Lines,’ The Virginia Pilot, 26 July 2006.
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sophisticated shoothouses, parachute drop zones, a mock village, two mock ships, and 
miles of driving track—exemplifies the new, infrastructure-intensive penetration of the 
private security industry into the tactical military training market. This large facility, 
based in Moyock, North Carolina, has allowed Blackwater to conduct thousands of 
short-term contracts training soldiers at the unit or infantry company level in advanced
fOiT
driving, marksmanship, and urban warfare courses. Success with these contracts has 
led to an unprecedented expansion in privately sourced tactical military training. In its 
single largest contract to date, Blackwater was hired to train 50,000 US Navy personnel
c o n
in weapons handling and force protection. As a result of this volume of work, 
Blackwater has expanded their training facilities nationwide, purchasing and 
refurbishing a firearms training center in Illinois while currently negotiating the 
construction of another 800 acre canyon facility in Southern California near the 
Mexican border.
Internationally, Blackwater has completed numerous training contracts for the military 
and security forces of governments around the world. As with MPRI, some of this 
training is done on behalf of the US government, with Blackwater acting as an auxiliary 
foreign military assistance tool, replacing overstretched US Special Forces personnel 
normally tasked with these training missions. Operating in this capacity, Blackwater has 
trained foreign forces both at their US training facilities (such as the Greek and 
Colombian government forces trained in high-threat executive protection), as well as in 
the client’s country (as in the case of a 2005 maritime commando enhancement program 
conducted in Azerbaijan). An increase in demand for security training from foreign 
military and security forces has led Blackwater to look into creating overseas training
586 These contracts last on average one to two weeks and generate roughly $35,000, interview with Chris 
Taylor, Vice President of Blackwater USA, 28/04/06.
587 Ibid; see also: www.defenselink.mil/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=2350.
588 See www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17308917/.
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facilities, with one such project leading them into negotiations with the Subic Bay
C Q Q
Metropolitan Authority for a training site in the Philippines. Indeed, as the company 
has continued to evolve, it has looked toward focusing on the creation of a global 
network of security training facilities. In the words of its Senior Vice President, “[t]his 
company will continue to provide personnel protective services for high-threat 
environments when needed by the U.S. government, but its primary mission will be 
operating our training facilities around the world, including the flagship campus in 
North Carolina.”590
The security firm Olive Group is displaying similar international expansionist 
tendencies. Founded in 2001 by a small group of retired British SAS soldiers operating 
out of a small London office, Olive has grown and diversified rapidly into a self­
described ‘global company in terms of our presence, perspective, and people.’591 In a 
testament to this, the firm has moved its headquarters to Internet City, Dubai, and 
operates from 30 locations in five continents employing over 500 personnel with annual 
returns of $90 million, while maintaining offices in the United States, Britain, Kuwait, 
India, Singapore, Jordan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Though the vast majority of its revenue 
comes from providing armed security details, Olive Group has invested heavily in 
expanding its business in the military and security training sector. Within the United 
Kingdom, Olive Group is actively marketing itself as a professional military training 
provider to the Ministry of Defence, and an expedient way to relieve the country’s 
overstretched armed forces. Within the United States, Olive has opened offices in 
Washington, DC, to lobby the Pentagon for lucrative defence training contracts for its
589 Ibid; See also Chris Taylor, Congressional Testimony, Subcommittee: National Security, Emerging 
Threats, And International Relations, 13 June 2006.
590 ‘Blackwater Drops Tarnished Name’ Globe and Mail February 13 2009.
591 See www.olivesecurity.com.
592 Speech given by Lt. Gen. Sir Cedric Delves, Director of Olive Group. RUSI-BAPSC first annual 
conference 30/10/06. http://www.olivegroup.com/press releases.htm.
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new US based training center. Located in Nesbit, Mississippi, Olive Group is using their 
780 acre Olive Security Training Center to build a ‘mock combat village—a nine block 
city replica complete with residential areas, government buildings, schools, retail stores 
and roundabouts designed in Middle Eastern architecture’ in an effort to win ‘military
C Q 'i
operations in urban environment’ contracts from the US Department of Defense. 
More generally, Olive Group’s North American subsidiary has won a number of 
contracts within the broader US security establishment by both assisting in the design of 
US government training facilities, as well as conducting training courses at established 
government training centers. Through these training contracts—which include the 
training of US military elite forces personnel as well as border guard units—Olive 
Group has exhibited the ability to successfully market itself as a professional provider 
of security training that is capable of delivering a security training product across the 
military/police spectrum.
Operating for over 25 years and currently listed on the London Stock Exchange,
ArmorGroup International’s evolution as a provider of security training offers an insight
into the changing dynamics of the military training industry. Founded in 1981 by a
retired British SAS officer, ArmorGroup International (originally Defense Systems Ltd)
was a quintessential exemplification of the British model PSC described in section one;
the firm provided high-end armed security services to various diplomatic corps and
resource extraction firms operating in unstable regions of the world while
simultaneously offering low profile military training to foreign governments. As the
firm developed over the years, it moved away from its emphasis on military training and
diversified its training services to include a wide array of hostile environment training
programs aimed at corporate and other non-military markets. More recently, however,
593 Interview with Alan Brosnan, Director of Olive Security Training Center (formerly TEES) 16/05/06; 
see also Mark Minton, ‘Battlescape Shoots for Profit: State Sees Security Pros Bring War Home,’ 
Arkansas Democratic-Gazette, 19/02/06.
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the company has returned to its roots as a provider of military training. Seeking to take 
advantage of the post-9/11 paramilitary homeland security market in the United States 
(and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom), and the ballooning military training 
market in Iraq and Afghanistan, ArmorGroup International has opened a series of 
training centers in these four countries. As part of this business strategy, they opened the 
first commercial training center in Afghanistan, a two million dollar facility built to 
house and train 300 students with a close quarter battle house and weapons systems 
simulation. In Iraq, they created a training compound south of Baghdad equipped with 
NATO standard shooting ranges used to train Iraqi security personnel. Together, these 
Middle Eastern training facilities have trained thousands of local national security 
personnel.594 At the same time, the firm’s US branch, ArmorGroup International 
Training, has expanded its firearms training capabilities with a variety of specialized 
shooting ranges for pistols, shotguns, and carbines. These training centers, based in 
Texas and Virginia, have provided counterterrorism and force protection training to a 
wide spectrum Department of Defense and Department of State personnel.595 
This trend of replacing or supplementing ‘mobile training teams’—a featured 
component of all the PSCs mentioned thus far—with permanent or long term ‘brick and 
mortar’ training facilities has been a crucial component of the growth in private tactical 
military training. As a result, some smaller multinational PSCs, such as the Israeli firm 
International Security and Defence Systems (ISDS), have formed partnerships with 
civilian firearms training centers to compete for military training contracts that require 
such infrastructure without incurring the associated construction costs. For instance, in 
2003, ISDS created such a partnership with the arms manufacturer Smith & Wesson to
594 See ww w. armor group, com/services/security services/locations/ Accessed 02/08/07.
595See www.armorgroupiti.com Accessed 01/11/07.
285
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
offer counterterrorism training to military and police personnel at its shooting academy 
in Springfield, Massachusetts.
With the kind of growth exemplified by the PSC Triple Canopy, which in its first year 
of operation in 2003 grew to over 800 employees and had revenues exceeding $100 
million, the private security industry has gained the capital necessary to create 
multimillion-dollar military training facilities. This sheer magnitude of growth, 
combined with the evolution towards permanent, private military training centers, is 
enough to substantiate Triple Canopy’s claim that it and firms like it are ‘reshaping the 
entire security industry.’596 However important these changes are, the most significant 
aspect of the private security industry’s expansion into military training has been its role 
in constituting a new, hybrid security training market where PSCs such as Triple 
Canopy are increasingly providing training in military skill-sets outside of the state’s 
armed forces. It is to this blurring of the boundaries of private military training that we 
turn next.
6.5 The Pluralisation and Hybridization o f Private Security Training
A crucial aspect of the transformation of private military training has been the private 
security industry’s central role in the dispersal of military training above, below, and 
outside of the institution of the state’s armed forces. At the supra-state level, numerous 
organisations have looked to private security for a broad array of military and 
specialised security training. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), for 
example, has solicited international bids from PSCs to train the NATO International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operating in Afghanistan in the identification and
596 See Triple Canopy website at http://www.triplecanopy.com/triplecanopv/en/news. Accessed 05/02/08.
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• • • • • rQ7avoidance of roadside improvised explosive devices. Other supra-state organisations 
whose civilian personnel are increasingly posted in regions suffering from low-intensity 
conflict, and who are being targeted for kidnapping and other terrorist violence, have 
also turned to private security for new forms of robust security training. In July 2006, 
for example, the European Union sent twenty-six members of its diplomatic mission to 
Israel and the occupied territories on a course conducted by the PSC Hart Security 
designed to teach the diplomats skills in, among other things, defensive and off-road 
armoured car driving techniques.598
At the local or sub-state level, private security conducts a variety of specialised 
counterterrorism training programs for law enforcement agencies. The London 
Metropolitan Police Department has conducted a survey of the training services 
available from private security to help assist them in their role as a ‘first responder’ to 
terrorist incidents, and in the US it has become a common practice for PSCs to provide 
Homeland Security training to police forces. Within this new post-9/11 security context, 
private security companies are transferring military techniques in advanced 
marksmanship, close quarter combat, explosive door breaching, and other military skill 
sets to police forces across the US and around the world.
Moreover, many of these small paramilitary training contracts illustrate the increasing 
degree of local-global networks that pervade this industry, with local police clients 
receiving their training transnationally from foreign security firms. For instance, Task 
International, a PSC headquartered in London, has trained a number of special police 
units for Caribbean and Asian governments, while the firm Britain Defence provides 
anti-terrorism training to police personnel worldwide at a number of overseas facilities.
597 See NATO Notification of Intent to Issue Invitation for International Bidding - Provision of C- 
Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Training to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - 
Afghanistan at: www.fbo.gov/spg/DOC/BIS/DPD/IFIB-ISAF-C-IED/listing.html. Accessed 08/02/08.
598 See www.hartsecuritv.com/news.asp?rel= 1083 Accessed 05/03/07.
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At the same time, requirements for military training are increasingly being dispersed 
horizontally to a plethora of state-level non-military agencies. Absent an indigenous 
capacity to provide such training—and with overstretched militaries being unable to 
provide it—many of these agencies have turned to the private sector. This horizontal 
diversification of state agencies requiring military training can be seen most vividly 
within the United States government, where non-military state organs have acted as 
customers of PSC training for both internal US and foreign security forces. 
Domestically, the Department of Energy (DoE) has relied upon PSCs to train its own 
security force designated to protect the nation’s nuclear facilities up ‘to paramilitary 
standards.’ This training has included, among other things, the operation of M60 
machinegun mounted on armoured vehicles, sniper training, and M l6 automatic rifle 
marksmanship.599 Internationally, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has relied 
upon PSCs to train foreign security personnel as part of its international drug 
interdiction effort. In one such contract, Blackwater USA was hired by the DEA to train 
units from Afghanistan’s Ministry of the Interior, combining basic law enforcement 
skills—such as crime scene investigation—with military training due to the rough
terrain and hostile security environment this paramilitary force was required to operate
• 600 in.
In another salient example of the complexity of this diversification of US Federal 
Government consumption of private military training, an analysis of the US State 
Department (DoS) reveals a number of its various sub-agencies contracting with PSCs 
for a broad array of training requirements. One sub-department, the DoS Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, has solicited positions for retired 
US soldiers to conduct field training of foreign troops in support of US efforts at drug
599 The Department of Energy has also hired PSCs to provide ‘mobile security detail training’ at the 
Department of Energy’s National Training Center.
600 Chris Taylor Blackwater Vice President interview, 28/04/06.
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eradication programs in South America. One online State Department solicitation 
advertising a year long $61,081 position in Lima, Peru stated the following:
Train U.S. government employees and Peruvian Counterparts in the following subjects (but not 
limited to): paramedic, pathfinder, air mobile operations, helicopter external load operations, fast 
rope, rappelling, STABO, emergency extraction, water safety/survival, rescue swimmer, small 
boat handling, helicopter gunnery, and survival-evasion-resistance-escape (SERE)...set up and 
run range qualification courses for the M-4 carbine, 9mm pistol and 357 revolvers.601
Another DoS sub-department, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, has also turned to the 
private sector for its training needs. Unable to draw on an overstretched military to 
either provide the guard manpower or to provide the DoS with security trainers—and 
absent a sufficient in-house capacity of its own—the massive, one billion dollar 
Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract was awarded to three PSCs to provide 
a cadre of diplomatic security personnel with ‘counter assault team’ and ‘long range 
designated marksman’ training.602 This security force—administered and controlled by 
a Department of State auspice, yet staffed and trained (i.e. implemented) by a myriad of 
PSCs —exemplifies not only the expanded post-9/11 paramilitary security market being 
penetrated by PSCs but also the new public/private security hybrids that these 
partnerships create.
While these examples of the dispersal of paramilitary security training to various 
governmental agencies outside of the military illustrate the changing nature of the 
military training market, perhaps the most dramatic example of the fragmented nature of 
contemporary security training can be seen in the provision of paramilitary training
601 See the Fedbizopps government website:
www.fbo.gov/spg/State/INL/INL-RM-MS/PSC%2D06%2D019/SynopsisR.html.
602 Greg Starr, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State, 
Committee on House Government Reform; Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 
International Relations, 13 June 2006. See also See Rene Merle, ‘Embassy Security Firms Chosen,’ 
Washington Post, 17 June 2005.
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conducted by PSCs beyond the state to a variety of private sector clientele. Between 
1990 and 1993, for example, the British multinational agricultural conglomerate Lonrho 
hired the British security firm GSG to train its security forces to repel attacks conducted 
by Renamo rebels against its Mozambique tomato plantations. During the course of its 
contract, GSG trained hundreds of Lonhro security personnel in counterassault combat 
tactics with the use of government supplied tanks, AK-47 automatic rifles, and RPG-7 
grenade launchers. More recently, the United States Merchant Marine Academy has 
partnered with Blackwater USA to provide ‘world class tactical maritime security 
training’ in counter-piracy and counterterrorism to government, military, and private 
sector clients.604
6.6 Chapter Conclusion
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, global private security companies are fast 
becoming important actors in an expanding global security training market. At the same 
time, these private security companies are challenging and upsetting a number of our 
implicit understandings—and often tautological assumptions—regarding the modem 
state’s monopolistic relationship to security training. First and foremost, the massive 
growth of this industry suggests that we may be witnessing a long-term pluralization of 
the providers of military training, with private security companies joining state armed 
forces as professional providers of security training. However, this phenomenon cannot 
be interpreted merely in terms of the state’s outsourcing the training of its armed forces 
to the private sector. Instead, the privatization of security training needs to be 
understood as part of a complex shift in the nature of security training itself—a process
603 Alex Vines, ‘Gurkhas and the Private Security Business in Africa’ Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason 
(eds.) Peace, Proift, or Plunder: The Privatisation o f Security in War-Torn African Societies (South 
Africa:ISS) 1999 p. 127.
604See: gmats.usmma.edu/info/gmats/partners.aspx and www.blackwaterusa.com/maritime/. Accessed 
05/08/07.
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that increasingly includes the provision of hybrid paramilitary training to a variety of 
public and private actors external to the state’s armed forces.
This new security training market—itself the combined product of material changes 
associated with globalisation as well as new ideas and understandings of the private 
sector’s role and responsibility in shaping global security—is perfectly suited to both 
the rhetoric as well as the global strategic vision of this global private security industry. 
Partly as a result of this, Triple Canopy’s claim to be ‘a security solutions company 
[that] delivers comprehensive training programs customized to meet the demanding 
requirements of law enforcement, military, government and corporate clients 
worldwide’605 has become standard within the private security industry. Crucially, 
however, this language of ‘security training’ should not be interpreted merely as a 
cynical (or logical) attempt by the security industry to expand the scope of its market, 
but rather as part of a new security discourse that is shared with governments 
themselves. The Pentagon’s transformation of the National Defense University—its 
premier educational institution—into the National Security University as a result of it 
‘acknowledging the complexity of the 21st century security environment,’ and 
recognizing the need to ‘support the educational needs o f the broader US national 
security profession’ is a case in point.606
Ultimately, the cumulative effects of these changes in government and private security 
industry rhetoric, as well as the changing realities on the ground, suggest that we can no 
longer regard either the provision or consumption of ‘military training’ as a functional 
field of expertise monopolized by the state’s armed forces. Furthermore, as private 
security companies continue to evolve into established, multinational firms that operate 
training facilities in multiple countries around the world, they will also further unsettle
605 http://www.triplecanopv.com Accessed 02/06/07.
606 Emphasis added. See the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, p.79 www.defenselink.mil/qdr .
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our traditional understanding of the relationship between the state, territory, and 
coercion.
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7 Conclusion
607‘But what is the business of rule? The state is a set of institutional arrangements for doing what?’
—Gianfranco Poggi
7.1 The Business o f Rule: A Reprisal from Private Security
This dissertation, at its core, is grounded upon a rejection of the above Realist 
proposition that posits the ‘business of rule’ can and must be understood as limited to 
what the state does. In a somewhat ironic fashion, the security governance model 
presented in this dissertation is also grounded upon a more literal reading of the above 
quote than Gianfranco Poggi had intended, insofar that it takes Poggi’s terminology of 
the state’s ‘business of rule’ and applies it to a political analysis of the ‘business’ of 
private security.
Indeed, a central theoretical task of this dissertation has been to explicate how the 
Weberian Realist vocabulary of the state’s monopolistic relationship to authority, 
territory and coercion—and hence the political itself—has limited attempts within 
International Relations to properly theorise the political significance of private 
security. As a result, this dissertation has not only developed and applied a security 
governance theoretical framework to an analysis of private security in global politics. 
On another level, it has also engaged in a meta-theoretical critique of Realist theory’s 
state-centric interpretation of authority, territory and coercion—as well as the Realist 
binary zero-sum understanding of power—underpinning Realism’s theoretical 
inability to interpret the legitimate coercion engaged in by private security as a 
political act of security governance.
607 Gianfranco Poggi, The Development o f the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press) 1978 p.l.
293
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
1 2  Thesis Summary
Overall, this thesis set out to provide an empirical examination of the role of private 
security in global politics and to address the theoretical implications that the growth of 
private security had for International Relations theory more generally. Specifically, this 
thesis set out to answer the following research question: ‘How can we theorise the 
political significance of the global expansion of private security, and how does private 
security affect the state’s relationship to violence, in both theory and practice? The 
answer to this multi-faceted question lay in the application of a security governance 
theoretical framework capable of simultaneously deconstructing the state’s conceptual 
monopoly on security governance, and reconstructing its component parts—authority, 
territory and coercion—in such a way that allowed the political significance of private 
security to be properly articulated.
In part one of the first chapter, the significance of deconstructing the state’s conceptual 
monopoly of security governance was contextualised against a deeply ingrained—and 
as yet unresolved—claim within the IR private security literature that private security 
‘challenged’ or otherwise problematized the discipline’s Weberian definition of the state 
as monopolizing legitimate violence. Part one of the first chapter also posited that the 
challenge private security presented to Realism was grounded in the way it exposed a 
fundamental paradox within Realist theory: by arguing that a theory of politics was an 
explanation of way legitimate violence was organized, and then assuming that the state 
held a monopoly on legitimate violence, Realism’s conceptual vocabulary was literally 
unable to theorise private security in political terms. Thus, part one of the first chapter 
also set the stage for this dissertation’s security governance framework to be read as a
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direct engagement with—and critique of—Realist theory’s inability to address the 
political content of private security.
Part two of chapter one provided a succinct definition of security governance as 
comprised of three parts: first, meta-political authority located exclusively within public 
law and/or the authority of public institutions; second, the existence of an auspice 
legally entitled to hire a security implementer and make a set of rules that promote a 
particular definition of order; and third, an implementer that uses coercion or the threat 
of coercion to enforce this order within a particular territorial space. It then proceeded 
with a deconstruction of the state’s authority-coercion-territory monopoly, both with 
reference to how Realist theory interprets these concepts, as well as how the security 
governance framework used in this thesis re-interprets these concepts.
Next, part two of chapter one provided a pair of brief two-part sections on the history 
and terminology of private security. The section on history helped situate this thesis 
within a larger debate that pits the stasis and ahistoricism of the Realist idea of the 
state’s monopoly of legitimate violence against the emphasis on the changing nature of 
organized political coercion found in security governance approaches to private 
security. The second history section discussed other important theoretical differences 
between Realist historiography and histories of private security from a security 
governance perspective. Specifically, it contrasted Realism’s rationalist account of the 
elimination of mercenaries from nineteenth century European warfare and Realism’s 
teleological account of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence with a security 
governance approach that emphasised the ideationally contingent nature of both of these 
developments. This historical section concluded with a short explanation of where this 
thesis was situated within these various historical debates related to private security and 
the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence.
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The first half of the two-part discussion of the terminology of private security provided 
an overview of the various linguistic and terminological debates within the academic 
and popular literature on private security. It also explained how the language of ‘private 
police services’ and ‘private military companies’ were linguistically implicated in the 
reproduction of a state-centric understanding of security governance. The second 
section on terminology discussed the underlying reasons for choosing to use the terms 
private security and private security company. Here, it was demonstrated that these 
terms did not reference the state’s twin coercive institutions—the police and military— 
and therefore moved away from the language of the state’s monopoly of legitimate 
violence. The term ‘private security’ was also shown to be better suited to imagining 
new global/local and networked territorial configurations of security governance as well 
as new social understandings and practices of security that transcend and/or are not 
easily captured by the terms ‘military’ and ‘police’.
Part three of chapter one provides a critical review of both first-cut and second-cut 
interpretations of private security within IR. The discussion of the first-cut private 
security literature corroborates—with the use of examples from within this literature— 
the claim made in Part One that the Weberian Realist conceptual vocabulary of the 
state’s monopoly of legitimate violence had handicapped these early studies of private 
security. The discussion of the second-cut private security literature is used to highlight 
the way these studies of private security continued to reference their analysis of private 
security in terms of a binary and zero-sum relationship to the state. It also allowed the 
reader to situate this thesis as a response to a theoretical gap identified within 
contemporary studies of private security within IR.
Chapter two provided a brief and direct critique of Realist thought in IR and Sociology 
in order to demonstrate the way the first-cut private security literature’s insufficient
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attention to private security’s relationship to the state was predicated upon a larger 
silence on these questions within Realist IR and Realist sociological theory as a whole. 
Part one of chapter two focused on the writings of Kenneth Waltz, Hedley Bull and 
Hans Morgenthau—in a discussion of neo-Realist, English School, and Classical Realist 
thought respectively—to corroborate the claim that the conceptual problems related to 
the analysis of private security located in first-cut studies of private security can be 
traced back through Realist IR theory’s treatment of ‘private violence’.
Part two of the second chapter moved to the field of Realist sociology and directly 
engaged with the writings of Max Weber and his definition of the state and modem 
state. Weber’s theoretical treatment of ‘continuous operation’, ‘administrative staff, 
‘compulsory jurisdiction’ and legitimacy were discussed with reference to the 
alternative way that the security governance framework used in this thesis approached 
these concepts. This discussion also provided a qualified defence of Weber’s concept of 
‘last resort control’ and critiqued attempts made by theorists to dismiss Weber’s concept 
of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence in purely empirical terms by pointing to 
the growth of private security without directly confronting the core idea of ‘last resort 
control’ embedded within Weber’s understanding of the state’s monopoly of legitimate 
violence.
Chapter three moves beyond a critique of Realist thought to provide a positive 
application of a security governance model to the study of private security. The first of a 
two-chapter study of the operation of private security in Iraq between 2003 and 2007, 
chapter three introduces the concept of ‘security network’ as a descriptive and analytical 
tool for discussing the pluralization of auspices and implementers of security 
governance that crisscrossed Iraq during this period. Chapter three also introduces the 
terms ‘hybrid public-private security network’ and ‘hybrid private-private security
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network’ and uses a series of empirical examples to demonstrate the way security 
governance is conducted through these auspice-implementer partnerships. Next, chapter 
three demonstrated what a security governance deconstruction of the state’s monopoly 
of authority, territory and coercion looks like when applied to Iraq. It provided a 
discussion of the fragmented and networked way in which security governance was 
territorially organized in Iraq as well as a discussion of the fragmented, overlapping, 
and de-centered operation of political authority over security governance within Iraq 
during this period as well. Chapter three also provided a discussion of the de­
centralization and dispersal of security governance within the institution of the state 
itself, and illustrated how private security embedded itself into the state’s bureaucratic 
apparatus—at multiple sites or nodes—via hybrid security partnerships with the state. 
Chapter three also directly addresses the issue of the power relationship between private 
security and the state. It fulfills this dissertation’s goal of moving beyond merely 
understanding this relationship in binary and zero-sum terms through a discussion of 
‘rule at a distance’ and the dual application of a new sociology of governance power 
analysis and a neo-Foucauldian power analysis. Here, different types of observations 
regarding state techniques of rule at a distance—from both the new sociology of 
governance and neo-Foucauldian literature—are applied to two detailed case studies of 
large-scale hybrid public-private security networks.
Chapter four shifts the dissertation’s analytical focus to the operation of private security 
in Iraq at the capillary level. One the one hand, it introduces the concept of the micro­
level security network to provide a focus on—and to empirically document—the way 
that security governance within the state itself has been flattened and dispersed to a 
multiplicity of sub-state agencies that act as auspices for private security companies. By 
demonstrating the way public agencies within and above the state ‘activate’ resources
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external to the state—e.g. NGOs and PSCs—to implement public policy programs, 
chapter four also provides a rich and detailed account of rule at a distance through the 
analytical lens of the new sociology of governance. On the other hand, chapter four also 
introduces the concept of security governance operating ‘beyond state rule at a 
distance.’ Here, chapter four provides a case study of an NGO hiring private security for 
armed protection without being embedded into a hybrid security network with a public 
auspice, and explains how this constitutes an instance of security governance beyond 
state rule at a distance.
Chapter five provides a study of private security within the maritime environment. It 
returns to the concept of meta-political authority developed in chapter one and offers an 
empirical account of how the dispersal of meta-political authority away from the state 
can have significant political affects for the operation of private security and its 
relationship to the state in global politics. Specifically, chapter five focuses on two case 
studies of maritime private security companies turning to international law as an 
alternative non-state source of meta-political authority to undergird the legality of their 
security governance programs.
The first case study examines a fisheries protection security governance program run by 
a hybrid public-private security network under the auspices of Puntland State of 
Somalia and a private security company. The power dynamics between the public and 
private nodes of this networked security actor are emphasized as well as the 
entrepreneurial strategy used by the private security company to build a matrix of 
international law to legitimate this security governance program.
The second case study in chapter five provides an example of a hybrid private-private 
security network. On the one hand, the concept of security network is used to describe 
and the interactions between this hybrid security actors and its interactions with the
299
P.J. Cullen: 02 September 2009
littoral states of the Malacca Straits. On the other hand, and more radically, this case 
study demonstrates how an entrepreneurial use of international law was used to 
empower private security to engage in a security governance program within the 
territorial waters of the littoral states that contradicted the political wishes of these 
states’ governments.
Chapter six moved away from this dissertation’s focus on empirical case studies of 
hybrid security networks in order to provide a holistic overview of the broader global 
market in private security training. This chapter traced the post-WWII origins of this 
global training industry in the United States and the United Kingdom through to its 
current consolidation and transformation into a globalised private security training 
industry. Chapter six also discussed this industry’s transformation through the lens of a 
security governance perspective along a number of different trajectories. First, it 
provided an empirical analysis of the pluralization of the consumers of security training 
to institutions above the state (e.g. the UN, EU and Nato), outside the state (e.g. to 
commercial entities), and within the state (e.g. to new sub-agency state auspices) 
besides the state’s armed police and military forces. Second, it provided a discussion of 
a series of global private security companies and the transnational characteristics of 
these firms and their security training. Third, chapter six briefly discussed how private 
security was involved in a process of socially reconstructing the way we think and speak 
about security training as a field that is constituted by public and private actors instead 
of a field monopolized by the state.
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7.3 On Methodology: the Difficulty and Necessity o f  Interview-Lead Research in Private 
Security Studies
Before providing an overview of the empirical and theoretical contribution made to IR 
and the field of private security research within this dissertation, a discussion of some 
of the methodological issues regarding the nature of private security field work and the 
role played by interviews within this dissertation is in order. Overall, conducting 
original empirical research on the private security industry can be an extremely 
daunting task, and necessarily involves the researcher dealing with issues more 
typically associated with the work of an investigative journalist or (potentially) even 
that of a war correspondent.
On one level, the prospect of conducting field work within this subject—especially 
when the research is focused on the provision of armed private security services in 
warzones and other politically unstable areas—carries with it a clear, immediate and 
potentially extreme safety risk. Under these circumstances, the utility of conducting 
field visits to Iraq between 2003 and 2007—something which presented itself as a
ZAO
possibility on a number of occasions during the course of this project —needed to be 
measured against the obvious risks to personal safety. While a visit to Baghdad or 
Puntland would have provided a significant increase in the degree of access to the 
various public auspices of hybrid public-private security networks—such as CPA 
officials, Coalition military and Puntland government personnel—safety concerns (as 
well as related financial costs609) took precedent over the advantages of visits to the
608 During interviews with the heads of various private security companies in London and Washington 
DC I was invited to ‘embed’ within their operation in Iraq—staying at a secured PSC headquarters in 
Baghdad—to witness their security governance programs first hand.
609 One irony of conducting field work on private security in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 is the fact that 
the researcher would find him or herself reliant upon these very security firms for their personal safety 
while conducting the research. Moreover, since these firms are in the business of providing security for 
profit, the researcher is placed in a position of either paying a private security firm for the protection they 
provide while the field research is conducted, or not paying and thereby allowing the PSC to essentially
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field.610 Ultimately, rather than travelling to the locations involved in the case studies 
within this dissertation, the substantial number of interviews that were conducted 
during this research project took place either using telephone and email 
correspondence611 or in-person interviews conducted primarily in London and 
Washington DC.
The large number of interviews used in this dissertation brings up a series of related 
methodological issues. In general—and again in parallel with investigative 
journalism—any effort to make an original empirical contribution to the study of
fi\*yprivate security by moving beyond recycled examples of private security contracts 
necessarily required an often painstaking process of developing personal contacts. 
These contacts—with private security implementers and/or their commercial, non­
profit, or government auspices—would then need to be convinced to allow the 
researcher to conduct in-depth multiple-hour interview sessions. In many instances, 
while the author was able to meet with an executive of a private security company to
subsidize the cost of one’s field work. Both of these choices come with ethical considerations the 
researcher must be aware of.
610 On this point, to the extent that the PSC personnel providing the researcher with security are in turn 
putting themselves in harm’s way—e.g. driving the researcher back and forth between Baghdad 
International Airport and the PSC headquarter offices—the researcher conducting field work in Iraq (or in 
other dangerous places where armed security may be required) must not only be willing to risk their own 
safety, but also the safety of the security contractors that would necessarily be assigned by their private 
security company to protect them during the course of their research. This point was made to the author 
by Doug Brooks, the President of the International Peace Operations Association, during preliminary 
discussions about conducting field work in Iraq. Similar security concerns limited the possibility of field 
visits to Puntland State of Somalia, and to a lesser extent field visits to the Malacca Straits. However, in 
this latter instance, ship access during an anti-piracy escort proved the greater problem.
611 Where possible, interviews were conducted in person. However, due to the practical field constraints 
discussed above, as well as the highly itinerant nature of the private security workforce, this dissertation 
relied heavily on telephone and email correspondence as a way to interview people often located half-way 
around the world. During the course of this dissertation, email and telephone correspondence were used to 
interview people in Singapore, Baghdad, New Zealand, Nigeria, Cyprus, Washington DC, London, the 
Philippines, Australia, Israel, and Pakistan in order to reach security contractors or other interviewees as 
they moved around the world from one contract or posting to another.
612 For instance, both Peter Singer and Deborah Avant used the examples of MPRI’s work in Croatia and 
the US military’s Reserve Officer Training Corps in their work. See Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors 
p. 123-130 and Deborah Avant, Market for Force p .101-13 and p. 116-20. Moreover, this focus on MPRI 
and its work in Croatia had already been the subject of attention within the literature on private security 
for as long as seven years prior to Avant’s study. For example, see: David Shearer ‘Private Armies and 
Military Intervention’ International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 316 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 1998 p.56-62.
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discuss the private security industry or their security work on a general level, any 
attempt to make detailed case-study-relevant inquiries relating to a particular security
/ r i ' ]
contract would be rebuffed.
This is explained by a number of factors. First, there is a general problem of gaining 
access to an industry with a strong tradition of secrecy partially grounded by the fact 
that many of its members are comprised of retired military intelligence or special 
operations forces personnel that are professionally conscious of politically sensitive 
nature of their work.614 Second, gaining access to interviews is also difficult insofar 
that many within the private security industry have developed a suspicion of a media 
that they perceive as only interested in writing sensationalist (and commercially 
damaging) stories. The fact that the executives of many private security companies do 
not trust the difference between an academic interview and a media interview proved 
to be a significant research hurdle. Finally, the fact that academic interviews were 
often perceived by PSC executives in terms of a commercial liability—or a simple 
waste of valuable time without any positive incentive for the PSC to participate—was 
another considerable obstacle.615
Moreover, the problem of access is not merely a problem confined to private security 
company personnel. Many NGOs, commercial firms and government agencies are
613 For instance, even though the author interviewed Tim Spicer, the CEO of Aegis—a process that 
involved multiple last minute cancellations by Mr. Spicer for interview appointments—the substantive 
content of this interview did not include any unique information otherwise unavailable to the public. As a 
result, the utility of this interview for the case study on the Aegis-operated Reconstruction Operations 
Center was quite limited.
614 Ed Soyster relayed the fact that the decision by MPRI to grant interview requests to the media was 
considered by members of the company—some of whom had been working in this private security field 
for well over a decade without ever considering talking to the media—as a novel and potentially risky 
public relations decision. Ret. Lt. Gen. Soyster is himself a retired head of the United States Defense 
Intelligence Agency. Interview with Ed Soyster, Vice President, Military Professional Resources 
Incorporated. Washington DC 18/07/00.
615 This problem is compounded when attempting to discuss on-going security contracts. For instance, the 
author was able to telephone Erinys management stationed in Iraq during the OPF contract only to have 
them express surprise that the author was able to get access to that telephone number and politely explain 
that they would not discuss the contract. Erinys eventually granted me interview access after the contract 
was completed.
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unwilling to discuss their relationship to private security due to these organization’s 
sensitivities to public perceptions of dealings with ‘mercenary’ private security 
companies. For instance, efforts made by others to get access to the amount of money 
spent on private security by the United Kingdom’s FCO in Iraq between 2003 and 
2006 were ultimately only successful with the use of a Freedom of Information Act 
request.616 Occasionally, security issues would also limit an individual’s willingness to 
grant interview access. In one example, the author made successful email contact with 
the head of the Iraqi NGO IMCO in an effort to widen the base of sources used within 
the IMCO case study, only to have the prospective interview cease contact with the 
author when it became apparent that the queries centred on the content of IMCO 
security procedures.
Ultimately, because of these research difficulties intrinsic to any effort in making an 
original empirical contribution to the study of private security, once a well-placed 
interviewee granted the author in-depth interview access, this became a crucial source 
of data for that particular case study. Occasionally, gaining access to one individual 
created the possibility for multiple interviewees. The IMMAP and IMCO case studies, 
for instance, were able to draw upon multiple interview sources from various nodes 
within these hybrid security networks. Interviews from the government auspice (e.g. 
Dennis Hadrick from the WRA); the NGO implementing partner (e.g. Joe Donahue 
from IMMAP); and the private security implementer (e.g. Dan Bowen from the PSC 
Ronco) all mutually reinforced one another and provided a richer discussion of the 
security governance that took place within these case studies. In other instances— 
including the IWPR and Puntland case studies—sole interviews with a well-placed 
individual (e.g. the IWPR Iraq Program Director) or multiple interviews from a single
616 David Isenberg, Shadow Force p. 32.
617 Since IMCO personnel had received death threats from anti-Coalition forces, the reasons for the 
hesitancy of this individual to discuss IMCO security procedures were self-evident.
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node within a security network (i.e. Hart Security personnel involved in the Puntland 
contract) provided much of empirical information from the case study.
Consistent efforts at triangulation were made in order to verify and cross-reference the 
claims made during these interviews with the use of third party interviewees familiar 
with a particular case study (e.g. the Director of the IMB for the Puntland case) as well 
as through the use of relevant newspaper and magazine articles or government
f% 1 Rreports. These were referenced throughout the various case studies. At the same 
time, in an effort to gain a more candid interview, efforts were made to reach security 
contractors that had worked on a particular security contract but that had since left the 
private security company under discussion within a particular case study.619 Problems 
associated with the inability to widen the net of interviews—such as the effect of the 
inability to reach Puntland officials to relate their interpretation of their interactions 
with the PSC Hart—were also mitigated by orienting the analytical focus of a case
f / y ( \
study towards a particular issue unlikely to be affected by interviewee bias.
This thesis also made use of a small number of confidential interviews. However, it is 
not unique in doing so, and numerous studies of private security have relied upon 
confidential interviews in order to include important information that would have not
£91 • «otherwise been available. Overall, while there are potential pitfalls with interview- 
lead case-study research that the scholar must be aware of, it is a necessary element of 
an effort to make an original empirical contribution to the study of private security.
618 The author’s extensive network of personal contacts also allowed the possibility to cross-reference the 
identity of the actual interviewees, and confirm their participation in the particular security governance 
programs being discussed.
619 For example, both Robert Parr of Hart Security and Stephen Weatherford of GDMA had been 
interviewed after having left their positions at the private security companies involved in these case 
studies.
620 For example, without making any claim regarding the technical legal validity of the PSC Hart’s 
attempts to use international law as a source of meta-political authority for this Puntland security 
program—a subject where a clear potential for interviewee bias exists—this case study merely 
emphasized the fact that the PSC engaged in this entrepreneurial use of international law in the first place, 
and then explained the theoretical significance of this fact from a security governance perspective.
621 For example, see Deborah Avant, confidential correspondence cited in footnote 136, p.208.
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7.4 Empirical and Theoretical Contributions
Both the theoretical and the empirical contribution of this thesis have been touched 
upon in the first three sections of this conclusion. What follows is a concise summary 
of the primary empirical and theoretical contributions of this study for IR in general, 
and security governance studies and private security studies more specifically. By 
intentionally eschewing case study material that had been the focus of other studies of 
private security, this thesis has made a significant empirical contribution to the private 
security literature. Chapter five provided two original case studies involving private 
security implementing security governance programs within the maritime 
environment. While the role of private security in providing anti-piracy escorts has 
grown considerably in the last twelve months, empirical research within the subfield 
of maritime private security studies is still limited. The case study work on the 
Puntland-Hart EEZ fisheries program and the GDMA and BARS anti-piracy work in 
the Malacca Straits therefore helps to add empirical depth to this under-researched 
area.
Chapter four provided three original case studies of hybrid security networks 
involving the use of NGOs, governmental donors and private security. While there is a 
great deal of interest—and debate within the NGO community—regarding the use of 
armed security by NGOs and other humanitarian actors, the amount of detailed 
information on this subject still remains very limited. The case studies in chapter four 
not only provide insights into the use of armed private security by NGOs in Iraq; they 
also provide empirical insight into the way the auspices of the UNDP, the United 
State’s DoS and the United Kingdom’s DfID are connected (or relatively 
unconnected) to this process.
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Chapter three provides a rich empirical account of the various types of auspices—both 
public and private—that hired private security companies in Iraq between 2003 and 
2007. In combination with the two large case studies on the OPF and ROC presented 
in this chapter, a significant empirical contribution was made to the empirical map of 
the operation of private security in Iraq during this period. Chapter six also made a 
number of salient empirical contributions to the study of private security. First and 
foremost, it provided an account of the pluralisation of public and private customers of 
security training, and also made an original contribution to our understanding of the 
origins, growth and transformation of the domestic US market in tactical security 
training.
The theoretical contribution of this thesis is rooted in its dual critical engagement with 
Realist thought and in its positive application of a security governance theoretical 
framework to the study of private security. This thesis demonstrated that in order to 
theorise the political significance of private security in global politics, it was first 
necessary to identify and then deconstruct the state-centric way IR theory—and 
Realist IR and Weberian sociological theory specifically—had defined the political 
exclusively in terms of what the state does. This theoretical deconstruction of the 
state’s monopoly of security governance—predicated upon a dissection of a Realist 
understanding of authority, territory, coercion and power—then laid the groundwork 
for a re-articulation of the way each of these concepts would be understood with 
reference to the political content of private security within a security governance 
framework.
In chapter one and chapter two, this process involved a unique, direct engagement 
with—and critique of—the Weberian understanding of each of these terms and an 
explanation of how and why the operation of private security is rendered apolitical
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within a Weberian theoretical vocabulary. Special emphasis was placed on the binary 
and zero-sum understanding of power within Realist thought. It was demonstrated that 
a binary and zero-sum power model a) unhelpfully emptied private security of its 
political content; b) created a false choice whereby the state always ‘lost’ or ‘gained’ 
power when interacting with private security; and c) was blind to other changes in the 
modality of security governance.
In order to correct these problems, this thesis deployed two alternative approaches to 
power analysis in chapter three: a new sociology of governance power model that 
focuses on the contradictory power effects of security networks, and a neo- 
Foucauldian power model that focuses on actor identities and techniques of 
governance left invisible in binary and zero-sum studies of power. Chapter four 
introduced the concept of micro-level security networks and the political significance 
of security governance at the capillary level, and also introduced the concept of 
security governance ‘beyond rule at a distance.’ Chapter five illustrated the 
significance of a) maintaining a legal-formal understanding of meta-political authority 
while b) conceptually de-linking meta-political authority from the Realist idea of the 
state monopolising it. Finally, chapter six demonstrated the way new understandings 
of security—such as the process of subsidiarity and neo-liberal techniques of 
responsibilising actors for their own security—were fundamentally altering the way 
security training was organized, imagined, and implemented across the public-private 
and police-military spectrum.
7.5 Further Developments
The study of private security is the study of a moving target, both literally and 
figuratively. While this latter point is true of many subjects in the social sciences, few
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have changed as quickly and as dramatically as private security during the last few 
years. At the same time, the theoretical sophistication of the investigation of private 
security within IR has also grown dramatically in recent years. Importantly, much of 
this sophistication is the result of cross-disciplinary studies involving insights taken 
from the fields of economics, criminology, sociology, and civil-military relations 
theory. This is clearly not a new development; indeed, the micro-economic 
foundations of neo-Realist theory are commonly understood within IR. However, the 
role of cross-disciplinary investigations in pushing the study of private security 
forward within IR does indicate the importance of a multi-disciplinary approach.
With respect to future studies of private security, this thesis touches on two different 
and equally important avenues for future research. First, while not explicitly addressed 
within this thesis, the security governance framework developed here—and its 
unbundling of the state’s monopoly of authority, territory, and coercion—have clear 
and immediate ramifications for studies of globalization. This intersection between 
private security, security governance, and globalization theory more broadly will be an 
important element of the study of private security in the coming years. Second, the 
continued application of a neo-Foucauldian approach—and other broadly 
constructivist or ideational approaches—to the study of private security will be a 
second important avenue of research on private security over the next few years. The 
security governance framework developed within this thesis is well situated to make a 
significant contribution along both of these theoretical avenues.
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